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## Cold War: China's Reselection of Allies

Ziji Jin

Student, Department of History, The Peddie School, US

### Abstract:

*This scholarly discourse delves into the genesis of Ping-Pong Diplomacy between the United States and China and its consequential ramifications on China-Soviet Union relations. This diplomatic overture had a profound impact on the dynamics of the Cold War, with the Soviet Union witnessing the erosion of a key ally and perceiving China as a burgeoning threat. Concurrently, China reasserted its presence on the global stage, embarking on the transformative path of Reform and Opening Up. The U.S. benefited from turning an enemy into an ally in Asia and became the only superpower in the world. The paper introduced how a simple ping-pong friendly match contributed to the diplomacy between the Chinese and US governments, which eventually led to China's reselection of allies that contributed to the end of the Cold War.*

*"We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow."*

*– Henry Temple (1784 – 1865), 3<sup>rd</sup> Viscount Palmerston, The Speech in the House of Commons*

**Keywords:** *Cold war, china, soviet union, united states, history, international relationships, political science and diplomacy; ping-pong diplomacy*

### 1. Alienation between China, the Soviet Union and the US

#### 1.1. China's Ambition for Independent Diplomacy and Ideology Difference between China and the Soviet Union

Since its establishment on October 01, 1949, the People's Republic of China sought active participation in global affairs and independent diplomacy, with the Soviet Union offering support during the communist revolution's early stages.<sup>1</sup> China and the Soviet Union formed an alliance, formalized through the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance."<sup>2</sup> However, this assistance entailed directives and guidance from the Soviet Union regarding the formation of China's communist party.<sup>3</sup> They stood in the position of world communist leader and attempted to decide China's development. China, a civilization with millennia of history, historically viewed itself as a global center. It resisted Soviet Union control and sought equal standing despite substantial Soviet assistance.<sup>4</sup>

Nationalism surged as Mao perceived Soviet directives as counterproductive to China's communist ideals. He also contended that the United States did not regard China as a significant threat due to its relative weakness compared to the Soviet Union. In a fall 1955 speech, Mao articulated that given their vast resources and population, China should attain a position on par with the Soviet Union and the United States.<sup>5</sup> Political tensions escalated between China and the Soviet Union as China aspired to reclaim its historical dominance in Asia. Mao's rejection of subservience to Soviet control stemmed from this desire for renewed autonomy.<sup>6</sup>

#### 1.2. Deteriorating Relationship Between China and the Soviet Union

The pivotal event leading to the estrangement of China and the Soviet Union was the June 20, 1959, meeting between the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the prohibition of nuclear weapon testing.<sup>7</sup> The two

<sup>1</sup>Hunt, Kenneth. "THE CHINESE ARMED FORCES AND THE SOVIET UNION." *Asian Perspective* 2, no. 2 (1978): 176–84. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43737921>.

<sup>2</sup>Record of Conversation between I.V. Stalin and Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China Mao Zedong on December 16, 1949," December 16, 1949, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), fond (f.) 45, opis (op.) 1, delo (d.) 329, listy (ll.) 9-17. Translated by Danny Rozas <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111240>

<sup>3</sup> Levy, Richard. "New Light on Mao 2. His Views on the Soviet Union's Political Economy." *The China Quarterly*, no. 61 (1975): 95–117. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/651933>.

<sup>4</sup>Elleman, Bruce A. "Soviet Diplomacy and the First United Front in China." *Modern China* 21, no. 4 (1995): 450–80. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/189387>.

<sup>5</sup>Teiwes, Frederick. "Erratum: Mao Texts and the Mao of the 1950's." *The China Journal*, no. 34 (1995): 94–94. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2950134>.

<sup>6</sup>Knight, Nick. "The Marxism of Mao Zedong: Empiricism and Discourse in the Field of Mao Studies." *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 16 (1986): 7–22. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2158773>.

<sup>7</sup>"Letter from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee to the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee on the Temporary Halt in Nuclear Assistance," June 20, 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 109-02563-01, 1-3.

superpowers agreed to stop the competition for nuclear weapons. This also prevented the other countries from growing the technology and forming nuclear weapons. As a result, the Soviet Union retreated all their technology advisors from China, which paused the progress of China's first atomic bomb and other technological developments. Mao and the Chinese Communist Party were angry with the Soviet Union's attitude, which greatly disturbed their relationships.<sup>8</sup> Eventually, China developed the first atomic bomb on October 16, 1964, by itself.<sup>9</sup>

The ultimate catalyst for the China-Soviet Union rupture was Khrushchev's July 1959 speech in Poland, wherein he criticized China's Commune activities.<sup>10</sup> Mao's indignation led him to counter the "opposition faction and skeptic faction" within the Soviet Union, underpinned by profound ideological disparities. His censure of Khrushchev as anti-Communes marked the definitive rupture in Sino-Soviet relations. Subsequently, the deployment of one million Soviet troops near the Sino-Soviet border culminated in their severed ties during the 1969 military confrontation.<sup>11</sup> The dispute over the ownership of Ostrov Damanskiy Island culminated in a series of confrontations between China and the Soviet Union, resulting in China's triumph and the island's renaming as Zhen Bao Island, now under Chinese control. This incident catalyzed a latent conflict between the two nations, ultimately prompting China to reconsider its alliances and estrangement from the Soviet Union.<sup>12</sup>

## 2. Ping-pong Diplomacy and the "Hands Shaking" between the U.S. and China

### 2.1. Main Conflict between China and the U.S.

Following the Korean War, the central contention between China and the U.S. revolved around the Taiwan issue. The United States expressed readiness to protect the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. Taipei asserted its jurisdiction over the mainland, and China, while asserting its moral right to reunify with Taiwan, avoided provoking a conflict with the United States.<sup>13</sup>

### 2.2. Willingness for Détente between China and the U.S.

Before China's shift in diplomatic strategy, on January 05, 1950, U.S. President Harry Truman announced a reversal in American support for the KMT, discontinuing substantial economic and military aid and refraining from involvement in China's civil conflict. In effect, the United States indicated it would not interfere with the Chinese invasion of Taiwan.<sup>14</sup> The Korean War escalated tensions between China and the United States, deteriorating their bilateral relations and undermining the semblance of "friendliness" from the U.S.<sup>15</sup>

Nonetheless, China's internal strife, including the failure of The Great Leap Forward, had profound consequences and altered the geopolitical landscape. The proportional relationship between the national economy and food shortage started to bother the Chinese citizens. From November 1959 to the middle of 1960, the Chinese government tried to solve the problem through diplomacy. According to Lengxi Wu, president of the All-China Journalists Association, during the meeting held by Mao from January 07 to January 17, 1960, the Chinese government decided to actively create new alliances through foreign diplomacy.<sup>16</sup> One proposed solution entailed mitigating the tension stemming from the Taiwan Problem and existing between the U.S. and China.

In May 1960, at the behest of Chairman Mao, Zhou Enlai engaged in discussions with Bernard Law Montgomery<sup>17</sup><sup>18</sup>, the marshal of the British army. During this meeting, China expressed its willingness to seek a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan Problem with the United States.<sup>19</sup> During their dialogue, the U.S. representative consistently asserted that the

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Translated by Neil Silver. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114346>

<sup>8</sup>Mikhail Zimyanin's Background Report for Khrushchev on China (Excerpt), September 15, 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD Fond 5, Opis' 30, Delo 307, Listy 49-79. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117030>

<sup>9</sup>Powell, Ralph L. "China's Bomb: Exploitation and Reactions." *Foreign Affairs* 43, no. 4 (1965): 616-25. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20039126>.

<sup>10</sup>Summary of the Talks with the GDR Party-Governmental Delegation on June 18, 1959. On the Soviet side, the same people took part as in the previous meeting, and also A.N. Kosygin and N.S. Patolichev," July 04, 1959," July 04, 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, Fond 0742, Opis 4, Portfel' 33, Papka 31, ll. 71-87 for June 09 and ll. 88-102 for June 18; obtained and translated from Russian by Hope M. Harrison. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112012>

<sup>11</sup>Su, Chi. "China and the Soviet Union." *Current History* 83, no. 494 (1984): 245-81. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45315345>.

<sup>12</sup>Cusack, Thomas R., and Michael Don Ward. "Military Spending in the United States, Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25, no. 3 (1981): 429-69. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/173662>.

<sup>13</sup>Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. "Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China." *The Journal of American History* 92, no. 1 (2005): 109-35. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3660527>.

<sup>14</sup>Simmons, Robert R. "Taiwan and China: The Delicate Courtship." *Current History* 65, no. 385 (1973): 111-34. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45312909>.

<sup>15</sup>Henry Kissinger. *On China*. New York: Penguin Press, 2011. xviii, 586 pp. Hardcover \$36.00, isbn 978-1-59420-271-1

<sup>16</sup>"Memoir by Wu Lengxi, 'Inside Story of the Decision Making during the Shelling of Jinmen,'" August 23, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Literature, Beijing), no. 1, 1994: 5-11 <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117009>

<sup>17</sup>Appendix A

<sup>18</sup>"Transcript of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Bernard Law Montgomery," September 21, 1961, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhou Enlai Waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1990), pp. 311-315. Translated by Simon Schuchat. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/260514>

<sup>19</sup>"Zhou Enlai's Telegram to the CCP Central Committee and Mao Zedong regarding the Discussion of Political Issues," April 30, 1955,

revised version was mutually advantageous, respecting both parties' sovereignty and their right to address the issue.<sup>20</sup> Consequently, China conducted 136 meetings with U.S. counterparts in Warsaw over a 15-year span. These constituted the initial and most direct private engagements between the two nations' delegations. In June 1962, the Kennedy government proposed through the Warsaw Conference that The U.S. would not provide any military support to Taiwan's military that was planning to attack mainland China.<sup>21</sup> Without the support from the U.S., the Taiwan military force did not have a chance to pose a threat to Mao's government.

### 2.3. *Desire of China and the U.S. for Engagement*

Following China's estrangement from the Soviet Union and its acquisition of nuclear capabilities in 1964<sup>22</sup>, the United States recognized China's increased influence and potential to impact the Cold War dynamic, surpassing Taiwan.<sup>23</sup> The United States contemplated transforming China from a rival into an ally through diplomatic engagement, while China, seeking to mitigate the military threat from the Soviet Union, also aspired to establish a relationship that would alleviate this threat from its northern neighbor.<sup>24</sup> China found the United States an attractive partner due to its capacity to counterbalance the Soviet Union, while the United States viewed China as a strategic ally capable of challenging the Soviet Union's position in Asia.

However, this was delayed by the different political ideologies and the happening of the Vietnam War. Though the two countries did not battle against each other directly this time, China supported North Vietnam and stood on the opposite side of the U.S. That made the relationship tense again and the former efforts were spoiled to some extent. The entering of the Vietnam War by the U.S. on the opposite side of China made the relationship tense again and the former efforts were spoiled to some extent.<sup>25</sup>

## 3. Ping-Pong Diplomacy

### 3.1. *Ping-Pong Incident*

While the diplomatic meeting was not as successful as expected between China and the U.S., sports, the "unrelated" factor, created the opportunity to change the game. Since the mid-1960s, China tried to win friends by engaging in sports competitions with Third World countries.<sup>26</sup> In that period, the Chinese provided sports coaches to Africa and Latin America.

Among the sports, an incident in the 31<sup>st</sup> World Ping-Pong Championship started the butterfly effect of breaking the barrier between China and the U.S. The World Ping-Pong Championship was held in Japan from March 28 to April 07, 1971. China attended this match with the instruction from Zhou Enlai to meet different Ping-Pong delegations from around the world and create friendships. At the end of the first day's match, when the Chinese team was getting on the bus to their hotel, Glenn Cowan, an American Ping-Pong player, thumbed a lift and joined them.<sup>27</sup> The Chinese delegation welcomed him greatly on the bus and gave him a traditional Chinese-style brocade as a present.<sup>28</sup>

The other day, Cowan brought a shirt with "Peace" and "Let it Be" signs on it as a return. The emergence of an athlete as an unexpected catalyst in thawing Sino-U.S. relations was a remarkable development. During an interview, Cowan, when queried about his desire to visit other nations, particularly China, expressed a keen interest in exploring China's culture and society. Subsequently, the U.S. Ping-Pong delegation extended an invitation to the Chinese Ping-Pong team, marking an unprecedented visit by American athletes to China. Given the heightened tensions of the Cold War, this event garnered significant attention and was promptly reported to Zhou Enlai.<sup>29</sup> Following consultations with Mao and the

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History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Ya Fei huiyi (Selected Diplomatic Archival Documents of the People's Republic of China, Vol. 2: The Chinese Delegation at the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2007), 87-90. Translated for CWIHP <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121750>

<sup>20</sup> "Premier Zhou Enlai's Report to the Central Committee on the Possibility of Reaching an Accord on an Agreed Announcement regarding the Issue of Chinese and American Nationals," August 18, 1955, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 111-00017-15, 61-62. Translated by Yafeng Xia. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110869>

<sup>21</sup> "Memorandum of Conversation between First Vice Premier Hysni Kapo and Albanian Labor Party Politburo Member Ramiz Alia with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai," June 27, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Central State Archive, Tirana, F14/ L14/ D7/ Viti 1962. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110807>

<sup>22</sup> BURMAN, SHIBDAS. "China's Nuclear Weapons Programme." *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 4, no. 1 (1995): 42-52. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45064259>.

<sup>23</sup> Weidenbaum, Murray. "United States-China-Taiwan: A Precarious Triangle." *Challenge* 43, no. 5 (2000): 92-106. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40722032>.

<sup>24</sup> "Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'The Soviet Revisionists Have Greatly Strengthened their False Support for Vietnam,'" December 11, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 109-03654-02, 33-36. Translated by David Cowhig. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118731>

<sup>25</sup> Appendix B

<sup>26</sup> Guanhu, Wang. "'Friendship First': China's Sports Diplomacy during the Cold War." *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 12, no. 3/4 (2003): 133-53. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23613227>.

<sup>27</sup> Appendix H

<sup>28</sup> Appendix C

<sup>29</sup> [Zhou Enlai's] Conversation with the U.S. Table Tennis Delegation," April 14, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhou Enlai Waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1990), pp. 469-475. Translated by Gao Bei. Originally included in Chen Jian, ed., "Chinese Materials on the Sino-American Rapprochement (1969-1972)" (unpublished collection, February 2002) <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/260525>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China extended an invitation to the U.S. Ping-Pong team for a visit and friendly match, marking a pivotal thaw in relations between the two adversarial nations. The U.S. Ambassador to Japan promptly relayed the news to the United States Department of State, leading to President Nixon's late-night telegram approval of the visit, reflecting the significance of this development.<sup>30</sup>Nixon later remarked that he had never anticipated the China initiative would manifest through a ping-pong team.<sup>31</sup>

### 3.2. American Athletes Visiting China

As the U.S. Ping-Pong team accepted the invitation from China, the visit was planned between April 10 and 17, 1971. Cowans and ten other athletes became the first group of athletes to visit China after 1949.<sup>32</sup>They visited the Forbidden City and the Great Wall and appreciated Chinese traditional arts.<sup>33</sup>They also played several friendly matches in Beijing and Shanghai.<sup>34</sup><sup>35</sup>Zhou Enlai warmly received the team at the Great Hall of the People and delivered a speech emphasizing the transformative potential of this event in Sino-U.S. relations. Shortly after the speech,<sup>36</sup>President Nixon initiated policy changes that dismantled barriers between China and the United States.<sup>37</sup>They extended an invitation to the Chinese Ping-Pong team for a visit to the United States.<sup>38</sup>A seemingly trivial Ping-Pong ball forged a profound transformation in Sino-U.S. relations.

## 4. Hands Shaking between China and the U.S.

### 4.1. Henry Kissinger's Secret Visit to China and Nixon's State Visit to China

To solidify Sino-U.S. friendship, on July 08, 1971, Henry Kissinger, then Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, clandestinely traveled to Beijing.<sup>39</sup>Both governments agreed on keeping the visit private and secret from the world. Kissinger was welcomed by Zhou Enlai and they discussed the Taiwan issue for three days. Kissinger conveyed to Zhou that the United States would progressively reduce its military presence in Taiwan and disavow support for the "Two Chinas" or "China and Taiwan" concept.<sup>40</sup>Moreover, Kissinger promised Zhou that the U.S. was willing to cooperate with China against the Soviet Union. The fruitful meeting between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai laid the groundwork for President Nixon's state visit to China in 1972.<sup>41</sup>

On February 21, 1972, President Nixon arrived at Beijing Airport, marking the first-ever state visit to China by a U.S. President. This historic event unequivocally signaled the burgeoning friendship between China and the United States. During his visit, Nixon held meetings with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, lauding their transformative efforts in China and the establishment of amicable relations with the United States.<sup>42</sup><sup>43</sup>President Nixon told Mao that he had perused the Chairman's poetry and speeches, discerning his acumen as a seasoned philosopher.<sup>44</sup> Kissinger added on by saying that he previously assigned the Chairman's comprehensive writings to his Harvard University classes. Nixon asserted that the Chairman's writings had a transformative impact on the nation and the world. Mao humbly responded, saying that he had only been able to change only a few places in the vicinity of Peking, not the whole world.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>30</sup>"Minutes of the Romanian Politburo Meeting Concerning Nicolae Ceaușescu's Visit to China, North Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam," June 25, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, ANIC, Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Chancellery, file no.72/1971, ff.10-58. Translated by Viorel Buta. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112058>

<sup>31</sup>Ping-Pong Diplomacy: The Secret History Behind the Game That Changed the World By Nicholas Griffin December 12, 2014.

<sup>32</sup>Appendix G

<sup>33</sup>Appendix E

<sup>34</sup>Appendix F

<sup>35</sup>Appendix I

<sup>36</sup>"[Zhou Enlai's] Conversation with the U.S. Table Tennis Delegation," April 14, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhou Enlai Waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1990), pp. 469-475. Translated by Gao Bei. Originally included in Chen Jian, ed., "Chinese Materials on the Sino-American Rapprochement (1969-1972)" (unpublished collection, February 2002) <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/260525>

<sup>37</sup>"Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and Mao Zedong in Beijing on June 03, 1971," June 03, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, ANIC, CC RCP fond, Foreign Relations Section, file 39/1971, p. 3-29; published in *Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880-1974 [Sino-Romanian Relations, 1880-1974]*, ed. Ambassador Romulus Ioan Budura, (Bucharest, 2005), pp. 1064-71]. Translated by Mircea Munteanu. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117763>

<sup>38</sup>Appendix D

<sup>39</sup>Henry Kissinger. *On China*. New York: Penguin Press, 2011. xviii, 586 pp. Hardcover \$36.00, isbn 978-1-59420-271-1

<sup>40</sup>Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. "Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China." *The Journal of American History* 92, no. 1 (2005): 109-35. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3660527>.

<sup>41</sup>"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR, Far Eastern Department/ United States Department, 'Assessment of the Invitation to President Nixon to visit the PR China,'" July 26, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PA AA, C 496/75. Translated by Bernd Schaefer. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/209220>

<sup>42</sup>Porter, Andrew, and John Adams. "'Nixon in China': John Adams in Conversation." *Tempo*, no. 167 (1988): 25-30. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/945213>.

<sup>43</sup>"Memorandum of Conversation between Chairman Mao Zedong and President Richard Nixon," February 21, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford, 1974-1976 (Box 19). <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118064>

<sup>44</sup>Appendix K

<sup>45</sup>"Memorandum of Conversation between Chairman Mao Zedong and President Richard Nixon," February 21, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford, 1974-1976 (Box 19). <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118064>

During their conversation about Taiwan and the Soviet Union, Nixon remarked, "Mr. Chairman, it is interesting to note that most nations would approve of this meeting, but the Soviets disapprove, the Japanese have doubts which they express, and the Indians disapprove. So we must examine why and determine how our policies should develop to deal with the whole world, as well as the immediate problems such as Korea, Vietnam, and, of course, Taiwan." In response to these sensitive queries, Mao opined that previously, the likelihood of aggression from either the United States or China was relatively low because there was no state of war between the two nations. However, it was a unique situation because the ideologies of the two countries had never been discussed in the past 22 years. In less than 10 months since the initiation of the table tennis diplomacy, or less than two years if the inception of President Nixon's suggestion in Warsaw is considered, a significant shift had occurred. Furthermore, he conveyed his willingness to cultivate friendship with the United States under President Nixon's leadership.<sup>46</sup>

The fruitful dialogue among Nixon, Mao, Kissinger, and Zhou resulted in the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué, a published and globally significant document.<sup>47</sup> This marked a profound shift in the dynamics involving the Soviet Union, the United States, and China. Nixon's visit to China is a rare instance where a state visit catalyzed a seminal transformation in global affairs. The re-entry of China into the global diplomatic game and the increased strategic options for the United States gave a new vitality and flexibility to the international system.<sup>48</sup>

#### 4.2. China Established Diplomatic Relations with the U.S. and the State Visit of Deng Xiaoping to the U.S.

President Nixon's State Visit successfully fostered friendship between China and the United States. However, Mao Zedong<sup>49</sup> and Zhou Enlai<sup>50</sup> passed away in 1976, four years after the State Visit by Nixon. Deng Xiaoping's ascendancy in China in 1978 marked the continuation of efforts to foster amicable ties with the U.S. After eight years of persistent diplomacy; China officially established diplomatic relations with the U.S. on January 01, 1979.<sup>51</sup> President Jimmy Carter formalized the relationship with a declaration stating that the United States of America and the People's Republic of China mutually agreed to recognize each other and establish diplomatic relations on January 01, 1979.<sup>52</sup> This pivotal move in the Cold War era ultimately facilitated the collaborative political strategy of China and the United States to counterbalance the Soviet Union.

Symbolizing the burgeoning Sino-U.S. friendship, Deng Xiaoping embarked on an official state visit to the United States on January 28, 1979, becoming the first Chinese leader to do so.<sup>53</sup> He reaffirmed China's commitment to the core concept of Reform and Opening Up while expressing China's willingness to engage in political and economic cooperation with the United States.<sup>54</sup>

### 5. Impacts of China's Reselection of Allies

#### 5.1. Impact on the Soviet Union

The formation of diplomatic ties between China and the United States significantly impacted the Soviet Union. The loss of a communist ally in close proximity, possessing nuclear technology and atomic bombs, was of paramount significance. China and the United States devised a strategy to counterbalance the Soviet Union's superpower status, effectively forging allies. This strategy played a pivotal role in the eventual decline and collapse of the Soviet Union.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>46</sup> "Memorandum of Conversation between Chairman Mao Zedong and President Richard Nixon," February 21, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford, 1974-1976 (Box 19). <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118064>

<sup>47</sup> "Joint Communiqué between the United States and China," February 27, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Staff Member Office Files (SMOF), President's Personal Files (PPF), Box 73. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121325>

<sup>48</sup> Henry Kissinger. *On China*. New York: Penguin Press, 2011. xviii, 586 pp. Hardcover \$36.00, isbn 978-1-59420-271-1

<sup>49</sup> "Informational Note II from the Meeting of CC Secretaries for International Affairs in Moscow," September 14, 1976, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Polish Central Archives of Modern Records (AAN), KC PZPR, LXXVI-1027. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113569>

<sup>50</sup> "Current Situation of Chinese Party Leadership," July 06, 1976, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archive, Prague, CPCz CC Presidium 1976-1981, box 12, arch. Sign. 12. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113242>

<sup>51</sup> FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1977-1980, VOLUME I, FOUNDATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d104#:~:text=JANUARY%201%2C%201979-,The%20United%20States%20of%20America%20and%20the%20People's%20Republic%20of,sole%20legal%20Government%20of%20China.>

<sup>52</sup> Address by President Carter to the Nation, Washington, December 15, 1978, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1977-1980, VOLUME I, FOUNDATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY

<sup>53</sup> "General Meeting of Prime Minister and Vice Premier Deng (Summary Record)," February 07, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 01-1237-1, 012-016. Contributed by Robert Hoppens and translated by Stephen Mercado. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/120021>

<sup>54</sup> "Meeting of Former Prime Minister Tanaka and Vice Premier Deng (Summary Record)," February 07, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 01-1237-2, 034-039. Contributed by Robert Hoppens and translated by Stephen Mercado. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/120025>

<sup>55</sup> Sheng, Michael. "The United States, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1950: A Reappraisal." *Pacific Historical Review* 63, no. 4 (1994): 521-36. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3639947>.

### 5.2. Impact on the U.S.

The United States transformed a former adversary into an ally, playing a crucial role in the end of the Cold War through the collapse of the Soviet Union. The friendship with China encouraged trade, which benefited both countries economically.<sup>56</sup>The U.S. gained an important ally in Asia, which was both influential and had great potential in the future.<sup>57</sup>Establishing diplomatic ties between China and the United States proved to be a mutually beneficial strategy.

### 5.3. Impact on China

Following the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USA, China reengaged in global affairs and mitigated Soviet military threats. Under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, China's core strategy of Reform and Opening Up facilitated rapid development, with political and economic support from the United States.<sup>58</sup>Furthermore, aided by the United States, the People's Republic of China secured accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), propelling economic growth in the early twenty-first century.<sup>59</sup>China's accession to the WTO, coupled with the Reform and Opening Up policy, elevated its development and served as a foundation for its emergence as the world's second-largest economic entity.<sup>60</sup>

## 6. Conclusion

The estrangement between China and the Soviet Union, coupled with the triumphant diplomacy between China and the United States, imparted a momentous transformation to the Cold War dynamics. The Soviet Union's loss of a crucial ally instilled apprehension about China's burgeoning influence in Asia. Meanwhile, China reasserted its global presence through the initiation of the Reform and Opening Up policy. The United States, by converting a former adversary into an Asian ally, consolidated its status as the world's sole superpower. Ultimately, China's recalibration of alliances played a pivotal role in bringing the Cold War to its conclusion.

## 7. References

- i. H. Kissinger, Top Secret Document: Contact with Chinese, September 12, 1970, accessed May 06, 2022, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/#docs>
- ii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- iii. This document established Kissinger's secret visit to China, which contributed greatly to the friendship created later on between the two countries.
- iv. "Letter from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee to the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee on the Temporary Halt in Nuclear Assistance," June 20, 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 109-02563-01, 1–3. Translated by Neil Silver. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114346>
- v. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- vi. This document presented the commanding instructions from the Soviet Union to the Chinese government, which was one of the factors for the alienation between China and the Soviet Union.
- vii. "Zhou Enlai's Telegram to the CCP Central Committee and Mao Zedong regarding the Discussion of Political Issues," April 30, 1955, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Ya Fei huiyi (Selected Diplomatic Archival Documents of the People's Republic of China, Vol. 2: The Chinese Delegation at the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2007), 87–90. Translated for CWIHP <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121750>
- viii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- ix. Zhou Enlai and Mao discussed the relationship between China and the U.S. and the relationship between China and the Soviet Union. This showed the beginning when China started questioning their choice of allies.
- x. "Mikhail Zimyanin's Background Report for Khrushchev on China (Excerpt)," September 15, 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD Fond 5, Opis' 30, Delo 307, Listy 49–79. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117030>
- xi. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xii. After Khrushchev criticized China for their policies, the Chinese government was angry about his statement and this attitude was reported back to Khrushchev.
- xiii. "Transcript of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Bernard Law Montgomery," September 21, 1961, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhou Enlai Waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1990), pp. 311–315. Translated by Simon Schuchat. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/260514>

<sup>56</sup>Hyland, William G. "The Soviet Union and the United States." *Current History* 80, no. 468 (1981): 309–46. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45315012>.

<sup>57</sup>LEE, SHAORONG, YUQIN HAN, and YONG PENG. "THE ROLE OF CHINA IN EAST ASIA AFTER CHINA ENTERING THE WTO." *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 15, no. 2 (2001): 369–95. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23255914>.

<sup>58</sup>LEE, SHAORONG, YUQIN HAN, and YONG PENG. "THE ROLE OF CHINA IN EAST ASIA AFTER CHINA ENTERING THE WTO." *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 15, no. 2 (2001): 369–95. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23255914>.

<sup>59</sup>Ciuriak, Dan. "China after the WTO." *American Journal of Chinese Studies* 9, no. 1 (2002): 59–93. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44288690>.

<sup>60</sup>Fewsmith, Joseph. "The Political and Social Implications of China's Accession to the WTO." *The China Quarterly*, no. 167 (2001): 573–91. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3451061>.

- xiv. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xv. The discussion between Zhou and Bernard Law Montgomery about China's willingness to solve the Taiwan problem peacefully with the U.S. This was an important step leading to the détente between China and the U.S.
- xvi. ""Summary of the Talks with the GDR Party-Governmental Delegation on June 18 1959. On the Soviet side, the same people took part as in the previous meeting, and also A.N. Kosygin and N.S Patolichev," July 04, 1959," July 04, 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, Fond 0742, Opis 4, Portfel' 33, Papka 31, ll. 71-87 for June 09 and ll. 88-102 for June 18; obtained and translated from Russian by Hope M. Harrison. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112012>
- xvii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xviii. This records the discussion in the Soviet Union not only regarding the European and Chinese policies. It showed the attitude of the Soviet Union toward China.
- xix. "Memorandum of Conversation between First Vice Premier Hysni Kapo and Albanian Labor Party Politburo Member Ramiz Alia with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai," June 27, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Central State Archive, Tirana, F14/ L14/ D7/ Viti 1962. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110807>
- xx. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xxi. This showed China's effort in attending to world affairs by creating a friendship with third-world countries.
- xxii. "Memoir by Wu Lengxi, 'Inside Story of the Decision Making during the Shelling of Jinmen,'" August 23, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Literature, Beijing), no. 1, 1994: 5-11 <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117009>
- xxiii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xxiv. This records Mao's speech about China's solution to the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
- xxv. "General Meeting of Prime Minister and Vice Premier Deng (Summary Record)," February 07, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 01-1237-1, 012-016. Contributed by Robert Hoppens and translated by Stephen Mercado. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/120021> Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xxvi. This was the State Visit of Deng Xiaoping to the U.S., and he had a conversation with President Jimmy Carter. It was a result of establishing the diplomatic relationship between China and the U.S.
- xxvii. "Meeting of Former Prime Minister Tanaka and Vice Premier Deng (Summary Record)," February 07, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 01-1237-2, 034-039. Contributed by Robert Hoppens and translated by Stephen Mercado. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/120025> Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xxviii. This was a conversation between Deng Xiaoping and former prime minister Tanaka. Deng reassured his determination to continue the Reforming and Opening Up policy and continue the friendship with the U.S. to collaborate and counterbalance the Soviet Union.
- xxix. "Informational Note II from the Meeting of CC Secretaries for International Affairs in Moscow," September 14, 1976, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Polish Central Archives of Modern Records (AAN), KC PZPR, LXXVI-1027. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113569>
- xxx. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xxxi. This revealed the tense atmosphere in Moscow when China and the U.S. gradually developed further relationships.
- xxxii. "Current Situation of Chinese Party Leadership," July 06, 1976, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archive, Prague, CPCz CC Presidium 1976-1981, box 12, arch. Sign. 12. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113242>
- xxxiii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xxxiv. This article reported the death of Mao and the inner change of the political system after the death of Mao and Zhou Enlai.
- xxxv. "General Meeting of Prime Minister and Vice Premier Deng (Summary Record)," February 07, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 01-1237-1, 012-016. Contributed by Robert Hoppens and translated by Stephen Mercado. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/120021>
- xxxvi. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xxxvii. This was the official state visit from Deng to the U.S. and strengthened the relationship between the two countries. The diplomatic relationship between the two countries was beneficial on both sides.
- xxxviii. "[Zhou Enlai's] Conversation with the U.S. Table Tennis Delegation," April 14, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhou Enlai Waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1990), pp. 469-475. Translated by Gao Bei. Originally included in Chen Jian, ed., "Chinese Materials on the Sino-American Rapprochement (1969-1972)" (unpublished collection, February 2002) <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/260525>

- xxxix. This was the speech Zhou Enlai gave in front of the U.S. Ping-Pong delegation visiting China. It showed China's willingness to bring friendship between the two nations.
- xl. "Minutes of the Romanian Politburo Meeting Concerning Nicolae Ceaușescu's Visit to China, North Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam," June 25, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, ANIC, Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Chancellery, file no.72/1971, ff.10–58. Translated by Viorel Buta. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112058>
- xli. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xlii. This showed the policies that President Nixon created regarding China. It canceled certain policies that were prohibiting the trade between China and the U.S.
- xl.iii. "Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and Mao Zedong in Beijing on June 03, 1971," June 03, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, ANIC, CC RCP fond, Foreign Relations Section, file 39/1971, p. 3–29; published in *Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880–1974 [Sino-Romanian Relations, 1880-1974]*, ed. Ambassador Romulus Ioan Budura, (Bucharest, 2005), pp. 1064-71]. Translated by Mircea Munteanu. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117763>
- xliv. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xlv. This recorded the conversation between Mao and the Ping-Pong delegation from the U.S. He welcomed the United States' visit and wished them a great trip to China.
- xlvi. "Record of Conversation between I.V. Stalin and Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China Mao Zedong on December 16, 1949," December 16, 1949, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), fond (f.) 45, opis (op.) 1, delo (d.) 329, listy (ll.) 9–17. Translated by Danny Rozas. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111240>
- xlvii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xlviii. This was the forming of an alliance between China and the Soviet Union before the Cold War and how China formed an ally with the Soviet Union at first.
- xl.lix. "Joint Communiqué between the United States and China," February 27, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Staff Member Office Files (SMOF), President's Personal Files (PPF), Box 73. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121325>
- l. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- li. This was the Shanghai Communiqué sent by Nixon and Mao after the State Visit to China by President Nixon. It showed the world the newly established relationship between China and the U.S.
- lii. Address by President Carter to the Nation, Washington, December 15, 1978, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1977–1980, VOLUME I, FOUNDATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY.
- liii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- liv. This was the speech that President Carter gave to the U.S. regarding establishing the diplomatic relationship between China and the U.S.
- lv. Henry Kissinger. *On China*. New York: Penguin Press, 2011. xviii, 586 pp. Hardcover \$36.00, ISBN 978-1-59420-271-1.
- lvi. This was a great book written by Henry Kissinger about his views and his experience with China. His secret visit to China and the official State Visit with President Nixon to China were important components of the Ping-Pong diplomacy and the reselection of allies for China.
- lvii. Elleman, Bruce A. "Soviet Diplomacy and the First United Front in China." *Modern China* 21, no. 4 (1995): 450–80. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/189387>.
- lviii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- lix. This book analyzed the help the Soviet Union brought to China and also the commands brought by the Soviet Union. It revealed the ally but tense atmosphere between China and the Soviet Union.
- lx. Simmons, Robert R. "Taiwan and China: The Delicate Courtship." *Current History* 65, no. 385 (1973): 111–34. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45312909>.
- lxi. The book summarized the origin of Taiwan and China's problem and how the U.S. was involved in the event with primary evidence.
- lxii. BURMAN, SHIBDAS. "China's Nuclear Weapons Programme." *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 4, no. 1 (1995): 42–52. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45064259>.
- lxiii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- lxiv. This evidence proved the effort of China to successfully create its own nuclear weapon and atomic bomb without the help of its foreign allies.
- lxv. Perkins, Dwight H. "Economic Growth in China and the Cultural Revolution (1960--April 1967)." *The China Quarterly*, no. 30 (1967): 33–48. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/651861>.
- lxvi. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- lxvii. Written by Perkin, Dwight H. on the economic growth in China during the Cultural Revolution in 1967. It is a strong source proving the negative impact of the Cultural Revolution and The Great Leap on China's economy, which led to the requirement for support from other countries.
- lxviii. Dernberger, Robert F. "Radical Ideology and Economic Development in China: The Cultural Revolution and Its Impact on the Economy." *Asian Survey* 12, no. 12 (1972): 1048–65. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2643023>.
- lxix. Annotation: [Primary Source]



- lxx. This book analyzed the relationship between the Cultural Revolution and China's economy. The Great Leap Forward had a negative effect on China's economy and the Cultural Revolution, which led to the changing of policies toward foreign countries.
- lxxi. Cheng, Chu-yuan. "The Cultural Revolution and China's Economy." *Current History* 53, no. 313 (1967): 148-77. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45311754>.
- lxxii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- lxxiii. This book also analyzed the relationship between the Cultural Revolution and China's economy with specific graphs and data. The Great Leap Forward had a negative effect on China's economy as well as the Cultural Revolution, which led to the changing of policies toward foreign countries.
- lxxiv. Segal, Gerald. "China and the Disintegration of the Soviet Union." *Asian Survey* 32, no. 9 (1992): 848-68. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645075>.
- lxxv. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- lxxvi. This book introduced the ideological difference between China and the Soviet Union, which contributed partially to the alienation between the two countries.
- lxxvii. Tang, Peter S. H. "Experiments in Communism: Poland, the Soviet Union, and China." *Studies in Soviet Thought* 26, no. 4 (1983): 287-370. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20099281>.
- lxxviii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- lxxix. The passage compared communism in China, the Soviet Union, and Poland. There was an ideological difference between different communisms and they were not able to work in the absolute same way.
- lxxx. Deshpande, G. P. "Cultural Revolution and China's Foreign Policy." *Economic and Political Weekly* 3, no. 26/28 (1968): 989-91. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4358801>.
- lxxxii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- lxxxii. This book introduced the impact of the Cultural Revolution on China's Foreign Policy. The inner struggle of China led to the need to find foreign allies to continue its development.
- lxxxiii. PRYBYLA, JAN S. "THE SOVIET VIEW OF MAO'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION." *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 44, no. 3 (1968): 385-98. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26443097>.
- lxxxiv. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- lxxxv. This book showed the attitude toward the Chinese communist party from the perspective of the Soviet Union. There were potential conflicts in methods of managing the country between the two governments.
- lxxxvi. Ka-kui, Tse. "AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVIZATION AND SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION: THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA." *Dialectical Anthropology* 2, no. 3 (1977): 199-221. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29789902>.
- lxxxvii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- lxxxviii. China's attempt to solve the inner economic difficulties through agriculture led to a failure.
- lxxxix. BERBEROGLU, BERCH. "THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THEIR STAGES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT." *International Review of Modern Sociology* 17, no. 2 (1987): 273-95. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41420900>.
- xc. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xc. This book compared the development of China and the Soviet Union and discussed the advantages and disadvantages of the two similar but different communist systems.
- xcii. Donnithorne, Audrey. "China's Cellular Economy: Some Economic Trends since the Cultural Revolution." *The China Quarterly*, no. 52 (1972): 605-19. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/652286>.
- xciii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xciv. This book introduced in detail the economic fall of China after the Cultural Revolution. It is the trigger of China's inner development and the future of Reform and Opening Up.
- xcv. Guanhua, Wang. "'Friendship First': China's Sports Diplomacy during the Cold War." *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 12, no. 3/4 (2003): 133-53. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23613227>.
- xcvi. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- xcvii. This book explains the core thesis of China's sports events during the Cold War. Creating friendships and getting along with more countries
- xcviii. Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. "Beyond Ping-Pong Diplomacy: China and Human Rights." *World Policy Journal* 17, no. 4 (2000): 61-66. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209719>.
- xcix. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- c. This book discussed how China tried to get into world affairs through Ping-Pong Diplomacy. Human rights have a huge difference in the world and how it is like in China.
- ci. Eckstein, Ruth. "Ping Pong Diplomacy: A View from Behind the Scenes." *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2, no. 3 (1993): 327-42. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23612842>.
- cii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- ciii. This book revealed the details of ping-pong diplomacy and how it works toward official diplomatic relationships between China and the U.S.
- civ. Hunt, Kenneth. "THE CHINESE ARMED FORCES AND THE SOVIET UNION." *Asian Perspective* 2, no. 2 (1978): 176-84. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43737921>.
- cv. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- cvi. This passage argued how China was threatened by the Soviet Union and was forced to create certain policies.

- cvii. Teiwes, Frederick. "Erratum: Mao Texts and the Mao of the 1950s." *The China Journal*, no. 34 (1995): <https://doi.org/10.2307/2950134>.
- cviii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- cix. This telegram talked about Mao's friendship with the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Cold War.
- cx. Knight, Nick. "The Marxism of Mao Zedong: Empiricism and Discourse in the Field of Mao Studies." *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 16 (1986): 7-22. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2158773>.
- cxii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- cxiii. This book introduced Mao's ideas and opinions on how communism should work in China. This started the ideological difference between China and the Soviet Union.
- cxiiii. Powell, Ralph L. "China's Bomb: Exploitation and Reactions." *Foreign Affairs* 43, no. 4 (1965): 616-25. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20039126>.
- cxv. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- cxvi. This book collected the experiments and accomplishments of China's nuclear weapons and atomic bombs.
- cxvii. Clubb, O. Edmund. "Living with China as a Great Power." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 351 (1964): 140-47. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1035229>.
- cxviii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- cxviiii. This book was written from the angle of China toward the behaviors of the U.S. about how things had changed the economy of China.
- cxix. Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. "Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China." *The Journal of American History* 92, no. 1 (2005): 109-35. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3660527>.
- cxx. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- cxxi. This book talked about China's relationship with the U.S. regarding the Taiwan problem. Nixon and Kissinger's visit to China laid the foundation of the solution to the Taiwan problem and how China and the U.S. came closer.
- cxxii. Porter, Andrew, and John Adams. "'Nixon in China': John Adams in Conversation." *Tempo*, no. 167 (1988): 25-30. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/945213>.
- cxxiii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- cxxiv. This book introduced Nixon's detailed visit to China and how he shared ideas with Mao and, in the end, signed the communique toward the world.
- cxxv. Hyland, William G. "The Soviet Union and the United States." *Current History* 80, no. 468 (1981): 309-46. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45315012>.
- cxxvi. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- cxxvii. The book talked about the impact on the Soviet Union after China and the U.S. established diplomatic relationships. It was a turbulent time and involved a number of changes.
- cxxviii. Sheng, Michael. "The United States, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1950: A Reappraisal." *Pacific Historical Review* 63, no. 4 (1994): 521-36. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3639947>.
- cxxix. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- cxxxx. This book compared the events in the early Cold War between China, the U.S., and the Soviet Union. It compared the governments and the policies of different countries and how these things were linked to each other.
- cxxxi. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1977-1980, VOLUME I, FOUNDATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d104#:~:text=JANUARY%201%2C%201979-,The%20United%20States%20of%20America%20and%20the%20People's%20Republic%20of,sole%20legal%20Government%20of%20China>.
- cxxxii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- cxxxiii. This listed the relationship decision between China and the U.S. for establishing the diplomatic relationship.
- cxxxiv. Fewsmith, Joseph. "The Political and Social Implications of China's Accession to the WTO." *The China Quarterly*, no. 167 (2001): 573-91. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3451061>.
- cxxxv. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- cxxxvi. This explained how China's economy benefited from entering the WTO and how getting into world affairs changed China.
- cxxxvii. Cusack, Thomas R., and Michael Don Ward. "Military Spending in the United States, Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25, no. 3 (1981): 429-69. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/173662>.
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- cxxxix. The book recorded the military spending in the three countries and revealed the strong U.S. army and the threat from the Soviet Union.
- cxli. Su, Chi. "China and the Soviet Union." *Current History* 83, no. 494 (1984): 245-81. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45315345>.
- cxlii. Annotation: [Primary Source]
- cxliii. This book introduced Mao's ideas and opinions on how communism should work in China. This started the ideological difference between China and the Soviet Union.
- cxliiii. Zhang, Denghua. "China's Diplomacy in the Pacific: Interests, Means and Implications." *Security Challenges* 13, no. 2 (2017): 32-53. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26457717>.
- cxliv. Annotation: [Secondary Source]


- cxlv. This book talked about the idea of how China was planning to spread its diplomacy and influence in Pacific and Asia.
- cxlvi. Weidenbaum, Murray. "United States-China-Taiwan: A Precarious Triangle." *Challenge* 43, no. 5 (2000): 92-106. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40722032>.C
- cxlvii. Annotation: [Secondary Source]
- cxlviii. This book talked about China's relationship with the U.S. regarding the Taiwan problem. There were potential solutions at that time to the Taiwan problem, which brought China and the U.S. closer.
- cxlix. LEE, SHAORONG, YUQIN HAN, and YONG PENG. "THE ROLE OF CHINA IN EAST ASIA AFTER CHINA ENTERING THE WTO." *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 15, no. 2 (2001): 369-95. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23255914>.
- cl. Annotation: [Secondary Source]
- cli. The book discussed China's influence and power in Asia and how China gradually replaced the role of the Soviet Union.
- clii. Ciuriak, Dan. "China after the WTO." *American Journal of Chinese Studies* 9, no. 1 (2002): 59-93. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44288690>.
- cliii. Annotation: [Secondary Source]
- cliv. This explained how China's economy benefited from entering the WTO and how getting into world affairs changed China.
- clv. *Ping-Pong Diplomacy: The Secret History Behind the Game That Changed the World* By Nicholas Griffin December 12, 2014
- clvi. Annotation: [Secondary Source]
- clvii. The book suggested the importance of Ping-Pong diplomacy and its role in the Cold War, which changed the Allies' formations.

### Appendix

"Transcript of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Bernard Law Montgomery," September 21, 1961, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhou Enlai Waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1990), pp. 311-315. Translated by Simon Schuchat.

<https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/260514>


Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Bernard Law Montgomery



Newspaper from The People's Daily 1970, May 20

The title stated that "Mao claimed to support people around the world to oppose the 'evil American Imperialism'"

This shows the tension between China and the U.S. during the Vietnam War and how Ping-Pong diplomacy changed the whole situation.




Glenn Cowan exchanged handshakes with Chinese player Zhuang Zedong after getting off a bus for Chinese players during the 31<sup>st</sup> World Table Tennis Championships in Nagoya, Japan, on April 04, 1971.

<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/bus-ride-opened-long-road-to-beijing-ln7mxzp6q>




This picture presents the Chinese Ping-Pong delegation's visit to the U.S., which is an essential primary source.

Connie Sweeris (right) played one of the Chinese players in 1972 on their return visit to the US. [Photos/Provided to China Daily]



This was from the Time Magazine as the US table tennis players visited the Great Wall.

US table tennis players at the Great Wall in 1971. The long-haired man (left) sitting on the ground is Glenn Cowan. [Photos/Provided to China Daily]




This was a picture taken in Shanghai when the US table tennis delegation played a friendly match with China in Shanghai. The US ping pong delegation members Glenn Cowan (right) and Errol Rerek (left) took photos with Shanghai players Yao Zhenxu (second from right) and Wu Xinmin on April 15, 1971, when they arrived in Shanghai.



This was the picture when Cowan shook hands with a news agency showing friendship. This April 1972 image, disclosed by China's Xinhua News Agency, captures Zhuang Zedong (right) engaging in a handshake with U.S. table tennis player Glenn Cowan during his visit to the United States. Zhuang, a pivotal figure in the historic 1971 "ping-pong diplomacy" between China and the U.S., passed away in Beijing at the age of 72. Xu Bihua/AP



A photograph featuring American table tennis player Glenn Cowan was published on a magazine cover. [File Photo]  
[http://www.china.org.cn/international/china-us/2009-01/07/content\\_17071140\\_4.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/international/china-us/2009-01/07/content_17071140_4.htm)



The China-US ping pong friendly match was staged at Beijing Capital Gymnasium on April 13, 1971. Xinhua



U.S. President Richard Nixon says goodbye to China's Premier Chou Enlai at Shanghai Airport on Monday, February 28, 1972, before departing for Alaska, winding up his eight-day China visit. (Image: AP Photo)



The conversation between Mao and President Nixon during the State Visit. "Memorandum of Conversation between Chairman Mao Zedong and President Richard Nixon," February 21, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford, 1974-1976 (Box 19). <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118064>

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/~~  
~~EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~ February 21, 1972 *zhr*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Chairman Mao Tsetung  
Prime Minister Chou En-lai  
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Chief of Protocol  
of the Foreign Ministry  
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter

President Nixon  
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Winston Lord, National Security Council Staff  
(Notetaker)

DATE AND TIME: Monday, February 21, 1972 - 2:50-3:55 p.m.

PLACE: Chairman Mao's Residence, Peking

(There were opening greetings during which the Chairman welcomed President Nixon, and the President expressed his great pleasure at meeting the Chairman.)

President Nixon: You read a great deal. The Prime Minister said that you read more than he does.

Chairman Mao: Yesterday in the airplane you put forward a very difficult problem for us. You said that what it is required to talk about are philosophic problems.

President Nixon: I said that because I have read the Chairman's poems and speeches, and I knew he was a professional philosopher. (Chinese laugh.)

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~~EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~ E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSA Memo, 3/30/05, State Dept. Guidelines