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How Educational Policies Are Adopted in Developing Countries: The Case of Ghana's Proposed Public-Private Partnerships in Education

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Abstract:

The literature on public-private partnerships (PPPs) generally concurs that its entry in the education sector is fairly recent, particularly in developing countries. Also, there is little empirical evidence to prop up the claims about its efficacy in addressing the challenges it is purported to address in the education sector- cost-reduction, efficiency, accountability, and quality. And finally, the exponents for their promotion in developing countries are largely neoliberal-oriented transnational actors. However, not much is known about how they are adopted, especially in developing countries where policy-making is often shrouded in secrecy. To add to our illumination the politics involved in the adoption of PPPs in education, this paper examines the PPP policy to be piloted in Ghana. Specifically, it explores how the policy was either internally or externally motivated, by analysing the texts of the three Education Strategic Plans (ESPs) and relevant publications related to some transnational actors. The findings indicate that the PPP policy was the outcome of the synapse of domestic incremental and systemic policy-making processes and the mechanisms of globalisation (transnational forces). However, the role of transnational actors in shaping the PPP policy appears to be greater than any rational internal processes deduced from the ESP documents and outside of them. For the sustainability of the policy, it is, therefore, important the transnational actors, who are directly involved in promoting the policy but depends on external support, work on maintaining good relationships with their network of sponsors, to ensure the continual inflows of resources to execute the policy.

Keywords: Public-Private Partnerships, transnational actors, systemic, incremental, globalisation

1. Introduction

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are not new. But they have for a long time been limited to sectors such as energy, water, transportation, and construction, amongst others (Verger & Moschetti, 2016). Despite their popularity and the enthusiasm with which they are circularised, their extension "...into social policy areas such as health and education is more recent and is arguably one of the most significant trends in public finance in the past decade" (LaRocque, 2008, p. 9). One of the reasons for this may be because the "...task of promoting diversity in what was formerly a state monopoly is neither easy nor is it universally welcomed" (Patrinos & Soale, 2007, p.70).

In developing countries, in particular, the monopoly of the state over the provision of education may still be justified because of market failures and equity concerns. However, governments in these countries lack the capacity to deliver accessible and quality education. Yet, there is the exigency, both locally and globally, to ensure universal access to education. It is argued that PPPs designed specifically for developing countries, is one of the policy options that could potentially assist them to meet this human rights imperative of universal access (Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio & Guáqueta, 2009).

While different models of PPPs have been put into practice for some time in the advanced economies, they appear to be gradually promoted in developing countries, crammed with inefficiencies in education delivery and, therefore, embracing almost any policy that promises to improve their systems. It is apparent that in these countries, PPPs are also promoted by external institutions such as the World Bank and other institutions with neoliberal undercurrents. The recent case of Liberia, amongst others, is an example. While the role of these institutions in the spread of PPPs in developing countries is unambiguous, little is known about how they are actually promoted and adopted.

The case of Ghana, one of the latest countries to adopt education PPP, illustrates this difficulty of understanding the PPP adoption process. The PPP reform is captured in the third Education Strategic Plan (ESP- 2018-2030). This document consists of a number of reforms that are supposed to guide the direction and activities of the education sector from now until 2030. The PPP which is a management model, and which is to start in September (2019), is one "...that will be piloted in the short to medium term to consider whether they merit a scale-up effort to contribute to sector development..." (MoE, 2019a, p. 19). However, there are dissenting voices against the policy, raising questions about how it was adopted. On account of the mistiness surrounding its adoption, this paper seeks to filter and understand the dominant

settlings that have relevance to the education PPP reform in Ghana's third Education Strategic Plan (ESP 3). In researching a topic of this nature, it is suggested that the focus should be on:

The processes, reasons and circumstances that explain how and why policy-makers (or other education stakeholders) select, embrace, and/or borrow global education policies, and aim to implement them in their educational realities (Verger, 2014, p. 14).

This paper follows the above suggestion and divides its task into two. One is to understand how the process was internally driven. This is achieved by analysing the texts of the Education Strategic Plans (ESP), 2003-2015; 2010-2020; and 2018-2030, including its accompanying medium-term development plan; and the role of one internal stakeholder, teacher unions. The ESPs are respectively referred to in this paper as ESP 1, ESP 2, and ESP 3. The second task is to understand the external influences on the policy. This is achieved by drawing on the publications related to two main international actors, Ark Foundation and its Education Partnerships Group (EPG); and Innovation Development Progress Foundation (IDPF). While the ESP document states that the PPP would be experimented in both basic education and second-cycle (high school) levels, the emphasis of this paper is largely on the former.

2. The Good and the Bad of PPPs in Education

It is widely held that the private sector has an organisational culture that effectively promotes efficiency, irrespective of how it is defined. Implicit here is that the public sector is suffused with inefficiencies, hence, "...the main objective of PPP advocates consisted of trying to bring the public sector closer to private sector organizational culture in order to address perceived inefficiencies in state provision of public services" (Verger & Moschetti, 2016, p. 4). If efficiency in education is understood as having occurred when, for example, test results and 'value-added' (outputs), are realised with the least deployment of financial resources (Johnes, Portela & Thanassoulis, 2017, p. 331), it is instructive that the proponents of PPP in education, assume that the managerial expertise and approaches of the private sector, when leveraged, would achieve this better than the government doing it alone.

It is also argued that PPPs can bring competition in the market for education, forcing the public sector to deliver quality education (Latham, 2009). The argument for these proceeds like this: as private entities begin to deliver education; they are set in competition with public providers. This forces public providers to improve upon their services to maintain their legitimacy as lead providers of education. This point has limited application. For some educational goods and services, for instance, infrastructure- classrooms- if it is the under-provision of them that led to the creation of PPPs in the first place (especially in developing countries where governments lack financial resources to make school buildings reasonably available), it may still be difficult for the government to respond in a competitive manner to private providers. However, in an attempt to be competitive, it is possible for teachers and parent-teacher associations in the public sector, to, for example, work together to reduce teacher absenteeism and consequently improve educational outcomes in ways similar to what would have been achieved by private providers.

Partnerships are also instrumental in improving inclusion in education. Irrespective of the sphere where exclusion is perceived, either in "...the domain of adult literacy, or formal or informal education, the objective of reaching the poorest and most marginalized groups of people, PPPs in education are leading to strong community ownership of the purposes and processes of education" (Patrinos & Soale, 2007, p. 3). There is evidence supporting claims of this nature, however, it is not without minor reservations. For instance, Morgan, Petrosino and Fronius, (2013), examined two rigorous studies that addressed PPP and educational inclusion in developing countries. Their conclusion was that,

Both the Colombia and Pakistan programmes increased private school enrolment amongst the countries' poorest income groups, thus probably improving equity. The Pakistan programme resulted in girls being educated for less than it would have cost for the government to create public school spaces, while the Colombia programme cost rather more, but will most likely prove cost-effective in terms of long-term economic gains (Morgan, Petrosino & Fronius, 2013, p. 2).

In general, the evidence that PPPs would deliver results similar to that experienced in the private sector is sketchy. Indeed, leading scholars and commentators do not hesitate to state that there is few evidence to prop up the claims about the efficacy of PPPs in addressing the challenges it is purported to address- cost-reduction, efficiency, and quality (Latham, 2009; Verger & Moschetti, 2016; Afridi, 2018); and empirical studies are few and without 'robust conclusions' (Patrinos et. al., 2009). A commissioned study by OXFAM in Pakistan, for instance, concluded that in sampled schools (PPP schools), "...cost savings come at a high price, and that schools are sacrificing quality due to a lack of investment in qualified teachers, relevant training and support, and adequate facilities" (Afridi, 2018, p. 6). The Liberian experience also adds to this, raising questions about the cost-effectiveness and alleged quality associated with PPPs in education. According to EURODAD (2018), the teachers in partnership schools were sometimes paid higher than those in government schools. The extra expenditure of the government on every student in partnership schools was also about US\$20. Also, partnership schools maintained smaller class sizes, often pushing students with poor performances to public schools, causing enrolment in surrounding public schools to swell. Based on the findings of this nature, there is strong opposition to PPPs in developing countries. For instance, in a policy brief by OXFAM in April of 2019, it is emphatically asserted that the "World Bank and other donors should stop promoting and financing market-oriented education schemes and focus on expanding quality public schooling as a human right for all" (Malouf Bous & Farr, 2019, p. 2).

PPPs may introduce changes in the educational landscape in fundamental ways and with some unintended consequences. Some of the consequences could be leveraged to improve ached for educational outcomes. However, others, if not well-managed, would fertilise existing tensions or create new educational challenges. According to Ball and Youdell (2007, pp. 9-10), for example, by bringing the private sector into the business of education delivery, the following scenarios are likely to arise: it would likely,

Change how teachers are prepared; the nature of and access to ongoing professional development; the terms and conditions of teachers' contracts and pay; the nature of teachers' day-to-day activities and the way they experience their working lives...[it will] alter both the perception of teachers within society and the quality of students' experience in schools...[bring about] new set of incentives and disciplines and a new set of roles, positions and identities within which what it means to be a teacher, student/learner, parent etc. are all changed.

3. Models of PPP in Education

Different forms of PPPs have evolved over time to deal with given educational challenges. A government or a local authority may invite a private entity to provide some educational goods and services- this may be initiated by either of them, with the government being the buyer. Irrespective of who initiated a partnership, a contract is always at the centre of it, to amongst other things, impose accountability on both parties. According to Patrinos et. al. (2009), a contract arises in education delivery when "...a government procures education or education-related services of a defined quantity and quality at an agreed price from a specific provider" (p. 9). Being time-bound is also an essential element of contracts. If the private provider is contracted to provide any of the services listed below in table 1, for example, building maintenance, 'time-bound', could mean when the art of maintenance must have been completed. At the same time, it could refer to how long the government wants to continue to engage with the private provider.

What Governments Contract for	What Governments Buy
Management, support services (input)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • School management (financial and human resources management) • Support services (meals and transportation) • Professional services (teacher training, curriculum design, textbook delivery, quality assurance, and supplemental services)
Operational services (process)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The education of students, financial and human resources management, professional services, and building maintenance
Education services (outputs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Student places in private schools (by contracting with schools to enrol specific students)
Facility availability (inputs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Infrastructure and building maintenance
Facility availability and education services (both inputs and outputs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Infrastructure combined with services (operational or educational outputs)

Table 1: Types of Contracts in Education

Source: Patrinos et. al., 2009, p. 9

According to Latham (2009), the common models of PPPs are vouchers, subsidies, private management and private finance initiatives. They fit at different scales, the various forms of contracting by Patrinos et. al. (2009) in table 1. Whenever any of these are adopted, the hopes are always that, they would lead to increased enrolment; improved educational outcomes; and enhanced equality in access to a quality basic education (Latham, 2009, p. 158).

Vouchers help to promote school choice and allow the government or a local authority to corroborate with private schools to provide education. A voucher is "...a certificate of public funding of a certain amount that can be used by parents of students in any school of the parents' choosing that accepts such vouchers, usually private (Carnoy, 2017, p. 2). According to the Democracy and Education Research Group (DERG), this system is less accountable to the public- because private schools have their own rules; and that, though they are required to admit students with special needs, they are usually unwilling to make significant adjustments to accommodate the needs of such students, leading to them opting out and joining government schools (DERG, 2012). Also, "...affluent families with more social capital and access to voucher programme information are more likely to find the best schools..." (Morgan et. al., 2013, p. 1). The difference between the voucher system and that of subsidies is thin. Under a subsidy contract, if a government wants to support the capacity of private schools to provide education, it subsidises their operational cost- the cost of educating a certain number of students; funds could also be provided to cover school inputs such as teachers' salaries and textbooks. A typical example of subsidy programme is in New Zealand, where the government currently has a fixed appropriation of about \$47.8 million to support private schools for students enrolled in them (Ministry of Education Circular, 18 September 2018). However, because this regime does not "...necessarily follow the students' school of choice, it does not foster competition" (Patrinos et. al., 2009, p. 17).

When an education system or a sector exhibit poor management, private entities may be co-opted to strengthen the management of the system or sector, giving rise to management PPPs in education. According to Patrinos et. al. (2009), a private entity could be brought in to partner a government or local authority to manage schools or an entire school district. Their obligations under such contracts may include financial management, planning, staff and leadership management. By assuming these responsibilities while other no-management staff are still government employees, they are expected to bring to bear their management skills and ideas in education, to reduce the bottlenecks associated with the recruitment of employees in the public sector; bring about competition in the processes of awarding contracts, making it possible for "...education authorities to specify performance requirements so that they can change contractors if

performance is unsatisfactory" (Patrinos et. al., 2009, p. 10). According to them, a lapse in management contracts is how to attribute quality educational outcomes exclusively to it, since many factors coalesce to cause that to turn out.

4. A framework for Understanding How Educational Policies Are Adopted

In its basic form, a policy is "...whatever governments choose to do or not to do" (Fischer, Miller & Sidney, 2007, p. xix). They may be precipitated by some conditions, for example, when there are challenges within a sector, or it may simply be the result of a political decision or a part of general national planning (Haddad & Demsky, 1995). Irrespective of what the lever is, a given policy may be selected partly because it is perceived to be effective; likely to be successful; or because it is consistent with some specific goals and values (Harris, 2012). But who bundle up alternative policies for choices to be made from? How free are governments to choose from a bundle of such alternatives? These questions are raised against the backdrop that global forces have eroded national policy spaces (Philips, 2017) and education policy-making is now deterritorised (Verger, Novelli & Altinyelk, 2012), hence, policy alternatives and the conditions under which certain policies are chosen, may not respectively be internally composed and freely selected. It is unquestioning that this is the case, particularly in the case of developing countries, since "...there is a bigger presence of external factors including international NGOs, donor agencies and international organisations (IOs) that have a great capacity – both material and ideational - to set agendas and country priorities" (Verger et. al., 2012, p. 5). In sum, educational policies are either internally or externally induced, or they are the result of a concursion of the two.

4.1. Internal Processes: A Rational Approach

Haddad and Demsky's (1995) framework for education policy analysis, is useful in explicating how educational policies are internally induced. Their exposition may be described as a rational approach. According to Williams and Cummings (2005), rational approaches rely on empirical data as well as analysis- both quantitative and qualitative; and that, the articulation, evaluation, and the goals that selected policies are intended to achieve are underpinned by efficiency. Haddad and Demsky (1995) provide that, the first step in the policy process is a situational analysis of the educational sector. According to them, since policies are necessitated by the desire to resolve a problem or set of problems in a sector such as education, any analysis supremely begins an appreciation of the sector itself, including its contexts. The social, political, economic, demographic, cultural, and social issues that could directly or indirectly affect the policy, including the processes involved in settling on the policy and its implementation processes, must be analysed. For instance, economically, policy-makers may look at the capacity of the educational system to provide inputs for the system, as well as the sources of allocations for the educational sector. Educationally, they may examine access to educational opportunities; equity in the distribution of educational services; and institutional arrangements for the management of the sector. They may also look at the dynamics of change. There are always contending forces, for and against new policies; and they need to be understood because they have implications for the strategies that could be deployed to successfully implement policies. In the education sector, they include amongst others, teachers, teacher unions, parents, students, interest groups, and a range of education providers and stakeholders.

After doing a situational analysis of the education sector, policy-makers then generate policy options or alternatives. This process may involve a combination of methods. Amongst them are the systemic and incremental methods. The systemic model is data-driven. Data from the education sector and other sources such as published research concerning the educational problem are analysed; alternative responses generated, and the best options selected. Though this process appears facile, the following limitations must be called to mind:

A variety of intellectual, political, social and professional constraints limit the range of policy options. Moreover, options may be given different weights and priorities depending on the perceived importance of the sectoral issues, the relative strength of the interest groups, and the possible combination of different options (Haddad & Demsky, 1995, p. 31). In the incremental mode of policy-making, major changes observed within a system are usually the result of minor changes previously introduced serially in the system (Hayes, 2017). In education, it could manifest when policy-makers "...merely propose minor revisions to previous [educational] reforms...or follow-up on previously controversial debates..." (Baek et. al., 2018, p. 34). It is similar to the systemic model, in that, it begins with the identification of a challenge. Once this is done, the solution to the problem is gradually imposed on the system. It is mostly experienced in cases where the public itself is cognisant of the problem and widely debates it (Haddad & Demsky, 1995). It may be preferred by governments in particular because it could help them avoid the attention that is often associated with the sudden introduction of policies (Baek et. al., 2018).

The third in the policy-making cycle is the evaluation of the policy options generated. It is taken that there are always many options on the policy menu, and what determines whether or not a particular policy is preferred is its desirability, affordability, and feasibility. Beyond these three, sustainability- political and financial- is quintessential and should not be compromised. In assessing the desirability, some basic questions policy-makers ask are: who would benefit? Who might feel threatened? What would make the option desirable to all stakeholders? How compatible is the policy with the prevailing political ideology and the overall national economic aspirations contained in national development plans? Concerning affordability, different types of costs need to be assessed- political and social. However, it is challenging to do this because of unpredictable changes in economic growth. Also, another difficulty is found in the fact that "...educational expenditures are more vulnerable to changes in economic situations and political objectives than some other kinds of public expenditure" (Haddad & Demsky, 1995, p. 33). Furthermore, there is private cost- whether or not consumers would bear the cost of the new policy; and if it is the case that consumers would suffer some cost, then what happens to poorer households? Finally, opportunity cost- what would the government forego to pay for the new policy? Another important question considers the policy evaluation stage is whether a given policy is feasible: are there enough human and fiscal

resources to implement the policy? What kinds of training for teachers and technology are required? Is there favourable institutional culture- norms, procedures, and the environment- to attract the best professionals to implement the policy? Is the time-frame for the policy realistic?

4.2. Education Policies as Outcomes of Globalisation

The forces of globalisation have limited the extent to which national education policies may be freely and rationally determined. Globalisation has made it difficult for some particular policies to even be looked at in simple terms as national education policies. According to Verger et. al. (2012, p. 3), some educational policies such as "...school-based management, teachers' accountability, public-private partnerships...are being discussed and implemented everywhere, to the point that they have acquired the status of 'global education policies' (GEP)". To understand how globalisation alters educational policies and practices in countries around the world, Dale (2000, p. 427), suggested that a number of questions need to be asked and pursued. Among them are: What forms do changes in educational policies and practices take? Do the effects occur directly, indirectly, or what other changes does it bring within or on the education sector? These questions raised in Dale (2000), are important in understanding the education PPP in Ghana. Verger et. al. (2012, pp. 5-7), partly provide answers to the questions; and they could be used as analytical tools for the purpose of this paper. They identified what they called the 'impact dimensions of globalisation in education policy'. They contend that they represent some of the ways in which globalisation affects education policies. Some of these are:

- Globalisation generates new inputs for education policy-making and defines new problems that education policy needs to address.
- Globalisation revitalizes the role of international agencies in the making of educational policy. Major amongst them are the World Bank, the OECD or UNESCO; however, transnational corporations and foundations, international consultants, and transnational advocacy coalitions are increasingly becoming key international players in education policy-making.
- It has resulted in the deterritorialization of the education policy process- international players have an increasing capacity to settle education agendas and define the priorities of countries concerning education reform processes, but also to impose certain policies via funding mechanisms and aid conditionality.
- Globalisation also creates a transnational private market of education provision that complements and/or competes against national education providers.
- It defines the problems to be addressed and, at the same time, alters the capacity of the states to respond to these problems by themselves; it empowers international actors and makes the transnational organisation of policy networks more pressing; and is a strategically selective and conflicting terrain for educational policy-making, which is more conducive to certain education policy ideas and political actors than others.

The above gives the impression that global forces and processes are almost ineluctable and policy-makers remain passive, while the currents of globalisation shape national policies and priorities. While globalisation complicates national policy-making, itself is equally not uncomplicated, as the implementation of the actual contents of policies, including irrefutably, global policies, "...relies on things like commitment, understanding, capability, resources, practical limitations, cooperation and (importantly) intertextual compatibility" (Ball, 1993, pp. 12-13). Being aware of this, the importers of globally scripted educational policies, who are usually "foreign specialists, operating as consultants for international agencies..." (Haddad & Demsky, 1995, p. 32), are expected to engage, if not contend with, recipient countries, including their contexts, to get their innovations accepted.

5. Independent Private Schools and Experimental PPPs in Ghana

The private provision of education has taken firm roots in Ghana. The overarching impetus for this development has been from the constitution of Ghana, as it encourages the participation of the private sector in education delivery. The 1992 constitution provides that:

Every person shall have the right, at his own expense, to establish and maintain a private school or schools at all levels and of such categories and in accordance with such conditions as may be provided by law (Ghana 1992, rev. 1996, p. 20).

The growth in the number of private schools has since been tremendous, contributing immensely to the improvement of educational infrastructure- school buildings- and general access to education, including notably, in the rural areas. Of all basic schools in Ghana, private schools account for the following: KG- 40%; primary- 39%; and junior high school- 36%, in 2017/18 (World Bank, 2018). It is noted that they are responsible for the growth in the total number of schools from 2010/11 to 2016/17 (MoE, 2019a).

The prevailing belief is that, in Ghana, students in private schools perform better in national examinations than their counterparts in public schools (Akyeampong & Rolleston, 2013). However, the Ministry of Education points out that there is no rigorous research that validates the actual learning outcomes of private schools (MoE, 2019a). Akaguri (2011) equally notes that the idea that, the quality of education provided by private schools is better than that of public schools, especially in rural areas, is more informed by perceptions than reality; and higher interests in private schools are more informed by parental aspirations. Though students in private schools do demonstrate higher competence in Maths and English, there are also chances that it is more based on the tendency of good students and their parents to self-select private schools than any inherent quality in their teaching (Abdul-Hamid, 2015). This appears to be the case, as parents who can pay for their children to enrol in private schools, prefer to do so for their academically good children, because, they feel enrolling weak children in such schools amounts to wastage of resources (Akaguri, 2011).

Despite the contentions about the educational outcomes of private schools, it is irrefutable that they are playing a significant role in educational access. Also included is equity, as households of diverse socio-economic statuses patronise private schools (World Bank, 2015). However, they fall short of PPP, since they usually do not have any binding contracts-formal contracts are key in education PPP (LaRocque, 2008; Patrinos et. al., 2009). Though they are required to ensure that a third of their teachers are certified teachers, it equally does not amount to a partnership with the government. The regulation is only to ensure that proprietors of private schools provide education ethically and professionally.

There has also been a number of small-scale experimentations with education PPP in Ghana. These initiatives were uncontentious, in terms of stakeholders' reactions, largely because they tended to be partnerships with NGOs and local communities, and not with the government. Akyeampong (2009), analysed three of such PPPs; and the findings are revealing, both in terms of the challenges partnerships face, and the innovations they can unleash on the educational scene in Ghana. Two of the partnerships, the Shepherd School Programme and the School Feeder Programme, show how non-state providers of education can adapt teaching and learning to facilitate inclusion. They operated in communities with a high prevalence of out-of-school children being caused by children engaging in farming and shepherding. They were able to come up with flexible academic calendars, with the help of the local communities, which took their mode of livelihoods into consideration, and thus, permitted children to access education while being able to assist their parents in their agricultural activities. This kind of flexibility is lacking in public education- it has a rigid calendar. In fact, when the School Feeder Programme was handed to the Ghana Education Service, they started using the public schools' calendar and lesson times, running down the gains previously made under the PPP. Some of the challenges these experimental PPPs faced were financial, sustainability issues, and the inability to connect their management practices with the public education sector in a mutually beneficial way.

The education sector experience with the private sector over the years, though do not count as PPP, has implications for the education PPP policy introduced. The community-led experimental PPPs also have similar implications. First, the flourishing of private schools has exposed the public to school choice, though this applies largely to those parents who can pay to enrol their wards in private schools, while the option and feasibility to enrol in public schools also exist. In one study in southern Ghana for example, when parents were asked which school system they preferred, "...they typically responded that they actually preferred private school but are unable to afford the costs", and for others who could afford to send some of their children to private schools, they expressed that, they wish to move their other children from the public schools to the private schools (Akaguri, 2011, pp. 9-10). Thus, on the part of the public (parents/guardians), there is an appetite for education with some elements of 'private'; and since there are many who cannot afford it, it means there has been void in education delivery that needs to be filled. Second, for the Ministry of Education and the Ghana Education Service, having regulated and worked with private providers of education, it should have accumulated an unquestionable amount of experiences useful for negotiating the PPP deals.

6. Findings

6.1. Inside ESP 1 and 2: Private-Sector Ideas and Principles Incrementally Introduced in Educational Policies.

It is not uncommon for private-sector ideas and principles to be plied in public spheres. The intention is always to make the public sector look like the private sector (Ball & Youdell, 2007) and consequently improve upon their service delivery (Diefenbach, 2009). A critical assessment of the ESPs shows how ideas such as accountability and efficiency, which the private sector is noted for, have been emphasised in education policy in Ghana. The level of emphasis is clearly incremental, in that, they were vaguely elaborated in ESP 1 but became progressively and markedly elaborated in ESP 2 and 3. It is evident that their transcendence evolved alongside progress made in access to basic education; and the attention paid to them is largely based on the analysis of issues arising from the increased access, notably quality education, making them equally the product of systemic policy-making. At the basic level, enrolment and gender parity have been commendable: KG- gross enrolment (GE) is 112, with gender parity (GPI) of 1; primary- GE is 106 and GPI, 1; and junior high school (JHS) - GE is 86 and GPI, 1 (World Bank, 2018). It is evident that this progress was engineered under the first ESP. This was at a time when globally, universal primary education and education as a human right, championed under the Education for All (EFA) initiative, was high on the agendas of governments.

As progress is being made in basic education, concerns about improving quality have heightened, spawning the emphasis paid to efficiency and accountability which were sparingly and passively captured in the first ESP. The salience of this is evident in how the leading political parties have been framing their visions for the pre-tertiary education sector since 2012. Their political asseverations only daintily differ on access at this level: there are promises of mass access on the one hand, with no explicit mentioning of quality; and promises of progressive access, with quality as a stated goal, on the other hand. Debates at this level about educational problems would usually spark incremental responses (Haddad & Demsky, 1995). One, therefore, finds in ESP 2, efficiency savings in education and monitoring and accountability, being among the well-elaborated ten major policy guiding principles. It is asserted that:

If the ESP is to be effective and affordable there should be efficiency savings throughout the education system. In the interests of efficiency and equity, and in order to be able to afford the innovations within the ESP, it will be necessary to reduce recurrent expenditures, especially those that appear to reward a relative few at the expense of a relatively deprived majority (MoE, 2012, p. 28).

Among the cost-cutting strategies outlined to achieve the above in ESP 2 was PPPs. This was the first time PPPs, in its classical sense, was patently captured in education policy text. However, the ESP 1 could be described as a harbinger to this development, partly because it recognised the importance of the participation of the private sector in tackling educational challenges, though it was not explicit on the nature and modalities of such participation. One may expect this

because there are practical difficulties regarding the setting of cost-sharing modalities arising from the differences in the cost of private and public provision of education across Ghana (Acheampong, 2009). The private sector, NGOs, Civil Societies, amongst others, were, therefore, severally mentioned in ESP 1, but with vague obligations. Indeed, it is clear in the text of ESP 1 that policy-makers were unsure of how to deal with any corroboration with the private sector. It stated that:

The policy to encourage and mobilise non-state resources from the private sector to support education sector development has to be given greater attention. The challenge is how to balance the need for such support and participation from the private sector against the needs of the poor in society who may not be able to afford the fees charged by the private institutions (MoE, 2003, p. 12).

By the time ESP 2 was crafted, policy-makers had decided on the nature of corroboration needed with the private sector. The modality was described as 'two-way support for PPPs', where the government would:

- Support private kindergartens by meeting some of their teacher costs;
- Support primary and JH schools by providing non-salary inputs (e.g. textbooks) and in-service training;
- In return for private support to TVET, the government will provide tax holidays, tax exemptions on imported equipment imported, etc.
- In return for public support (above) private to increase contribution to kindergarten and tertiary (MoE, 2012, p. 31).

This maiden model of PPP in Ghana was a subsidy programme. It is apparent that this policy was conceived partly because independent private schools already existed, regulated, and cooperated, albeit, poorly with the state. The modalities were unarguably aimed at reducing the operational cost of private schools, thereby enabling them to expand their infrastructure and other inputs to admit more students, possibly at lower fees than they previously charged. Economically telling, where there are independent private schools with well-established infrastructure, a government can make significant progress at increasing access to education, through these types of arrangements with the private sector. However, little is known about how this has been carried out in practice, though there is a whole unit within the Ghana Education Service (GES), which mandate includes amongst others, the provision of syllabuses and textbooks to private schools. Indeed, the whole ESP 2 had barely expired when it was replaced by ESP 3. The above PPP modality is also hardly mentioned in ESP 3. But at this stage, education PPP was no longer new in policy cycles. What is apparently new is the model of PPP and the public reaction to the policy.

6.2. ESP 3 and PPPs in education

In this current ESP (ESP 3), there are six (6) sector-specific reforms and all are management reforms, including the PPP. Such reforms are common in centralised education systems and are not bare "...administrative adjustments, but as [are] reforms that fundamentally alter relationships of accountability and the way in which services are provided" (Tiongson, 2005, p. 263). While consolidating the progress made in access to basic education is still on the agenda, the fact that these new reforms are management-related adds to the previous mentioning that education quality is strongly emphasised now. The ESP 3 did not miss stating this. In the first paragraph of its introductory page, it asserted that "The document presents evidence-based priorities and policies formulated after wide-ranging consultations, ensuring that all education stakeholders in Ghana are in agreement on the need for the delivery of quality education to the nation" (MoE, 2019a, p. 1). This apparently is in keeping with the systemic (rational) mode of policy-making which has been prevalent in the education sector for some time now. Usually, groups of policy-makers assess an educational challenge, review alternative solutions, and against some principles, select what they think is the best. It is noted that most often, the merits and demerits of the alternatives are not properly assessed by these policy-makers (Nudzor, 2014). It is hard to know the various alternatives that are often examined in light of a given educational problem. But PPP in education emerged as a core reform policy, in response to requisitions for quality in education.

Once again, efficiency and effectiveness are among the five principles that undergird ESP 3. In public provision of education, these are considered as needing improvement. They featured more prominently in the text of ESP 3 than in ESP 2; and that equally is keeping with the incremental way of policy-making, which governments, in particular, may prefer to avoid the attention eminent when policies are introduced out of the blue (Baek et. al., 2018). To achieve efficiency and effectiveness, the PPP was specifically introduced. The model differs from the 'two-way PPP' found in ESP 2 because it is a management PPP. According to LaRocque (2008), this form of PPP "...involves education authorities contracting directly with private providers to operate public schools or certain aspects of public-school operations. While these schools are privately managed, they remain publicly owned and publicly funded" (p. 13). The specific policy text announcing the introduction of the PPP fits precisely in this definition. It reads as follows:

In a bid to introduce innovation and learn from management practices that could be more widely introduced, Ghana is launching a pilot public-private partnership (PPP) in basic and secondary education. This will be focused on improving the quality of education delivered through contracting out the operation of public schools to not-for-profit organisations and is another pillar of the reform agenda...Non-state providers will be required to meet clearly defined KPIs or be exited from the programme, while schools will remain government owned and government funded (MoE, 2019a, p. 23).

All the six sector-specific reforms in ESP 3 are management reforms, because of this, some of the educational challenges that necessitated them are cross-cutting- they justify not only the need for PPPs. However, they are largely issues that the private sector is noted as being proficient at, in addition to the broad notions of efficiency and effectiveness. It is hoped that they would be brought to bear on the provision of education in Ghana. The ESP 3 was categorical that private operators are being brought in through the PPP to address issues that the public sector is not able to effectively

deal with. They included amongst others, mentoring, accountability, supervision, effective leadership skills, and timely delivery of services. On public education sector accountability, it notes that:

Education management at the basic level points to weak accountability mechanisms at the school, community, and district levels. School leadership and management, particularly in relation to the oversight and mentorship of teachers, ensuring time-on-task, and the administration of the capitation grant, is also poor (MoE, 2019a, pp. 6-7).

There are monitoring and accountability structures within the system. They include amongst others, the National Inspectorate Board (NIB), the National Teaching Council (NTC), and the National Council for Curriculum and Assessment (NaCCA). However, these problems listed above and many others still persist. As to what accounts for this, the policy document noted that these agencies have not been able to perform well because of lack of funding, personnel, accountability structure, and enforcement powers.

Teacher absenteeism is also a challenge and the management reforms are hoped to contribute to resolving it. This challenge is widespread in developing countries. According to Patrinos (2013), this ranges from 11% to 30% in developing countries and it is responsible for the loss of 25% of expenditure in primary school. Because of this resource wastage associated with it, it is considered a form of corruption. It equally disrupts students' learning, with negative implications on their achievements (Obeng-Denteh, Yeboah, Sam, & Monkah, 2011; Guerrero, Leon, Zapata & Cueto, 2013). Despite the education ministry declaration of zero tolerance for teacher absenteeism in 2014, the canker still lurks. Studies that compare teacher absenteeism in public and private schools in Ghana are lacking. But so far, absenteeism is observed to be "...generally less in the private schools since teachers are generally paid for what they deliver, and pupils risk losing the benefits of what they have paid for if they truant" (Akaguri, 2011, p. vi). In the public sector, it is noted that:

In terms of teacher management, absenteeism, attrition, and time-on-task have been widely recognised as a problem, with overall teacher absenteeism as high as 14% in 2014/15 and varying considerably by region. Furthermore, teacher attrition increased to 4% in 2016, from 2% in 2009 (MoE, 2019b, pp. 4-5).

The foregoing has so far created the impression of a mechanical or rational way of policy-making – incremental and systemic approaches. But this is just a part of a much larger and complex process, because, the policy-making process, including the implementation, is steeped in 'messiness' (Ball, 1993; Trowler, 2002), with constellations of "...untidy and overlapping episodes in which a variety of people and organizations with diversified perspectives are actively involved - technically and politically" (Haddad & Demsky, 1995, p. 17). Distilling the inputs of major actors would, therefore, not be an easy task as one would expect. It would even be harder in the case of Ghana, where the policy process has for some time been a 'closed-circuit' system (Ohemeng, 2005), with only those inside, abreast with what goes into the selection of a particular policy. But, by analysing the publications (internet-based) of organisations linked to the policy, some observations stood out, and they are apparently instructive on the role that external player might have played in shaping the PPP. They include the Education Partnerships Group (EPG), an arm of Ark foundation; and the Innovation Development Progress Foundation (IDPF).

6.3. The Role of Transnational Actors

Foundations are playing crucial roles in the spread of PPPs described as multi-stakeholder partnerships (Verger & Moschetti, 2016). They are considered new actors who are more likely to take educational policies that have been tried and tested in one jurisdiction, rebrand and promote them in other jurisdictions (Verger et. al., 2012). The potentials that foundations have and which governments can leverage to provide education for the citizenry are great. GBC-Education (2016), for example, lists some of them as:

- A source of financial resources
- Rapid and flexible funding modalities
- Ability to move quickly and adapt to fast-changing circumstances
- Ability to take the initial financial risk to identify and support new innovations
- Serve as a bridge between the private sector and government

The EPG is an international non-governmental (not-for-profit) consultancy organisation with a mission of helping governments to create effective interventions to address educational challenges. The IDP Foundation is also a not-for-profit organisation that encourages and supports novel and viable solutions to pressing global issues. The IDP typically support other organisations- local and international- to do three main things: innovate, develop, and ensure progress in the issues they work with, including education (IDPF, n.d). In effect, the IDP is an international NGO (INGO) that fund the programmes of other organisation. In the case of the PPP in Ghana, the IDP funded or is funding the EPG. It notes that "In 2017, IDPF provided a grant to the EPG to support the design and implementation for a PPP in Ghana that will include contracting non-profit providers to run a small group of government schools" (IDPF, n.d).

The EPG has a specific division aimed at promoting education PPP around the world. It is in effect, engaged in policy entrepreneurship. Policy entrepreneurs "...are public entrepreneurs who, from outside the formal positions of government, introduce, translate, and help implement new ideas into public practice" (Roberts & King, 1991, p. 147). They usually achieve these objectives by first defining a problem, suggest solutions, and use their social networks, including their track records, to get the attention of policy-makers (Mintrom & Luetjens, 2017). In the case of Ghana, the EPG reported having played an advisory role to policy-makers on how to implement education PPP. It engaged in situational analysis and paid attention to the question of who would benefit from the policy, suggesting that global policies are not passively promoted. The EPG notes that education quality is low in Ghana; and that, over-age enrolment and school dropouts are pervasive. It then advocated the piloting of PPP in deprived communities. The PPP it suggested is in the following form:

The pilot will adopt a 'contract management' partnership model whereby a number of operators will be contracted to run about 25 primary schools and junior high schools. These organisations will be given greater flexibility in school leadership and management as well as their application of the government curriculum. They will be held accountable by both communities and the Ministry of Education through a mix of report cards and school inspections (EPG, n.d).

As the organisation with the apparent greater responsibility of negotiating and implementing the PPP policy, one would have conventionally thought that the EPG initiated the process, but only sought funding from IDPF. However, the available evidence pertaining that is fuzzy, as it appears that the IDPF might have been the lead organisation driving the PPP. The IDPF (n.d) notes that:

Ark's EPG shares the same belief as the IDP Foundation: non-state actors play a valuable role in providing education and it is important to create this understanding with the government as well. Our shared beliefs are what led us to enlist EPG in PPP research and design work in Ghana, encouraging the ministry of education to establish the viability of a PPP for education.

As indicated by Haddad and Demsky (1995), the question of who bears the cost of a new policy is crucial when policy-makers are evaluating policy options and consequently which policy is adopted. This would even be more so in developing countries, such as in Ghana, where around 90% of government expenditure in basic education is on salaries (Bashir, Lockheed, Ninan & Tan, 2018). In such cases, one would reasonably expect innovative non-salary policies to need external financing. This is evident in the education sector medium-term development plan (2018-2021), where almost all the policies to be implemented in ESP 3 are strongly backed by donor partners- the World Bank, Global Partnership for Education (GPE), UNICEF, amongst others. This often opens the way for these external actors to use their financial incentives in combination with other strategies such as ideational, to influence policies (Foli, 2016, p. 268). With respect to the PPP, the EPG is identified as one of the non-traditional private sector or civil society organisations the government hopes to work with to implement it. It is thus, not only a sponsored researcher and advisor but also a likely donor. The possible financial role of IDPF has not been stated in ESP 3 or its accompanying medium-term development plan. But it appears to have a good presence in Ghana, usually partnering with other organisations in some vital sectors. For the EPG, it is noted that:

The MOE [Ministry of Education] will engage with non-traditional donors of the education sector to explore additional financial support for education. This will include the following: Exploring public-private partnership programmes with relevant domestic and international organisations, such as Ark EPG...to leverage financial as well as technical assistance (MoE, 2019b, p. 78).

The discussion so far is summarised in table 2 below. The key issues of the section and the impact dimensions of globalisation (verger et. al., 2012), are placed one to another; and it becomes apparent that the influence of the external actors mentioned until now, count as a manifestation of globalisation.

Impact Dimension of Globalisation	Examples in Ghana's PPP
Transnational corporations, foundations, international consultants, etc. becoming key players in education policy-making.	The Ark Foundation, EPG, and IDPF are examples. EPG is a not-for-profit consultancy organisation. The EPG is a possible international financial partner; a source of technical assistance to the Ministry of Education.
Globalisation defines new problems policies need to address but alters the capacity of states to respond to these problems by themselves.	EPG noted that education quality is low in Ghana; cited over-age enrolment and school dropouts as being pervasive. Suggested the government works with the private sector (PPP) to improve quality in education.
International actors now set education agendas and define the priorities of countries concerning education reform processes.	EPG and IDPF: IDPF sponsors EPG to conduct research on the feasibility of PPP in Ghana. Advises the government of Ghana on the need for PPP.
It creates a private market of education provision that complements and/or competes against national education providers.	Private operators to take over the management of partnership schools.

Table 2: The Impact Dimensions of Globalisation with Examples (Adapted from Verger Et. Al., Pp. 5-7)

All things considered, the IDPF and the EPG are like what Mintrom (2000), described as 'savvy policy entrepreneurs. By this, Mintrom (2000), explains that, instead of these entrepreneurs to wait for opportunities to avail themselves before they get on board with their innovative ideas to salvage a situation, they rather "...might engage in various activities designed to force these windows open, thus providing more opportunities in which to set the stage for the consideration and adoption of policy innovations" (p. 279). The initiatory role of IDPF and EPG also shows how powerful policy entrepreneurs are. It shows how they frequently override even the most powerful institutional and political structures that tend to bridle other traditional organisations from getting their ideas flicked through by key policy-makers. They are able to achieve this "...by telling new causal stories, creating new frames of reference, or making arguments that break down traditional alignments of interests" (Mintrom & Luetjens, 2017, p. 3).

There is, as one could in a breeze surmise, no evidence of how the EPG engaged in the task of encouraging the government of Ghana. But, as part of the strategies, they could have referred to 'new causal stories' as indicated by Mintrom and Luetjens (2017), which they are directly involved in making. The Ark Foundation, which the EPG is part of, is currently involved in a similar PPP project in Liberia, not far from Ghana- Partnership Schools for Liberia (PSL). It is

identified in this project as an education charity that manages a pool of philanthropic funds: it does not provide the money paid to the operators of the partnership schools; and it does not also pay the salaries of additional teachers posted to the partnership schools (Romero, Sandefur & Sandholtz, 2017). Evaluation studies from this program show mixed findings. However, by managing the pool of program funds, it shows the financial and organisational coordination capabilities of Ark. It is equally engaged in the publication and review of international literature concerning education PPP. These credentials could have been leveraged by EPG to articulate the PPP project in Ghana.

In international development assistance discourses, the relationship between the IDPF and EPG is one of a partnership. This represents a shift, as up until the 1980s, most INGOs took contracts from their home governments and directly implemented them (Lewis, 1998). By entering into partnerships (contracts) as these two INGOs apparently did, a widely discussed challenge they could face is accountability. This challenge already exists in education PPP; hence, this additional level of challenge could introduce further complications. Despite the numerous international principles to ensure effectiveness in these complex relationships (Lingan, Cavender, Lloyd, & Gwynne, 2009), some of them may still want to work according to their visions and priorities (Ramalingam, 2013). To get the best out of the PPP in Ghana, it is, therefore, important for clearly defined rules of engagement to be established.

6.4. Teacher Unions' Reactions To The Education PPP

The whole ESP 3 is said to have been formulated after wide stakeholder consultations. This involved three regional consultations, and other relevant stakeholders, including development partners. The aim was to make the process participatory. But as indicated previously, 'participation' is sometimes used for the purposes of gaining legitimacy, even for bad policies (Kpessa, 2011). Also, where various stakeholders actively participate and make inputs in the process, the minister responsible for the education sector, sometimes, determines what makes its way into a given policy. Other times too, the concessions that are made during consultations depends on how committed the ruling government is to the policy (Kudzor, 2014). An examination of the reactions of teacher unions to the PPP policy raises questions regarding the stakeholders who were consulted and the extent to which any feedback from such bodies might have affected the final policy. One would conventionally bank on the fact that teacher unions were aware of, and probably involved in negotiating the PPP modalities, considering that, private operators would be required to work with professional teachers. However, whether this was the case, is obscure.

The planning process for the policy took about two years. However, teacher unions appear oblivious of the reform and perspicuously inveigh against the introduction of it. Contending forces like this are expected and are supposed to be identified and dealt with early, because of their implications on the success of policies (Haddad & Demsky, 1995). Among the remonstrating unions are the Teachers & Educational Workers Union of Ghana (TEWU), the Coalition of Concerned Teachers (CCT-GH), the National Association of Graduate Teachers (NAGRAT), and the Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT). These bodies see the PPP as a move towards privatisation of education in Ghana. The general secretary of GNAT, for example, is reported to have said that:

The project is purported to last for three years after which it may be institutionalized permanently. The unions find the Ghana partnership project as subtle and eventual privatization, commercialization and commodification of public education in Ghana. We are amazed that the government is trumpeting the implementation of the project. In all these endeavours, the major stakeholders, GNAT, NAGRAT, TEWU and CCT-GH have not been involved in the two-year planning process of the project. We find this unfortunate and unacceptable (Lartey, 2019, March 1).

These concerns of teacher unions echo the notion of hidden privatisation. Ball and Youdell (2007) contend that concepts such as choice, improvement, quality, effectiveness and efficiency, may be used in policy texts; and though these concepts do not directly suggest privatisation, they nevertheless set the scene for privatisation or its variants. It appears teacher unions, from the above, are on the one hand, in defence of the ordinary Ghanaian, against some of the unintended, but pernicious effects that result from the privatisation of public sector services.

On the other hand, teachers are also against the policy because the modalities embedded within it appear to bequeath too much power to private operators, at the expense of professional teachers. This is similar to the Liberian experience. In Liberia, private providers had powers under the contracts they signed with the government, to remove underperforming teachers and students from their schools. A study found that a particular private provider had within a short period dismissed about 74% of its teachers (EURODAD, 2018). According to the Education International (2019, March 12), a spokesperson for the teacher unions has noted that:

An aspect of this policy empowers the private operator to decide to work or not with staff from the Ghana Education Service (GES)...Under the project, the transfer of GES staff from the selected schools will not attract transfer grants and school leaders will not be maintained automatically by the private operator, as the latter have the liberty to invite people from within or outside the GES to manage the schools.

If teacher unions were adequately involved in the negotiations, mutually beneficial modalities could have been crafted to avoid or minimise the negative reaction to the policy. This lack of involvement in the negotiations, as teacher unions point out, is not a big surprise, because, for a long time, proper engagement with relevant stakeholders in most African countries is often avoided by policy-makers, because they see them not as "...resource[s], but rather as a source of potential problems which the decision-maker must somehow strive to neutralize" (Juma & Clark, 1995, p. 125). Most PPPs equally are the result of "...pragmatic, usually, executive decisions based on technical feasibility and appropriateness, as opposed to legislative deliberation regarding public policy ends" (Verger & Moschetti, 2006, p. 6). One could argue that this opens the doors of policy-making to external parties like EPG, who usually come with incentives to the policy table, but closes in on internal stakeholders like teachers, who have no financial incentives to offer. One, therefore, finds the

education ministry clearly impervious to the antipathy of teachers and others who oppose privatisation tendencies. It is noted that,

Despite these agitations, the Ministry of Education has called the bluff of some teacher unions in the country who say they will kick against the implementation of the Ghana Partnership Schools (GPS)...According to the ministry, it will go ahead to roll out the policy to improve the standards of education in the country (GhanaWeb, 1 March 2019).

7. Summary and Conclusion

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) in education, particularly in developing countries, are fairly new. It is widely affirmed that there is little empirical evidence to prop up the claims about its efficacy in addressing the challenges it is purported to address in the education sector- cost-reduction, efficiency, accountability, and quality. Also, the exponents for their spread in developing countries are largely neoliberal-oriented transnational actors. However, not much is known about how they are adopted, especially in developing countries, where policy-making is already likened to a closed-circuit system (Ohemeng, 2005).

The findings in this paper show that in the case of Ghana, the PPP policy was the outcome of the synapse of domestic rational policy-making processes and the mechanisms of globalisation. The texts of the Education Strategic Plans (ESPs) show that the PPP policy was the result of incremental and systemic policy-making processes. Incrementally, we find the private sector's basic principles of efficiency, cost-effectiveness, accountability, and quality, amongst others, percolate educational policies from one period to another. In the first ESP (2003-2015) these basic tenets which the private sector is noted to be proficient at were only passively mentioned. There was an explicit affirmation of the importance of working with the private sector to improve education delivery, however, policy-makers were unsure of how the modalities could be framed. In the second ESP (2010-2020), the management principles were well elaborated; and there was also a subsidy PPP with access-oriented objectives. This PPP in the second ESP did not face any opposition, partly because it did not threaten any group's interest. In this current ESP (2018-2030), the emphasis on the private sector (business) principles could be described as having reached its crescendo, considering that nearly all the reforms contained in it are management reforms, including the PPP. The observed antipathy towards this PPP in the current ESP, maybe because it is management-oriented, which means specific institutions and groups' interests are somehow affected. Regarding how systemic the policy-making process has been, we find that the private-sector ideas and principles, and eventually the management PPP in ESP 3, are informed by the need for improvement in the quality of education at the basic level. Low education quality has been observed over the years, and this tilted public discourse from universal access towards improved quality, resulting in the education sector policy-makers looking inward for solutions, and eventually spawning the incremental emphasis paid to the private sector ideals and the PPP policy.

One would have thought that teacher unions were involved in the PPP policy-making process, which is alleged to have taken about two years. As it turned out, the teacher unions claim to have been uninvolved in the process, though the ESP document is explicit that all the policies listed in it received inputs from all relevant stakeholders in the education sector. This raises some important questions: what is the role of teacher unions in education policy-making in Ghana? And, why are some important stakeholders excluded from taking part in policy-making?

The resulting opposition to the policy from teacher unions need addressing. It is important that the Ministry of Education and the Ghana education service, quickly find mutually beneficial solutions to the concerns of teachers, to avoid some of the cases in Liberia, where for example, teachers were found to be frequently dismissed by private providers (EURODAD, 2018). This liberty private operators have to dismiss teachers, apart from disrupting teaching and learning in partnership schools, could make it difficult for private operators to attract qualified teachers. What is needed is transparency in the recruiting of teachers and their terms of engagement, especially in areas that concern their tenure in the partnership schools.

The role of transnational actors in shaping the PPP policy appears to be greater than any rational internal processes deduced from the ESP document and outside of it. One can, therefore, safely state that the PPP was in a large measure, a product of the forces of globalisation. This became apparent when the activities of Ark, EPG and IDPF, were collocated with that of the 'impact dimensions of globalisation'. However, it needs stating that this was possible partly because some internal conditions had already smoothed the policy landscape for it to occur. Among these are the legal framework (constitution) which allows private provision of education; the public's (parents and guardians) liking for private schools; the education sector managers long engagement with private providers of education, which has equipped them with enormous experience to negotiate any engagement with the private sector; the general calls for improved quality in education; and the introduction, in incremental order, some private sector management principles in educational policies and practices. While these factors might have facilitated the acceptance of the idea of PPPs in education pushed by these transnational actors, it is important to note that the strategies often used by these transnational actors are equally instrumental in getting their ideas accepted. In the case of Ghana, the Ministry of Education is emphatic that it hopes to leverage the financial and technical expertise of EPG and others to implement the PPP (MoE, 2019b, p. 78). The EPG and IDPF also made an indication of having conducted feasibility studies regarding the PPP and played an advisory role to the government in its formulation process. Combined with the financial and technical expertise they have to offer; they could have dominated the policy-making process.

Given the level of possible transnational influences on the policy, going forward, it is important steps are immediately taken towards guaranteeing its sustainability. It is typical of transnational actors like EPG to take the initial financial risk and then look for external support (GBC-Education, 2016). This is even the case for EPG, as it relies on support from other networks. The case of Liberia, where EPG's parent Ark Foundation manages a pool of philanthropic funds (Romero, Sandefur & Sandholtz, 2017), should also serve a lesson. The responsibility for sustainability is thus, in the

hands of both the government of Ghana and the transnational actors who are externally funded but have direct roles in the implementation of the policy. While the government manages its relationships with EPG for example, the EPG should also work on its relationships with its network of sponsors.

8. References

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