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## India -Pakistan; the Process of Conflict Resolution

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### **Abstract:**

*Indeed Asia's ugliest unsolved problem has been the constant bad relation between India and Pakistan instead of devoting all their resources to the economic development both countries have spent millions of rupees on defence against each other. If they would have acted together, it could have made a very valuable contribution to the maintaining of international peace. But because of their perennial dispute, they have been pushed into an antagonism that threatens the peace and prosperity of whole south Asia and in turn constitutes a grave menace to international peace and security the most important area of crises between India and Pakistan had indeed been Kashmir question for Pakistan Kashmir constitutes its jugular vein and for India Kashmir is the core of Indian nationalism. Despite their hostile relations certain periods in India Pakistan relations witnessed deep engagement. The present paper entitled "India Pakistan the Process of Conflict Resolution" Is designed to examine the process of conflict resolution in light of Kashmir conflict and its long term consequences.*

### **1. Introduction**

The emergence of India and Pakistan with sovereign status 65 years back opened a Pandora's Box of issues rooted in the colonial legacy as well as historical acrimony. The region is often referred to as high risk conflict zone owing to history of tense relations border clashes, limited or large scale wars between these two neighbours. Indo-Pak difference depict several dimensions of historical enmity ranging from territorial dispute to water issues to security paranoia, i.e. demarcation of maritime boundary, Sir Creek Baglihar Dam, Siachin glacier, Wullar Barrage, threat perception between two armed forces, arms proliferation so on and so forth. Yet the historical orientation of their difference converge on a single ground of conflict Kashmir, worse, the relations, states fought four major wars (1948, 1965, 1971, 1999) out of which three had their origin in the Kashmir dispute (1948, 1965, 1999) Hence, this problem is the core of difference and any hope for peace and cooperation in south Asia lies in resolution of this issue. Despite various efforts, for instance, UN resolution (1848-1949) Tashkent Agreement (1966) Shimla accord (1972) Lahore declaration (1999) Agra Summit (2001) joint statement in the work of 12<sup>th</sup> SAARC Summit 2004. The two states failed to resolve their differences amicably.<sup>1</sup> The ongoing composite dialogue between Indian and Pakistan brings hopes to the region, on 17-19 January 2004, the two neighbours took peace initiatives in the backdrop of 12<sup>th</sup> SAARC summit 4-6 January held in Islamabad. President Musharaf outlined a four point strategy as the basis for dialogue with India

India also moved forward with diplomatic and economic proposals. The two countries are trying to improve their relations through diplomatic moves and confidence building measures. Renewed sports links the resumption of air and railway services as well as establishing bus routes to benefit the two peoples across the borders are the landmark achievements. A ceasefire along the line of control and on the Siachin glacier in Kashmir was agreed between Indian and Pakistan in November 2003 subsequent annual meetings under the auspices of SAARC also provided opportunities for a composite dialogue between the two countries as their bilateral difference gravely affected the activation and function of the regional organization. Above all the opening up of five bus routes on the line of control (Loc) on 7 November 2005 in the wake of the devastating earthquake that hit Pakistan on 8<sup>th</sup> October 2005 is one of the mile stone in the Indo-Pakistan relations.<sup>2</sup> Throughout the post two years of the dialogue it is imperative to note that the confidence building measures were taken under two frameworks, Tract I and tract II simultaneously and reciprocally and the people of two sides are getting benefits of mutual cooperation in the political, social and economic spheres. The major challenge remains how

<sup>1</sup> Maria saifuddin effendi, Pakistan india peace process, summits in focus(1999-2005) p 66

<sup>2</sup> Ibid p77,

long this process of diplomatic move will last and how would it contribute to creating a positive and conducive environment for the discussion, management and finally resolution of the Pakistan India conflict.<sup>3</sup>

## 2. Kashmir in the UN

On 1 January 1948, the Indian representative to the UN, P P Pilli brought to the notice of security council under Article 35 of UN Charter, a situation in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the continuance of which was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council adopted resolution, establishing the united nation commission in India and Pakistan (UNCIP). Its established function was to investigate the facts that give rise to Kashmir dispute, and to exercise any mediatory influence likely to smooth away difficulties, to carry out directions given by the security council, and to report on the progress executing the advice and directions of the security council. The Security Council passed resolution 47 in April 1948 before the UNCIP. Could act on its mandate. Resolution 47 increased the number of UNCIP member and suggested additional measures, including the use of observers. In July 1949 the first Kashmir war came to an end with the Karachi agreement which created a ceasefire line. Resolution 47 still remains the Security Council's outlined structure for a recommended permanent resolution. After further unsuccessfully attempts of mediation. The UN terminated UNCIP in favour of authorizing a UN representative to conduct negotiations. A number of UN representatives attempted to mediate a permanent resolution and enforce the plebiscite until 1958, but were unsuccessful.<sup>4</sup>

## 3. "Karachi Agreement 1949"

The Karachi agreement signed by India and Pakistan on 27<sup>th</sup> of July 1949 specified that UNCIP would station observers where it deemed necessary, and that the ceasefire line would be verified mutually on the ground by the local commanders on each side with the assistance of UN military observer. Disagreement was to be referred to the UNCIP military observer whose decision would be final.

1. Honorable Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani minister without portfolio, Government of Pakistan.
2. Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, the president of Azad Kashmir.
3. Choudry Ghulam Abbas. Head of all Jammu and Kashmir Muslim conference<sup>5</sup>.

The UNCIP submitted three interim reports, in the third interim report it suggested that as the military situation had changed, the task of solving the entire issue be entrusted to one person who would act as a mediator instead of a commission.<sup>6</sup> On the recommendations of the commission the Security Council appointed its president. General MC Naughton as mediator. He forwarded various proposals to India and Pakistan, which could not make a breakthrough and on 12 April, 1950 the security council appointed Sir Owen Dixon of Australia to implement MC Naughton's proposal for the demilitarization of state, but he too failed, on 15 September 1950, Dixon submitted his report, suggests the partition of Kashmir rather than holding an overall plebiscite<sup>7</sup>. Dixon's proposal were not acceptable to both Indian and Pakistan. The discussion on Kashmir issue was once again resumed in the security council in 21 February 1951 with the submission of joint draft resolution by UK and US presenting the draft resolution Gladwyn Jebb of the UK submitted that no reference to the wishes of Kashmir regarding the future accession of that state made otherwise than under the auspices and with the full consent of the UN can be regarded as constituting a settlement acceptable to this council.<sup>8</sup> This Anglo American reaction was the result of India's policy of going ahead with a constituent Assembly in Kashmir. Another revised draft resolution was introduced after hearing the views of Indian and Pakistani representatives. Pakistan agreed to accept the resolution while Nehru considered it as "extraordinary objectionable" again at the 542 meeting of security council, Frank P- Graham, senator from north Carolina, US was appointed UN representative for India and Pakistan. He submitted five reports and suggested direct negotiation between India and Pakistan<sup>9</sup>.

## 4. Tashkent Agreement

Again, efforts were made to improve the relations, when general Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru met in Delhi in September 1957. While Kashmir stayed deadlocked, good progress was made on another vital issue. The division of the waters of the Indus and its tributaries. The Indus water treaty was signed between the two nations in 1960. With the mediation of World Bank, whereby the waters of three eastern rivers Ravi Sutlej and Beas were awarded to India-Pakistan was allocated water from the western rivers Indus Jhelum and Chenab.<sup>10</sup> The treaty also allowed Pakistan to construct a system of replacement canals to retain water from the western rivers into these areas in the West Pakistan. Which had previously depended for their irrigation supplies on water from the eastern river the 'Indus water treaty' was seen as a very significant developed between the two nations since the war in 1947. As a result hopes and expectations were raised that the two nations would be able to find a peaceful settlement of all the other disputes

<sup>3</sup> Ibid p-7-8,

<sup>4</sup> Neal D Gidvani, the peaceful resolution of Kashmir, A united nation led effort for successful international mediation and a permanent resolution to indo pak conflict, vol 18 p-724.

<sup>5</sup> K R Gupta, India Pakistan relations with special reference to Kashmir, Atlantic publishers and distributors, New Delhi 2003 p-887.

<sup>6</sup> S S Bindra, Indo pak relations tashkent to shimla agreement, p-24

<sup>7</sup> Sisir Gupta, Kashmir a study in India Pakistan relations, Asia publishing house Bombay 1966 p-220-221.

<sup>8</sup> S S Bindra, Indo pak relations, tashkent to shimla agreement p-24

<sup>9</sup> Ibid p -25.

<sup>10</sup> For detailed account of treaty See Sisir Gupta, 'Indus water treaty, Foreign Affairs Report, December 1960.

including the contentious issues of Kashmir existing between two countries. The agreement regarding Indus water treaty was itself an event of great significance as it put one of the two most serious obstacles to Indo-Pak amity put off away. However, the countries could not find any such settlement on the Kashmir issue.

Throughout 1960's the problem of Kashmir was raised on several occasions in the United Nations Security Council but no progress was made towards any resolution. In the context of Sino-Indo war in 1962, India came under pressure from the West especially US and UK on because of various reasons to resume dialogue with Pakistan. As a result delegation headed by Swarn Singh and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto from India and Pakistan respectively, met six times in Pakistan and in India, between 27 December 1962 to 16 May 1963. This failure was partly responsible for the 1965 war between the two states. According to some various credible sources, it is said that India during these talks, India offered Pakistan 3500 square kilometres of territory along the ceasefire line starting from near Zoji-La in the north to near Jhangar in the south which Pakistan rejected<sup>11</sup>. In the year 1964 Kashmir was again discussed in the UNSC United Nations Security Council however, no resolution could be passed because of Soviet Veto.<sup>12</sup>

Following the disappearance of the holy relic in Hazratbal in Srinagar, Jawaharlal Nehru's death and India's economic problems, Pakistan's military edge over India after its 1954 agreement with United States of America and India's increasing attempts to integrate into its fold. Pakistan made plans for "operation Gibraltar" to do what they could not do in 1947. With hope that this time the people of the state would raise against the India state. However, the things went opposite as there was no such support available. Soon the situation worsened as the Indian forces crossed the international border and retaliation continued from both sides, which ultimately led to second full fledged military battle between the two nations<sup>13</sup>. India and Pakistan waged a war in August, September 1965. In August 1965, Pakistan sent a number of so called freedom fighters to the Indian side of Kashmir and they were asked to investigate the people of Kashmir against India. While Kashmiris were indulging in creating trouble, the Pakistan gave extended full support to them. This was for the first time in the history of two countries since their independence in 1947. That air forces from both sides were engaged in a full scale combat. The war also witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II. Regarding the 1965 war between Indian and Pakistan most of the war commentators across the world held the view that the war ended in a sort of draw. Dennis Kux in his book "India and United States estranged democracies" said that "although both sides lost heavily in men and material, and neither gained a decisive, military advantage. New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated"<sup>14</sup>. The Secretary General U-Thant also carried out goodwill mission to India and Pakistan. But the visit did not bring out any worthwhile results. He requested both India and Pakistan to stop fighting without imposing any conditions on each other. India's prime minister Lal-Bahadur Shastri accepted unconditional ceasefire, but Pakistan president Ayub Khan put some pre-conditions. The Secretary General of the UN again appealed to Pakistan as well as India for ordering their respective armed forces for a cease fire. After the war, the USSR took the initiative and convened a meeting of the heads of the two states at Tashkent.<sup>15</sup>

The Tashkent declaration signed in January 1966 was an effort to solve the Indo-Pak problems that came out of the August-September 1965 war. The conference at Tashkent was organised on the initiative of the Soviet Premier Kosygin. He invited president Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri to meet in the Soviet Union for diffusing the tension between India and Pakistan. On 4 September 1965 Kosygin wrote identical letters to India and Pakistan. Acting in the spirit of the UN Charter and the Bandung principles, the letter stated. The parties should enter into the negotiations of the peaceful settlements of the differences have arisen between them. President Ayub Khan did not want to accept. The Kosygin offer to mediation in the context of the post Soviet sympathy with India. On the other hand, Prime Minister Shastri immediately accepted the offer. An examination of the pre-Tashkent context is quite interesting. The Sino-Pak axis had been created and this forced the USSR to change her attitude towards Pakistan and she decided to play the role of peace maker. It may be noted here that Pakistan felt jealous of Indo-Soviet relationship Pakistan wanted USSR to adopt neutral policy on Kashmir. Pakistan felt that Kashmir issue could not be easily solved due to Moscow's open support to India on this aspect. Pakistan wanted to normalize relations with USSR and hence president Ayub visited Moscow in the first week of April 1965 and gave an impression to the world that by giving dependence on the US she had not become the of China. Pakistan also wanted to destroy India's relationship with USSR the Dawn wrote in an editorial that it was an 'intimate personal touch which alone can create friendship really' meaningful and rewarding<sup>16</sup>. The main point was that both side forces would withdraw to the positions they had before hostilities began (dated 5 August) other practical points include repatriation of prisoners of war and resumption of diplomatic relations. More generally, the declaration committed both sides to settle their disputes through peaceful means and to non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, and to promote the development of friendly relations between the two countries. Finally it was agreed that the bi-lateral talks would be continued.<sup>17</sup> The Tashkent declaration did not deal with the Kashmir dispute other than to note its existence. In effect it suggested that the issue should be put into cold storage while other more urgent problems were being solved.

<sup>11</sup> Verghese Kiothara., crafting peace in Kashmir, through a realistic lens, New Delhi, p-37.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, p-38.

<sup>13</sup> G W Choudry , Pakistan's relations with India, Meerut New Delhi 1971, p-242.

<sup>14</sup> Dr S S Bindra Indo Pak relations , Tashkent to Shimla agreement , New Delhi p-42.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid p-44.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid p-45.

<sup>17</sup> Iffat Malik , Kashmir Ethnic conflict international dispute., p-123.

Prisoners of war were repatriated and by 25 February 1966 the forces of India and Pakistan had withdrawn to their pre 5 August positions.<sup>18</sup>

### 5. Shimla-Agreement

After signing of Tashkent declaration very little attempt was made by either side to permanently resolve the problem of Jammu and Kashmir. The year 1971 proved a landmark in relations of the two countries because it is in this year dismemberment of Pakistan took place, a new country Bangladesh emerged on the world map and both countries were once again involved in a bloody war initially the 1971 Indo-Pak war was sparked off by the Bangladesh liberation movement which was result of the conflict between the traditionally dominant west Pakistan is and the majority east Pakistani. The Bangladesh liberation war commenced after the 1970 Pakistani election, in which east Pakistani Awami league won 167 of 169 seats in East Pakistan and secured a simple majority in the 313 seats lower house of the Majlis-e-shoora (Parliament of Pakistan) Awami league leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman presented the six points to the president of Pakistan and claimed a right to form the govt. in the country. After the leader of the Pakistan people's party refused to yield the premiership of Pakistan to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the president of Pakistan. General Yahya Khan called the military, dominated by West Pakistanis to suppress the movement resulting in a mass arrest of dissidents and the political un-rest in the whole country. After several days of strikes and non-cooperation movements by the Awami league, the Pakistan military cracked down on Dhaka on the night of March 25, 1971. The Awami league was banned and many members fled into exile in India. Shiekh Mujibur Rehman was arrested and taken to the East Pakistan<sup>19</sup>. At the same time, on 30 January 1971 on Indian Airline (the Ganga) flying from Srinagar to Jammu was hijacked and forced to land at Lahore, the hijackers demanded India to release some thirty six prisoners belonging to the group called the Kashmir Nation liberation front. The hostages were returned to India the next day, but the hijackers destroyed the aeroplane before Pakistan could comply with Indian demand that it too be handed back. India accused the Pakistani govt. of assisting the hijackers, on 4 February, it banned the over flight of all Pakistani aircraft (civil and military) across the Indian Territory.<sup>20</sup> New Delhi sent its forces in East Pakistan to openly assist the Mukti-Bahini. Pakistan responded by invading India from the west on 3 December 1971, and later launched attacks into Indian Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian's countered by attacking West Pakistan in Sindh and North Punjab, and by also crossing ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir. The war did do go well for Pakistan, especially in the Eastern wing were it faced strong local opposition as well as supply and communication problems (increased by Indian over flight ban). On 17, December, Pakistani forces in Dhaka surrendered un-conditionally to Indian forces, ending the third Indo-Pak war after just fourteen days. Although Indo-Pak has been fought largely outside Jammu and Kashmir, its consequences aside from the obvious emergence of Bangladesh were critically left in that state. East Pakistan become an independent nation as Bangladesh, the world's third most populous Muslim state Shiekh Mujibur Rahman was released from a West Pakistani jail to Dhaka capital of Bangladesh on January 10, 1972<sup>21</sup>. A number of factors contributed to the disintegration of Pakistan but the people of what remained Pakistan developed on impression that it was India who uncovered the destruction of Pakistan in the hope of marginalizing the later politically, economically and militarily. It was felt that without material and moral support of India, Bangladesh wouldn't have seen the light of the day as on independent polity<sup>22</sup>. Post Bangladesh period added a new causes of bitterness in the relationship between the two countries. Pakistan had suffered a new sense of humiliation as a result of this war and resulted out dismemberment. But because of the objective pressure like large number of prisoners of war, it had to seek some rapprochement with India; India also in turn was keen to build the relationship. It was in their context the conference was held in June 1972 between two prime ministers Mr's Indira Gandhi and president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at Shimla. They signed an agreement which came to known as Shimla agreement, by which India would return all Pakistani personnels (over 90,000) and captured territory in the West, and the two countries would settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations they also agreed that the two countries will put on end to conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent, so that both countries may hence forth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people. the compromise that was reached between the two heads of states was that the ceasefire line established by united nation (UN) in 1948 in Jammu and Kashmir territory will be converted into line of control (LOC which shall be respected by both sides without prejudice, recognizing the position of the other side. This agreement become the basis for the renewal of the official relations between the two countries both at political and economic levels, thus ending the requirement of an intervening role for either the United Nations or any other outside power including United States, of America.<sup>23</sup> Both govt's. Agreed that their respective heads meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that in the meanwhile the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss the future modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and the normalization of relations, including the question of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, final settlement regarding Jammu and Kashmir and resumption of diplomatic relations. However, the agreement never resulted in a structured and a sustainable peace process and none of the agreement lasted long enough for a systematic and in depth discourse and discussion,

<sup>18</sup> AlastairLamb, Kashmir A disputed legacy , 1846-1990 p-271.

<sup>19</sup> Mohmmad Ayoub,(1971), Bangladesh A Struggle for Nationhood,Vikas Publishing House New Delhi, pp1-8.

<sup>20</sup> Alaster Lamb Kashmir, A Disputed Legacy, 1946-1990 p-228.

<sup>21</sup> Ifat Malik Kahmir Ethnic conflict international Dispute p-137.

<sup>22</sup> S S Bindran n 23 p-63

<sup>23</sup> Mohmmad Ayoub(1925) India Pakistan and Bangladesh , New Delhi, p-92.



therefore most of the issue between and discussion, therefore, most of the issue between two countries are still unsolved.<sup>24</sup> After signing of Simla agreement to some extent relations between the two countries improved. The tension considerably relaxed but it did not last for long. India exploded on underground nuclear device in 1974. Pakistan strongly protested over the Indian nuclear explosion Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said that the India's action dynamited and shattered NPT. He further said that Pakistan would not surrender its right and claims of self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and have intension to make nuclear bomb even if we have to eat grass.<sup>25</sup> Due to conventional disparity with India, Pakistan has become more dependent on nuclear option.

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan turned Pakistan into a frontline state. Pakistan used the Soviet action as a pretext to strengthen her position and also to renew its relation with the United states. The USA came forward with a 3.2 million dollar package of economic and military aid for Pakistan. These factors changed security perception in India. In the centre of this emerging strategic network, Indo-Pakistani relations have been adversely effected. It was around this time that governments were replaced both within India by democratic means and within Pakistan through an army coup<sup>26</sup>

## 6. Lahore Declaration (1999)

The nuclear tests deeply affected bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. The period following the tests. Only modest attempts were made to initiate a meaningful dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad. Later attempts to establish confidence building and security mechanism have been shattered by the military escalation of the conflict in the region of Kargil in Kashmir. The first meeting after the tests between India and Pakistani heads of state took place on the sidelines of the regional summit in July 1998 in Colombo without producing any result. Prime Minister Sharif and Vajpayee met again during the UN General Assembly in New York in September 1998. In a joint statement both sides at that time "reaffirmed their common belief that an environment of durable peace and security was in the supreme interest of both India and Pakistan and of region as a whole" they expressed "their determination to renew and reinvigorate efforts to secure such an environment". The meeting marked the beginning of slow moving process to improve the direct dialogue between both sides. In the middle of October 1998, both sides on the level of foreign secretaries met for three days of talks on confidence building measures (CMB's) and on the crisis in Kashmir. Even if no progress on the substance was made during this meeting, at least it was agreed to continue the dialogue and to work, towards a set of a CBMs.<sup>27</sup> Besides several civil society groups engaged in initiating and sustaining non-official rendezvous between the citizens of both countries, some of widely known groups that have invested great efforts to promote dialogue and peace in the region are India Pakistan friendship society established in 1987, Chaired by Inder Kumar Gujral, Neemrana dialogue. The first meeting of the group took place at the Neemrana fort in Rajasthan it comprises former diplomat, former military personals, media persons. NGO workers, educators and academics from the two countries. The co-chair of the meetings is M.K. Rasgotra and Niaz Naik. In the initial years the Neemrana group decided that there were certain core issues that should be discussed in every meeting. These include Kashmir conflict, economic relations, the conventional arms race, nuclear proliferation and CBM's. Other issues that the group regularly discusses include cultural exchange, easing of travel restrictions, media and industrial cooperation and trade. In 1995 an interesting dimension was added to the work of Neemrana. The group decided to involve, some of its meeting, specialists from the two sides, for instance, professionals with background in business, in trade and in science and technology were invited to attend some of the dialogue and to meet with their counter parts from across the border. The value of a group such as this lies in the refined analysis and advice that it gave to the two governments, thereby emerging as a source for useful ideas and options and as a tool for communication between the governments.<sup>28</sup> The Balusa group is another significant track two initiative comprising leading opinion makers from Pakistan, India and the USA it is Chaired by Shirin Tahir Kheli who is founding director of South Asia programme of foreign policy institute, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC. In June 2001 this group made some significant recommendations to enhance the relations between the two countries. the Balusa group is primarily known for its efforts to build a partnership between India and Pakistan on trade in electricity. Another significant track two group is the India Pakistan soldier's initiative for peace, comprising retired armed forces personal from two countries. Formed in 1999 by the Pakistani peace coalition, the initiative began with the visit of a group of retired Pakistani officers to India in January 2000 followed by the visit retired Indian officers in March 2001. The delegation has communicated with the political and military leadership and diverse civil society groups in the two countries. What is unique about this initiative is that, in addition to impacting the overall relationship, it seeks to build a much needed dialogue and understanding between the two militaries. Another example has been the nuclear risk reduction talks led by the Delhi policy group and the Islamabad policy research institute. The talks seek to develop 'a shared and agreed lexicon' on nuclear concepts such a 'minimum nuclear deterrence and prepare the ground for bi-lateral negotiation between the two governments'. Apart from above mentioned initiatives of mutual cooperation from civil society groups, there has been numerous student exchange and cultural exchange programmes along with granting medical treatment in the best Indian hospitals to many Pakistani patients have together contributed to general goodwill between the people of both countries. The most notable attempt to improve the bilateral dialogue on security issue was made on February 20, 21, 1991 when Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee used the opening of the first direct bus line between India and Pakistan to visit Lahore in

<sup>24</sup> See <http://www.IPCS.org>

<sup>25</sup> Jawinder Kumar, (1989) Irritants in indo pak relations Deep and Deep publications, New Delhip-101.

<sup>26</sup> Rochana Mitra "India Pakistan diplomatic relations" An overview, Detante Vol 1 No 1 May -June 1990.

<sup>27</sup> Oliver Meier, Involving india and Pakistan, Nuclear arms control and non proliferation and after nuclear tests, Berlin information center for transatlantic security (BITS)p-12

<sup>28</sup> Track Two Diplomacy, Possibilities and chellanges, p-41.

Pakistan. The outcome of two day Summit seemed to show a willingness to continue the bilateral dialogue. In addition measures to reduce the risk of escalation of military crises between the two countries were taken. Prime Minister Sharif and Vajpayee agreed on the "Lahore declaration" in this document, both governments declare that their intention to "refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs" to "intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda" and to "take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict."<sup>29</sup>

A memorandum of understanding, signed by both foreign secretaries, details some of their general intentions. It contains the intention of both countries to start "bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building on the nuclear and conventional field aimed at avoidance of conflict" towards this end India and Pakistan agreed to negotiate an agreement on early notification on ballistic missile flight tests to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and improved the information exchange on such matters. India and Pakistan also announced their intention to start talks on an agreement on prevention of incidents on sea. Besides establishing a regular review mechanism for CBM's. Both countries "announced bilateral consultation on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora"<sup>30</sup>. Lahore declaration was assurance to the world community that the South Asia nuclearization achieved by two responsible nations of the region, Indian and Pakistan, would never fall victim to any strategic miscalculation of the two leaderships. The declaration along with memorandum of understanding and joint statement emphasised the bilateral initiatives and efforts of India and Pakistan to discuss and resolve their conflicts in future. Lahore Summit assumed greater importance as it had regional and international dimensions. It was the first ever meeting between the leaders of two countries after Shimla Agreement, July 1972 and it was first bilateral Summit held post-Nuclearization. The two countries reiterated their pledge to resolve the Kashmir issue through peaceful measures. However, New Delhi's stance remained that the Pakistan India relationship should not be held hostage to one issue. Pakistan's option on the other hand, was that whatever small gains were made in other areas in terms of normalization these were neither significant nor may be permanent unless and until the core issue of Kashmir is solved. The Lahore Summit would have been one of the greatest achievements throughout the history of peace process between India and Pakistan since 1947. But in a same year 1999 India and Pakistan fought their fourth war" in Kargil that brought large scale violence in the region ever since 1971. The crises were managed with the involvement of the US under the Washington Accord, 4 July, 1999. Pakistan agreed to withdraw from Kargil<sup>31</sup>. Only three months later, on May 26, 1999 hopes that the meeting in Lahore had marked the beginning of a process of confidence and security building were shattered when India launched an air and ground campaign to evict intruders from territory on its side of the line of control (LoC) in Kashmir. It soon becomes clear that from February to April. Islamic armed forces had secretly crossed the LOC in Kashmir and seized territory that had been vacated by the Indian army during winter. India claimed that the regular Pakistan armed forces were part of the occupying force. While the Pakistani government insists that it was lending only moral support to Kashmiri "Freedom fighters".

The resulting military conflict made clear. How big the potential for escalation between the two countries is in the absence of stable govt. in Delhi and Islamabad, threats of general war were quickly exchanged. Estimates of casualties were in hundreds. Even if neither side openly contemplated the threat or use of nuclear weapons the conflict showed that such restraint could be lost under conditions of an all out conventional war. On July 4 Pakistan prime minister Sharif and US president Clinton issued a joint statement, in which Pakistan pledged that "concrete step will be taken for restoration of line of control" According to Pakistan agreement "called on" the freedom fighters in Kashmir to leave territory on Indian's side of Loc. The conflict in the Kargil region reinforced calls for permanent dialogue between Indian and Pakistan on nuclear weapons issues. Whether this aim can be achieved, will depend to a large degree on the domestic climate, Both Prime Minister Sharif and Vajpayee, were criticized by hard liners in their respective countries for the Lahore Summit<sup>32</sup>

## 7. Agra Summit 2001

India and Pakistan experienced the worst state of their relations after the Kargil Flare up. The Kargil war as it is called as second such military operation that Indian army had carried forward on her own sail. The first was the operation blue star in June 1984 against the Sikh terrorists being holed up in Golden temple of Amritsar, but air forces were not used in this operation. The Kargil operation as the biggest such inland military operation that the Indian army have even undertaken being backed by air forces. The operation code named operation Vijay began on May 26, 1999 and continued until July 11, 1999. The war confined to Indian Territory. The Kargil war ended with Pakistan failing to secure her objective and under the US pressure besides the pressure of G8 countries that were assembled at Cologne, Germany, Pakistan decided to accept the ceasefire, declared by India on July 11, 1999. India had set July 16, 1999 as a deadline before Pakistan for total withdrawal, and Pakistan complied with it. Pakistan was told by US and G8 countries to respect the line of control and follow the spirit of Shimla agreement 1972, to resolve Kashmir dispute. It is interesting to note that,

<sup>29</sup> Ibid p-44-45.

<sup>30</sup> "Lahore declaration" signed by prime minister of Pakistan and India "Lahore February 21, 1999.

<sup>31</sup> Memorandum of understanding signed between foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan, K Raghunath and Shamshad Ahmad "Lahore 21st February 1999.

<sup>32</sup> Maria Saifuddin Effendi, Pakistan India peace process, summits in focus (1999-2005)p-81.

China which had all through supported Pakistan on Kashmir since October 26, 1947 kept herself non-committal on the Kargil issue. It was biggest diplomatic failure for Pakistan. Pakistan become isolated internationally.

Pakistan suffered military coup on October 16, 1999 and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was removed and subsequently exiled to Saudi Arabia in December 1999. General Musharraf declared himself the Chief executive, Chief of army and latter as president of Pakistan.<sup>33</sup> In summer 2001 two year. After the Kargil conflict which really provoked full scale India Pakistan war, president Musharraf proposed a "reciprocal action plan" to new Delhi as a first step to defuse tension between them to promote peace. While calling up India to stop atrocities in Indian held Kashmir (IHK) it said "Pakistan might recommend to the freedom fighters to moderate their indigenous freedom struggle in Kashmir" in his meeting with all parties Hyrriyat conference (APHC) leaders in New Delhi on July 14, 2001 president Musharraf advised them to adopt a flexible approach in there dealing with Indian government and also generate awareness about the inevitable changes which are expected on the Kashmir front" according to one report, in his plain speaking" to APHC leaders, president Musharraf warned that "we all should be ready for some recommendations."<sup>34</sup>

In May 2001, India extended on official invitation to the Pakistan to revitalise bilateral contacts. In response president Musharraf accepted the invitation from his Indian counterpart and a meeting was held between two leaders in Agra 14-16 July 2001. The Summit brought higher hopes to the region as it was major breakthrough after the two years of stalemate. President Musharraf assured the Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee; I have come with an open mind and look forward to my discussion with the Indian leaders on establishing peaceful tension free and cooperative relations between our two countries. The Summit dispute a euphoric beginning did not produce the desired result and was generally considered a failure. The initial round of talks reportedly took place in a cordial environment. While Pakistan focussed on atrocities being committed by the Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir. India emphasized the alleged support of Pakistan to militants in Kashmir and extradition of a leading underworld figure. Dawood Ibrahim, who was accused of masterminding the Bombay Bomb explosion in 1993. The Summit ended with no fruitful conclusion. The draft of the joint declaration was not issued due to Indian refusal to deal separately with Kashmir and Pakistani reservation about "cross border terrorism" the Summit ended with silently and depressingly.<sup>35</sup> The documents support the President Musharraf and his foreign ministers version the draft Agra Declaration did no more than set up a new mechanism for resolution of pending issues its first Article provided that "the settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue would pave the way for normalisation of relations between the two countries. Foreign minister Jaswant Singh and Abdul Sattar revised it jointly in their own hands. Initially the Indian modification read progress on addressing outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir and the establishment of cooperative relationship will be mutually reinforced. Abdul Sattar proposed a further modification which both wrote out to read thus. Progress towards the settlement of Jammu and Kashmir would be conducive towards normalization and will further the establishment of a cooperative relationship in a mutually reinforcing manner. Jaswant Singh took this agreed draft back and promised to return in 15 minutes. He did not instead as hours passed. Pakistani's high commissioner Ashraf Jahangir Qazi was informed that the talks were off.<sup>36</sup>

Thus Agra Summit ended abruptly late in the evening of 16 July 2001 without agreement having been reached on the wording of a declaration or joint statement, without a press conference, and indeed without even a photographed final handshake. On Kashmir neither side was willing to stray too far from long standing maximalist official formulations- India's that Kashmir had to be liked with cross border terrorism. Pakistan's that Kashmir was primarily a problem of human, rights and self-determination<sup>37</sup>

#### 8. Indo-Pakistan peace process 2003-2004

Although the leaders of both countries had agreed to meet again during the November United nations General Assembly meetings. It did not took place as India was engaged by the suicide bomb attack on Jammu and Kashmir state Assembly building. On October 1, 2001 in which forty (40) innocent civilians and the three terrorists who have caused blast were killed. Atal Behari Vajpayee took the tough stand indicating that he would not talk to General Musharraf unless Pakistani government stops supporting cross border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Moreover, India's foreign minister Jaswant Singh cancelled the scheduled trip to Pakistan to talk to his counterpart. Relation between two countries again turned tense resulted in an intense exchange of fire along the line of control (LOC). On December 13 2001, the Indian parliament building was attacked by terrorists in which Thirteen (13) people including four (4) terrorists were killed. This further exacerbated the already stressed relations between the two countries. To defuse the tension, the Bush administration persuaded General Pervez Musharraf to take strong measure against terrorist's camps in his country and cross border activity. On January 12, 2002, in an address to his nation president Parvez Musharraf pledged not to use his country as a base for cross border terrorism in Kashmir. He, however, reiterated Pakistan's political and diplomatic support for Kashmir cause, saying that the issue 'runs in our blood'. He banned the two militant groups Lashkar-i-Tayyaba and Jaishe-Mohammad and arrested 2000 militants. India welcomed this measure and the crisis was defused. But to the dismay of India, in an incident in Jammu province 34 people (mostly children's and women of army personals) were killed by terrorists. In response the govt. of India on May 14, threatened to strike at the terrorist camps in Pakistan administered Kashmir banned Pakistani commercial air flights from Indian air

<sup>33</sup> Oliver Mier, involving india and Pakistan, Nuclear arms control and nuclear non proliferation after nuclear tests Berlin information center for trans atlantic security(BITS)Research report p-13-14.

<sup>34</sup> Suddepto Adhikari, Muku IKamie, the Kashmir an unsolved dispute between india and Pakistan Geopolitics Quarterly, vol6 no 4 winter 2010 p-92

<sup>35</sup> Syed Riffat Hussain, Pakistan's changing outlook on Kashmir ,The Turkish Year book..vol 28 , p-149.

<sup>36</sup> Maria Saifuddin Effendi, Pakistan india peace process Summits in focus(1999-2005) p-83.

<sup>37</sup> A G Noorani, india Pakistan peace process, Institute of regional studies seminar paper `s islambad 20, 21, oct2008p-135-136.

space, and launched operation Parakarm (Valour) and moved 50,000 troops close to the line of control. In addition when prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was visiting troops in the frontline District Kupwara, Kashmir on May 22 he called for “decisive battle”. General Parvez Musahraf responded by moving half million of his troops to the border and on May 27 he warned India by saying ‘if war is thrust upon us, we will respond with full might.’<sup>38</sup> The escalating tension brought the two countries close to the brink of nuclear war. The threat of nuclear clash between the two neighbouring countries invited diplomatic mediation from government of Britain and the United states to deescalate tension along the border. British foreign secretary, Jack Straw, US deputy secretary of state. Richard Armitage and defence secretary Ronald Rumsfeld visited both India and Pakistan in May and June 2002 to defuse crises. They extracted a pledge from General Musahraf that he would stop cross border infiltration into Kashmir following their visits the process of normalisation started taking place. India re-established diplomatic ties by sending its ambassadors to Islamabad, recalled its novel ships to their Bombay base, and opened its air space to Pakistan commercial air travel. This is how the threads were picked up again when India’s National secretary Advisor (NSA) Brijesh Mishra and his Pakistani counterpart lieutenant General Tariq Aziz held several back door diplomatic exchanges to thrash out the differences and figure out how to reinstate the composite dialogue stated with the Lahore declaration in 1998. This resulted in the 25 November 2003 uni-lateral ceasefire announcement from the government of Pakistan on the line of control (Loc)<sup>39</sup>. The year 2003 brought a significant change in India Pakistan relations. The two sides stepped towards the process of normalisation through dialogue. The revival of peace dialogue between India and Pakistan in 2003 was an outcome of certain wise and objective political calculations of Pakistan and India. After the Agra Summit (July 2001) and disastrous attack on the twin towers of New York (11 September 2001). The security sensitivities of India and Pakistan were increased against each other. The terrorist attack on Indian Parliament house on 13 December 2001 worsened the situation and Pakistan was of being behind the attack. the international border as well as (LOC) line of control then saw a massive deployment of Indian and Pakistani forces in an eye ball to eye ball confrontation and two countries remained locked in an impose until October 2002. No improvement comes throughout the period of this deadlock until December 2002, when the withdrawal of troops from both sides was announced. Pakistan and India made significant diplomatic move in April 2003. The process of rapprochement towards normalisation of relations begin in April 2003. When Indian prime minister Vajpayee during his speech in Srinagar extended the hand of friendship towards Pakistan. The same year two countries resumed the diplomatic relations, reopened their high commission, started the exchanged of foreign mission, resumed air and railway links as well as Delhi Lahore Bus service etc. ceasefire also come into effect along the LOC In November 2003. Later the two countries also agreed to resume sports links. The year 2003 was marked with progress in structuring and preparing ground for composite dialogue between India and Pakistan.<sup>40</sup>

## 9. Communication Links

In order to enhance cross border movement of people to people meet their long divided families and relatives, India and Pakistan agreed to start a number of Bus services. These included Srinagar Muzaffarabad which started on 7 April 2005, Poonch Rawalakot one June 19, 2005 and Amritsar Nankana Sahib on January 20, 2006. It has also been agreed to start Truck trade on the Srinagar Muzaffarabad and Suchatgrah. Sialkot in addition the Delhi Lahore train service resumed on 11 July 2003 (suspended 2001) and Kakhrapar-Munabao service on 18 February 2006 (Defunct since the 1965 war) the Srinagar Muzaffarabad Bus service was watershed in Indo-Pak relations. Initially the talks were stalled over the modalities pertaining to travel documents with Pakistan insisting on United Nation documents and India as passport as travel document, Pakistan also demanded the Bus service be limited to Kashmir’s as opposed to India’s proposal to open into for all Indian’s. The Bus service was inaugurated on 7 April 2005.<sup>41</sup> But was opposed by political parties in Pakistan such as the Pakistan Muslim league Nawaz (PML-N) and Jammata-e-Islamia (JI) who argued it would dilute the ‘core’ issue of Kashmir. The Delhi Lahore Bus service was started on February 20, 1999 was stopped on January 1, 2002 after the attack on parliament. The service resumed from July 11, 2003 following the reestablishment of transport links. The frequency of this service was increased from two to three trips per week in the meeting of India Pakistan standing committee. On Bus service held on February 21, 2008. During the Indian external affairs ministers visit to Pakistan from February 15, 17, 2005 on agreement was reached to start a Bus service from Amritsar to Lahore and to Nankan Sahib. It was also begin cross LOC transport services by way of bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad following that:

The Amritsar Lahore weekly Bus service commenced on January 24, 2006.

Prime minister Manmohan Singh flagged off the Amritsar Nankhan Sahib bus service on March 24, 2006.

The Srinagar Muzaffarabad bus service started on April 7, 2005.

A second cross LOC service Poonch Rawalakot bus service commenced on 20, 2006.

The bi-weekly Delhi Attari Wagah Lahore Samjhuta rail resumed service on January 14, 2004.

During the visit of President General Parvez Musharraf in April 2005, it was agreed to establish the Munabao-Kohkrapar rail link. The link known as ‘thar express’. With the signing of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) on February 15, 2008 to revise the air services agreement between India and Pakistan. There is increase of frequencies from 12 to 28, designated air lines from 1 to 3 and addition of Islamabad and Chennai to the existing four points of calls. Mumbai, Delhi, Karachi and Lahore. During the foreign secretary level meeting in June 2004 the two governments had agreed, in principal, to the reopening of the consulates General in

<sup>38</sup> Atul Aneja, Restructuring the Agra summit The Hindu, 27 July 2001.

<sup>39</sup> Syed Rifaat Hussain, Pakistan’s changing out look on Kashmir, South Asian Survey 14th February 2007.

<sup>40</sup> President Musharraf’s Speech, www.Pakg/Pk/Prasident.addresses,index. Htm.

<sup>41</sup> Ashutosh Misra, “An Audit of india pakistan peace process” p-521.



Mumbai and Karachi in April 2005. India is ready to open its consulate in Karachi, but Pakistan insisted on simultaneous opening both consulates in Karachi and Mumbai. Pakistani inability to locate suitable premises in Mumbai has delayed the reopening of the consulates in both countries.<sup>42</sup>

#### 10. SAARC Framework and its implications on Kashmir conflict:

It is clear that South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) bloc will need to play a crucial role in providing the framework through which the Kashmir conflict can be solved. SAARC is a potentially powerful political and trading bloc that is capable of greatly reducing nationalistic passion and encouraging cooperation between its member states. SAARC, whose member states are India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Afghanistan was formed in 1985 with the following purpose. To promote the well-being of the population of [Sub-content] South Asia and improve their standard of living, to speed up economic growth, social progress and cultural development, to reinforce links between the countries of this area and lastly to promote mutual collaboration and assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific field.

Unfortunately the levels of cooperation spurred by SAARC so far among its member states have been less satisfactory, because of the obstinate nature of its two largest members, India and Pakistan. Intra SAARC is abysmally low, as detailed later, and India and Pakistan routinely slap trade sanctions against one another. Scientific collaboration between member states has also been held back greatly. Further the cultural links between these once-joined states have been strained by the nationalistic tendencies of neo-conservative groups on both sides. The same could be said of France and Germany at one point in history, however, now both are collaborating extensively in many different realms of society under the auspices of the European Union. In South Asia, of certain structural changes, detailed later, are implemented, SAARC stands to be one of the most vibrant blocs in the world by encouraging inter-regional trade on the part of two major blocs, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) nations and the European Union (EU) it will force its member states, through their shared dependencies to cooperate economically. This cooperation, which sorely lacks presently will lead to levels of cooperation in all realms of society among the SAARC members, namely between India and Pakistan, that have not been seen since the British entered the sub-continent in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. As detailed in "An alternate vision" the following three structural SAARC changes are necessary to truly create such a powerful framework.<sup>43</sup>

1. The immediate abandonment of most, but not all, of regional defence forces.
2. Increased cross border trade
3. The establishment of a new SAARC constitution which shall institute a federal political structure across SAARC Nation in which each member state will have its 'central govt.' functions [ Foreign policy defence, monetary policy etc] determined through a centralised SAARC ruling body and bureaucracy based in a neutral area in one of the member states.<sup>44</sup>

India and Pakistan have been locked in a long standing conflict since 1947. However, many initiatives have been taken from time to time to reduce the hostility by managing the differences through peaceful efforts. The SAARC is the most important from this direction as its agenda is to suggest that South Asian states should join together to form a tighter union. Mohammad Khan Junejo, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan inaugurated SAARC ministerial meeting on international economic issues in 1986 and stated that "the uni-lateral and limited measures adopted by the measure industrialized countries in response to crisis situation can't resolve the fundamental problem of the world economy which are structural and interdependence in nature and SAARC countries should consider. The feasibility of joint negotiating agreement with the industrialised nations. All members of SAARC endorsed his views but the nature of North South conflict kept the countries away from negotiating any individual agreement with others for their own benefit."<sup>45</sup>

The fourth SAARC summit was held in Islamabad, from 29-31 December 1988 the then Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi gave an optimistic assessment of trends and developments in the region calling them the beginning of 'new dawn' in Pakistan. He also praised Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto for "encouraging prospects of enduring friendship and good will between two countries". He mentioned Indian military action in Maldives in 1987 and Sri Lanka on the Tamil issue in 1988 as examples of Indian friendly manifestation towards its neighbouring countries. Basically India desires that all regional countries should let determine the policies and goals of the region. The Summit of SAARC Islamabad succeeded in making a breakthrough in view of softening stand of India and Pakistan on the disputed area. The India on their part pacified Pakistan's fears of economic domination and Rajiv Gandhi declared in Islamabad that India was fully conscious of its special responsibilities and that it would not seek to secure any Pakistan responded positively. Thus the successive summit afterwards showed a trend of including core economic areas within SAARC. Following this practice the regional actors can promote cooperation in less controversial areas including transfer of technology and bi-lateral trade.

In the 1990's India's relation with Pakistan were tense due to the allegation of the insurgency in Kashmir sponsored by Pakistan. To reduce the tension and bring down the hostilities, the then Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan. Conducted six meetings from 1991 to 1993 to reduce the tension and the two countries agreed on a number of confidence building measures (CMB's) to avoid military confrontation. The 8<sup>th</sup> summit was conducted in India (New Delhi) from 2 to 4 May 1995.

<sup>42</sup> Dr Ashok K Behuria, Pakistan India relations, An Indian Narrative, PILDT (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency) January 2011.

<sup>43</sup> Vivek Sankaran and Remit Sethi, India Pakistan and Kashmir conflict, Towards a lasting solution, p-9, 12/5/2003.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid p-9-10.

<sup>45</sup> Musarrat Jabeen, Muhammad Saleem Mazhar Naheed S Goraya, SAARC and Indo-Pak relationship Journal of Political Studies vol, 1 issue 2, 127, 145. P-132..

This summit was held under the clouds of tension and mistrust between Pakistan and India. Pakistan former president Farooq Ahmad Khan leghari participated in this meeting. All the heads of states expressed their satisfaction on the achievement of first decade of SAARC.<sup>46</sup>

\In 1997, I.K. Gujral and Nawaz Sharif met on sidelines of 9<sup>th</sup> SAARC Summit held in male and decided to resume the talks at secretary level. These talks were proved fruitless. Mean while the two countries declared nuclear tests on 11<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> May 1998 respectively. India declared into nuclear programme as multipurpose and one reason was to equate China in nuclear capability and was also wary of Sino-Pakistan relations. While Pakistan's aim was to balance the nuclear factor in the region. The 10<sup>th</sup> SAARC Summit held in Colombo (Sri-Lanka) in July 1998 in the after math of nuclear tests of India and Pakistan. These tests draw the global attention and major western powers imposed sanctions on Indian and Pakistan. Serious doubts were expressed on the smooth continuation of SAARC Process in the wake of overt nuclearization of South Asian region. The informal bi-lateral meetings between Prime Minister of India and Pakistan on the sidelines of SAARC summit acquired great significance. However, summit went ahead with its usual business<sup>47</sup>.

\The 12<sup>th</sup> SAARC Summit of Islamabad provided on opportunity to improve the relations and president Mushraff outlined fourfold strategy as the basis for dialogue with India. The year 2004 took its start with a positive note in India Pakistan relations with the SAARC summit (4-6 January 2004) and assumed greater importance for two main reasons.

1. The 11<sup>th</sup> SAARC summit was held in January 2002 at Kathmandu Nepal. And this 12<sup>th</sup> summit took two years to take place in Pakistan because of prevalent polemics and continuing deadlock between India and Pakistan since 2002.
2. It facilitated India-Pakistan dialogue and brought improvement in their bi-lateral relations against the backdrop of the revival of peace initiative in April 2003. The SAARC summit was attended by the heads of seven states of South Asia. It produced the Islamabad declaration along with social charter, South Asian free trade area agreement (SAFTA)

And additional protocol on blocking the financing of terrorism. Under the declaration the seven heads of states renewed commitments to ensure economic prosperity and stability throughout the region. It was emphasized that SAFTA would ensure equitable distribution of benefits of trade and cater to the special needs of small and LDC (Least developed countries) members by providing them special preferential treatment<sup>48</sup>. The 12<sup>th</sup> SAARC summit was important and productive for the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, although the SAARC Charter strictly disallows discussing regional problem with political orientation and does not deal with bilateral disputes and conflict. But the summit was held amidst the ongoing Indo-Pakistan peace initiative. It broke the diplomatic ice between the two members prevailing since 2001. The military standoff of 2002 did not allow the two countries to initiate dialogue and discuss the contentious issues. However, the discussion, they held on the sidelines of SAARC summit were positive. An India Pakistan joint press statement was also released on 6, January 2004, which was a remarkable achievement.

\While the Islamabad declaration issued after the SAARC summit focussed on regional cooperation and development in human, social and economic areas the joint press statement emphasized normalisation of Indo-Pak relations through a composite dialogue on contentious issue, including Jammu and Kashmir. The statement stressed the need for greater flexibility and mutual trust for the process of normalisation through confidence building measures. Prime minister Vajpayee said in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process, violence, hostility and terrorism, must be prevented. President Mushraff reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he would not support terrorism in any manner. President Mushraff emphasized that a sustained and productive dialogue addressing all issues would lead to positive result. To maintain the flexible stand and strictures the peace process, the joint statement proposed the commencement of the composite dialogue form February 2004.<sup>49</sup>

\Despite all this developments, a great deal depends on the way India decides to implement its grand designs in the region. As far as the majority of the states of the region are concerned, they take guidance from India for their territorial integrity and way of life. If territorial and other disputes are solved within region on amicable basis, a climate of tolerance would prevail in the region and it will possible to root out the hostilities, the 13<sup>th</sup> SAARC summit was held in Dhaka in November 2005, the reactivation of the regular annuals summits was a way to link India and Pakistan on composite dialogue because the sideline talks held during the 12<sup>th</sup> SAARC summit were helpful to conduct negotiation on bilateral issues. The 14<sup>th</sup> SAARC summit was conducted in New Delhi on April 3-4 2007 it was another attempt to scale the mountain of difficulties between the two countries. this meeting was to impress upon the participates of the official SAARC summit that South Asia countries will continue to lag behind in development until they realise the meaning of cooperation. It was first meeting for Afghanistan which got membership in the Dhaka summit of 2005. After the inclusion of Afghanistan, controversies between Pakistan and Afghanistan can block the path of cooperation and increase hurdles in making SAARC on active organisation.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Ibid p-133.

<sup>47</sup> J N Dixit Across borders ;Fifty years of india`s foreign policy,New Delhi,1998 p-234.

<sup>48</sup> Vivek Sankaran and Ramit Sethi,India Pakistan and Kashmir conflict; Towards losing solution.,12/5/2013. P-17.

<sup>49</sup> Maria safuddin Effendi; Pakistan india peace process Summits in Focus(1999-2005) p-84.

<sup>50</sup> Musrat Jabeen ,Muhmmad Saleem Mazhar Naheed S Goraya; SAARC and indo pak relationship Journal of political studies vol 2, 127 ,145 p-1137 138.

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