



ISSN 2278 – 0211 (Online)

## Has the Emergence of Female Suicide Bombers in Nigeria Depicted the Exploitation of Feminine Vulnerability? A Critical Appraisal of Boko Haram’s Female Suicide Bombers in Nigeria

Florence Anaedozie

Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Law, Dublin Institute of Technology, Ireland

### Abstract:

*The emergence of female suicide bombers in Nigeria has resulted in massive human and material casualties. The issue has raised concerns about gender based violence perpetrated at the behest of Boko Haram. While some scholars argue that terrorism is not exclusively a masculine violence, some research indicate that terrorism, could to a large extent, be dominated by men given some cultural and religious considerations. However, empirical evidence abound attesting that some women in Nigeria have assumed active roles within Boko Haram terrorist cells, and use their bodies as a means of transport and deployment of bombs. The acts of these women are deconstructing the cultural conception of femininity. It is against the backdrop of the conservative contextualisation of terrorism and masculinity, that this article, set in the cultural, social, economic, political and religious landscape of Nigeria examines feminine involvement in Boko Haram terrorism by interrogating some unresolved analytical questions as well as contemporary developments in the study of female terrorist bombers. The article examines if women within the Boko-Haram terrorist hotspots are mere victims in the hands of exploitative men asserting their hegemonic masculinity. It argues further that the emergence of female suicide bombers within the Boko Haram cells is to a large extent, a case of the exploitation of the feminine vulnerability and may not be conducts depicting willingness of certain Nigerian women to actively commit suicide bombing in the aid of Boko Haram terrorism.*

**Keywords:** Nigeria, Boko Haram, Femininity, Terrorism, Suicide Bombing

### 1. Introduction

This paper is set to engage some of the current debates that animate scholars in the field of gender based violence. It aims to appraise the relationship between femininity and terrorism in Nigeria by critically assessing the role of women in Boko Haram suicide terrorism. The paper explores the appropriation, exploitation or rejection of gender stereotypes linked to the emergence of female suicide bombers in Nigeria.

Boko Haram’s official name in Arabic is Jamā’a Ahl al-sunnah li-da’wa wa al-jihād (Tonwe & Eke 2013, p.234) which in Arabic means “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” (BBC, 4 May 2015). Boko Haram have also been linked with the interpretation of its name meaning that “western education is forbidden”. From its antecedents, Boko Haram is totally against western education- despite the fact that its leader and most of its members are products of western education. Boko Haram under its founder, Muhammed Yusuf became popular and was initially associated with pockets of attacks on law enforcement agents in Nigeria. They have developed into full-scale terrorist group and, till date, remained “a violent challenger of the Nigerian state” (START, 2015). The US State Department designated them a terrorist group in November 2013 (Office of the Spokesperson, 2013).

Suicide bombing became the latest addition to the strategies employed by Boko Haram in its violent attacks since June 2014 (New York Times, 10 February 2016) and is defined as a method that “requires the perpetrator of the terrorist act not to think of escape route in the process of executing his or her mission, but rather to accept death in the course of the mission” (Obi & Ezeogu, 2013, P. 175). Boko haram’s recent attraction lies on the use of underage and full aged female suicide bombers attesting to the assertion by Zedali (2014) that “into this boiling cauldron of terror, a new element has been added—women as suicide bombers” (p.1). What is the attraction for this seeming tactical manoeuvre? Feminist terrorist scholars point to the fact that the involvement of women in terrorist organisations is not a recent occurrence (Cohen, 2013, p.6-12) but within the context of Nigeria, it remains a novel phenomenon. Thus, to be daily inundated by the news of female suicide bombers killing people and creating colossal damage to people’s properties and investments in mostly the northeast states of Nigeria comes as a shock to everyone given the construct of the conservative Nigerian culture and tradition. One may be tempted to ask why is this happening? Does this depict avid disposition to violence or an exploitation of the feminine vulnerability? These questions are still vexing, but one way of addressing the issues raised is to look at

both the intention and context of the recent happenings in Nigeria. The resultant implication beyond Nigerian territorial boundaries helps in charting the trajectory of this paper. The paper crafts a critical analysis of these issues using these headings: defining Terrorism, Boko Haram's terrorism in Nigeria, femininity and terrorism, Female suicide terrorist within the Boko Haram Terrorist Group and conclusion.

### *1.1. Defining Terrorism*

Terrorism remains a complex term that has no universally accepted definition within the academic, government and security studies despite several years of robust scholarship. The term has presented "multiple and frequently disparate meanings" (Third, 2014, p.10) that Martha Crenshaw refers to the convolution as the "the now conundrum of defining..." (p.x). Scholars like Bassiouni (1988) suggests that to "define terrorism in a way that is both all-inclusive and unambiguous is very difficult, if not impossible" (p.xv). Interpretations of what counts as terrorism are varied and permeated with subtle, but significant, differences. Perhaps, this explains why most scholars involved in the research on terrorism agrees on the explanation proffered by White (2005) that "we do not know how to define terrorism, but we know what it is when we see it" (p.4).

However, this paper adopts the definition advanced by the Alex Schmid "terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties" (2011:39-98). Schmid's definition is apt, broad and relevant to Nigeria's current terrorist upheaval from Boko Haram since it targets the few in a way that attracts global attention and outcry. Martha Crenshaw (2011) in this regard notes that "terrorism is a form of violence that is primarily designed to influence an audience. Its execution depends on concealment, surprise, stealth, conspiracy and deception" (p.3). Accordingly, terrorism is characterised by extreme violence while most common terrorist objectives are media propaganda, provocation, force, indoctrination, insurrection, and intimidation. Other terrorist strategies include "creation of societal dislocation or chaos; discrediting or destroying a particular government; rendering economic and property damages; 'bleeding' other state security services and creating military damage; and spreading fear for the international effect" (Jatin Kumar Mohanty, 2006, p.38).

### *1.2. Boko Harm Terrorism in Nigeria*

Nigeria has an estimated population of about 170 million people and thus can be referred to as the most populous country in Africa. It ranks alongside Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan as countries plagued by highest impact of terrorism according to Global Terrorism Index (2015). The challenging political and economic history of Nigeria remains a paradox that haunts the colonial creation. Nigeria was "cobbled together and colonized by the British in the nineteenth century. Like many other African countries, it won independence in 1960" (Okonjo-Iweala, 2012, p.1). Since 2012, Nigeria's unity has been threatened by series of terrorist attack perpetrated by the Boko Haram sect.

Boko Haram is a Sunni Jihadist group founded by cleric Mohammed Yusuf, who was previously a leader within a Salafist group in the 1990s, and was inspired by 14<sup>th</sup> century fundamentalist scholar, Ibn Taymiyyah" (Mohammed Aly Sergie as cited in START, 2014). According to BBC Africa (4 May 2015), Boko Haram was "Founded in 2002...official Arabic name, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad". It is not within the scope of this paper to chronicle the history of Boko Haram, rather, it is important to stress that the group had, more or less, become a state within a state by even creating its Caliphate in the Northeast geopolitical region of Nigeria in 2014/2015. It took the combined African Union Joint Military Task Force months to dislodge them from most of the villages and towns they occupied. Boko Haram still occupy parts of the dreaded Sambisa Forest and has commenced a guerrilla sort of warfare as a result of concerted military assault on them. Boko Haram's audacious attacks in the northeast and central Nigeria targets bombing churches, markets, motor parks, bars, Police infrastructures and military barracks. It targeted and bombed the Police and United Nations headquarters building in the capital, Abuja in 2009 (Chothia, 2014).

According to Mauro (2015), Boko Haram is thought to be linked to the dreaded and ruthless Islamic State Group (ISIS). There are also ongoing efforts to ascertain the strength and the organizational connection of Boko Haram to Al-Qaeda and ISIS, the tapes often released to the media by Shekau is indicative that to some extent, Boko Haram owes allegiance and is linked to ISIS, the Taliban and other terrorist groups. The investment of \$3 million into Boko Haram activities in Northern Nigeria by the late Al-Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden, in promoting his brand of Salafist Islamism lends credence to the claims that Boko Haram is linked to the Al-Qaeda and ISIS (Ryan Mauro, 2015).

Boko Haram's act of terrorism in Nigeria was the reason why "the country witnessed the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever recorded by any country, increasing by over 300 per cent to 7,512 fatalities and has become the most deadly terrorist group in the world" (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). According to Global Terrorism Index Report 2015, Boko Haram featured prominently in the world's 20 most fatal terrorist attacks in 2014. Table 1 shows the 2014 world's most fatal attacks that happened in Nigeria:

Date	Country	City	Fatalities/Injuries	Group	Description
05/05/14	Nigeria	Gamboru Ngala	315 / —	Boko Haram	Boko Haram Assailants attacked residents and buildings with firearms and explosive devices in Gamboru Ngala town. At least 315 people were killed, an unknown number were injured, and numerous buildings were destroyed in the attack.
14/03/14	Nigeria	Maiduguri	212/-	Boko Haram	Assailants attacked the Giwa Army Barracks and a University of Maiduguri hostel in Maiduguri city. An unknown number of prisoners, who were being held at the base, were freed as a result of the attack.
17/09/14	Nigeria	Konduga	201 / —	Boko Haram	Assailants attacked Konduga town, Borno state, Nigeria. At least 201 assailants were killed in the attack.
13/05/14	Nigeria	Kalabalge district	200 / —	Boko Haram	Assailants attacked residents and buildings in Tsangayari village. Residents repelled the attack, killing approximately 200 assailants.
05/04/14	Nigeria	Galadima	200 / —	Fulani militants	Assailants opened fire on community leaders and residents that were meeting in Galadima village At least 200 people were killed and an unknown number were injured in the attack. Sources attributed the attack to Fulani assailants.
13/05/14	Nigeria	Garawa	151 / —	Boko Haram	Assailants attacked residents and buildings in Garawa village. Residents repelled the attack, killing approximately 151 assailants.
28/11/14	Nigeria	Kano	122 / 270	Boko Haram	Two suicide bombers and a roadside bomb detonated at the Grand Mosque in Kano city. Assailants opened fire on worshippers fleeing the explosions.
15/02/14	Nigeria	Izghe	106 / —	Boko Haram	Assailants dressed in military uniforms attacked residents in Izghe village. This was one of two such attacks in Borno on this day.
17/05/14	Nigeria	Unknown	101 / 6	Boko Haram	Assailants attempted to take control of the Damaturu-Benishek-Maiduguri road in Borno state.

Table 1

Source: Obtained from data supplied by Global Terrorism Index Result 2015.

The table above indicates the preponderance of Boko Haram attacks and when placed alongside global terrorist attacks, it is obvious that within the time under review, Boko Haram significantly increased its attacks on villages and towns in Northeast region of Nigeria and the neighbouring countries namely: Cameroun, Chad and Niger Republic. Most of the attacks were facilitated through the use of female suicide bombers as one of its lethal strategy in executing its campaign of violence. Suicide terrorism is the most aggressive form of terrorism as suicide is the intentional killing of oneself. Intentionality has a great role in differentiating suicide from every other act (Obi & Ezeugo, 2013, p.181). Pedahzur (2005) defines suicide terrorism as “a diversity of violent actions perpetrated by people who are aware that the odds they will return alive are close to zero” (p.8). Thus, what is the attraction for suicide terrorism? In answering this, Pedahzur’s analysis shows that suicide terrorism is a key tenet of terrorist organisations which provides the quickest means to achieve their aim with maximum impact and less cost. Moreover, Suicide terrorists may not live after the operation to give information or reveal the secrets of the terrorist networks. It also serves as a mission statement of such organisations showing their willingness to achieve their goals even at the point of self-harm. Table no.2 below shows attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria from 2013-2014 as held by The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) in its Global Terrorism Database records:

GTD Id	Date	Country	City	Perpetrator Group	Fatalities	Injured
201409090034	2014-09-09	Nigeria	Debiro	Boko Haram	0	0
201409080076	2014-09-09	Nigeria	Totari	Fulani Militants	1	4
201409080075	2014-09-09	Nigeria	Gundungyal	Fulani Militants	1	4
201409080074	2014-09-09	Nigeria	Unguwar Mata	Fulani Militants	1	4
201409080073	2014-09-09	Nigeria	Doka	Fulani Militants	1	4
201409080072	2014-09-09	Nigeria	Nawaje	Fulani Militants	1	4
201409080071	2014-09-09	Nigeria	Akuzo	Fulani Militants	1	4
201409080070	2014-09-09	Nigeria	Lafiya	Fulani Militants	1	4
201409080069	2014-09-09	Nigeria	Fura Girke	Fulani Militants	1	4
201409080068	2014-09-09	Nigeria	Kyankyashe	Fulani Militants	1	4
201409080067	2014-09-09	Nigeria	Dingwai	Fulani Militants	1	4
201409080066	2014-09-09	Nigeria	Fegin Kanaya	Fulani Militants	1	4
201409080065	2014-09-09	Nigeria	Wonaka	Fulani Militants	1	4
201409080064	2014-09-09	Nigeria	Fegin Mahe	Fulani Militants	1	4
201409070078	2014-09-07	Nigeria	Lagos	Unknown	0	1
201409070057	2014-09-07	Nigeria	Bazza	Boko Haram	Unknown	Unknown
201409070056	2014-09-07	Nigeria	Michika	Boko Haram	Unknown	Unknown
201409070055	2014-09-07	Nigeria	Bazza	Boko Haram	24	2
201409070024	2014-09-07	Nigeria	Buratai	Boko Haram	21	3
201409060047	2014-09-06	Nigeria	Lamba Gyambar	Tarok Militia	6	6
201409050056	2014-09-05	Nigeria	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
201409050055	2014-09-05	Nigeria	Okolomabo	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
201409040039	2014-09-04	Nigeria	Gulak	Boko Haram	Unknown	Unknown
201409040038	2014-09-03	Nigeria	Gidan Adamu Mai-Akuya	Fulani Militants	6	Unknown
201409020059	2014-09-02	Nigeria	Enugu	Unknown	1	0
201409020036	2014-09-02	Nigeria	Fadama-Bona	Fulani Militants	15	Unknown
201409020035	2014-09-02	Nigeria	Abulagu	Fulani Militants	15	Unknown
201409020034	2014-09-02	Nigeria	Kampani	Fulani Militants	15	Unknown
201409020014	2014-09-02	Nigeria	Magama Gumau	Boko Haram	2	0
201409020013	2014-09-02	Nigeria	Wukari	Unknown	47	Unknown
201409010036	2014-09-01	Nigeria	Bama	Boko Haram	59	30
201408310089	2014-08-31	Nigeria	Kotera	Boko Haram	5	0
201408300084	2014-08-30	Nigeria	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
201408280038	2014-08-28	Nigeria	Wunti Dada	Boko Haram	3	0
201408280037	2014-08-28	Nigeria	Jibwhiwhui	Boko Haram	7	0
201408280036	2014-08-28	Nigeria	Jibwhiwhui	Boko Haram	7	0
201408260094	2014-08-26	Nigeria	Mirga	Boko Haram	0	0
201408250042	2014-08-25	Nigeria	Ungwan Malam	Unknown	1	1
201408250040	2014-08-25	Nigeria	Keffin Hausa	Unknown	6	0
201408250039	2014-08-26	Nigeria	Gamboru	Boko Haram	0	3
201408250038	2014-08-25	Nigeria	Ashigashia	Boko Haram	3	0
201408250037	2014-08-25	Nigeria	Gamboru	Boko Haram	21	Unknown
201408240079	2014-08-24	Nigeria	Wumban	Unknown	10	42
201408240078	2014-08-24	Nigeria	Nbishu	Unknown	10	42
201408240077	2014-08-24	Nigeria	Sabon Garin Hyanbula	Unknown	0	0
201408240076	2014-08-24	Nigeria	Kaduna	Boko Haram	1	0
201408230045	2014-08-23	Nigeria	Madagali	Boko Haram	3	Unknown
201408210081	2014-08-21	Nigeria	Pulka	Boko Haram	Unknown	Unknown
201408210080	2014-08-21	Nigeria	Buni Yadi	Boko Haram	2	0
201408210060	2014-08-21	Nigeria	Tilden Fulani	Unknown	3	0
201408190062	2014-08-20	Nigeria	Liman Kara	Boko Haram	Unknown	Unknown
201408180053	2014-08-18	Nigeria	Lagos	Boko Haram	0	0
201408180051	2014-08-18	Nigeria	Dikwa	Boko Haram	6	Unknown
201408180050	2014-08-18	Nigeria	Dikwa	Boko Haram	6	Unknown

201408170052	2014-08-17	Nigeria	Marte district	Boko Haram	4	0
201408170051	2014-08-17	Nigeria	Marte	Boko Haram	6	0
201408160049	2014-08-16	Nigeria	Marte	Boko Haram	2	Unknown
201408160048	2014-08-16	Nigeria	Marte	Boko Haram	2	Unknown
201408160047	2014-08-16	Nigeria	Marte	Boko Haram	2	Unknown
201408160046	2014-08-16	Nigeria	Tumu	Unknown	0	Unknown
201408110051	2014-08-11	Nigeria	Babayo-Zarazong	Fulani Militants	2	0
201408100051	2014-08-10	Nigeria	Yelwa	Unknown	12	Unknown
201408100047	2014-08-10	Nigeria	Baga	Boko Haram	28	Unknown
201408080075	2014-08-08	Nigeria	Ede	People's Democratic Party (PDP)	0	0
201408080061	2014-08-08	Nigeria	Liman Kara	Boko Haram	Unknown	Unknown
201408070074	2014-08-07	Nigeria	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
201408070053	2014-08-07	Nigeria	Sanga district	Fulani Militants	4	0
201408070052	2014-08-07	Nigeria	Marte district	Boko Haram	8	0
201408060064	2014-08-06	Nigeria	Garkida	Boko Haram	0	0
201408060045	2014-08-06	Nigeria	Gwoza	Boko Haram	100	Unknown
201408040043	2014-08-04	Nigeria	Korokorosei	Unknown	0	0
201408030081	2014-08-03	Nigeria	Ungwan Patachi	Fulani Militants	1	Unknown
201408020108	2014-08-02	Nigeria	Abuja	Unknown	0	1
201407310041	2014-07-31	Nigeria	Manjakwa	Boko Haram	0	0
201407310040	2014-07-31	Nigeria	Karbutu	Boko Haram	0	0
201407310039	2014-07-31	Nigeria	Tashan Alade	Boko Haram	0	0
201407310038	2014-07-31	Nigeria	Kwajaffa	Boko Haram	0	0
201407300107	2014-07-30	Nigeria	Buni Yadi	Boko Haram	2	1
201407300059	2014-07-30	Nigeria	Unknown	Boko Haram	0	0
201407300058	2014-07-30	Nigeria	Kano	Boko Haram	7	6
201407290046	2014-07-29	Nigeria	Potiskum	Boko Haram	3	Unknown
201407290045	2014-07-29	Nigeria	Potiskum	Boko Haram	5	5
201407280063	2014-07-28	Nigeria	Katarko	Boko Haram	0	0
201407280062	2014-07-28	Nigeria	Katarko	Boko Haram	8	12
201407280060	2014-07-28	Nigeria	Katarko	Boko Haram	0	0
201407280055	2014-07-28	Nigeria	Kano	Boko Haram	1	6
201407280054	2014-07-28	Nigeria	Kano	Boko Haram	4	7
201407270064	2014-07-27	Nigeria	Unknown	Boko Haram	6	0
201407270063	2014-07-26	Nigeria	Shaffa	Boko Haram	2	Unknown
201407270062	2014-07-27	Nigeria	Lube	Boko Haram	Unknown	Unknown
201407270061	2014-07-27	Nigeria	Mubeng	Boko Haram	12	Unknown
201407270060	2014-07-27	Nigeria	Zar	Boko Haram	12	Unknown
201407270059	2014-07-27	Nigeria	Garkida	Boko Haram	7	Unknown
201407270051	2014-07-27	Nigeria	Kano	Boko Haram	1	5
201407270050	2014-07-27	Nigeria	Kano	Boko Haram	5	8
201407260059	2014-07-26	Nigeria	Kano	Unknown	0	0
201407260058	2014-07-26	Nigeria	Sigal	Boko Haram	Unknown	Unknown
201407250054	2014-07-25	Nigeria	Rann	Boko Haram	0	0
201407250053	2014-07-25	Nigeria	Rann	Boko Haram	0	0
201407250052	2014-07-25	Nigeria	Rann	Boko Haram	0	0

Table 2

Source: START GTD (Data slightly modified to suit paper's theme).

What then drives the continued devastation of Nigeria by the Boko Haram terrorists? Anaedozie (2015) & IRIN news (2015) argue that a culture of endemic grand corruption and non-realisation of socio-economic rights in Nigeria contributes in sustaining Boko Haram's terrorism. The Nigerian military could not tackle it head-on at the onset due to the systemic grand corruption that denied troops of the much needed military equipment. Funds earmarked for fighting terrorism were looted by the National Security Adviser, Sambo Dasuki and his cronies (BBC News, 2015). Religious extremism is also another cause of Boko Haram's terrorism in Nigeria. The sect is intolerant of other religious groups in the country and thus pursues a policy of aggressive conversion achieved by intimidation,



indoctrination and violence. Zedalis (2004) notes in this regard that “religious terrorism is a particularly potent form of violence; religion offers the moral justification for committing seemingly immoral acts” (p.9).

Boko Haram’s gruesome atrocities includes the seminal kidnap of about 300 Chibok school girls (New York Times, 2015). The majority of the kidnapped girls are yet to be rescued despite the global co-ordinated manhunt as at the time of the writing of this article. The Chibok saga is argued to have opened another dimension in the operational tactics of Boko Haram; involving the use of “female and under aged” suicide bombers. This underpins the discourse of this paper in interrogating the idealist feminine incorruptibility. Has Boko Haram disrupted the idealised femininity in the Northeast Nigeria or are the feminine wilfully sliding into criminality? Within the Boko Haram terrorist discourse, is the “female terrorist the shadowy figure of excess and deviance?” (Third, 2014, p.4) or a challenge of the prevailing patriarchal notion of femininity where according to Ragan (2013) “women are consistently framed in certain ways that curb their visibility and voice in comparison to men, so that they are not just different from men but also devalued in comparison” (p.19).




Figure 1: Fatalities in Boko Haram incidents, Nigeria

Source: Fatalities in Boko Haram incidents inside Nigeria, data from ACLED/Irinnews

### 1.3. Femininity and Terrorism in Nigeria

It is the intention of this article, given the cultural, traditional and religious background of Nigeria to espouse femininity as “socially constructed to function differently than is masculinity” (Julie Rajan, 2011, p. 19). Accordingly, femininity is often “constructed as less self-evident forms of harm, whether through conformity to feminine ideals or through disqualification from femininity by social status, sexual orientation, or race, among other factors” (International Encyclopaedia, 2008). Femininity is synonymous unpretentiousness mostly in certain northern states of Nigeria where cultural underpinnings constructed the feminine as mostly invisible in the scheme of internal politics and economics as opposed to the patriarchy which “privileges masculinity in all social, political, economic, religious and other infrastructures and processes” (Rajan 2013, p.19). According to Third (2014:4), “feminist analyst have traditionally contended that the extreme responses elicited by female terrorist can be attributed to her disruption of the idealised form of femininity (passivity, nurturance, pacifism and so on)...”. Does this depict the female terrorist as “simply non-feminine?” (Third, 2014, p.4). It does not really seem that the construction makes the female terrorist as simply non-feminine rather, it queries the traditional conceptions which hitherto placed the feminine in a passive, subservient and docile state.

Arguably, within the cultural and religious beliefs in Nigeria, the widely ascribed traits to femininity are passivity, submissiveness, and compassionate, caring, nurturing behaviour toward others, especially infants, are widely considered feminine traits (International Encyclopaedia, 2008). This is stereotypical in comparison to masculine firmness and keenness. While these views can spark off myriads of challenges and dissention particularly in this era of clamour against sexism, promotion of gender equality, the obvious fact remains that the culture and religion of most people in the sub-Saharan Africa which upholds the patriarchal system may not be easily diluted. It brings to mind the concept of cultural relativism which though not intended to be espoused holistically in this paper, plays a crucial role in determining the ability of the female suicide bombers to act intentionally. The worrisome dimension rather is the increasingly unabated frequency at which the Boko Haram uses women in suicide attacks in Nigeria. Considering the conservative cultural and religious underpinnings around women’s etiquette, it becomes an issue that is mind boggling. Is this a trend rejecting gender stereotypes, the patriarchal system and depicting a paradigm change or an exploitation of the feminine vulnerability? This forms the core question this paper intends to uncover.

The intention here is not to argue the legitimacy of examining the motives behind the involvement of men and women in extreme violence, rather, given that men and women occupy different positions in socio-cultural matrices, I argue that it is critical to understand precisely the reasoning behind the attraction in using “under-aged and aged female” in such extremism. This goes beyond

the “female agency” hypothesis within the scholarly context purporting “socio-culturally meditated capacity to act”, but rather urges a critical review of the testimony of some female suicide bombers in Nigeria caught before the detonation of their devices which suggests that most of them were mere vulnerable pawn in the hands of the terrorist group (START, 2015). Confessions obtained from these would be female bombers indicates that they were captured or kidnapped by the terrorist cells and amidst threat and intimidation, and were forced to carry out the suicide missions (Mike Pflanz, 2014). Human Rights Watch (2014) corroborates that the women are taken by force by Boko Haram according to reports of interviews conducted across rescued women formerly in Boko Haram’s camp:

- The victims, including 12 students of the Chibok School who escaped from Boko Haram custody after they were abducted, provided further details of the abuses they endured. The women and girls described how they were abducted from their homes and villages while working on the farms, fetching water, or attending school. The victims were held in eight different Boko Haram camps that they believed to be in the 518-square-kilometer Sambisa Forest Reserve and around the Gwoza hills for periods ranging from two days to three months. They saw scores of other women and children, but were unable to ascertain if some, or all, had also been abducted or if they were family members of the insurgents. The women and children ranged from infancy to 65 years old.

In the same vein, police reports indicate that upon interview and investigation, it could be deduced that most of the feminine suicide bombers were minors who may not have reached the age of criminal responsibility in Nigeria and most other countries. Moreover, further evidence from data obtained from police interviews have not shown any arrested suicide bomber who defiantly agreed that they were willing members of Boko Haram or that the women freely submitted themselves to extreme radicalisation (BBC News, 2014). This begs the question on why some women would be targeted and exploited in Nigeria by terrorist groups. Furthermore, the legal implications of dealing with female child terrorists arises and is an area deserving further academic inquiry. The mystery beclouding the location of the kidnapped Chibok girls further complicates the inquiry thereby calling for more scholarly activism in this area. Scholars like David Cook (2005), Debra Zedalis (2004), Ken Sofer (2012), O’Rourke (2009) and Katerina Standish (2008) posited clear sociological interpretations of incentives for feminine participation in terrorism and such topics have generated considerable theorizing across scholarly disciplines, however, more deserves to be achieved in view of the evolving trends in the contemporary religious, social, cultural, political and economic world order particularly in emerging economies.

One might wish to query the fuss about female terrorists in view of the much documented academic works around femininity and terrorism since the 1960s and 1970s in America. Third (2014) reiterates that as far back as the 1960s and the 1970s, “a crucial thread connects” the discourses which were “crosswired” (P.8). However, since the concepts have traversed domestic and global boundaries and has challenged age-long cultural, economic, political and religious affinities, the interrogation of the issues is necessary as “the figure of the female terrorist compels a re-examination of the ... limits of gendered (post) modernity” (Third 2014:8). The novelty, frequency/spate and the level of fatalities caused by female suicide bombers in Nigeria, drives the argument of this article. It supports the seminal works of David Cook (2005: 383) that “to date, women fighting in jihad have only been a factor in these nationalist—Islamic resistance movements (Palestinian and Chechen), but not in other globalist radical Muslim warfare”. This is partly reinstated by Jacques and Taylor which incidentally aligns with the events happening in Nigeria through Boko Haram’s terrorism.

This paper refutes the suggestion by Liz Sage (2013, p.74-75) that “...a woman’s own sense of disenfranchisement from national or international economic, social, or political spheres could be a potential motive... her violence comes from the domestic, familial sphere”. Sage’s repudiation of the seminal works of Cook and Jacques and Taylor on the grounds that it suggests that “in societies that take the masculine subject to be the norm—as is the case in patriarchal cultures across the globe—women’s violence is always posited as deviant in relation to the standard, and therefore “normal,” forms of violence executed by men” is an indication of working within a constrained epistemological underpinning. I argue like Cook (2005) as cited by (Sage, 2013) that (Nigerian) “women involved with militant...organisations as simply being the passive victims of an exploitative patriarchal culture”. More so, given the Nigerian experience of domestic violence and female suicide terrorism, evidence abound indicating that there is often forced indoctrination and compulsion from the men around her into “radical ideas” that has shaped her incursion into terrorism (New York Times, 2015). Despite the intense promotion of “woman’s agency” by Liz Sage (2013, p.78), it is argued in this paper that terrorism in Nigeria is mostly a masculine induced activity due to the desire to propagate a form of religious, political and cultural ideological viewpoint. There are no doubt that history of active female terrorist networks abound in other parts of the world, yet the Nigerian experiences presents some peculiarity that may not be easily diluted by opposing scholarly arguments. While it is not the intention of this paper to contribute in propagating feminism, it is also not intended to promote a doctrine of motivated woman terrorist nor collapse the woman’s agency hypothesis, rather, it argues for the need to appreciate that the current Nigerian situation reflects activities of certain misogynist, hypocritical and exploitative male extremist who have used all sinister means to drag some women into terrorism including the seminal kidnapping of the Chibok School Girls and using under-aged girls as explosive couriers.

#### *1.4. Female Suicide Terrorist in the Boko Haram Terrorist Group?*

According to BBC Africa news (2014), “Nigeria’s first female bomber - a middle-aged woman - struck in June: Riding a motorcycle, she went to a military barracks in the north-eastern city of Gombe, where she detonated her explosives while being searched at a checkpoint, killing one soldier”. Ever since the Gombe Barrack incident, there has been numerous strings of suicide bombings in Northeast Nigeria perpetrated by women. This underscores the paper’s focus in appraising whether this is the assumption of a radical feminist position or whether Boko Haram is exploiting the feminine vulnerability. In contextualising the discourse, this paper is not intended to portray the male terrorist as “an ideal gender-neutral yardstick against which to gauge female terrorism”, as argued by

Sage. Rather, it presents an objective analysis of issues relating to female suicide terrorism relying on secondary data compiled from different scholarly sources. This is intended to project a balanced analysis, unique to the Nigerian caseload. It starts by asking in line with Aljazeera report (2015), “whether the girls were recruited from within Boko Haram fold, lured by their operatives, abducted from communities within and outside Nigeria or sourced from human trafficking syndicates”? Empirical study suggests that most of the female suicide bombers caught before they could detonate their devices confess that they were often lured or at times coerced into carrying out suicide attacks (The New York Times, 2015; The Guardian, 2015). Human Rights Watch interview with some girls and women rescued from Boko Haram’s camp in Sambisa Forest states:

- The women and girls told Human Rights Watch that for refusing to convert to Islam, they and many others they saw in the camps were subjected to physical and psychological abuse; forced labour; forced participation in military operations, including carrying ammunition or luring men into ambush; forced marriage to their captors; and sexual abuse, including rape. In addition, they were made to cook, clean, and perform other household chores. Others served as porters, carrying the loot stolen by the insurgents from villages and towns they had attacked. While some of the women and girls seemed to have been taken arbitrarily, the majority appeared to have been targeted for abduction because they were students, Christians, or both.

Similarly, the WorldPost (28<sup>th</sup> February, 2015) in a celebrated interview with a gender and radicalisation researcher, Elizabeth Pearson, submits that “there have been some indications that families are involved in coercion. A 10-year-old girl who was arrested wearing a suicide vest last July was accompanied by her older sister and another older man. A 13-year-old girl arrested in December said she was coerced into carrying out a suicide attack by her father, who she described as a Boko Haram supporter. Another female suicide bomber last November was reportedly accompanied by two men, suggesting there may have been an element of doubt that she would go through with it”. Human Rights Watch (29<sup>th</sup> July, 2015) states further that “The captives are raped, forced to marry Boko Haram fighters and convert to Islam, and, sometimes, brainwashed to become suicide bombers”. These could be indicative of the naivety and lack of complicity of most of the Nigerian female suicide bombers and I argue that on the strength of these empirical evidence, most of the feminine used for Boko Haram suicide missions could have been coerced, intimidated or brainwashed into the act and therefore have not willingly participated in their terrorist activities.

However, it is acknowledged that scholars have advanced arguments on other factors that could motivate a woman to resort to suicide terrorism which arguably often arise from her experiences within the domestic sphere. Sofer (2012) cites women whose honour has been violated in ways such as this may often see martyrdom as a socially acceptable, and even encouraged, manner in which she restores the honour to herself and her family. Zedalis (2004) argues that another motivation for martyrdom that can arise for a woman after the loss of a man to combat is the manners in which she copes with the grieving of his loss. Grieving women’s “innocence, enthusiasm, personal distress, and thirst for revenge” (Zedalis, 2004, p.6) have been exploited by radicals seeking candidates to become suicide bombers”. Generically, scholarly arguments push factors like “the death of a loved one, a sexual assault, family dishonour, or the persuasive words of a militant man she loves obsessively are all often cited by studies as fully explaining her turn to violence” (Liz Sage, 2013, p.74). This line of thought, I argue does not presently reflect the pattern followed by Boko Haram female suicide bombers so far. Even though it could not be ruled out that Boko Haram may have female supporters and sympathisers, there are currently scant empirical evidence to support cases of defiant and radicalised female Boko Haram members. Rather, Aljazeera studies (2015) in line with other similar research empirically and consistently documented incidents of female suicide bombers within a given period in 2015, suggesting that they could have been forced into terrorism. According to Aljazeera studies (2015) research indicates that:

- On 8 June 2014, however, Boko Haram dispatched the first female suicide attacker to the 301 Battalion barracks of Nigerian Army in Gombe, Gombe State. The girl detonated the explosive concealed in her hijab (traditional dress), killing herself and a soldier. The attack was followed by the June 25 bombing at an energy depot in Lagos which was also executed by a female attacker. As of 20 January 2015, there have been a total of 15 female suicide bombings in Nigeria. Of the 17 attempted and actual female suicide bombing attackers, 15 detonated their explosives while 2 were arrested. A girl was caught in July 2014 in Katsina with bombs strapped to her body. Kano recorded the highest number (7 cases) followed by Borno and Yobe States ...”

Likewise, BBC Africa News (2014) notes in its timeline of female suicide bombing incidents:

- “8 June: A middle-aged woman arrives on a motorcycle at a military barracks in Gombe, detonating an explosive killing herself and a policeman
- 27 July: A teenager with an explosive device concealed under her veil blows herself up at a university campus in Kano, injuring five police officers
- 28 July: A young woman joins a kerosene queue at a filling station in Kano before her bomb detonates, killing three people and wounding 16 others
- 28 July: A teenager injures six people after exploding her device at a shopping centre in Kano
- 30 July: A teenager within a crowd of students at a college campus in Kano blows herself up, killing six people”.

The data above indicates that suicide attacks in Nigeria are increasingly conducted by women, mostly the under-aged who can more easily slip through checkpoints without detection and acting under the instructions of Boko Haram. Typically clad conservatively from head to toe, women are rarely stopped and even more rarely subjected to body searches, because it is considered improper in the Nigerian Islamic culture for a male to conduct bodily search on a woman (START, 2015). O’Rourke (2009) argues that “suicide attacks conducted by females are substantially more lethal than those conducted by men. Beyond mere numbers, however, female



suicide attacks are considered especially shocking since such actions violate the gender norms of the societies from which the attackers emerge” (p.682). Hence, Boko Haram in Nigeria exploits these facts by using women to smuggle weapons and bombs on their bodies knowing that they can usually pass through check-points without the necessary body searches. Through this method, they smuggle large cache of weapons and also execute dangerous suicide terrorist attacks.

It is a well-known fact that in the past, young boys were paid and lured into executing acts of intelligence gathering, spying, arson, thefts for Boko Haram and there was never an attempt at using women in carrying out such activities (Punch News, 2013). The sudden change in Boko Haram’s tactics throws more puzzles than answers in these circumstance. Could it be inferred that when women engage in terrorism, they are potentially becoming political agents and therefore are transgressing traditional feminine norms established by patriarchy that claim “women are apolitical [and] that women’s primary purpose and function is to be a mother and a wife rather than having an individual identity of her own” (Herman, 2010, p. 261-262). Moreover, experts say, the use of women in attacks offers a greater psychological impact against the target population and offers greater publicity to the attackers. According to Zedalis (2004), “using women in attacks also increases the number of potential combatants that a militant group can draw from...The success of suicide bombers considerably depends upon surprise and accessibility to targets...both of these requirements have been met by using women” (p.1). Others argue that female bombers are favoured by extremist groups due to the ability of the women to use their bodies in concealing weapons and explosive devices (Mazurana, 2013). Zedalis (2004, p.7) adds that terrorist organizations use women as weapons because they provide:

- Tactical advantage: stealthier attack, element of surprise, hesitancy to search women, female stereotype (e.g., nonviolent).
- Increased publicity (greater publicity = larger number of recruits).
- Psychological effect.

The motivations of suicide attackers in general are not well understood, what prompts women to strap on explosives and target crowds, for instance, is equally vexing. Like male suicide bombers, women who do attack tend to be younger and not very educated than their peers. Some reports indicate that certain women are motivated by revenge for male relatives or spouses killed in the continuing violence, while other anecdotal evidence suggests that others are unwittingly used to transport explosives that are remotely detonated (Mazurana, 2013, p.160-161).

While female suicide attackers are new to Nigeria, research indicates that there is a long history of such attacks by Sri Lankan, Chechnyan, Palestinian, and Turkish terrorists (Cohn, 2013). The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka have used women most frequently, conducting some 200 attacks or more. The uniqueness of the Nigerian experience is that it involves “using women and girls indoctrinated by male relatives, or else forced to carry out attacks against their will” (The Telegraph, 2014). Buttressing this line of argument, BBC Monitoring International Report 2008 and (Zavis as cited in Cohn 2013) states that “at times, women and girls are forcibly recruited and trained by husbands, relatives or local “emirs”...”. It goes on to reinforce the argument that vulnerable women are often at times coerced into “wearing explosive belts or transport bombs without knowing that the bomb will detonate by remote control” (Fried 2008; Kingsbury as cited in Cohn 2013). This reflects the dire situation Boko Haram terrorism has placed vulnerable Nigerian women into. It is therefore paramount to argue that Boko Haram’s use of femininity in achieving part of its terrorist campaign is a form of violence against women. The analysis in this paper indicates that almost all the female suicide bombings were coerced and relying on this empirical evidence, the pattern of female suicide bombings in Nigeria does not confirm to the patterns linked with the ISIS, Taliban, PKK, Hezbollah and the Chechnya where women willingly commit suicide bombings for these groups.




Figure 2: Female suicide incidents, June 2014- 11 January 2015

Source: Aljazeera Report 2015

## 2. Conclusion

There is no denial that there are cases of feminine involvement in suicide bombing in Nigeria. Empirical evidence espoused in this paper highlights how sustained it has been. Gauging from the spate of feminine allied suicide attacks in Nigeria, it appears that the trend may not abate easily, considering the violent recruitment methods used by Boko Haram in conscripting vulnerable women. There is also media propaganda by Boko Haram targeting younger women whom they appeal to join their group with the deceit that

they are waging a just religious jihad and would be rewarded as martyrs (Weinberg and Pedahzur, 2010). Recent events in France have given impetus to this topical issue while the feminine wings of ISIS from Syria and Iraq keep luring yet more helpless women into joining extremist terrorist groups possibly as suicide bombers. The power of the social media in contemporary global order cannot be underestimated so, it becomes pertinent to restate that this emerging trend should not be underrated or ignored in the discourse around terrorism. Gendered insurgency in Sub-Saharan Africa is thus an area deserving further research.

Evidence from this Nigerian case study suggests that the involvement of female suicide bombers at the time of writing this paper is premised on Boko Haram's use of force in the exploitation of the feminine vulnerability and neither a paradigm change nor does it "pose an express challenge to the patriarchal social order posed by radical feminism" (Third, 2014, p.8). The state of affairs today does not purport that it is a guarantee that the situation will remain static. In the words of Third (2014, p.8) "the figure of the feminine terrorist compels a re-examination of the project of radical politics and the limits of gendered (post) modernity".

This paper does not represent masculinity as misogynist, hypocritical, or exploitative. Rather, it argues that it is the activities of Boko Haram that has contextualised female suicide bombers as the instruments of certain masculine hegemony. Hence, the peculiarity of the female suicide bombers in Nigerian as spurred by Boko Haram terrorism does not suggest that "feminist ideals and fantasies of equality lead vulnerable women into the hands of men who would exploit them, or encourages women with "unnatural" predispositions to violent behaviour to actually harm others" rather it goes to reiterate according to (Mazurana, 2013:161) that "although ideological, emotional and economic circumstances may motivate women and girls to become suicide bombers, their involvement is by no means always voluntary".

In sum, "government's priority efforts should focus on leveraging women in counter violent extremism interventions, scaling up of gender-sensitive recruitment and training amongst the security agencies, neutralisation of Boko Haram's recruitment channels and effective identification and destruction of sanctuaries used for radicalisation" (Aljazeera Report, 2013).

### 3. References

- i. Alfred, C. (2015, February 28). How Boko Haram Uses Female Suicide Bombers to Terrorize Nigeria. The WorldPost.
- ii. Brinkel, T., & Ait-Hida, S. (2012). Boko Haram and Jihad in Nigeria. *Scientia Militaria South African Journal of Military Studies* 1–21, 7. Retrieved from <http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/994/992>.
- iii. Bassiouni, C.M. (1988). A Policy Oriented Inquiry into International Terrorism. In C.M.Bassiouni. (Eds.), *Legal Responses to International Terrorism: US Procedural Aspects* (pp. xv).The Netherlands: MartinusNijhoff.
- iv. Chothia, F. (2015, May 4). Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists? BBC Africa.
- v. Chothia, F. (2014, August 6). Boko Haram crisis: Nigeria's Female Bombers Strike.BBC Africa.
- vi. Cook, D. (2005). Women Fighting in Jihad? *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. vol. 28, no. 5, (2005): 375-384. Doi: 10.1080/10576100500180212.
- vii. Cohen, C. (eds). (2013). *Women and Wars: Contested Histories uncertain Futures*. Wiley Publishers.
- viii. Crenshaw, M. (2011). *Exploring Terrorism: Causes, processes and Consequences*. Routledge.
- ix. Crenshaw, M. (1987). Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and organisational Approaches. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 10 Issue 4. DOI: 10.1080/01402398708437313
- x. Crenshaw, M. (1995). Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Context. In M. Crenshaw (Eds.), *Terrorism in Context*.USA: Pennsylvania State University.
- xi. David, R. (Eds.). (2001). *Inside Terrorist Organisations*. London: Frank Cass.
- xii. Falola T. (1998). *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*. Rochester, N.Y: University of Rochester.
- xiii. France-Presse, A. (2015, November 18). Young female suicide bombers kill 15 in Nigeria market attack. The Guardian.
- xiv. Herman, S.N.(2010).The Gender Dimensions of Terrorism: Women and Terrorism: Keynote Address.Women's Rights Law Reporter, vol. 31. 258-337.
- xv. Human Rights Watch. "Those Terrible Weeks in Their Camp" Boko Haram Violence against Women and Girls in Northeast Nigeria. Retrieved December 15, 2015, from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/10/27/those-terrible-weeks-their-camp/boko-haram-violence-against-women-and-girls>.
- xvi. Human Rights Watch. (n.d). A Long Way Home: Life for the Women Rescued from Boko Haram. Retrieved December 22, 2015, from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/29/long-way-home-life-women-rescued-boko-haram>.
- xvii. Jacques, K., & Taylor, P. J. (2008). Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons? *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* vol. 31, no. 4, (2008): 304-326. doi: 10.1080/10576100801925695.
- xviii. Laqueur, Walter. (1977). Interpretations of Terrorism: Fact, Fiction and Political Science. *Journal of Contemporary History* vol. 12, no. 1, 1-42. doi:10.1177/002200947701200101.
- xix. Mazurana, D. (2013). Women, Girls, and Non-State Armed Opposition Group in Cohen, C. (eds). *Women and Wars: Contested Histories uncertain Futures*. Wiley Publishers.
- xx. Mohanty, J. K. (2006) *Terrorism and Militancy in Central Asia*. Delhi: Kalpaz.
- xxi. Nacos, B. (2005).The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* vol. 28, no. 5, 435-451. doi:10.1080/10576100500180352.
- xxii. Ndahi, M. (2013, August 17). JTF, Boko Haram Suspects Female Vigilante Arrest. Vanguard.

- xxiii. Nossiter, A. (2015, April 14) Boko Haram Abducted Nigerian Girls One Year Ago. *New York Times*.
- xxiv. Nossiter, A. (2015, January 10). In Nigeria, New Boko Haram Suicide Bomber Tactic: 'It's a Little Girl. *New York Times*.
- xxv. Obi, C., & Ezeogu, U. A. (2013). The Mortality of Suicide Terrorism and Boko Haram Challenges in Nigeria. *UJAH UNIZIK Journal of Arts and Humanities* 14, no. 3 174-191. Retrieved from <http://www.ajol.info/index.php/ujah/article/viewFile/106106/96077>.
- xxvi. Obiora, A. & Toomey S. (2010) Federalism and Gender Politics in Nigeria in M. Haussman, M. Sawyer & J. Vickers (Eds), *Federalism, Feminism and Multilevel Governance* (pp.211). England: Ashgate.
- xxviii. Okai, N. (2014). Terrorism in West Africa: Boko Haram, Adding Some Few Recommendations to the Yamoussoukro Declaration. *International Journal of Innovative Research & Development Vol 3 Issue 5 ISSN 2278-0211*. Retrieved from <http://www.ijird.com/index.php/ijird/article/viewFile/49370/40015>.
- xxix. Onuoha F. C., & George, T. (2015, March 17). Boko Haram's use of Female Suicide Bombing in Nigeria. *Aljazeera Reports*.
- xxx. O'Rourke, L. (2009). What's Special about Female Suicide Terrorism? *Security Studies*. 18:681-718. DOI: 10.1080/09636410903369084.
- xxxi. Pedahzur, A. (2005). *Suicide Terrorism*. Cambridge UK: Polity Press.
- xxxii. Pedahzur, A. & Weinberg, L. (2010). *Suicide Terrorism*. *Religion Compass* 4/4 (2010): 234-244, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2009.00206.x
- xxxiii. Pflanz, M. (2014, July 31). 10-year-old would-be suicide bomber arrested in Nigeria. *The Telegraph*.
- xxxiv. Rajan, J. V. G. (2011). *Women Suicide Bombers: Narratives of Violence*. London: Routledge.
- xxxv. Ross, W. (2014, April 21). Chibok Abductions in Nigeria: More than 230 Seized. *BBC News*.
- xxxvi. Ross, W. (2014, November 10). Nigeria School Blast in Potiskum Kills Dozens. *BBC News*.
- xxxvii. Sage, L. (2013). The Impossible Terrorist: Women, Violence and Disavowal of Female Agency in Terrorism Discourses. *JPCS*, Vol.4, No1.
- xxxviii. Schmid, A. (Ed.). (2011). *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. London and New York: Routledge.
- xxxix. Schmid, A. P. and Jongman, A. (1988). *Political terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories and literature* New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- xl. Sergie, A. M., & Toni, J. (2015). Boko Haram. *United States Institute of Peace*. Retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739>.
- xli. Silke, A. (Eds). (2004). *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*. London: Frank Cass.
- xlii. Skaine, R. (2006). *Female Suicide Bombers*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
- xliii. Sofer, K. (2012). The unaddressed threat of female suicide bombers. *Centre for American Progress*. Retrieved from <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2012/01/05/10992/the-unaddressed-threat-of-female-suicide-bombers/>
- xliv. Spivak, G. C. (1994). Can the Subaltern Speak? In Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, (Eds.), *Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader*. (pp 67-111). Harlow: Pearson Education, Ltd.
- xlv. Standish, K. (2008) *Human Security and Gender: Female Suicide Bombers in Palestine and Chechnya* [Online]. *Peace & Conflict Review* Volume 1, Issue 2 ISSN: 1659-3995. Retrieved from <http://www.review.ucepeace.org/pdf.cfm?articulo=73&ejemplar=13>.
- xlvi. Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office, Department of Defense, and the Office of University Programs, Department of Homeland Security. College Park MD: START. (n.d). *Boko Haram: An Assessment of Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options*. Retrieved January 2, 2016, from [https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START\\_%20SMA-AFRICOM\\_Boko%20Haram%20Deep%20Dive\\_Jan2015.pdf](https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_%20SMA-AFRICOM_Boko%20Haram%20Deep%20Dive_Jan2015.pdf).
- xlvii. The Clarion Project Fact Sheet. (n.d). *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Group*. Retrieved December 20 2015, from <http://www.clarionproject.org/factsheet/boko-haram-nigerias-islamist-group>.
- xlviii. Tonwe, D. A., & Eke, S. J. (2013), *State Fragility and Violent Uprisings in Nigeria* [Online] *African Security Review*, Vol. 22, No. 4. doi: 10.1080/10246029.2013.838794.
- xlix. Tupman, W.A. (1989). *Towards a Typology of Terrorism: Criticisms and Definitions in the Field of Political Violence*. Brookfield Press.
1. Usam Sadiq, A & Dionne, S. (2016, February 10). Young Bombers Kill 58 at Nigeria Camp for those Fleeing Boko Haram. *The New York Times*.
- li. Victor, B. (2004). *Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers*. London: Robinson.
- lii. Ward, I. (2009). *Law, Text, Terror*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
- liii. White, J. R. (2002) *Terrorism: An Introduction*. (Update). London: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.
- liv. Yonah, A. (Ed). (1976). *International Terrorism, National, Regional and Global Perspectives*. New York: Praeger.
- lv. Yusuf, O H. (2013). Harvests of Violence - Neglect of Basic Rights and the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria. *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 6 (3) n/a(n/a), 1-21. 10.1080/17539153.2013.835528.
- lvi. Zedalis, D. (2004). *Female Suicide Bombers Strategic Studies Institute*. Retrieved from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub408.pdf>.