



## **Innovative Technology In Agriculture In Contemporary Nigeria: The Relevance Of The Hamitic Hypothesis**

**Dr. Lexington Oyarekhua Izuagie**  
Department of History and International Studies  
Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma

**Dr. A.B. Emanemua**  
Department of History and International Studies  
Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma

***Abstract:***

*The study attempted an examination of the crisis of innovative technology in rural agriculture in contemporary Nigeria using the Hamitic Hypothesis. However in a manner unusual of African historiography, it contends that the Hypothesis is not a complete dismissal in explaining general technological backwardness in Africa. While it frowns at the biological explanation for Hamitic domination of Africa, the study concedes to the alleged cultural superiority but believe that valid explanation for this is currently lacking. But the inability of the Hamites to influence contemporary Nigerian farmers to adopt innovative technology leaves more questions than answered. Intervention of the dependency theory, though contain some validity, is not sufficient I explaining the situation either. The study therefore calls for future investigation to explain general African technological backwardness of which the persistence of crude implements in rural agriculture in contemporary Nigeria is only a minute expression.*

**Introduction**

Under-development and its related issues in sub-Sahara African have continued to ignite debates. Its new dimension is the ravaging impact of food crisis in spite of the abundance of arable lands. This was an uncommon precolonial African phenomenon according to Walter Rodney. Astonishingly, a country such as Nigeria largely depended on agriculture for survival before the discovering of exportable oil in the country. The reverse is the case today with the country's central dependence on crude oil export in practical terms. The precarious implications can be very sordid in the worst case scenario. Part of the fall out, for instance, is that Nigeria the 'Giant of Africa' is unable to feed its teeming population. Unfortunately, the Nigerian experience is largely replicated all over the length and breadth of the West African sub-region. Explanations for these are usually diverse. One observable trend however, is the perverse use of crude implements in practical agriculture in spite of the claim to the globalization of innovative technology. The outcome is that the majority of the population primarily survives on subsistence agricultural and informal trade economy that survived the colonial era. Arising from the use of crude implements, the economy is highly labour intensive. In this context, the organization of labour in the rural areas where the bulk of agriculture is practiced remains essentially a re-enactment of the precolonial era. To this extent the organization of labour is largely centered on the family at two levels, the nuclei family and the extended family. Consequently the wealth of a man basically depended on the size of his family. This encouraged polygamy and the attendant population explosion that often exert unusual pressure on local resources and intensification of poverty. The first objective of this study is to examine the relevance of Hamitic Hypothesis in the persistent use of crude implements in agriculture in Nigeria. The second objective which flows from the first is to examine the interaction between the Hamitic Hypothesis and the now currently less fancied structural dependency theory in explaining the first objective. The study is not intended as an addition to the existing series of Afrocentric rejoinders against the Hamitic Hypothesis. Neither is it intended as its re-assertion. It is expected to provide evidence from which the reader reserves judgment. It could therefore be located within the ambit of a moderated perspective of the emerging African renaissance theory.

**Clarification Of Main Concepts**

Innovative technology as a concept refers to new and improved devices which enhances productive efficiency ([http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What\\_is\\_innovative\\_technology#ixzz21egyrSex](http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_is_innovative_technology#ixzz21egyrSex)). This could range from simple machines to hi-tech devices. Fundamentally, there is a transition from the earlier

inventions, often crude and less production efficient methods to more sophisticated ones involving the use of machines. For instance, when this becomes the primary base of agriculture, such is said to be mechanized. This is the connotation of the concept of innovative technology within the context of this study.

### **The Hamitic Hypothesis**

In summary the Hamitic Hypothesis contends that Africans on their own are incapable of any innovation, except with the influence from the Caucasoid race from which the Hamites derived.

In unequivocal terms, C.G Seligman, remarked that:

It would not be very wide of the mark to say that the history of African South of the Sahara is no more than the study of the permeation through the ages in different degrees and at various times of the Negro and Bushman aborigines by Hamitic blood and culture. The Hamites were in fact the great civilizing force of black Africa from a relatively early period (Cited in Armstrong, 1960, p.28).

Therefore the various landmark cultural and architectural feats such as the great masonry of Zimbabwe and Egyptian pyramids were the brainchild of the Caucasian blood either remotely or otherwise. This theory has been evoked to explain state formation in Africa by scholars such as J. D Fade (1957) and Oliver. Accordingly, state ideology was borrowed from the Hamite; and that state formation was the outcome of the conquest of an aboriginal black population by hordes of culturally and technologically superior Hamites. Moreover, that heroes of state formation in Africa had Hamitic blood flowing in their vein (Adeoye, 1990). So strong was the presumption underlying Seligman postulation that every vestige of development in sub-Sahara Africa was attributed to the influences of 'light-skinned Hamites'. Only the touch of this alleged superior race could guarantee development in the continent (Farelius 1993). Left to the Hamitic Hypothesis therefore, the persistence of the use of crude agricultural implement by the contemporary Nigeria peasants results from their innate backwardness.

However the hypothesis provoked reactions upon its publication. It was interpreted, perhaps legitimately so, as an attempt to provide a pseudo theoretical justification for imperialism (Rekdal, 1998; Adeoye, 1990). The logic was that if all innovations that had taken place in Africa were products of external influence, then colonialism was even a better organized medium of interaction to impact on the African people on humanitarian grounds. This was against the background that previous external influences were rather through accidental and gratuitous contacts. It was not a deliberate effort by the Tarzan to civilize the apes which later colonialism tended to arrogate to it, and epitomize in the imagination of its proponents.

Subsequently, various scholars, especially of the African descent continued to expose the alleged emptiness in the hypothesis. They include Armstrong, Ambrose (1982), Adeoye, (1990), Murdock (1959), Greenberg (1963), Bohannan (1964), Matunhu, (2011), and many of their contemporaries and a host of others. In this context independence among the African states heralded an opportunity for the re-examination of the influence of Europe in Africa. Consequently, later rebuttals to the Hamitic Hypothesis were even more pungent. In a complete round-about turn therefore, the former messiahs became venomous tyrants. Colonialism assumed the character of a notorious phenomenon from its earlier attribute of altruistic intervention. So it became a synonym for imperialism, economic exploitation, or even genocide! (Rekdal).

Rodney (1972) argued that at the maiden engagement of Africans with the Europeans in the fifteenth century, great states in form of empires were already flourishing in various parts of the continent including East, Central, West, and South. Specifically in West Africa, the empires of Mali and Songhay, and the Mossi states, the Kingdom of the Zululand under Tshaka in South Africa, blossomed; in Zululand, Mossi to the East of Mali and the kingdom of Dahomey in the central part of Africa (Rodney, 1972). The various states ran economies that exhibited perhaps the highest level of sophistication, with specialization as the galvanizing principle (Samir et al., 1987; Rodney, 1972; Matunhu, 2011). What these Afrocentric conceptions sought to establish was that African already had its indigenous idea to development before its contact with Europe. That engagement was to derail the original course of development in the continent in favour of Europe following the imposition of Rostowian theory of growth on the continent (Matunhu, 2011).

These series of intellectually sound rebuttal against the Hypothesis did little to revise its influence in the international community. Consequently its conjectures and conclusions about the dependency of Africa on outsiders for its evolution and development lingered on. The idea continued to exist in European thoughts along with their allies in the international community. The myth of Caucasoid superiority continued and survived in variant forms. Africa remained to be perceived by many as the white man's burden, and continued to be defined by what it lacks and rather than its wealth (Rekdal). The 'magical external hand' was still needed to supervise the states at independence, so that they did not ignorantly commit suicide. Once, again the West, like the humanitarian mission which colonialism epitomized in the imagination of its proponents, arrogated to itself the responsibility of developing Africa because, by implication,

sub-Saharan Africa's development was lagging far behind other regions of the world because of the obvious 'innate' inferiority of black people to master the socio-economic and technological environment in order to improve their social and economic conditions (Rekdal).

So it is was their responsibility, as the then United States of America (USA) president Harry Truman expressed in his presidential inaugural address on January 20, 1949, to:

...embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. The old imperialism- exploitation for foreign profit- has no place in our plans . . . (Allen and Thomas, 1992: 06; Matunhu, 2011, p66)".

Consequently, all kinds of characters organized various redemption missions to Africa even when they had failed in more ways than one in their standard fidelity test. For instance, Tony Blair, in a manner reminiscent of the Christian missions of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> in the background to colonial conquest, convoked the Blair Commission on Africa as recent as at 2005 (the Blair Commission for Africa, 2005). This was to allegedly chart a way forward for African economic development, with the the alleged crimes of war over his controversial role in the illegal invasion of Iraq in 2001 for possession of weapons of mass destruction hanging on his neck. As it turned out, the allegation against Baghdad was a diplomatic façade. Blair's attendant crisis of credibility did not dissuade him from convoking a mission to 'salvage' Africa in 2005. Perhaps, he was not aware that the billions of fund that was deployed to wreak havoc on the Iraqi civilian population would have done better in his self-assigned salvaging mission in Africa than the convocation of a debate club. But remarkably Blair Commission merely symbolized the superior Hamitic blood require for Africa development in the context of the lingering Hamitic Hypothesis. Beyond semantics, this is the logic embedded in the modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s. And it is the same idea that underlines the craze for external investors which has ridiculously become the major song of Africa ruling class under the aegis of the African Union - idea so much celebrated by neo-liberal economic thought (Todaro and Smith, 2006). So Seligman's hypothesis is still relevant in explaining contemporary dynamics in Africa in spite of the barrage of sophisticated attack on it by scholars.

In the light of the fore-going analysis, it is our considered judgement that it is better to accept an existing reality and confront it rather than pretending its non-existence. For the purpose of this study therefore, we accept Seligman's conclusion about the external role in African development in spite of its derogatory connotation. This position is largely informed by our conviction that if Seligman were to write today, he would have more hypocritical justifications for his hypothesis. One of this obviously, would have been the alleged success of the civilizing mission of

colonialism. Again, beyond the courtroom of scholarship, imperialism has acted rather more in consonance with hamitic hypothesis. For instance, African states are being forcefully tutored today to accept the virtue of sodomy euphemistically labeled as 'gay' (Nsehe, (2011, Leonard, 2012); a practice held with disgust and classified as banal in virtually every part of the continent. We believe that Africa scholars should accept the self-assigned mission of the Hamites while the focus of African historiography should shift to the failure of the mission rather than its negation. Consequently a fundamental question arises: Why has Nigeria agricultural peasant remain dependent on crude implement in spite the strong influence of the external hand especially under the globalization regime? Here the dependency theory seems to intervene to explain the situation.

### **Structural Dependency**

The theory of dependency evolved in the late 1950s, supervised by Raul Prebisch, then the Director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. There emerged a major discontentment with the modernization theory arising from its alleged distortion of facts about the social realities in the developing states in the 1950s (Matunhu, 2011; Frank, 1967; the Brandt Commission, 1980; Reid, 1995, p.47-48). At issue was the realization that economic advancement among the OECD states did not reproduce similar results in the poorer countries. Much more serious was that, in a dialectical manner, economic activity in the richer countries historically precipitated malignant economic factors in the poorer ones. This finding completely punctured neoclassical theorists presumption that economic growth was beneficial to all (Pareto optimal), though such benefits may not be equitably shared. The logic behind this, according to Prebisch, was that because of the primary commodity dependent nature of their economies, they lose unquantifiable revenues to the manufacture economies of the OECD through "Value Added". The direct outcome is that their export earnings cannot pay for their imports (Ferraro, 1996).

In other words, structural dependency asserts that the international system is comprised of two sets of states, variously described as dominant/dependent, center/periphery or metropolitan/satellite. The dominant states are the advanced industrial nations in the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The dependent states are the Third World countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa with low per capita GNPs and which rely precariously on the export of a single commodity for foreign exchange earnings (Sunkel, 1963; Santos, 1971; Amin, 1990; Radice, 2000).

The possible remedy therefore to Prebisch was import substitution. It was thought that a regime of import substitution would save them from purchasing the manufactured products from the richer countries. The poorer countries would still sell their primary products on the world market, but their foreign exchange reserves would not be used to purchase their manufactures from abroad. Limited size of the respective national markets, in addition to inadequate political will plagued the process (De Melo and Panagariya, 1993). This culminated in the adoption of regional integration to address the problem of limited size in the poor nations. Unfortunately, this too ended up in the collectivization of dependency (Izuagie, 2011).

Variants of this theory exist. From one perspective are the liberal reformers such as Prebisch. From another are the Marxists such as Andre Gunder Frank. The third perspective is the world systems theorists led by Wallerstein. Their engagement on this subject on the subject produced an intellectually challenging atmosphere. While landmark distinctions abound in their thought on the subject, they enjoyed consensus on a wide space of consensus among them (Ferraro, 1996). For instance, Sunkel (1969) conceptualized it as an exposition of of the economic development of a state in terms of the external control, including political, economic, and cultural, on national development policies. Gunder Frank (1967) and Theotonio Dos Santos (1971) stressed the historical dimension of the dependency relationships. Specifically, Santos sees dependency as:

...a historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favors some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economics...a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected (Santos, 1971, in Ferraro, 1996). Within this context, African social crisis can only be understood through a proper grasp of its centuries of engagement with Western Europe. Unfortunately, since the European expansion from the industrial and mercantile capitalism in the 15<sup>th</sup> century and the colonization of the continent and beyond, their engagement had only service the metropolitan economic interest of Europe (Frank, 1969). Rodney (1972; Matunhu, 2011; Onimode, 1988) noted the global exploitation of imperialism in Africa for more than five centuries. In the process it left behind destruction and disruption. It accomplished this through profit repatriation from the continent to their metropolis. The tragedy about repatriation of profits is its actual and conscious expatriation of the surplus values that was produced by African labour with African resources. Consequently, while the processes developed Europe, they under-developed Africa. The conclusion therefore is that African centuries of engagement with Europe entrenched under-development in the continent and therefore counter-productive

from the African perspective. The poor state of innovative technology is today is therefore a fall-out from this process, dependency would argue. From another perspective, dependency presents the character of a linear and multi-staged. There exists accordingly, a centre that dominated Africa historically and contemporarily. In this regard, economically, politically and culturally the continent has depended on America and Europe since colonialism. Within the same social formations the urban centres dominate and exploit the rural areas. Within those rural areas the rich exploit the poor individuals in what appears as sub-imperialism in a concentric model. The economic development of rural areas symbolizes the entrenchment of metropolitan-satellite (centre-periphery) link at diverse categories in the socio-economic structure of the economy. Rural peasants, confronted by the vagaries of international market are confronted by lack of capital, among others. So they cannot transform their crude means of production and therefore constitutes the ultimate victims in the global capitalist chain.

Beyond this, Just like Samir et al (1987:2) observed in the case of South Africa,

Imperialists partitioned the countries in Africa and then forced the African peasantry into reserves, deliberately planned to be inadequate for the purposes of ensuring the failure of subsistence in earlier traditional forms.... (Samir et al (1987:2 in Matunhu, 2011, p,68).

The underlying idea was to key them in into the colonial economy that was counter-productive to Africa from every ramifications. The outcome alienated agriculture from co-evolving with the other sectors of the economy based on local needs and invariably the collapse of the rural economies (Nnoli, 1978). Therefore agricultural sector could not be transformed, as the hoe and cutlass remain the major instruments for labour. But whether this argument is still legitimate almost five decades after independence is debatable. Unfortunately, the trend has been perpetuated by the collaboration of African ruling class, themselves as imperialist recruits. So as the metropolis exploit the country, so the federal centres exploit the states, so the local governments exploits the clans, the clan the village and rich individuals in the village exploits the poor in the conception of dependency theorists. The ultimate victim in that chain, to the dependency theory is the rural farmer who barely survives on subsistence agriculture. We can practically demonstrate this with empirical example.

Ayua is one of the nineteenth villages in Uzairue Clan, Etsako-West Local Government Area of Edo State Nigeria. Largely the inhabitants survive on subsistence agriculture and informal trade economy that survived the colonial era. Harvest season is usually very unfortunate ironically because it is the period he is ironically reminded of his worthlessness. From his experience, in spite of the labour-intensive nature of his profession he found himself dispensing with his



products to relatively big traders from the market in Jattu the clan headquarters. This can be explained by the dependency syndrome.

Global imperialism dominates and exploits the various periphery states including Nigeria. This it accomplishes through institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, MNC, etc. In turn the Nigeria Federal Government exploits and controls its component states, including Edo. It is able to achieve this through disproportionate revenue sharing formula and outright starvation of federally controlled infrastructures in favour of other perceived more amenable states. The State Government itself exerts pressure on the local government and could set aside the elected local government administration and arbitrarily appoint a Care-taker Committee (Nyam, 2012). The local government in turn piles exploitative pressure on the clans through the traders who are made to pay diverse categories of taxes. The traders themselves with the active connivance of the local and clan administrations freely exploit the peasants through the under-value purchases of their highly limited surplus (Abraham, 2012).

This miserable system has to be sustained since its constructive change could disrupt the metropolitan dominance. Yet only a bottom-top approach to development can meet the needs of the people including transformation of agriculture Max-Neef (1991). Unfortunately the current system run by global imperialism is top-bottom which cannot fulfil this objective. As it turned-out, Africa lacks the “expertise and ability to fight poverty” just as they inevitably cling to pre-colonial implements for agriculture. So we are back to square one when African could practically achieve nothing except when influenced by the Hamites in the Seligman world.

#### **Interaction Between The Hamitic Hypothesis And The Dependency Theory**

The Hamitic Hypothesis provided a framework for imperialism to establish its authority (Adeoye, 1990). Consequently, while Africans could ‘learn’ from the Hamites freely in the pre-capitalist epoch, as the hypothesis implied, imperialism has established structures in the post capitalist epoch for its self protection having envisaged ‘free transfer of knowledge’ could amount to its suicide. This is largely the underlying factor behind the lack of technological transfer since independence. Technological transfer could endanger the system. Withholding it became part of the strategy for itself protection. Starved of information and knowledge through the with-holding of patent rights, capital flight, and similar mechanisms, the Nigerian rural farmer is compelled to rely on the centuries’ old crude implements.

Significantly, Seligman’s pontification has a constructive element, at least, from the African perspective. Unfortunately this has often been down-played or completely ignored both from the Afro centric and Eurocentric divide, at least to our knowledge. That is that Africans are highly adaptive to social and economic change (from an inferior technological epoch to a more

sophisticated one. Hence they were amenable to external influences in their centuries of evolution. In other words they were not culturally xenophobic. There then developed a problem. Why has Africa, with such a long history of receptiveness to external ideas, acknowledged even by Seligman in his epic controversial status, remain under-developed in spite of the neo-liberal regime that has practically make our bedrooms the corridors of external ‘invaders’? Why agricultural practice remain largely under-developed in spite of contemporary external influences and Africans’ implied high level of adaptability? Why has the agricultural and informal trade economy depended on crude implements, such as hoes and cutlass in spite of the scientific and technological innovations that have manifested outside and the influence of that ‘outside’ on the entire African continent especially under the neoliberal regime? Or has that external influence terminated? These issues are addressed subsequently in the course of this study.

By the argument of the hamitic hypothesis, and the realities abound in the continent at large, and Nigeria in particular, it would appear as if this outside influence has not been strong enough. Unfortunately, the reverse is the case. For instance, flowing from the Hamitic Hypothesis and the contemporary African realities, pre-colonial Africa ‘benefited more’, as manifested in the feats recorded in Egypt, Zimbabwe, and the likes. The smooth transition from crude method of hunting to the use of more sophisticated weapons such as gun equally tends to substantiate this conclusion. But astonishingly, the outside influence was not as sophisticated in harmonization and organization as in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> c. It was diverse. Indeed the outside influence became more organized in the recent epoch as epitomized by the establishment of transnational institutions, such as the defunct League, the UN and its agencies, the WTO, IMF, WORLD BANK, Paris Club, London club etc. Yet, Nigerian rural farmers have been unable to revolutionize agriculture. In fact the gap between Africa and the West has deepened under that influence.

For instance, as Kauffman (2010) reported, at the time Adam Smith wrote his historic book, *The Wealth of Nations*, in 1776 to explain income disparity among nations, income gap to be explained was of the order of 4-to-1. In contemporary time, the gap between rich and poor, between the superior and inferior nations largely located in Europe has grown from 70-to-1. Although Kauffman did not specifically mention African nations, various UN and World Bank reports have demonstrated that majority of the world’s poorest countries are in sub-Sahara Africa. Therefore, ‘poorest nations’ has regrettably become a synonym for African States in international forums. Therefore they belong to the inferior category in Kauffman’s classification.

The UNDP observation on the issue is even more chilling. According to the agency, 358 billionaires now possess a wealth equivalent to that possessed by 2.5 billion persons - that is half of the wealth owned by the world population (UNDP Human Development Report, 1996). One obvious conclusion from these statistics is that the contemporary world economy tends towards the centre constituted by the North in a seemingly scientific process of gravitational force. In other words, a centrally converging process is in progress. That is what is branded as globalization. In a dialectical manner, it leaves on its trail destruction, plunder, anguish misery and abject poverty in the periphery of the World economy of which the Nigerian social formation is a distinguished component. Informed by this observation, the April 2000 Conference of the Group of 77 (now 133 countries) legitimately branded the process 'the globalisation of poverty' (Shehab, 2009).

The outcome is that local industries and entrepreneurs are left unprotected. Exposed to competition with their counterparts from the more advanced capitalist world armed with superior technical skill, technology, and overall capital base, they are unable to survive. Those that barely survived are highly marginalized and thus lacked enough economic clout. There is, therefore, the dearth of a local investor class to propel national agricultural development. The 'hoe and cutlass' agriculture in Nigeria is only symbolic of the technological gap between African and Europe, and the income gap, it inevitably engendered. Persistence of such crude implements has consistently limited production. Therefore, the local farmers cannot withstand international competition such as the US farmers highly subsidized by their governments in breach of WTO position (Jones, 2008; 2009). Table-banging at successive WTO trade negotiations on the issue has unfortunately not make a difference. So as it stands, the Nigerian peasant is compelled to confront his Western counterpart who enjoys the towering protection of his home government at the international market defenselessly. The real scenario is that he is being sacrifice by his own ruling class to soothe the interest of their disproportionate corporate alliance with their European counter-parts.

Consequently, beyond dismissing Seligman's pontifications as products of a racially stimulated delusion, two conclusions are possible here. By the logic of the Hamitic Hypothesis, either that the outside influence has been grossly inadequate in contemporary Africa, or, there is a program of deliberate sabotage. The first conclusion seems unlikely arising from the network of transnational institutions that offer adequate room for engagement between the 'superior' and the 'inferior'. We however admit that the terms of those interactions could constitute an issue which the dependency theory attempted to resolve from the above analysis. The second conclusion therefore appears more logical. To this extent one observe with consternation the

implied 'success' of the 'external influence' in the pre-colonial period alleged by Seligman and his cohorts that manifested in a monumental Hamitic acculturation. In contradistinction, the contemporary influence of the Hamites over Africa has disempowered Africa unprecedentedly. Consequently, chilly accounts of poverty and under-development are rife among the peasants in the country side (Abraham, 2012). This has manifested in the blackout of innovative technology in the practice of rural agriculture among others. Here lies the possible point of interaction between the Hamitic Hypothesis and the dependency theory in a manner rather ironical. That is: the Hamitic Hypothesis Africa, whether real or imagined, and its 'recolonised' contemporary Africa counterpart is marked by similarities and contradictions. From the first perspective both concede leadership of Africa to the Hamites arising partly from racial consciousness (Adeoye, 1990). Indeed, the former appeared to be the gestative stage of imperial subjugation of the Dark Continent. To that extent they are mutually re-enforcing. However, the difference is while the former openly relied on racial consciousness in its explanation, the latter carefully attempted avoiding it from its diction even when and where it is obviously implied. The continued domination of contemporary Africa by the Hamites, without any practical resistance, tends to give credence to the presumed superiority of the Hamite in either case.

The reality is that the conduct of the contemporary ruling class in Africa, and Nigeria in particular, seems to have vindicated proponents of the Hamitic Hypothesis. This is epitomized by their inability to devise a viable strategy of resistance against dependency. Rather, they submitted to be recruited as a corporate entity into the imperialist organogram. So, they connived in the process. Then the question is why are they so vulnerable? Here lies part of the the interaction between the dependency theory and the Hamitic Hypothesis. Is the excuse of the alleged crude apprenticeship of African ruling class under imperialism (Rodney, 1972; Onimode, 1989) still a legitimate excuse after almost half a century after independence? Perhaps one possible weakness against the Hamitic Hypothesis is its reliance on pseudo biological data for its conclusion. However, its claim of cultural superiority appears rational in the face of empirical realities. For instance, ugly episodes in African history such as the reality of the slave trade raise so many questions than answered. Why was Africa not organized enough to enslave the Europeans since the phenomenon was not alien to the continent? After all indigenous slavery existed. The different roles of the buyers and the sellers in the episode connote a clash of two cultures unevenly matched. Again why did the African anti-colonial resistance take the dimension it took? For instance, apart from the often over celebrated cases by African historiography such as the Ethiopia victory at Adowa, Samouri Toure heroic resistance with his scorch-earth policy, and a few other isolated cases, African attempted resistance was a complete

subterfuge culminating in the ultimate establishment of colonial rule. From the other spectrum, what accounted for the relative ease with which that technology was transferred to the Africans initially within the context of the Hamitic Hypothesis? Diffusionist explanations, legitimate as they originally sounded, do not seem rational enough anymore in the face of African palpable technological backwardness. We concede that characteristically, innovations are not bound to their place of origin. They commonly spread from the innovator to other individuals and groups once they occur (Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Innovation>). These explanations do not seem sufficient in the case of Afro-Euro relations. Otherwise, one wonders, why agricultural technology has not diffused to the Nigerian farmer having provided the international community with a vineyard since the 15th century. One feasible explanation however lies in an artificial plot insinuated by the dependency theory, which was initiated during colonialism and cemented under the global neoliberal regime. But again, the failure of the African elite to transcend its present bounds indicates a fundamental problem. A refurbished Hamitic Hypothesis could explain this. There seems to be a gap in knowledge here. In the absence of biological explanation, what is the underlying factor behind first, the obvious technological superiority of the Hamites which African historiography often dissipated so much energy on denying? Generally, existing literature do not seem to have answered these questions. Even if they did, their findings were obviously not adequately reported. Therefore it is an area that calls for further investigation beyond the scope of this study in the face of the persisting crisis of underdevelopment in Africa.

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