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## Militancy, Domestic cum International Terrorism: Interrogating the Effectiveness of Nigeria's National Security and Strategic Planning

**Dr. Ajayi Femi**

Professor, Department of Political Science & Public Administration, Babcock University,  
Management & Conflict Resolution, Ilishan-Remo, Nigeria

**Dr. Nwogwugwu Ngozi**

Lecturer, Department of Political Science & Public Administration,  
Babcock University, Ilishan-Remo, Nigeria

### **Abstract:**

*Nigeria's security system struggled with militancy in the Niger delta region till the implementation of the amnesty programme in 2009. Following that, it has equally been struggling with the domestic cum international terrorist activities of the boko haram terrorist group since 2009. The inability of the national security system to effectively check emerging security threats raises questions regarding its capacity. The paper assesses Nigeria's approach to national security as being ineffective in curbing various security challenges in the last decade. The paper relied on secondary data comprising relevant published books, scholarly peer-reviewed journal articles, newspaper articles, and materials downloaded from the internet. It adopts political economy, frustration-aggression and game theories as major theoretical constructs. These theories are used as platform to build a treatise for a pro-active preventive approach to Nigeria's national security and strategic planning. We argue in the paper that Nigeria's approach to national security and strategic planning systems are outdated, and need to be completely transformed. The paper concludes that new approach to Nigeria's national security must be a combination of military and non-military strategies that have deterrent measures to curtail future threats to security and anchored on delivery of good governance by political leaders cross all levels of government. Those who contravene national security either directly or through proxy must be made to face the full wrath of the law regardless of their social status.*

**Keywords:** Domestic terrorism, international terrorism, militancy, national security, strategic planning

### **1. Introduction**

Security of lives and property of citizens and other nationals within any given national jurisdiction is usually regarded as the primary responsibility of government. Usually, security is given a prominent position in national constitutions across the globe (Nwolise, 2006). Any government that fails to deliver on this parameter is regarded as either a failed state or on the verge of achieving that ignoble status. Unfortunately, since independence in 1960, Nigeria has continuously experienced security challenges from time to time, under various governments, military as well as civilian.

From 1970 onwards, the country's political, economic, and policy elites have put in place an authoritarian and commandist power structure to enable them centralize control of strategic resources, including the not insubstantial oil receipts. This rent-seeking behaviour has not only banished the great majority of ordinary Nigerians from the policy-making process, it has also led the power elites to pursue social and economic strategies that are shortsighted and self-serving, strategies that are not driven by the needs of the people. The consequence has been material scarcity, deepening frustration, and social unrest, across the different geo-political divisions of the country (Oronto, Kemedi, Okonta & Watts, 2004).

The rise of ethnic militias and communal vigilante politics flourished during the Abacha years (1993-1998) when Nigerians experienced the most severe political repression and economic hardship in the country's history. The O'odua Peoples Congress (OPC) was established in the Yoruba-speaking southwest in 1994 largely to protest the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections in which was believed to have been won by Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim. In the South East, two vigilante groups, the Bakassi Boys and Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), emerged in the Igbo-speaking southeast two years later. MASSOB claimed that the Nigerian state and its functionaries had systematically oppressed the Igbo since the end of the civil war and sought to secure self determination by resuscitating the Republic of Biafra. In the North, Arewa Peoples Congress (APC) emerged in 1999 following the election of Obasanjo, from the South West as President as a reaction their perceived harassment of Northerners as well as protesting the killing of northern elements in Lagos and other Yoruba cities and towns by OPC cadres. Others include, Tiv

Militia (2001), Jukun militia (2001), Egbesu Boys (1998), Itsekiri militia (1999), Ijaw militia (1999), as well as the militant arm of MOSOP (1992) (Oronto, Kemedi, Okonta & Watts, 2004; Onimajesin, 2004).

However, militancy in the Niger Delta, took an enhanced violent nature from 2006, when the kidnapping of expatriate staff of the oil companies, car- bombing, and seizing of oil installations by different militant groups became a common feature in the polity. The militants put forward several reasons for their agitations including, the marginalization of the peoples of the Niger delta, environmental degradation, bad governance and inconsistent policy framework, and the divide and rule policy of the oil companies (Nwogwugwu, Alao & Egwuonwu, 2012).

## 2. Conceptual Clarifications

### 2.1. Militancy

The term militancy refers to the violent activities of an individual or group holding an aggressive position in support of a given ideology or a cause. Such individuals or group of persons in a psychologically militant state is in a physically aggressive posture (Nwaodike et al, 2010: 17). A common trend among militant groups is the justification of the use of force in their ideological rhetoric. The method adopted in enrolment of new members include, volunteering, enlistment and conscription (Nwaodike et al, 2010: 18). Militant groups are usually able to use their ideological rhetoric to enlist new members as a result of the inability of the governmental structures to provide the basic needs of the people. Though their method of operations involve the use of violence they win the sympathy of those who see them as fighting for the poor masses against a system that has become distant and unmindful of their needs.

Militancy is not unique to Nigeria, it is something that a global phenomenon, with a variety of causes and manifestations in different countries and across different continents or regions. For the purpose of this paper, we refer to two countries in Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Writing on militancy in Afghanistan, Mehboob (2011a) uses militancy in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK) of Afghanistan to put across his case on role of ineffective governance system in the rise of militancy in a given society.

Mehboob (2011a) writes that militancy in KPK began mainly among the Pashtuns during the anti-Soviet “jihad” in Afghanistan following the soviet invasion in 1979. After the soviet withdrawal and the civil war that followed, some Pashtun-Afghan war veterans realigned under the Taliban government until they were ousted from Afghanistan in 2001. These militant organizations were quick to identify several sectarian organizations inside and outside KPK to exploit as instruments of violence (Mehboob, 2011a). The author observes that “militancy across Afghanistan prospered as a result of the near collapse of KPK’s governance systems which created the enabling environment for militant operations” (Mehboob, 2011a:8).

In analyzing the state of militancy with relations to governance structures in Southern Punjab district of Pakistan Mehboob (2011b:5) writes that “the prevalent impression is that the increase in militancy across Pakistan might be correlated with a growing number of religious seminaries in Southern Punjab”. Among the identified factors for the growth of militancy in Southern Punjab was the inability of the state apparatus to effectively deliver basic services. This vacuum which the state system created in the health and educational sectors especially led to a situation where “some religious militants have been offering families cash transfers or guarantees of free education for their children, including free boarding and lodging” Mehboob (2011b:5).

### 2.2. Terrorism

Terrorism like most concepts in social science defies any single universally accepted definition. Bellamy (2007:13) defines it as “a method of employing organized armed force with unusually little regard for humanitarian considerations to achieve, normally, political cum religious warlike ends, and which relies for its effectiveness on creating a pressing fearfulness in the minds of target persons for their lives or the lives of those close to them, or their property.” Birch (2007: 69) defines terrorism as “the infliction of grievous harm on one or more members of an identifiable group or category of people with the aim of frightening other members of that group or category into changing their intended behaviour”. Whether pursued for political or religious reasons, most civilized people regard it as being morally repugnant because “it involves the infliction of grievous harm on innocent and defenceless people, irrespective of whether the observer happens to approve or disapprove of the policy objectives of the terrorists” (Birch 2007: 68).

Terrorism generally involves clandestine activity which is carefully planned as to goals, means, targets and access (for example the bombing of several police stations and locations in Kano city simultaneously in January 2012). The goals of the terrorists “may be understood generally as political, social, ideological, or religious, otherwise terrorists would be thought of as delinquent criminals” (Whittaker 2004).

As a result of the fact that terrorists most of the time, have to operate in a hostile environment, security is their primary concern. This is why terrorist groups operate through the use of small cells, in which each member knows and is known by a few of their colleagues, in case of defection or capture. Defectors are usually killed by the terrorist groups, though defections are usually rare. In the absence of a charismatic leader, the terrorists are affected by group dynamics that could be source of both problem and opportunities for security agencies. Opportunities are provided when dissenters provide security leaks, while problems arise as a result of changes in operational methods as a different faction prevails in leadership (Whittaker, 2007). Though there are terrorist groups who manifest a great deal of religious bent, such as the *boko haram*, Hoffman (2006 cited in Whittaker 2007) describes terrorism as being inherently political and a calculated process, with different manifestations presented by different terrorist groups based on the way they regard themselves and their mode of behaviour, whether it is domestic or international terrorism.

### 2.3. Domestic Terrorism

This is terrorism that is home grown which manifest through the adoption of terrorist tactics by revolutionary groups within a given country. Abimbola & Adesote (2012) write that when a terrorist group carries out attacks on government officials of their country, it is domestic terrorism. If a group equally carries out attack on embassies of their country in other countries, it is regarded as domestic terrorism also. The authors categorize the various kidnappings of government officials and local nationals, bombing of oil installations, pipeline vandalization amongst others by the militants in the Niger Delta region (prior to amnesty programme) as well as the insurgency activities of the *Boko Haram* terrorist group in the Northern part of Nigeria as domestic terrorism.

Aluko (2013) expounds on the concept of domestic terrorism when writes that it results from a high level discontent by the ruled in a given country which they express through alternative socio-political arrangements. Such groups utilize violence as their way of crying for change. In this regard domestic terrorism becomes use of violent acts targeting at changing or overthrowing a dominant ideology, governance system or hegemonic interest. Domestic terrorism emerges in this wise as an instrument of struggle between opposing camps in a violent adversarial relationship (Imobighe, 2009: 15 cited in Aluko, 2013). Birch (2007) writes the use of terrorist tactics by revolutionary groups does not usually advance their cause as such domestic revolutionary terrorism has hardly been successful over the years.

### 2.4. International Terrorism

International terrorism refers to the premeditated use or threat of use of extra normal violence or brutality to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience beyond national boundaries (Kegley 1990 cited in Idowu 2013a). Peter Sederberg (cited in Whittaker, 2007: 4) defines international terrorism as the “threat or use of violence for political purposes when (1) such action is intended to influence the attitude and behaviour of a target group wider than its immediate victim, and (2) its ramifications transcend national boundaries”.

Whittaker (2007) sees international terrorism not only from the standpoint of specific national boundaries. He writes that international terrorism does not recognize territorial borders or delimited areas of combat or demarcated battlefields, much less respect of neutral territory. Accordingly, terrorists have reportedly taken their often parochial struggles to other, sometimes geographically distant, third party countries and there deliberately enmeshed people completely unconnected with the terrorists’ cause or grievances in violent incidents designed to generate attentions and publicity (Whittaker, 2007: 8).

These attributes have been displayed severally by the *Boko haram* terrorist group with their attacks cutting across Nigeria, Cameroun and The Chad, and victims including foreign nationals residing in the stated countries. Though Idowu (2013a) classified boko haram terrorism as domestic terrorism, we have chosen to classify it as both domestic and international because of its reported links with al Qaeda and ISIS, as well as the fact that it has carried out several terrorist attacks in other countries such as Cameroun and Chad.

### 2.5. Counter Terrorism

The prime need of counter-terrorism is to work out policies and put programmes into operation, to pinpoint the originators of violence, to deter them from further outrages, and to deal as best we can with a traumatized public” (Whittaker 2004: 129). Counter terrorism activities and operations are taken to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals (US Joint Chief of Staff, 2014).

Though most of the time counter terrorism strategies are viewed from military perspective, it has been proven from earlier studies Benjamin, 2008; Cato Institute, n.d; that wholesale military activities to counter terrorism have in most cases been counterproductive. Military activities have led to increased sympathy for the terrorists and enhanced their ability to attract new recruits. Where the terrorist groups have religious inclinations, military action has most of the time been ineffective.

Large-scale military efforts to deal with terrorists typically leads to other benefits for our opponents, as we have seen in Iraq and elsewhere. They gain critical experience in tactics, create new networks of support as well as the social bonds among disparate groups that will enable future collaboration. It also gives them opportunities to raise more funds, acquire weapons and the like. Finally, the use of military force against terrorists is frequently unwise because it is inevitably indiscriminate and often results in the alienation of exactly those individuals in a given community who we do not want radicalized. Military action against terrorist targets often causes the deaths of innocents, no matter how much care is taken (Benjamin, 2008, p.9).

This brings forward the need to adopt some non military options in counter terrorism operations, especially in cases where terrorism is homegrown like the *Boko Haram* insurgency in Nigeria. Wholesale military operations to counter terrorism in Nigeria, without addressing the pertinent issues raised that have been raised by the group which border on bad governance would not achieve the expected result.

### 2.6. National Security

Idowu (2013b) views security from a political perspective as meaning all forms of precautions taken by governments and their agencies to guide against crime, violence, accidents, attacks, conspiracy, sabotage, and espionage. It is a protection or precaution taken to ward off any action of individuals or groups likely to endanger the peace and harmony of a section or the whole nation. Security can equally be regarded as a device for ensuring proper custody and prevent escape or losses of anything of value.

Kronenberg (1973, p. 36 cited in Asamu 2006, p.126) defines national security as “that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries.” Imobighe (1990) describes national security as freedom from danger, or from threats to a

nation's ability to protect and defend itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interests, and enhance the well being of its people.

The scholars above have provided two significant perspectives to the concept of national security, protection of national interests against internal and external aggression, as well as the good life for the citizens. In the light of this, Aliyu (2009) provides a description of national interest that embraces both perspectives when he writes that that national security goes beyond military preparedness to defend the nation to the issue of provision of good life for the citizenry. It is the ability of a country to maintain its sovereignty, protect its political, economic, social and other interests in a sovereign manner and both internally and in relations with other states. It is not only about the security of national territory and infrastructure but also, about the good life, the basic values which keep the community together and advancement in the quality of life available to the individual regardless of their social status. This is why we view good governance as a necessary attribute of national security. If the territory is secured, while the majority of the citizenry endure a very low quality of life on live under poverty line, then such a country is not truly secured.

### 3. Theoretical Framework

The paper adopts political economy, frustration-aggression and game theories as theoretical constructs in proposing ways of curbing domestic-cum international terrorism through effective national security and strategic planning.

#### 3.1. Political Economy

The Marxist political economy approach holds that the economy is the sub-structure on which all other super-structure such as the political, the legal and social are built. Ake (1981) argues that a proper understanding of the economic system will bring about an appreciation of the general character of other aspects of the social system. The position a person or group occupies in the production process determines the class which the person or group belongs. The interaction between the forces of production and the social relations of production is the determinant of the economic development and progress in human society (Otite, 2008). Karl Marx in his interpretation of the dialectical method postulated that there are two classes in the society, the class which controls the means of production (in our context, state resources) and that which does not.

In the present context, the privileged bourgeoisie (ruling class, political elite and business men), control the state resources and utilize it to determine the fate of the majority who form the poor or less privileged class. Political leaders loot state resources as the enormous wealth of the nation is not translated to provision of basic infrastructure and provision of essential services. There is high level youth unemployment, underemployment of the middle age, whose salaries cannot take them home. A large number of states in Nigeria claim that they cannot pay minimum wage of 18, 000 per month, yet the elected officials and political appointees earn jumbo pay and loot state resources without delivering public goods and services.

The bourgeoisie (political leaders and their cronies) use the unemployed youths as tools to either rig elections or destabilize the government in power when they are denied direct access to control of government; through funding of violent activities by the youths. Even when these youths are used with promises of being "taken care of" they are not rewarded after the elections are won in terms of being given meaningful employment. As such, some of them, who had been used and dumped by the political leaders after being armed for political violent purposes become frustrated and aggressive.

#### 3.2. Frustration-Aggression

Dollard, Doob, Mowrer, Miller & Sears (1939) argue that people are motivated to act aggressively by a drive induced by frustration. "The concept of frustration denotes condition that arises when goal attainment is blocked, while aggression constitutes actions aimed at harming perceived stumbling blocks" (Jegede & Ajayi, 2008: 147). It is implied that frustration will inevitably lead to some form of aggression. When the aggrieved do not have easy access to the stumbling block, they take out their violent response on "symbolic representation of the imagined enemy and expressed in an indirect way" (Hewstone & Stroebe, 2001 cited in Jegede & Ajayi, 2008: 147). In this case, the stumbling block is the government which has failed to provide the means of self-actualization for majority of the population (over 70%) that is regarded as poor; living on less than \$2 per day and with no access to basic social infrastructure (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). The symbolic representation include, innocent unprotected civilians, expatriates, government officials (including police & military officials) public property; perceived as agents of the state.

#### 3.3. Game Theory

Game theory is a branch of mathematics that has been applied to politics with increasing frequency since 1960 (Mbah, 2006: 316). Game theory is "a body of thought dealing with rational decision strategies in situations of conflict and competition, when each participant or player seeks to maximize gains and minimize losses" (Plano & Riggs 1973 cited in Varma, 2004: 286). Shubik (1968 cited in Varma, 2004: 287) defines game theory as "a mathematical model for the study of some aspects of conscious decision-making in situations involving the possibilities of conflict and or cooperation. It deals with processes in which the individual decision unit has only partial control over the strategic factors affecting its environment."

Originally developed in the 1920s by Emil Borel it was made popular by John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstein in 1944. R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Martin Shubik & Anatol Rapoport are credited with the application of the theory to political science. The major concepts in game theory are players, rule of the game, outcome, pay-off, with strategy being the core concept (Varma, 288-289). The assumption behind the game theory, however is that each player is not only thoroughly rational, but completely self aware about the priorities among his purposes and has complete knowledge about the strategies available to him in pursuit of the pay-off, and

is invariably engaged in the attempt to maximize his pay-off, in a manner consistent with his own pay-off formation or ranking preferences (Varma, 2004: 289).

The relevance of these three theories for this study can be appreciated by analyzing the security threats Nigeria has experienced. The rise of militancy and the adoption of amnesty programme in 2009 after the failure of military efforts in curtailing it, and the domestic-international terrorism has been linked to the crisis of governance in Nigeria which has resulted from massive exploitation of the public resources and common wealth by the political class and those involved in rulership both military and civilian over the years. Nigeria has become divided into two classes, the political leaders who have access to state resources (and their associates and cronies in the private sector) and the class of poor Nigerians with no direct access to state resources (some of them are under-employed, while a large majority are unemployed and living under poverty line).

When some members of the political class are deprived of direct access to political power or state resources, they recruit the unemployed youths who they use to cause various kinds of crises aimed at undermining the operations of government. Some of them are known to have armed the youths ahead of general elections to facilitate the rigging of elections, to enable them have access to state resources. Once elections are “won” they abandon the now armed youths in their state of unemployment, without fulfilling the promises they made to “take care of them when they win elections”. These youths become frustrated and aggressive, and since the political elites who used and dumped them, are now protected by state agencies as they go about looting public treasuries which they display to the chagrin of the public, they engage in militancy and terrorism as way of rising against the system that they believe has turned completely against them. They attack public buildings, kill innocent citizens as a way of telling those in power that they cannot fulfill their basic mandate, including kidnapping of helpless secondary school students.

Adoption of Game theory provides the platform for adoption of viable counter-terrorism measures which should be both military and non-military; encompassing infiltrating and disrupting terror groups, targeted lawful surveillance of terrorists and terror suspects, effective policing of the countries many borders, controlling the proliferation of small and light weapons, cutting of funding for terrorists, strategic alliances with other countries engaged in fighting terrorism, massive education of the citizenry on security awareness measures, as well as ensuring good governance by the political leadership. Among the major agitation of the militants and terrorists has been that those who occupy public office neglect the vast majority, and do not deliver on promises made. Rather they engage in massive looting of public treasury, while critical public infrastructure are neglected and basic social services are not provided. Governments at all levels are reported to be highly corrupt, and effective counter terrorism measures will include effective curbing of public sector corruption. The governments at all levels would need to provide adequate funding for public educational institutions to make quality education available to all the young people in need of education, to avoid the current situation where many young men are uneducated and readily available for recruitment by militant and terrorist groups. The government would also need to provide the enabling environment for the private sector especially those in the productive sector to create employment for the large army of unemployed youths to eliminate the frustration that they face as a result of their unemployment and inability to secure jobs after acquiring education. Provision of social security programme for the aged would also reduce the pressure on the young who are working in terms of fending for their aged dependents. Provision of other critical infrastructure in the power, energy, road and health sectors would ease the pressure on the citizenry and create an environment in which it would be difficult for the terrorists to operate.




Figure 1: Interaction of the theories and the attainment of Effective national security & Strategic Planning

#### 4. Methodology

The study is a desk research which utilizes qualitative data. The design adopted was descriptive, and we equally utilized data from other climes on terrorism and counter terrorism in interrogating Nigeria’s national security and strategic planning system. We relied entirely on secondary data, derived from scholarly peer-reviewed journal articles, relevant books, government publications, newspapers, as well as materials downloaded from the internet. The data were content analyzed integrated into the discourse according to the relevant themes.

#### 5. Enabling Environment for Militancy and Terrorism in Nigeria

Edeogu (2008 cited in Egwemi, 2009) militancy in the Niger delta region gained international prominence following the Kaiama declaration of 1998, which was the direct fall out of failure of peaceful efforts for resource control by MOSOP led by Ken Saro Wiwa, who was extra judicially murdered inspite of global appeal against the death sentence passed by the military tribunal during the regime late Gen Sanni Abacha in 1995. The major grievance of the militants was marginalization by the federal government in terms of control of the national resources, which was accessed predominantly from their part of the country. Related to this was the absence of

good governance in the country, which has been reflected in the complicity of government officials and the oil producing multinational companies to subvert internationally accepted environmental standards for their operations.

They claimed the two parties engage in “systemic looting of their resources, damage to their environment and habitat, denial of appropriate revenue accruable from the mineral sales and absence of political control of their God given resources (Edeogu, 2008: 65 cited in Egwemi, 2009: 19). This position is in tandem with propositions of Mehboob (2011 a, and b) on the reasons why Militancy thrived in Afghanistan and Pakistan. When the governance structures fail to meet the expectations of the citizenry and become predominantly anti – people, it provides the veritable environment for militants to win the sympathy of the populace as they claim to fight for the needs of the common people.

In spite of the enormous resources that Nigeria possesses, and the high gross national product figures it poses each succeeding year, the large majority of its citizenry cannot connect with the national wealth. This poses a threat national security, as citizens cannot be relied upon in terms of facing adversaries including militants and terrorists. Igwe (1989) aptly captured it when he wrote that:

An economy with high degree of unemployment and highly unsatisfactory conditions of service for the working classes, but which is able to achieve high levels of the gross national product (GNP) because of technical efficiency is very unlikely to produce a very patriotic citizenry which can be reliable ally in the struggles with adversaries. In addition, a situation in which a great proportion of the national wealth gets concentrated in a few hands, while the rest of the population live on pittance, is not likely to adequately promote the overall power of the state, even though it may claim a very high gross national product (Igwe, 1989: 37 – 38).

A situation where Nigerian political leaders wantonly engage in barbaric acquisition of wealth and property through public corruption to the chagrin of the impoverished population creates a scenario where the ordinary poor citizen sees the leaders and the state apparatus as enemies. This scenario which plays out across the country, creates a disconnect between the majority, who are under-employed, unemployed poor and impoverished and the few political leaders and their cronies who have access to state resources and live in affluence. When such groups rise up to change the status quo, they get the sympathy of the masses, though their activities may be illegal in the first place.

There have been unconfirmed reports of terrorists offering money to families of recruits with promises of taking good care of them, and those communities have facilitated their operations as they see them as having their interests at heart as against the political leaders who are very distant from the people. The flagrant and wanton display of this ill gotten wealth by corrupt political leaders has the tendency to induce some weak-minded citizens to take to the side of the terrorists as the government system seems to meet the definition of the terrorist groups as enemy of the people.

Most of the border routes into Nigeria are unmanned making it very difficult for the security agencies to control the proliferation small and light arms. A situation where the borders are porous makes it possible for hoodlums and gun runners to operate without meaningful challenge. Internally, the security system is equally ineffective. As a result of public outcry against extortion by police officers on road block, the roadblocks have been removed giving free access to those engaging in trafficking of arms within the country.

## **6. Suggestions for Effective National Security & Strategic Planning**

Achievement of Effective national security and strategic planning for Nigeria would require the adoption of a radical approach which would combine both the military and non military strategies. Adoption of game theory would ensure that effective counter terrorism strategies are adopted to ensure that proactively, the terrorist groups are prevented from carrying out their terror activities. This would equally be complemented by good governance at all levels of government which would be entrenched by the right type of political leadership who see public office as call for service and not avenue for amassing looting the public treasury.

The counter terrorism strategies would include infiltrating and disrupting terror groups, targeted lawful surveillance of terrorists and terror suspects, controlling the proliferation of small and light weapons, cutting of funding sources for terrorists, taking reasonable precautions to secure against likely vectors of attack on infrastructure are also important, as well as preparing for terrorist attacks and their aftermaths, cooperation with neighboring countries for effective border controls, International collaboration efforts with countries that have made positive in-road in combating terrorism (Cato Institute, nd; Idowu, 2013). Achieving this will require massive collaboration among all the security agencies and the general public, whose buy-in into the fight against militancy and terrorism would only come through the delivering of good governance by different levels of government in the country.

Governments at various levels (federal, state and local government) needs to address the root causes of agitations by militants and terrorists through adherence to the characteristics of good governance, such as participatory decision-making, consensus orientedness, accountability, transparency, responsiveness to the needs of the citizenry, effectiveness and efficiency in administration, inclusive and equity in the allocation of resources and the rule of law (Nwelih & Ukaoha, 2010; Adelegan, 2009; Adeyemi, 2006; UNESCO, 2005; Hope, 2003).

Governments at all levels must provide the basic infrastructure needed in the society. There must be food security – sufficient food for the citizenry at cheap rates making it affordable by all households in the country; qualitative education at all levels, primary, secondary and tertiary with adequate funding for research and development by the government; provision of pipe borne water in both urban and rural areas; well equipped and functional public health centres, secondary and tertiary hospitals across the country; motorable roads across the length and breadth of the country; constant and uninterrupted power supply for domestic, commercial and industrial purposes; as well as well functioning refineries to make prices of petroleum products affordable.

The federal government of Nigeria must empower the anti corruption agencies to effectively curb corruption in the public sector of the country. As such, elected and appointed public officials at all levels must be held accountable for their activities, and made to use the

public resources that they are entrusted with to meet the needs of the populace. As long as public officials engage in wanton looting of public funds are get away with their crimes at the end of their tenure, corruption will continue to be fashionable in the country. it is only by promulgating draconian laws such as death penalty or life imprisonment for public sector corruption that public officials will be able to desist from it.

## 7. Conclusion

Nigeria has struggled for some years with curtailing security challenges, especially militancy and terrorism. However, evidence point to the fact that adoption of wholesale military strategies have not delivered expected results. This is because some of the reasons for the emergence of these threats to security cannot be curtailed by military efforts alone. A major reason for these threats both militancy and terrorism has been recurring issue of lack of good governance by elected governments at all level across the country. Some political leaders have been fingered as having master-minded the emergence of some of the groups who they equipped to facilitate the rigging of elections.

Nigeria's current national security strategy seems to be archaic and reactionary. There is a need to refocus the national security strategy to be proactive and to curtail the present domestic-cum international terrorism led by *Boko Haram*. Adoption of the combination of military and non-military counter terrorism strategies suggested above would be the best option for the country.

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