The Upsurging Waves of Islamic Fundamentalism and the Case for Nigeria's Development: Institution, Structural Processes, and System

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Abstract:
Islamic fundamentalism, sequel to the demise of the Cold War, surfaced as the new form of confrontation on a global scale. Nigeria has not been spared as it has experienced its own share of religious-fundamentalist based violence, especially from July 2009, following the resurgence of Boko Haram on the political scene. This paper investigates the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism as epitomized in Boko Haram and Nigeria's quest for development. It seeks to answer the question: is there a conception of development within Islamic fundamentalism? How is it pursued and attained? How would these pursued goals leave the Nigerian state at the end? The paper argues that the activities of Boko Haram has had adverse effects on the political, economic and socio-cultural developmental chart of Nigeria by causing loss of lives, properties and businesses, political instability, the state of public fear and intolerance, and weakened national integration. The thrust of this paper is to examine how the Nigerian Constitution, corrupt structural processes in the military, and the failure of the Almajiri system of education caused the wave of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria. It, therefore, recommends that government needs to fight corruption, place utmost attention on the welfare of the citizens, incorporate the Almajiri system into the Ministry of Education, and amend sections of the Constitution which supports the imposition of the Sharia.

Keywords: Islamic fundamentalism, development, secularism, Almajiri System

1. Introduction

The evolution of the human society to the Post-Modern/Enlightenment and post-industrialization society has brought along with it the resurgence of the "sacred" as encapsulated within religion but in a radicalized fashion, as well as the need to reverse the Western secularist idea of the separation of the State from religion. Thus, modernity which promotes secularism that emphasizes the need for religion to be de-emphasized from the socio-economic and political strata of public life and to only occupy its place in a past and long-lost golden-age, has been met with huge confrontations. Prior to this time, scholars especially of Western origin such as Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimur I. Lenin, Friedrich Nietzche, etc., pushed for the demise of religion in entirety, paid little or no attention to the study of religion but pressed for a more aggressive study of the modern state vis-à-vis secularist lines and Western political, economic and social ideals, and they were poised at demystifying religious world views because they were taken to be based mainly in the realm of individual private life.

However, from the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the concomitant fall of the USSR cum Communism, the new-found form of confrontation, as Huntington (1996) wrote about, was one of a clash of civilization woven primarily along religious lines where emerging Confucian (mainly communist China) and Islamic (mainly the Arab world/Middle-East) non-Western civilizational societies would powerfully oppose and would vehemently be at loggerheads with the victorious post-Cold War Western Civilization. Huntington's view makes more sense when one thinks of the Hindu-Sikh confrontations in India, the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf war, the Lebanese crisis, the 9/11 attack of the World Trade Centre in 2001, the 2012 "Arab Spring", the Syrian Civil war, the Central African Republic's (CAR) crisis, and so on. In this view, we cannot but realize, the role religion has played (and is still playing) in wars/conflicts which directly or indirectly shapes human life, history, religious belief system, and the roles and nature of the modern state, government and religious institutions. Thus, it can be said to be a categorical fact that religion has been one of the most

conspicuous platforms upon which a myriad of wars/conflicts have be fought, upon which many lives, cities and means of livelihood have been ravaged, and upon which many tyrannical systems have been instituted.

The Nigerian State cannot be excluded from the overwhelming cases of religious-fundamentalist based violence. As a matter of fact, it cannot be conceived that the Nigerian State is talked of without the notion of religion (and ethnicity) surfacing within such discourse. This is because it has always played a very crucial role in the life of the society from the pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence periods. The Jihadist movement of Uthman dan Fodio the 30 months Civil War, the incorporation of Nigeria into the Organization of Islamic Country (OIC) and its resulting controversies, the partial adoption of the Sharia in some states of the Federation and the riots that ensued, the Matatsine riots, and the Boko Haram insurgency and terrorism, just to mention a few, are quintessential cases.

It is worth reiterating that the Nigerian State has had (and is having) its own share of religious-fundamentalist based violence. A vast number of which have been studied and presented as academic papers. The purpose of this piece, therefore, is to look at one of the aspects of religious fundamentalism which is Islamic Fundamentalism as manifested by Boko Haram and its relation to the concept of development. It poses and seeks to answer questions like: Is there a conception of development within Islamic Fundamentalism? And if there is, how is it pursued and attained? How would the utilized means and perceived goals leave the Nigerian State in the end? It is our aim that we add to the debate on the role of religion (specifically Islam) and its sectarian fundamentalist tenets to the management and development of Nigeria.

2. Conceptual Clarification

2.1. Islamic Fundamentalism

"Islamic Fundamentalism" has been a largely contested concept vis-à-vis its meaning, description and characteristics in both the intelligentsia and lay-man spheres. To that extent, therefore, there is no universally accepted meaning or description of the phenomenon, Islamic Fundamentalism. The plethora of views about the phenomenon, nonetheless, there exists certain key facts which aid our grasping of the issue at hand. The concept, Islamic Fundamentalism, is a combination of two terms, "Islamic" and "Fundamentalism". The adjectival term, "Islamic", is derived from the noun, "Islam". Islam is the name of one of the world's largest religion groups which propagates, and is guided by, the five pillars of the belief in, and worship of (via the medium of Arabic alone), an all mighty being known as 'Allah', fasting, almsgiving and pilgrimage to Mecca (Exhibition Islam, 2013) as embedded in its religious texts, the 'Qur'an' or 'Koran' (perceived to be the exact words or revelations of Allah, in verbatim, for which all adherents must live by), and the "Sunnah" and/or the "Hadith" (which are the composed commentaries/accounts of the life, teachings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad) - which are believed to be the two primary sources of Islamic theology and (Shari'a) law. The adherents referred to above are called "Muslims" or as it is sometimes (mis)spelt, "Moslems", and they are majorly dispersed into one of the two denominations: Sunni and Shia. This goes in line with the observation of Exhibition Islam (2013), where it was noted that "even the name stands out unique among other religions in that it means a state of being" (peace, submission, salutation, salvation, etc.); "it does not refer to any particular person such as Christianity, Buddhism or Zoroastrianism; a tribe like Judaism; or a nation like Hinduism".

On the other hand, certain crucial questions come to mind when attempts are made to decipher the term, fundamentalism. Is it substantially tied to religious connotations alone or are there some potent truths when fundamentalism is used vis-à-vis certain aspects of secular Western civilization? Even if the religious aspect is taken as ideal, is there a universal fundamentalist exposition for the world's religious in entirety? Can the term fundamentalism be ascribed to all religious movements in the world (both past and present)? Can people hold fundamentalist principles without being essentially violent? Also, does every fundamentalist movement result to a theocracy? As we bear these questions in mind, it is noteworthy that fundamentalism is both moderate and radical what Roy (1994) saw as 'traditionalist' and 'reformist' or what Macdonald (2002) perceived as 'historically progressive' and 'reactionary' positions), as well as both religious and secularist (Communist China under Mao Zedong, Marxist-Leninist Russia under V. I. Lenin/J. Stalin, the West's push for neo-liberal democracy and global capitalism, etc) in nature. However, the emphasis here is on the religious and radical purviews.

Fundamentalism, which was first used to identify a certain movement in Protestant Christianity in the US in the 1920s (Vorster, 2008), and which is believed to have been formed from the title of the book *"The Fundamentals"*- 12 volumes published between 1909-15, to confirm the fundamentals of Christianity (Herbert, 1957) - is an organized movement of conservatives, to borrow from Harle (2014), aimed at reversing the liberal Christian failure to counter the forces of democracy, industrial and scientific progress which has diminished the church's authority over the state. Also, it is seen as the belief that every Biblical record is absolutely true and infallible owing to its (the Bible's) divine inspiration, hence, only a Christian who believes in the divine inspiration and absoluteness of the Bible can be termed a fundamentalist, and by extension, being a fundamentalist is a prerequisite for being a "true" Christian. To Kressel (2007), fundamentalism is the approach to religion that sees believers embrace an early form of their religion, to consider it beyond criticism and worthy enough to be enforced upon oneself (or others) without having to accommodate modern evidences or logical arguments against it. Similarly, Timamy (2007) defined it as implying a belief in a single, rigid, and an unadulterated view that entertains no other view within that frame of thought or broad church (or other religious institutions like the Mosque, Synagogue, etc). Taking a cue from the foregoing, Islamic Fundamentalism, which though according to Shepard (1987) is not used by Muslims nor does it have an equivalent in Arabic; thus, more accurately referred to by many Middle-Eastern Marxists, e.g. Mansoor Hekmat, as political Islam (Macdonald, 2002), refers to the overwhelming and dogged adherence to a monolithic view enveloped within Islam which involves the literal interpretation and practice of the Qur'an and the Sunnah/Hadith, the establishment of an Islamic theocracy where the Shari'a laws are practiced, the (forceful) institution of this monolithic precept to the non-Muslim world, and the draconian

punishment or execution of 'Arnas' (infidels). Islamic fundamentalism can also be seen as the opposition to the perceived polluting influence of the West and other non-Muslim societies and the imposition of 7th and 8th centuries' Islamic doctrines as recorded in Qur'an and taught by the Prophet Muhammad and the 18th century teaching of Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, on contemporary societies without bearing in mind the evolutionary/reformative changes these societies have undergone since the 7th, 8th and 18th centuries.

The Islamic Fundamentalists believe Islam and the Shari'a to be the only suitable way of life, they aspire to state power, reject secularism and religious diversification, and seek the return of the long-lost golden age of Islam, thus, their profession of a "one-size-fit-all" model. Little wonder Timamy (2007) writes that "whatever the ranks within its structure or monolithic regime, the singular belief itself… is regarded as sacrosanct, infallible…. supreme. Therefore, given these doctrinal premises, any opposition to, or rejection of, such a deified dogma would be treated as sacrilege of the most intolerable kind".

2.2. Development
The term development is a very complex one. It has varied meanings depending on the context. At times, it is even not unusual for one to observe that the term growth is used to mean the same thing as development and in an exclusive economic sense. It is, however, worthy of emphasis that both have distinct meanings, as well as being multi-dimensional concepts which cut across economic, political, social, technological, cultural, ideological and individual aspects (see also Rodney, 1972). Hence, the availability of a very broad scopes. This paper, however, will concentrate on just two aspects of the scope: the economic and political aspects.

2.2.1. Economic Development
We live in a world where there is a dichotomy in the levels of wealth and poverty between nations. This unevenness propelled economists from Smith, Ricardo, Marx, Engel down to Keynes to provide guidelines as to how this is the case and the way forward (Jhingan, 2005). Marx wrote of the super- (the political) and sub- (the economic) structures, with the sub-structure being at the heart of the development of any society, thus, the stronger the economy, the stronger the polity, and vice versa. Economic development simply involves the (increased) creation of wealth of a nation and the increase in the standard of living of the people through the use of natural and human resources of a nation and the expansion of the productive, manufacturing, industrial, constructive and servicing capabilities of the nation. There is a two-way channel between these capabilities and other factors: First, before these capabilities are attained, there must be the introduction of novel skills, technologies, techniques and expert personnel; and second, these skills, technologies, techniques and expert personnel are most likely going to be improved if these capabilities need to meet the constant economic evolutionary course of society. Economic development does not just talk about more output, labour force, consumption, per capita income, volume of trade, capital, infrastructures, etc.; those are the realm of economic growth. But economic development talks about those and about the qualitative improvement of the human person and in the distributive frameworks of the gains economic growth in the form of food security, job creation, wealth, industrialization, increased technological know-how, human capital, etc. Little wonder Jhingan (2005) takes development to mean growth plus change. Thus, Seer's (1992) definition of (economic) development as the realization of human personality via the progressive elimination of poverty, unemployment and inequality (cited in Aiguosatile & Akov, 2011:23) – which constitute the three basic indices around which economic development centres - is pertinent.

2.2.2. Political Development
The political spectrum is very important because it ensures the formulation, coordination and implementation of sound policies, programs and processes to ensure the drive for economic, socio-cultural, technological development and for the sustenance and improvement of the level of the development attained. Political development refers to the maturation of a political system vis-à-vis its capacity to attain popular support (legitimacy) for its regimes. The maintenance of law and order, the ability to ensure the authoritative distribution of the gains of economic development, the provision of institutions and legal frameworks to respect the fundamental human rights of individual citizens, and the consistency in the practice of a system that allows the people's views and suggestions to matter and allowance for reforms when necessary. Also, political development emphasizes the increased functioning of state institutions such as the bureaucracy, political parties, etc, the instilment of transparency and accountability among public officials, practice of constitutionalism, adhering to the rule of law, the conduct of periodic free and fair elections as well as how well interests are formed and pursued. This calls to mind aggregate (public) interests and articulate (private) interests. It is worth opining that the political development talked about here is tied to the apron strings of the secular Western liberal democracy. To that extent, therefore, though it may seem bias, as well as very debatable when viewed in the lights of states like China and Russia which practice Socialist democracy, any country that does not practice liberal democracy cannot, technically, be said to be politically developed.

3. Islamic Fundamentalism and the Perception of Development
We have mentioned earlier that development is a process of change (within several scopes - political, economic, socio-cultural, etc.) pursued by a nation or region so as to move from a less favorable condition to a more favorable condition and comfortable status quo, where the quality of life of individual citizens, the political system, economy and social environment are the prime foci for improvement. So far, we have dealt with the political and economic conceptions of development. Now the question is, do the Islamic fundamentalists have a conception of development? If they do, how is this development perceived and pursued by the Islamic fundamentalists? On a more minute scale, a basic change in the current status quo of societal life is longed for where religion holds preeminence. Here, the yearning for a national, and probably a global society, in which everyone buys into the values and beliefs of

the Islamic fundamentalists who see themselves as having a messianic mission to propagate these 'values and beliefs' on behalf of Allah, and their adoption for daily living as the most profound way of life, is unending. In this vein, as Dower (2009:24) notes, a fundamentalist has a vision of a society in the future in which everyone accepts his beliefs. To wet the intellectual appetite of the most inquisitive of us, Dower (2009) asks a critical question: "how are these features -wanting others to accept their values and having a vision of the future- different from how many of us who do not see ourselves as fundamentalists think of development?" Or one may put it more precisely to suit this section of the work: 'is the secularist Western liberal perception of development comparable with the Islamic fundamentalists' perception of development?

It is worth noting that the Islamic fundamentalists have their conception of development. According to Emerson (1995), the tenets of militant Islamic fundamentalism not only mandate adherence to a strict religious lifestyle, but provide 'Islamic' views on politics, economics, social behavior, personal conduct and nearly everything else in daily life. To that extent, therefore, it can be noted that (political) religion on a communal/nationalist basis as was practiced in the 7th, 8th and 18th centuries AD, is seen as the core and precursor of every other form of development to be experienced in any society. What is clear here is that the Islamic fundamentalists preach social communication/relationship and development in the name of God. Also, it is the view of this paper, just as Nigel Dower tends to argue, that both the liberal and fundamentalist perceptions of development are compatible in means (the use of violence acting in democratic ways like joining parliament, parties, etc.) but not in goals. However, it is our strong conviction that an underlying difference in the liberal and fundamentalist view of development is in the motivational and/or inspirational (psychological) drive which guides them and the means utilized. Religious precepts are not underpinned in the secular Western vision of fundamentalism. But this is the case in Islamic fundamentalism. This makes the fundamentalists ever ready to use the most hostile means available to get the attention of a targeted audience and pass their message(s) across vis-à-vis the existing time of societal progress (if we may). This lends credence to the observation of Brigadier S. K. Malik of Pakistan, "terrorism (violence) is infinitely superior and more effective than conventional warfare because in Islam a war fought for the cause of Allah… all means and forms are justified and righteous" (Uji & Tserakaa, 2014). No wonder, Blaise Pascal noted that "men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious conviction" (Ilechukwu, 2014). Thus, the liberals are a lot more reluctant to use certain forms of violence while the reverse is the case for the Islamic fundamentalists. This is a key distinction.

Though Islamic fundamentalism is inclined to pursue the restoration of the fundamentals of the Islamic faith thus, is anti-modernist and anti-secularist (Edwards, 2005), Emerson (1995), however, perceives its goals to be, in reality, an all-encompassing political movement as well (see also Macdonald, 2002), demanding: "recreation of the Muslim Empire known as the Khalifa; absolute rejection of Western systems and values such as Capitalism, Marxism, democracy and separation of church and state; re-imposition of the old social and religious order in accordance with the Shari'ah (Islamic Law), under which second-class citizenship would be formalized for women and non-Muslims ; and inalterable rejection of the West". This is closely linked with Roy's (1994) observation that the (neo) fundamentalists out rightly oppose the influence of Western beliefs, ideas and values, e.g., mode of dressing, salutation style, sporting activities, etc., and as such this limits the Muslim public space to the family and mosque. But if the last print is to be accepted quite so, one cannot but ponder on the question, "if fundamentalism is more concerned with limiting the Muslim public space to the family and the mosque, why then do fundamentalists emphasize nationalism?" It needs reiterating that the establishment of a sole Islamic state and an all-out allegiance to that state is a goal of Islamic fundamentalism (though not all Islamic fundamentalist movements lead to the creation of this theocratic state), thus, this brings to the fore, the fact that human society has moved from the family to the city system and to the (nation-) state system (as well as the international/ global system). To that extent therefore, the Islamic fundamentalism's perception of development is quite distinct from the modernist/ secularist societies' perception of development, and as such, when attempts are made to impose the former within the latter, this may have dire effects on the development of the latter.

4. Islamic Fundamentalism and the Development of Nigeria

As Emerson (1995) noted and rightly too that, "… Islamic fundamentalist movements have proliferated beyond the local regions and cities where they had been simmering since the 1940's. From their bases in the Middle East, these movements have spread into Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan and Nigeria, as well as into the US, Europe and large parts of the former Soviet Union". Also, the World Review (2013) discussed that Islamic extremist groups pose growing threat in Africa; the countries most affected being Mali, Nigeria, and Somalia (which are all strategically relevant). These movements include al Qaeda, ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), Boko Haram, Al-Shebaab, Hamas, Hiz'b al-Tahrir (the Islamic Liberation Party), Ansar Dine, Ansaru, AQIM (al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreh), Gamaa Islamiyah, Palestine Islamic Jihad, etc.

In Nigeria, Islamic fundamentalism epitomized by the "Jama' atul Ahlus Sunnah Lidda' Awati Wal Jihah" which in Arabic translates as: "the Sunni Community committed to the propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad" (Shuaibu, Saleh & Shehu, 2015; Campbell, 2014; Idahosa, 2015), popularly known as "Boko Haram" (which translates as 'Western education is sinful) or "Wilayat Ghard Afriqiya (Islamic State West Africa Province) which it currently refers itself as to show allegiance to, and to show it is a branch of ISIL (wikipedia.org, 2016), has had gangrenous precipitations since its formation by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 in north-eastern Nigeria. Its primary goal is to create an Islamic theocracy vis-à-vis the Shari'a in Nigeria, and to expel Christian communities, secularist activities, Western ideals, and all those who accept 'the polluting' Western influences from (northern) Nigeria, as well as Ogunlesi (2015) noted, denouncing Sufi, Shiite and Izala Muslims as infidels. The Nigerian state has been largely unstable because of the consistency of the attacks by this sect, especially since July 2009. This has resulted in the gargantuan challenges of the insecurity of lives and property, the state of public fear and (religious) intolerance cum onslaught, as well as the weakening of national

integration. Its activities like bombing market places, police stations, churches, mosques, schools; kidnapping; arson; raiding and ravaging any locality it intends usurping; gun-battles with security forces; suicide bombing; violent execution of 'infidels' be it foreigners or locals; men, women or children; Christians, Muslims or others; and civilians and combatants alike; etc, instigates these problems and have had adverse effects on the development of Nigeria.

On the political front, "Boko Haram believes that it requires a change of political regime in Nigeria because the democratic and secular constitution is an affront to the laws of Allah" (Idahosa, 2015). This could be seen in the groups usurpation of more than 130 villages in north-eastern Nigeria (especially in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states), and its declaration of an Islamic caliphate and flying al-Qaeda's flag within these communities and as Braun (2015) notes as at the start of 2015, Boko Haram controlled about 20 local government areas in north-eastern Nigeria (a territory the size of Belgium). So as Modifi (2014:163) opines, "they attempt to political change, dominate over the power and form religious government" (headed by religious experts, Ulama, as in the case in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan - what some scholars call political Islam or Islamism). This validates N. D. Danjibo's position that the "Umma Mahammadiya" (Muslim faithful) and "Dar-ul-Islam" (Islamic community) cannot be compromised in the face of Western influence, and results in politics being 'religionized' and religion being 'politicized' (Emerson & Hartman, 2006). Owing to the disruption of peace, unity and integration and increase in the vicious cycle of violence/ restiveness, there exists, to borrow from Emerson (1995), a duel-to-the-death challenge over whose God and whose state/values will reign supreme: the Nigerian state's or Boko Haram's?

More so, the sect's activities have negatively affected the economic structure of Nigeria; economic growth and development have been slowed. This is because of the state of insecurity created in the nation. When insecurity and terrorism is the case like in Nigeria, investors, who are to facilitate industrial growth and employment generation, would avoid such unfavourable crisis-ridden business environment, thereby, impoverishing the economy. Okorocha (2012) in Adebayo (2014) noted that according to a World Investment Report (WIR) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Nigerian economy lost a whooping ₦1.33 trillion Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) owing to Boko Haram's activities. FDI flows to Nigeria have been depleting over the years. According to the CBN statistics (www.tradingeconomics.com), FDI flows fell to 4693.83 million USD in 2014 from 5608.45 million USD in 2013, and further fell to 3064.17 million USD in 2015. These statistics are quite similar to the World Bank's where FDI flows fell from 8841.11 million USD in 2011 to 7069.93 million USD in 2012, 5562.87million USD in 2013, and to $4655.85 million USD in 2014 (worldbank.org). Thus, a downward slope in the FDI flows is the only available reality. Also, businesses have been closed, abandoned or destroyed in affected states. Former Minister of Information, Mr. Labaran Maku, purported that Boko Haram's attack on Kano State especially is so significant because it affected the multi-billion naira Kano Textile Market, otherwise called the Kanti-Kwari Market, regarded to be the oldest and biggest textile markets in sub-Saharan Africa, and as such it affected the foundation of economic and social well-being of the northern region (Adebayo, 2014). Also, a vast wealth of human capital and labour time have been lost. The New York Times (November 18, 2015) noted that since the current insurgency in 2009, it has killed over 20,000 and displaced over 2.3 million from their homes.

Also, since Islamic fundamentalism is perceived as antithetical to the ideals of modernism/ secularism, the disparate socio-cultural contents of the latter-human rights, democracy, liberalism, individualism, feminism, sexual equality and mutual tolerance, pluralism, (Western) education, etc., have been meted with fierce rivalries. For instance, the sect aspires at a radical rejection/ reversal of Western education. In view of achieving this feat, the sect has been dogged in attacking schools at all levels – universities, polytechnics, colleges, secondary and primary schools- specifically in the northeast and the FCT. As Ilechukwu (2014) writes, "already, UNESCO estimates that Nigeria is home to 45% of the global school drop-out population and has 10.5 million children out of schools. The insurgence of Boko Haram is increasing these numbers today … (because of) the shutting down of all the schools in some states in northern Nigeria… thereby leading Nigeria to mass illiteracy". The sect has also been accused of violating the human rights of especially women and children residing in the north. The kidnapping of and threat of selling 276 girls from their school in Chibok in April 2014 and the kidnapping of over 100 women and children in Gumsuni, Borno State in December 2014, are cases in point. Vorster (2008:45) raises a valid point when he says that "the surge of fundamentalism is a present reality and it inhibits peace keeping and the maintenance of human rights in parts of the world troubled by violence and the violation of the principles of human dignity". It can even be said that Boko Haram has achieved some measure of success in its attack on Western Education. Tell Magazine of August 10 (2009:34) reported that students especially in tertiary institutions in Borno and Yobe states like the University of Maiduguri, Ramat Polytechnic, Maiduguri, Federal Polytechnic, Damaturu, and others, withdrew from school, tore their certificates and joined the group for Qur'anic lessons and preaching (see also, Ilechukwu, 2014). Little wonder Appleby and Martin (2002) noted that though the poor and uneducated are very sympathetic about the ideals of Islamic fundamentalism, at other times, "recruits come from the educated unemployed or underemployed, or form gainfully employed teachers, engineers, medical technicians and other professionals in the applied sciences…"

5. The Increasing Wave of Islamic Fundamentalism in Nigeria: Institution, Structural Processes, and System

Islamic fundamentalism epitomized in Boko Haram has gained monumental grounds in northeastern Nigeria especially since the sect's adoption of the Salafi Jihadist ideology in 2009, and as such, the Boko Haram sect has indeed undertaken a public rejection of the Nigerian government's policies and its relations to certain sections of society. The group has been very problematic; causing mayhem for the country and 'making the government look incapable' of protecting its citizens. Also, Boko Haram's challenges are multi-faceted which make it more difficult for the government to tackle the menace, all to the detriment of the people. Now the question is: what factors do produce the menacing wave of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria? Is it tied to economic frustration, joblessness,

poverty? State neglect/relative deprivation, regional history? Political corruption? Injustice? The global Islamic revival bandwagon and religious bigotry? A lot has been written by scholars on the causal factors of Islamic fundamentalism as animated by Boko Haram in Nigeria. However, it is our view that certain factors, which are in and of themselves, very important, have been ignored or watered-down.

First is the institution of the constitution. The Nigerian Constitution is believed to be one which is secularist in nature. It does not provide for state religion nor does it stipulate a fusion between the affairs of the state/ government and religion; both religion and government are in separate realms. This point is aptly captured in Chapter 1, Part II, Section 10 of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution, which reads, "The government of the Federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as State Religion" (LL 24) and in Chapter IV, Section 38(1), which reads, "Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance" (Nigerian Constitution, 1999:LL 39). However, contradictions do exist which may make one question the secularity of the Nigerian Constitution. The provision, in Chapter 1, Part II, Section 6(5) (f and g) of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, and a Sharia Court of Appeal of a state is a quintessence. As Ordy (2015:213) notes, 'the Koran is the principal source of Islamic Law (the Sharia)'. Thus, if the Sharia is adopted, the Koran becomes more like a constitution, and by extension, an Islamic state will evolve sooner or later. It is worth reiterating here that one of the fundamental aims of the Boko Haram sect is the establishment of Sharia Laws and Islam as State Laws and State Religion respectively. We believe strongly that the Nigerian Constitution is helping to facilitate the attainment of this goal because sequel to the move to civilian democratic rule in 1999, nine Muslim-majority states (Bauchi, Borno, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara States) and some parts of three Muslim-plurality states (Gombe, Kaduna, and Niger states) in northern Nigeria, adopted the Sharia (and consequently, the Qur'an) as the main "Law Giver"; the main body of Civil Law and Criminal Law. This action resulted in heating-up the polity following series of Christian-Muslims riots and onslaught regarding the violation of the right to freedom of religion, and creating a radical sect whose aims aligned with the adoption of the Sharia laws. Also, it has been argued that the Nigerian Constitution is more Islamic than secular. Bagobiri and Basun (2014) note that "Islam is mentioned in the Constitution 28 times and Muslim 10 times, Sharia 73 times, (Grand) Khadi 54 times but Christ, Christian and the Church were never mentioned" (in Idahosa, 2015). The question now is: is a 21st century secular nation as Nigeria ready for the strictly revolutionist/radical ideologies which Boko Haram and its pursuit of political Islam and the Shari'ah tends to bring? This is because as Campbell (2014) purports, "Nigeria is a society where the question of peace, stability and prosperity are clearly linked to the building of a secular society free of religious zealots". Hence, Boko Haram's motive of Islamizing (northern) Nigeria is of grave concern because, as "Nigeria is not an Islamic nation and any attempt to convert the entire country to Islam may structurally create an imbalance in the cultural, political, economic and ideological relativities that hold the country in place as one nation with diverse glamorization of her beauty as a country with diverse interest in occupation, ambition and vision".

Furthermore, another factor which billows the menacing wave of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria is the corruption in the nation's defense and security structures. As J. Peter Pham, director of African Centre a Washington D.C., noted "Nigeria's military has been in decline for the past 16 years ever since the country has moved from a military dictatorship to a democracy in 1999. The intervening years have seen the country's armed forces hollowed out by a combination of poor leadership, graft, and misdirected staff training…" (www.time.com, 2015). This decline creates instability in the military and the nation's security/ coherence. The links between corruption and instability are rightly gaining increased attention as is seen in the allegations against Nigerian senior officers who have been bribed to turn a blind eye to Boko Haram (Uwimana & Wawro, 2014), some even aggrandize budgetary allocations meant for beefing up the military might in the fight against insurgency, thus, handicapping the troops on the frontlines. A case in point is the 2.1 million USD Arms Deal Scandal, popularly called the Dasukigate, involving the former National Security Adviser (NSA), (Rtd) Col. Sambo Dasuki and other top military officers and politicians. The case has revealed the large-scale fraud in the armed forces where funds meant for the military were being distributed for private and partisan purposes, while parts of the fund used purchased substandard military wares. For instance, following the fatal crash of Group Captain Ubong Akpan and Master Warrant Officer Zabesan Hosea, who boarded a Russian-made Mi-24V helicopter with the intent to carry-out assault on Boko Haram terrorists in Adamawa state in December 2014, the arm procurement audit, which began in August 2015, revealed that Air Vice Marshall Amosu and (Rtd) Col. Sambo Dasuki, purchased two unserviceable Mi-24V helicopters which were missing the necessary parts to fly, including being without rotors. Also, the audit showed that Col. Dasuki and other defense Chiefs, purchased unserviceable and cheaper military equipment when they had budgeted for newer military hardware. They then diverted the left-over funds to their personal accounts (Sahara Reporters, 2016).

Fulani (2014) wrote that soldiers on the frontline in the northeast are in very deplorable situations: they are poorly fed; inadequately armed; poorly paid (₦15,000 from the initial ₦30,000), and have exceeded the time lag for their tour (6 months as against the 2 years most of them have spent in the base). Thus, there is no way soldiers in these states can defeat the insurgents, whose strong homicidal will is augmented by better weaponry. In this vein, despite the Nigerian government has one of sub-Saharan Africa's largest annual military budgets, which John Campbell, former US Ambassador to Nigeria, placed at somewhere between five and six billion US dollars (www.time.org, 2015), arms and ammunition, food and medical supplies, and transport vehicle do not always reach the frontlines because the monies meant for these supplies are at times syphoned or even when they are purchased, large parts are either sold to black marketers or they may be cheapish and substandard goods. The foregoing aligns with the 2015 Transparency International Government Defense Anti-Corruption Index, a global study of corruption risk levels in national defense establishment (along 6 bands: very low; low; moderate; high; very high; and critical). According to the report, "Nigeria's GI ranking in Band E (i.e.,

"very high"; alongside China Brazil, UAE, Cote d'Ivoire, and 28 others) places it in one of the highest risk categories for corruption in the defense and security sector. Nigeria's highest risk area is financial, followed by Operations, Procurement, Personnel, and Political" (government.defenceindx.org/countries/nigeria/). These are basic flaws which the sect exploits. With inadequate/ substandard arms, low morale and desertion, hunger/ thirst, and low welfare packages, the Nigerian military would be relatively ineffective in its fight against a well-armed and motivated opposition which sources its funds via illicit means like robbery, drug trafficking, and via sponsorship from other extremist militia groups like ISIL and al-Qaeda and is ready to die for its cause. Also, corruption within the police and abuse of human rights have been a motivating force for fundamentalism. It is believed that since its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed and other captured Boko Haram members were killed in custody, the sect rained fire and brimstone on the polity, majorly targeting police stations and other defense establishments.

Another key factor is the failure of the Almajiri system of education or Tsangaya schools. For Sebastine and Obeta (2015:1) the word Almajiri was derived from the Arabic "Almuhajiri" meaning an emigrant. It usually refers to a person who migrates from his home to other(s) or to a popular teacher (usually called "mallam") in the quest for Islamic knowledge – Islamic principles, values, jurisprudence, and theology. The Almajiri system, it is believed, was instituted in the 11th century in Northern Nigeria long before the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of British Nigeria (Ifijeh & James, N.d, 98). The beginning of the failure of the system can be traced to the invasion and usurpation of (northern) Nigeria by the British, who perceived the Amajiri system as mere Qur'anic schools, and consequently, neglected it and instituted in its place "Karatun Boko", i.e., Western education. Giving to the failure of the system, the Almajirai, estimated to be about 7 million in population size as reported by the National Council for the Welfare of Destitutes (NCWD) (in Sebastine & Obeta, 2015:2), became undereducated in Islamic education and vastly uneducated in Western education, and usually lack vocational skills, and as such, they roam the streets and high-ways begging for alms and do menial jobs for they and their teachers' survival. This results in child abuse where the children are exposed to hazardous/ laborious work and social vices at very tender ages, usually between 5 and 17 years. According to Abdullahi (2011), Nigeria's Almajiris have been denied every single right enshrined in the Child Right Convention. The students endure utter deprivation, and their appearances leave much to be desired. With their unkempt hair, dirty faces, blistered lips, tainted teeth, crusty skin, stinking bags, and bare feet; they are distinctive. No wonder, the word, Almajiri (and its plural, Almajirai) today in Nigeria, widely means both "a beggar and a student", especially amongst the Hausas. Hence, as Abdulaodir (2003) opined, "The Almajiri system of education as practiced today in northern Nigeria is a completely bastardized system compared to the form and condition under the system it was operating and its output during the pre-colonial period" (in Sebastine & Obeta, 2015). The negative use of the term and the predicaments of the system (its neglect by the British, loss of state funding, pupils' resort to begging and menial jobs for survival, etc.), made this vastly impoverished section of society a gold-mine for recruitment into political thuggery and religious-based insurgent groups like Boko Haram which present themselves and Islam as a viable alternative. As Ifijeh and James (p. 100) wrote, "The success so far made by the Boko Haram sect for instance, might not be unconnected with the proliferation of the Almajiri schools. It is believed that (founder) of the sect, Mohammed Yusuf while alive went recruiting his members from mosque to mosque and from one Almajiri school to the other". The Almajiris were more sympathetic to the ideals of Boko Haram (ridding northern Nigeria of Western values and instituting an Islamic state), and it appealed to them because firstly, originally the Almajiri system is antithetical to Western cultural values and education, and they were vexed at a state system which has abandoned them. Jaafar (2008) aptly captured it, "The literacy outreach of Almajiri system is limited to ability to read and write (Arabic and the Qur'an) only … (and this) increases half educated human forces". To that extent, therefore, it can be argued that the insurgents who are mostly Almajirai see the West and its values only through one lens, "radical Islamic world views" as taught them by their leader(s).

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

It has been a much-reiterated fact within this study that evolution of human society, especially at the twilight of the 20th century, presented a new form of confrontation which is aggressively distinct from the ideological face-off of the cold war, encapsulated at the core within religious worldviews; involving Islamic (and confusionist) societies and percepts against western liberal-secularist cultural values. The experience of the Nigerian state is a testimony to the adverse effects of this new-found confrontation. Thus, it has been the purpose of this study to discuss the phenomenon, Islamic fundamentalism has its view of development, this view is quite distinct from the western secularist perception of development as engraved within the frame of many nations, like Nigeria. Little wonder, attempts by the Islamic fundamentalist group, Boko Haram, to impose its Islamic orientated quest on Nigeria has affected the political, economic and socio-cultural development of the nation, and has been met with huge rivalry. It was our belief that it may not be out of place to take a different turn from the very common factors which increase the wave of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria like poverty, relative deprivation, bad governance, etc. Thus, the institution of the constitution, corrupt structural processes in the military, and the systemic failure of the Almajiri educational system occupied the analytical spotlight.

In all, it is a fundamental fact that Islamic fundamentalism as manifested in Boko Haram has become the most conspicuous threat to Nigeria's unity and her prospect for political, economic, and socio-cultural development. in view of this, one may ask, "is there still light at the end of the tunnel?" Of course, we believe that there is, and it is against this believe that we purpose the following recommendations: First, the government needs to place as its basic attention the welfare of the citizens through well guided policies so as to increase citizens living standards and support human capital development, there is a need for the government to be committed to lead a true daring anti-graft war, especially in the police force and military and/or the ministry of defence; through efforts are made to correct the Almajiri school system, the government needs to consolidate these efforts by incorporating the Almajiri system of education within the ministry of education and it should be supported by the Federal and State governments; the amendment of

sections of the constitution which support the Shaari'ah and its equivalents is necessary; there is the need for religious leaders-Priest, Pastors, Imans, Rabbis, etc to be cautious of what they teach their followers and to encourage them to be good, peace loving and law abiding citizens; individuals should ensure that they are vigilant so as to detect suspicious persons or objects around them and inform law enforcement officers; there is a need for public-private sector partnership for the creation of job and encouraging the acquisition of entrepreneurial skills among citizens especially youths.

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