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Tracing Evidence of Xenophobic Tensions and Conflicts amongst Informal Trader Foreign Nationals and Informal Village-Based Entrepreneur South Africans

Dr. Mavhungu Abel Mafukata
Centre for Development Support, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, Republic of South Africa

Abstract:
Many foreign nationals earn their living in informal business in South Africa where the majority own small street corner shops or are involved in street vending. Trading competition for the market has been increasing – sparking violent animosities, tensions and conflicts between foreign nationals and local entrepreneurs. The conflicts have at times turned horribly Xenophobic targeting foreign nationals in particular. Xenophobic violent tensions and conflicts amongst informal small-scale traders in South African townships have been widely recorded in the past decade or so – but studies tracing any such evidence of Xenophobic Tensions and Conflicts between Informal Trader Foreign Nationals and Informal Village-based Entrepreneur South Africans – especially in Limpopo Province are rare. In May 2008, most townships in South Africa experienced widespread attacks on foreign nationals. The advanced reasons by most commentators pointed to Xenophobia manifesting through hatred of foreign nationals for out-competing locals in the informal business market. This paper traces any such evidence of Xenophobic tensions and conflicts in the rural areas of South Africa. This study premised that patterns of Xenophobic tendencies would vary between the rural and urban set ups. Finally, the paper recommends that intensive public eduction campaigns be held in various societal groups to conscientise the citizens of the effects of population movements around the world on regional and local socio-economic dynamics. Better understanding of multi-ethnicity might remove or minimise Xenophobia amongst South Africans.

Keywords: Foreign nationals, Informal traders, Violence, Xenophobia, South Africa

1. Introduction

Figure 1: The torching of a Mozambican foreign national in Alexandra township near Johannesburg, May 2008 (A police officer tries to douse off the flames)

Figure 1 shows how far Xenophoba could entrench itself in society - people become extremely violent, brutal, inhumane, vicious and disregarding to human life as revealed in the two pictures captured in South Africa in May 2008. Figure 1 depicts a society ravaged by anger, hatred, dislike and violence against fellow human beings in a democratic and constitutional state which should have been a model of social modernity and human advancement.

Xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals in May 2008 – especially those attacks and violence sparked by tensions and clashes between informal traders amongst foreign nationals who owned businesses in South Africa and small-scale informal entrepreneur

South Africans have become a major issue of social debate and research both is South Africa and abroad, since. These violences have been mostly widespread in some urban and peri-urban areas of some major cities in South Africa. Ever since the outbreak of the violence, the majority of studies on Xenophobia in South Africa (Bekker, 2010; Crush & Ramachandran, 2014; Hickel, 2014; Isike & Isike, 2012; Konanani & Odeku, 2013; Schwikkard, 2013; Vahed, 2013; Valji, 2003; Zondi & Ukpere, 2014) emerged – covering mostly events in the urban areas particularly in some townships, and informal settlements in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and the Western Cape where most of the so-called May 2008 Xenophobic attacks took place. Even though the majority of the outbreaks were targetting informal foreign traders in places such as Diepsloot, Khayelitsha, Nyanga,

Gugulethu, Alexandra and Durban amongst others, Kirsting (2009) also found that Xenophobic attacks on foreign immigrants in South Africa subsequently spread over the entire country – and not only confined to the small-scale informal business sector but across society as a whole. It is however not the intention of this study at this stage to argue contrary to the conceptualization of Xenophobia – especially on the issues of geography as has been espoused by Kirsting (2009).

Isike and Isike (2012) opined that Xenophobia in South Africa had actually gone beyond ordinary citizens into government level also. Xenophobia is said to have been institutionalized across government agencies and structures – including the private sector (Isike & Isike, 2012). Valji (2003) reported that Xenophobia is also found in public service agencies and worse so public protection and law enforcement agencies such as the police. Some literature argued that South African police do not protect foreign nationals from violence and associated attacks positing that South African Police Services (SAPS) is regarded as one of the most brutal law enforcement agency, and in addition one of the most highly militarized safety and security dispensing agency in the world (Konanani & Odeku, 2013; Zondi & Ukpere, 2014). Gruesome killings of foreign nationals by the police in South Africa have in fact been reported all over the country, and such incidences are becoming perpetual and increasing. In fact, Zondi & Ukpere (2014) commented and lamented on police brutality in South Africa which they opined was a "*noticeable occurrence*" citing amongst others the example of the brutal killing of Mr. Mido Macia; a taxi driver Mozambican national who was tied and dragged behind a police vehicle in public until he died in Daveyton, East Rand, South Africa.

Zondi & Ukpere (2014) furthermore chronicled police brutality in South Africa to the violent and unfair police systems of the apartheid era where Blacks in particular were mainly the victims of such brutality. Police brutality fermented through unwarranted arrests, detentions and murders of foreign nationals (Konanani & Odeku, 2013) and on members of the local public undermines South Africa's constitutional provision of a society free and safe from all sorts and manner of violence (Zondi & Ukpere, 2014) while on the other hand increasing what Schwikkard (2013) termed "*death as a result of state violence*" Effectively, government's promotion of service to the community by all government agency entrenched in the "*Batho Pele*" (people first) and "*Ubuntu*" rhetorics in South Africa are thrown out of South Africa's constitutional and democratic equations.

The danger of police brutality on foreign nationals might be found and explained in the theory espoused by Correll *et al.* (2007) who argued that such actions might mobilize and galvanize the foreigner public community "*to engage in belligerent reactions to the police*" - which could spark and prompt more brutality from the side of the police. Despite so much evidence of Xenophobic attacks and violence by police agencies against foreign nationals in South Africa, government has on the other hand been reluctant to admit police brutality existed. It has been opined in fact that the whole South African society has been immensely permeated by high incidences of Xenophobia where foreign immigrants are emotionally and physically taunted, harrassed and tortured through various Xenophobic instruments and practices such as the use of derogatory words such as "*makwerekwere*", "*magrigamba*" and "*witches*" for example on daily basis (Achume, 2014; Hickel, 2009; Rukema & Khan, 2013) with authorities folding their hands in utter denial of the reality of Xenophobia in South Africa.

However, this paper argues that since most of the studies on Xenophobia in South Africa evaluated circumstances of Xenophobia mostly in the urban areas, some of the conclusions drawn based on such studies are therefore reasonably expected to materially differ with those conclusions drawn from elsewhere in the country – villages and rural areas in point. Socio-economic and demographic characterizations of urban areas - township communities in particular and those of the rural villages would reasonably differ and therefore factors informing Xenophobic tendencies in South Africa would not be universal in the rural and urban set ups. This view might be corroborated by the approach adopted by Bekker (2010) who investigated issues of Xenophobia in South Africa but on an urban geographical space and perspective. Bekker (2010) found and reported that "*the emergence of Xenophobic evidence is typically rooted in the micro-politics of township life*" where violence and attacks on foreign nationals were mostly instigated by civilian and young Black South African men. In South Africa, township life is reasonably expected to be socio-economically tough experience because of the high populations of different nationalities and ethnicity – amounting to millions there (Hadebe, 2010).

The supplier in chief of township livelihood to the majority of its residents is informal business (Hadebe, 2010). Rural South Africa is also highly dependent on small-scale informal business activities amongst its largely poor and small income earners for livelihood. This paper focuses on the informal business sub-sector to argue its case – but with particular focus on rural village set up in the Vhembe District, Limpopo Province. The choice of the informal business sector is encouraged by the fact that most of the reviewed literature (Hickel, 2014; Kirsting, 2009; Rukema & Khan, 2013) on Xenophobic attacks in South Africa opine that most of such attacks had actually taken place mostly in the informal business sub-sector where competition between local entrepreneurs and foreign nationals was more intense. However, a further search of literature on Xenophobia – especially South of the Sahara appear also to reveal that Xenophobia has indeed taken place and concentrated more in this sub-sector. For example, small-scale informal trading foreign nationals from West Africa were forbiden to do business in the Congo by the former president; Mobuto Sese Seko of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) just because these people were foreign nationals in Congo (Kirsting, 2009). Furthermore, certain political leaders in Africa still fermented Xenophobic and restrictive draconian rhetoric to deny foreign nationals socio-economic rights as espoused in the 1948 declarations of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights by international communities against Xenophobia and related behaviours including racism and discriminations

amongst others. Denying foreign national space to trade in the economy is denying them access to livelihood and the right to live and earn a living. This assertion is corroborated by Hadebe (2010) who argued that informal business has in fact been adopted in poorer communities as an anti-poverty strategy seeking to improve the daily needs of the adopters.

As it has been alluded to earlier, this paper investigates the so-called Xenophobic tendencies in South Africa from a rural village set-up. This study was undertaken in the Nzhelele area of Makhado Municipality, Vhembe District of Limpopo Province, and South Africa. The subject of Xenophobia in as far as this pre-dominantly rural province not received any such considerable research interest despite Xenophobia being of major interest in South Africa in general – especially after the May 2008 events during which many foreign nationals were killed and also displaced (Konanani & Odeku, 2013; Schwikkard, 2013; Zondi & Ukpere, 2014). However, a few studies (Francis *et al.,* 2012; Konanani & Odeku, 2013) based on rural backgrounds in the Limpopo Province exist. The difference is that these two studies did not take any different rout of empirical approach in their investigations – as compared to the others from urban set up. This paper wishes to extend the methodological and theoretical approaches beyond these studies. This paper presents a scenario where deductions are made as to the similarities and differences with regard relations between small-scale informal trader foreign nationals and their South African counterparts; both in an urban and rural village set-ups. This paper hypothesizes that such relations would differ from region to region and social space to social space – and the subsequent occurrences or non-occurrences of Xenophobic tendencies would largely depend on these relations.

2. Literature Review

There can't be Xenophobia without population migration. Through migration, peoples perceived as "others" move from one region to the other for livelihood opportunities – especially to regions perceived as more prosperous than the original bases. In Africa for example, immigrants would go to places such as South Africa, Angola, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria and Cameroon as these countries were considered prosperous and larger economies in the region in particular (Kirsting, 2009; Isike & Isike, 2012; Rukema & Khan, 2013). Population migration has been an interesting debate for decades around the world – especially at this dispensation when the world seems to have become more open and friendlier to international immigrants, alternatively when populations in various regions of the world are faced with immense socio-economic pressures which compel them to move from one area to the other. The world has also been highly globalised (Chigora, 2009) with regions needing each other more than before. A plethora of literature (Chimbga & Meier, 2014; Hungwe, 2012; Kerr & Kerr, 2011; Munshi, 2013) concede that socio-political changes which came into being in Sub-Saharan Africa after the end of colonialism of the majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and in addition apartheid in South Africa and devastating wars in countries such as Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique to mention some in the early 1980s had increased international immigration in the region for various reasons.

Although South Africa has been the most preferred destination of thousands if not millions of foreign nationals from most countries in the Souther Africa Development Community (SADC) – especially in the mining labour sector as far back as colonialism and later apartheid (Hungwe, 2012; Kerr & Kerr, 2011), the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa in April 1994 triggered increased migration of foreign nationals from across Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in South Asian countries such Bangladesh, Pakistan and India for example (Chimbga & Meier, 2014; Munshi, 2013). The reasons for the increased number of foreign nationals from across so many developing regions of the world to prefer South Africa as destination include amongst others the niche entrepreneurship opportunities – especially in townships, informal settlements and villages, improved livelihood guarantees; political asylum and security in the country for most of the foreign nationals wanting to escape escapades of political turmoil in places such as DR Congo, Pakistan, Rwanda, Somalia and Zimbabwe to state but a few. The fact that South Africa is the most advanced, industrialized, urbanized and largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa and perhaps 28th largest economy in the world, makes the country the most preferred target of international immigrants escaping socio-economic turmoil elsewhere (Turok, 2012).

With approximately 78 000 international immigrants *per annum* entering the Gauteng Province, the province therefore hosts approximately 46% of the foreign nationals immigrant population in South Africa (Duponchel, 2009). Immigrants from around the world further dispersed into most South African townships for socio-economic opportunities such as acquisition of permanent residence, formal employment, asylum for political reasons and informal entrepreneurship amongst others (Grant, 2013; Munshi, 2013). A new trend has been emerging however in the past ten years where foreign immigrants are beginning to populate even the remotest rural areas in South Africa. It is approximated that there could be more than three million Zimbabwean nationals living and working in South Africa for example (Hendrickse, 2009) – and the majority of these Zimbabweans live and work in the small-scale farming sub-sector of the economy in the rural areas. These nationals are legal or illegal immigrants – who live in urban and rural areas – with some working for villagers in their farms to earn a living. Some of these Zimbabwean, Somali and Ethiopian nationals are even getting integrated into these communities through marriage to the locals or illegally obtaining South African citizenships amongst others.

Where-ever there were foreign nationals; governments try to integrate them into their respective systems. However, Kirsting (2009) reported that Africa still battles to achieve integration of foreign nationals into its socio-economic systems because of lack of adequate resources. In countries such as Tanzania for example, integration of international immigrants – especially those in the country illegally or through acts of war and violence in their countries – the case of Rwandans in particular has posed fundamental socio-economic challenges for the citizenry – and government on the other hand. According to Gasarasi (2012), Tanzanians have begun a process of repatriating some of these Rwandans back to Rwanda – accusing some of these refugees of violent crimes; murder, armed robberies, livestock theft, poaching of wild game, attacking villagers and trade in arms. In South Africa, foreign nationals have been accused of weird propositions such as practicing of witchcraft – especially when the businesses of these foreign nationals do well and in addition, stealing of women from locals using cash which the locals wouldn't afford (Hickel, 2014). However, the expulsion and repatriation of the Rwandans in Tanzania – especially in 2000, 2003 and 2006 based on the

listed allegations has been duped un-African and therefore Xenophobic (Gasarasi, 2012). It is however historical that foreign national were victimized, harassed and tortured to n extent of being excused from access to public service opportunities including livelihood earning. For example, Kirsting (2009) reported that in some African countries such as Gabon and Congo claimed that foreign nationals were prohibited of engaging in any entrepreneurship, or they were expelled from the hosting countries.

In most of the host countries such as South Africa, some of these foreign nationals enter the informal business space by starting small grocery shops in townships and villages (Hickel, 2014; Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010; Munshi, 2013) in order to earn a living. By so doing, these foreign nationals place themselves in competing environment with the locals for the informal market space. In this competition, successful foreign nationals who out-compete local entrepreneurs are often accused of witchcraft – or *ubuthakhathi* in IsiZulu (Hickel, 2014). However, this paper posits that the reasons for increased immigration into South Africa are beyond mere entrepreneurial factors as many a literature asset (Hickel, 2014; Munshi, 2013). In South Africa, these foreign nationals arrive at a critical time when the post-apartheid government is experiencing a down-turn with regard creation of, and availability of formal employment opportunities for the locals. South Africa has a current rate of approximately 23.2% of unemployed adults (Kalintanyi & Visser, 2010). The economy is unable to create meaningful employment opportunities for the masses – especially the youths. It is for certain the foreign nationals who are in the country compete with the locals for the few available employment opportunities – and in some cases, foreign nationals out-competing South Africans for these opportunities. To make matters worse, foreign nationals are accused by the locals for providing cheap labour, and therefore generally more preferred by employers than the expensive locals who demand expensive packages (Hickel, 2014) – especially in domestic and security industry employment space and in commercial farming for example. This is where the notion that foreign nationals take the jobs due for South Africans emanates from (Chimbga & Meier, 2014). Most South Africans believe that foreigners take jobs which should have been theirs (Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010). However, it must be stated that this reaction by the South African public could not be viewed as solely South African conduct against foreigners. Literature portraying this reaction as a South African factor lacks credibility, thoughtfulness, logic and authenticity because all over the world such references were common. In fact, Berton (2013) contended that "*In the case of welfare states such as South Africa, locals would want to decrease the benefits of the state to the foreign nationals*" Berton's assertion points to other regions in the world including Europe, and even the United States of America (Hendrickse, 2009) to indicate that public misgivings on foreigner benefits are far wider than Sub-Saharan Africa – or South Africa in particular. There are several reasons to this effect. In South Africa, the public is also provoked into Xenophobic reactions against foreigners – especially in cases where foreign nationals are perceived to benefit ahead of locals in terms of government services. Hendrickse (2009) corroborate this view. From the assertions mentioned here, it is evident that Rukema & Khan (2013) opined correctly on the so-called "*scapegoating hypothesis*" theory for which they argued that locals blame the foreign nationals for job losses and lack of access to government services.

On the one hand, there are foreign nationals who enter the informal market entrepreneurship space in the townships therefore competing with South African nationals for the customer base. Foreign nationals doing small-scale informal business in South Africa have tremendously increased since April 1994 some bringing their families to live in the country. Practically, every settlement; village, town and city is awash with foreign national employment seekers and small-scale informal entrepreneurs who sell from grocery to hardware – especially electronics and building materials. Existing literature reveals that the majority of the foreigners entering the informal small-scale business space were from poor backgrounds. However, Munshi (2013) reported a contrasting scenario amongst Bangladeshi nationals for example who instead were from middle and upper-class households; some of them with very high educational qualifications at university and vocational institutions. With a poor education and training system characterized by intertwined limitations and also lacks capacity to produce relevant skills amongst the citizenry in South Africa (Mafukata, 2012; Rasool & Botha, 2011), the foreign nationals are reasonably expected to dominate certain areas of employment sector – especially in construction and mining services where foreign nationals seem to be better skilled than South Africans. Of late, there have been a growing number of Zimbabwean teachers – especially in Mathematics and Science into the South African educator market – and these teachers are said to have suffered Xenophobic attacks by South African teachers – even learners (Singh, 2013).

With regard small-scale informal entrepreneurship, which is an effective way and means of fighting poverty and unemployment, Grant (2013) posit that South African small-scale informal entrepreneurs suffer from low levels of entrepreneurial skills as compared to their counterparts from elsewhere in the region and beyond. This assertion opines therefore that local South Africans are faced with limited options to compete with mostly competent foreign national small-scale informal entrepreneurs who profess immense skills in small-scale business practice or to reasonably earn a living. In addition, there has been sudden emergence of large-scale commercial retail chain stores within townships which also compete with the informal businesses in the townships (Grant, 2013) making business harder for small-scale informal entrepreneurs. Beyond urban townships, foreign nationals are taking over businesses in villages; either through renting back rooms which are converted into grocery and hardware stores, renting or buying off local businesses outright. Big retail stores are also beginning to populate village premises drawing village customer base to these stores who now walk or travel short distances to reach these stores. The local small-scale informal entrepreneur is left out of the equation – and therefore facing frustrating moments of livelihood uncertainty.

Local entrepreneurs and the highly unemployed public react over this perceived unjust seizure of livelihood opportunities by foreigners. Some of the reactions have been characterised by serious incidences of violence. The May 2008 violence which engulfed mostly townships in the Gauteng Province were widely reported and condemned around the world. Approximately 62 deaths of foreign nationals were reported (Chimbga & Meier, 2014) – and as many as 21 deaths of South Africans (Charman & Piper, 2012) while approximately 100 000 foreign nationals had to flee their habitats in South Africa back home or moved elsewhere in the country where such violence was absent. The gruesome death of Ernesto Alfabeto Nhamuave from Mozambique who was set alight alive in front of a cheering crowd of locals made South Africa one of the worst regions terorised by acts of

gruesome Xenophobic violence in the world. A plethora of literature emerged in the late 2008 dealing with public reactions over foreigners and their impact on livelihood guarantees in South Africa. Reviewed literature (Charman & Piper, 2012; Chimbga & Meier, 2014; Rydgren, 2003) emerged with the following reasons for public reaction to foreigners in South Africa and elsewhere:

- Hatred and fear of foreign nationals by South Africans.
- Institutionalization of Xenophobic tendencies by promoting ethno-nationalistic political frame of thought   and behaviour amongst the public. In other words, politicization of Xenophobia.
- Pure factors of criminality propagated by protagonists of xenophobic violence.
- Public ignorance of diversity.
- Imaginary superiority of South Africans over foreigners.
- Lack of public understanding of laws governing International Human Rights.
- Lack of Ubuntu (Humane).

According to Crush & Ramachandran (2014), issues of Xenophobia are propagated and sustained from diverse theoretical approaches employed by stakeholders such as researchers, commentators and policy makers in their response to Xenophobia which amongst others include:

2.1. Denialism
Proponents of this theoretical approach on Xenophobia refute assertions that Xenophobia has a role to play in the unwarranted attacks and violence against foreign nationals. Denialists argue that instead, criminality by anti-social elements within local citizenry are the main causes of the violence.

2.2. Minimalism
Minimalists argue that violence against foreign nationals highs on societal inequalities – especially in countries such as South Africa where marginalization and exclusion of the majority Black people by the minority whites created a double-barreled economy of the rich Whites and poor Blacks (Mafukata, 2012). In the battle for access to scares resources in fierce competition, minimalists argue that frustrations and tensions emerge in society. In other words, minimalists explain Xenophobic tendencies through competition for materialism in society.

2.3. Realism
Realists on the one hand explain Xenophobic tendencies as being deep-rooted and developed into pervasive hostility and animosity of the locals against foreign nationals; either based on myths, stereotypical behaviour of the public and the violent nature of society – especially in the case of South Africa where violence and coercive tendencies were inculcated into society to that point of deep-rootedness particularly from the anti-apartheid era and struggle for liberation.

It is crucial in fact to note that emerging modern literature (Berton, 2013; Chimbga; Meier, 2014; Ngomane, 2009) opine that South Africa was the worst, and exceedingly xenophobic country in the world followed by Russia, Great Britain, Argentina, China, Botswana, United States of America, Mozambique, Japan and Austria respectively. Clearly, South Africa is not the only country in the world with tendencies of Xenophobia for evidence points to the fact that South Africa could as well be a case of increased intensity of Xenophobia. However, to characterise the country as being having the most Xenophobic and brutal police service in the world having based such assertions on isolated cases of police criminality and brutality against (foreigner) suspects just as in the case of Mido Macia (Mozambican), Sergio Cossa (Mozambican) and Obinna Ugboaja (Nigerian) amongst others (Konananani & Odeku, 2013; Schwikkard, 2013; Zondi & Ukpere, 2041) is empirically challengeable because such cases would in all probability exist all over the world. In fact, Konanani & Odeku (2013) conceded that police brutality has almost become a global phenomenon. Correll et al. (2002) revealed that the senseless killing of Amadou Diallo; a 22 year old West African foreign national to Bronx, New York by the Police in February 1999 who was shot at 41 times, and died after 19 of those bullets riddled his body confirmed that Xenophobia was a factor of increased debate even in commonly and supposedly advanced economies such as the United States.

In the case of South Africa, police kill the public almost daily regardless of the nationality of the victim. This is simple police brutality, and to export this behaviour to Xenophobia is sheer dramatization of the real facts on the ground. In the United States of America for instance, there have been a few such cases of police brutality against innocent members of the public – especially in 2014. The world is still realing from the shocking killing of Michael Brown in the United States in the second half of 2014 after a Xenophobic behaviour by the police.

The reasons for Xenophobic tendencies are reported by a plethora (Correll et al., 2007; Correll et al., 2002; Rydgren, 2003; Zondi & Ukpere, 2014) of studies. Xenophobic tendencies have been characterised as attitudinal orientations of hostilities against non-natives in a given population and perceived as hostility towards strangers and all that is foreign (Achume, 2014; Hickel, 2014; Kirsting, 2009; Rukuma & Khan, 2013; Rushton, 2005), and are caused by amongst others:

2.3.1. Political Rhetoric
politicians fuel Xenophobia and subsequent attacks of foreign nationals. For instance, in 1981 President Mobuto Sese Seko of former Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) expelled all Rwandans and Burundians living and working in Zaire by repealing the laws that granted them refugee status, and/or granted them citizenship in 1972 in Zaire (Kirsting, 2009). Some few years down the line in 1977, 6000 West Africans lost their hard earned property and businesses in the Congo, who were later expelled from the country (Kirsting, 2009). In Gabon, President Omar Bongo fermented Xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals

while conducting mass expulsions of the same in addition (Kirsting, 2009). At the same time when South Africa was on the news for attacks on foreign nationals in May 2008 (Hickel, 2014; Rukema & Khan, 2013), Kirsting (2009) reports that DR Congo nationals were also being expelled from Angola. From South Africa, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi (1997 as Minister of Home Affairs) had this construed Xenophobic statement in parliament:

"With an illegal population estimated at between 2.5 million and 5 million, it is obvious that the socio economic resources of the country, which are under severe strain as it is are further being burdened by the presence of illegal aliens...[citizens should] aid the Department and the South African Police Services in the detection, prosecution and removal of illegal aliens from the country...the cooperation of the community is required in the proper execution of the Department's functions"

2.3.2. Lack of Integration of Foreign Nationals into the Broader Society
Reviewed literature (Lim, 2009) posit that Xenophobic tendencies might be pointing to the fact that during the socio-demographic transition phase – especially post-apartheid in the case of South Africa – affected societies might have failed to integrate into multi-ethnic environments which the country has become.

2.3.3. Access to Socio-Economic Opportunities
Existing myths posit that foreign nationals outcompete locals on opportunities – especially on employment and profit making in informal businesses where some locals opine that foreign nationals use witchcraft – the so-called "*ubuthakhathi*" to gain advantage in business (Hickel, 2014). In the Congo during Mobuto, West Africans were forbidden to trade and to own shops such as bakeries or even to trade informally at some point (Kirsting, 2009). Koenane (2013) and Konananni & Odeku (2013) reported that some Xenophobic tendencies in South Africa were motivated by public frustrations for lack of access to expected socio-economic opportunities such as employment and government social services. Some South Africans felt disadvantaged and deprived of resources they felt should be there by right.

2.3.4. Violent Entrepreneurship
Charman & Piper (2012) argued that some violent attacks and Xenophobic practices emanate from "violent entrepreneurship" which might have been "generalized beyond cases"

2.3.5. Cultural Sentiments and Lack of Acceptance of Diversity
Even the most advanced democracies and economies in the world such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway and Switzerland amongst others also suffer from Xenophobic tendencies amongst their nationals who resent people of other nationalities and cultures (Rydgren, 2003). Lim (2009) found that in South Korea for example where society is viewed as being highly rigid and narrow-minded with regard multi-racialism, Xenophobic and ethnic resentments were based on public intolerance of cultural diversity – even against fellow Koreans from outside Korea from countries such as China, Russia, Japan and the United States of America.

2.3.6. The Use of Xenophobia to Promote Ethno-Nationalism
The reasons for such Xenophobic tendencies in these communities are not necessarily competition-based but political and social tendencies in most cases where Xenophobia has been employed to influence political thought and behaviour – especially amongst politicians and the electorate who seek to promote ethno-nationalism in their countries (Rydgren, 2003). Australia is a case in point where for decades political systems sought to exclude, marginalise and ostracize fellow Australians based on race – especially the Aborigines and peoples of mixed race (Lim, 2009). This assertion is corroborated by Rydgren (2003) who furthermore posited that the emergence of political formations such as the Radical Right Populist (RRP) parties in some European nations attest to widespread Xenophobic tendencies manifesting through exploitation of the intolerant political culture in these European countries. Furthermore, in the case of Australia for example, Lim (2009) reports that political systems attempted to employ instruments such as the Immigration Restrictions Act of 1905 (45) in order to create a mono-cultural society of the whites. Apartheid South Africa also had similar instruments institutionalizing Xenophobic and racial tendencies. A wide-based literature (Chimbga & Meier, 2014; Lim, 2009; Singh, 2013) revealed that the harsh views on foreigners in Xenophobic societies have resulted in:
- Violence against foreign nationals.
- Exclusion, institutional discrimination, deprivation and marginalization of foreign nationals from public service and life; economic and livelihood practices.
- Exploitation and violation of foreign nationals.
- Intense and pervasive inter-personal and social abuse.

2.4. Addressing Widespread Xenophobic Tendencies in Society
Entrenching social awareness of diversity in society – especially through schools where children are taught issues of social interests – especially those promoting and facilitating for social cohesion might be the way out of Xenophobic tendencies and practices in society. This educative approach could infiltrate through society (Chimbga & Meier, 2014).
Foreign nationals have always organized themselves into worker groups – especially labour unions such as the Migrant Trade Union (MTU) in South Korea to protest against zenophobic tendencies against foreign nationals (Lim, 2009). Social capital exploitation remains the best option to deal with existing animosities between these two groups of entrepreneurs.

Exploitation of social capital through promotion of networking amongst entrepreneurs; trust; cohesion and respect for diversity – especially with regard ethnicity and country of origin might assist mending bridges between the groups (Mafukata *et al.,* 2014). Absence of appropriate social networks based on exploitation of social capital amongst informal entrepreneurship opine that this sector faces challenges with regard access and exposure to market information and knowledge, labour and financial support (Grant, 2013). For example, Munshi (2013) found that the majority of Bangladeshi informal entrepreneurs who aspire to start small-scale businesses in South Africa would obtain credit from the Indians while indigenous locals lacked those opportunities because those Indians who assist Bangladeshi nationals would not trust the locals.

3. Methodology

3.1. Theoretical Considerations
This paper borrows from two important theories for its discourse which Hickel (2014) called "*theories of xenophobic violence*" and successfully employed in the study of xenophobic tendencies in Kwazulu-Natal Province, South Africa. The paper also employed the so-called "*Choice Theory*" adopted by Neira *et al.* (2013).

3.1.1. Marxist or Political Economy Perspective
In this theory, Hickel (2014) reveals that the challenges emanate from the properties of Neoliberal policy and the so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) as adopted by most post-liberation economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. The argument against neoliberal policies and the SAPs is that both undermined livelihood guarantees for the poor masses who expect national governments to make such undertakings possible – of which when the same fails to materialize spark competition between foreign immigrants and the locals over scares resources – especially employment and housing.

3.1.2. The Social Capital Theory
This paper is based on the theory of "Social Capital as a factor for local economic community development" espoused by Myrsine Roumeliotou and Kostas Rontos in their article about Kalloni, Lesvos in Greece (Roumeliotou & Rontos, 2009). These authors argued that it was possible for diverse societies to develop, promote and achieve social cohesion through exploitation of factors of social capital such as community trustworthiness, interpersonal trust, sharing and reciprocity of the citizenry at large. This assertion is also corroborated by various other social and political theorists (Dhlandhlara, 2014; Mafukata et al. 2014) who conducted corroborating studies elsewhere in the developing regions. Both these theorists posit that exploitation of factors of social capital would promote, develop and sustain social integration, respect for others, toleration, fraternity, solidarity, cooperation, collaboration, economic efficiency and democratic stability – even in a diverse and complex environment characterized by peoples of different norms, cultures and beliefs. This paper explores the use of trust; social, civic, institutional, organizational and psychological factors to promote collaboration of the local and foreign nationals in the small-scale informal trade economy in South Africa.

3.1.3. The Choice Theory
The choice theory regarding running of own business or opting for paid employment elaborated on by Neira *et al.* (2013) is also explored in this paper. In borrowing from this theory, this paper assesses whether South Africans are entrepreneurial or are a formal employment society. The assessment is based on the three dimensions of choice:
- Individual Factors.
- Social Factors.
- Macroeconomic Factors.

3.2. Data Collection and Analysis

3.2.1. Sample Frame
Since there was no record available on (foreign nationals) village-based small-scale informal businesses at any government department and local traditional leaders – especially in this part of the country, for the purpose of this study, a list of such businesses was first constructed for all the villages targeted for this study. A team of four enumerators who also acted as interviewers during data collection later was dispatched to do the counting of the businesses from village to village. The process took three and half days to complete. The data base is reflected in table 1.

Village	South African	Zimbabwean Nationals	N = (73)	Foreign Nationals	N = (21)
Murunwa	1	11	5	3	2
Phadzima	2	26	9	5	4
Mauluma	2	29	11	5	3
Mavhunga	2	22	9	2	2
Makumbwi	1	36	10	4	4
Raliphaswa	1	15	6	1	1
Matanda	1	17	5	1	1
Vhutuwangadzebu	1	11	4	1	1
Dzanani	1	10	3	3	2
Ramavhoya-Matidza	1	19	11	1	1
Total	13	196	73	26	21
Percentages	100	100	37.2	100	80.7

Table 1: Selected respondents for the study

During field work, it was established that a number of local entrepreneurs had stopped functioning, and it was therefore decided to include the non-functioning entrepreneurs in the list in order to establish the reasons for their non-functionality during data collection. Local entrepreneurs were interviewed through a semi-structured questionnaire with focus on their socio-demographic data (Age, Gender, Educational Level attained, Employment Status, Other Skills, Household Size, Relations with foreign nationals, Xenophobic experience) and business-related information (Type of business, Business registration status, Business Tax Compliance Status, Number of locals employed – if any, Ownership of Business site, Income generated, Expenditure pattern, Reasons for non-functionality of business – if not functioning).

Of the targeted number of foreign nationals for data collections, three (n=3) refused participation citing fear to be targeted for police raids or xenophobic attacks by locals. These foreign nationals opined that the field workers for this study were collecting information for the police or locals who might later attack them. Despite efforts to clarify and numerous assurances, they could not be persuaded. The interviews for the Zimbabwean nationals and other foreign nationals on socio-demographic (Age, Gender, Nationality, Immigration Status, Educational Level attained, Other Skills, Reasons for immigration, Number of years in South Africa, Place where staying, Relations with locals, Xenophobic experience) and business-related data (Type of business, Business registration status, Business Tax Compliance Status, Number of locals employed – if any, Ownership of Business site) were collected through semi-structured questionnaire instrument. It was decided to have a separate list of Zimbabwean nationals because none of them ran fixed address businesses.

Data from the semi-structured questionnaires from all sets of interviews were entered into a spread sheet for analysis. Data from focus group discussion (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KIIs) were recorded as field notes – and later analyzed through the constant comparative method of data analysis (Merriam & Ntseane, 2008). Quantitative data were analyzed with software SAS 2008 Version 9 to obtain descriptive results.

4. Results and Discussion

The results of this paper are categorized into two sub-sections. First the paper presents results on the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents for the study. Secondly, the paper presents the results of the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) held with various stakeholders.

4.1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

Nationality	South African		Zimbabwean		Other	
Data	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Measured Variable						
Gender						
Female	1	10	24	32.8	7	33.3
Male	9	90	49	67.2	14	66.7
Total	10	100	73	100	21	100
Age						
18-21 Years	-	-	12	16.4	2	9.5
22-35 Years	1	10	23	31.6	8	38.1
36-46 Years	6	60	21	28.8	6	28.6
47-57 Years	2	20	12	16.4	4	19.0
58 and Above	1	10	5	6.8	1	4.8
Total	10	100	73	100	21	100
Educational Level						
No Formal Education	2	20	-	-	-	-
Primary	5	50	34	46.6	8	38.1

Secondary	3	30	36	49.3	11	52.3
Tertiary	-	-	3	4.1	2	9.6
Total	**10**	**100**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
Marital Status						
Married	7	70	58	79.5	16	76.2
Never Married	-	-	2	2.7	4	19.0
Divorced	1	10	3	4.1	-	-
Widow	2	20	10	13.7	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-	1	4.8
Total	**10**	**100**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
How long have you been in South Africa						
Less than Five years	-	-	42	57.5	7	33.3
More than Five years	-	-	31	42.5	14	66.7
Total	**-**	**-**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
How long have you been in your village						
Less than Five Years	-	-	49	67.1	19	90.5
More than Five years	10	100	25	32.9	2	9.5
Total	**10**	**100**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
Do You have Family in South Africa						
Yes	10	100	23	31.5	9	42.9
No	-	-	50	68.5	12	57.1
Total	**10**	**100**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
Household Size In South Africa						
<Five	4	40	59	80.8	9	100
Six and Above	6	60	14	19.2	0	-
Total	**10**	**100**	**73**	**100**	**9**	**100**
Where do you stay while in South Africa						
Rented Shop	-	-	-	-	3	14.3
Rented Backroom	-	-	57	78.1	7	33.3
Other	10	100	16	21.9	11	52.4
Total	**10**	**100**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
Residence Status						
Legal Immigrant	-	-	29	39.7	12	57.1
Illegal Immigrant	-	-	8	11.0	9	42.9
Other	10	100	36	49.3	-	-
Total	**10**	**100**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
Reasons for being in South Africa						
Political Reasons	-	-	4	5.5	12	57.1
Economic Reasons	-	-	51	69.9	8	38.1
Social Reasons	-	-	9	12.3	-	-
Other	10	100	9	12.3	1	4.8
Total	**10**	**100**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
Do you send any remittances back home						
Yes	-	-	62	84.9	21	100
No	-	-	11	15.1	-	
Total	**-**	**-**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
Have you employed any South Africans						
Yes	4	40	4	5.5	8	38.1
No	6	60	69	94.5	13	61.9
Total	**10**	**100**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
If Yes, indicate number employed						
Less than Five	4	100	5	100	8	100

More than Five	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	4	100	5	100	8	100
Have you registered your employees with authorities						
Yes	-	-	-	-	-	-
No	4	100	5	100	21	100
Total	**4**	**100**	**5**	**100**	**21**	**100**
Home Base						
Ethiopia	-	-	-	-	3	14.2
Ghana	-	-	-	-	2	9.5
Mozambique	-	-	-	-	0	-
Somalia	-	-	-	-	14	66.6
Zimbabwe	**-**	**-**	**73**	**100**	-	-
Other	-	-			1	4.7
Total	**-**	**-**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
Have you any experience of Xenophobia while in RSA						
Yes	**-**	**-**	**11**	**15.1**	2	9.5
No	**-**	**-**	**62**	**84.9**	19	90.5
Total	**-**	**-**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
How do you relate with the locals	**-**	**-**				
Well	-	-	62	84.9	18	85.7
Fairly	-	-	8	11.0	2	9.5
Badly	-	-	2	2.7	1	4.8
Other	-	-	1	1.4	-	-
Total	**-**	**-**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
Do you participate in community activities						
Yes	-	-	26	35.6	2	9.5
No	-	-	47	64.4	19	90.5
Total	**-**	**-**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
If Yes, indicate the main activity of participation						
Sports	-	-	3	4.1	-	-
Funerals	-	-	52	71.2	-	-
Church Services	-	-	18	24.7	2	9.5
Nothing	-	-	-		-	90.5
Total	**-**	**-**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
Your Religion	**-**	**-**				
Christian	8	80	67	91.8	3	14.3
Muslim	-	-	0	-	16	76.2
Other	2	20	6	8.2	2	9.5
Total	**10**	**100**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
How do you rate public attitude towards your religion						
Good	-	-	51	69.9	15	71.4
Fair	-	-	8	11.0	4	19.0
Bad	-	-	5	6.8	1	4.8
Don't know	-	-	9	12.3	1	4.8
Total	**-**	**-**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
What is your view of the word makwerekwere						
Seriously offending	-	-	59	80.8	3	14.3
One of those words	-	-	5	6.8	2	9.5
Don't Know	-	-	9	12.3	16	76.2
Total	**-**	**-**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**
What do you fear most while in your local community						
Crime	-	-	57	78.1	16	76.2
Xenophobic tendencies	-	-	5	6.8	2	9.5

Other	-	-	11	15.1	3	14.3
Total	**-**	**-**	**73**	**100**	**21**	**100**

Table 2: Socio-demographic Characteristics of small-scale informal entrepreneurs in townships and villages

4.1.1. The Respondents
As indicated in table 2, the results of this paper revealed that the majority of entrepreneurs in the study area were immigrants from Zimbabwe (77.7%) while those from elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa amounted to 22.3%. However, those from Somalia (66.6%), Ethiopia (14.2%), Ghana (9.5%) and elsewhere (4.7%) dominated the other countries of origin without Zimbabwe. The results of a study conducted in Delft South, Cape Town by Charman & Piper (2012) found that Angolans, Somalis and Nigerians were the most dominant nationalities. These nationals were also the most unpopular immigrants in Delf South amongst South Africans. On the one hand, Singh (2013) found that Zimbabweans dominated immigrant teacher sector – especially in Limpopo Province. The Zimbabwean foreign nationals were in the majority Christians (91.8%) or other religious affiliations except Islam (8.2%) while the other foreign nationals were either Muslims (76.2%), Christians (14.3%) or other undisclosed religions (9.5%).

4.1.2. Family
Some (31.5%) Zimbabwean nationals had brought their immediate families such as children and spouses into the country, and therefore stayed with family. On the other hand, the large majority (68.5%) of Zimbabwean nationals had no family in the country. Most of these Zimbabweans regularly commuted between South Africa and Zimbabwe. However, those who found it expensive to commute would do so at least once per year during the Christmas season.

4.1.3. Status in the Country
The results of this paper revealed that some of the Zimbabwean nationals were in the country legally (39.7%), illegally (11.0%) while the larger majority were in the country on various statuses including political asylum or otherwise (49.3%).On the one hand, foreign nationals from other African countries were legally (57.1%) or illegally (42.9%) in the country. For those in the country with family, the majority (80.8%) had at least between one and five members per household while those with more than five household members amounted to 19.2%. The rest of the other foreign nationals who had family members in the country living with them had households with less than five members.

4.1.4. Place of Residence While in South Africa
Since arriving in South Africa, some of the foreign nationals apart from Zimbabweans were accommodated in rented backrooms from the locals where they paid rent on monthly basis (33.3%) while others stayed in rented shops (14.3%), and a huge majority of 52.4% with no fixed accommodation. Zimbabwean nationals mostly stayed in rented backrooms in the villages (78.1%) while some of them (21.9%) stayed in makeshift houses made of mud and grass (thumbani) in the bushes near the villages or fields were they were employed by locals as farm assistants. Those who earned less wages, preferred to stay here because they did not pay for the accommodations.

4.1.5. Reasons for Being in South Africa
 The majority of Zimbabwean nationals were in the country for economic reasons; that is employment opportunities and doing small-scale informal trading (69.9%), social reasons such as visiting relatives (12.3%) or other undeisclosed interests (12.3%) and political asylum (5.5%). On the one hand, foreign nationals from other regions were in the country mainly for political asylum (57.1%), economic and livelihood reasons (38.1%) and other undisclosed interests (4.8%).

4.1.6. Gender Distribution
The results of this paper also revealed that South African men were in the majority (90%) against women in the small-scale informal entrepreneurship in the villages selected for the purpose of this study. The same applies to Zimbabwean men (67.2%) against women (32.8%) while men foreign nationals from Somalia, Ethiopia, Ghana and elsewhere (66.7%) were also the majority as compared to their women counterparts (33.3%).

4.1.7. Distribution by Age
The age distribution of the entrepreneurs varied from country to country with South Africa having no entrepreneurs between the age of 18-21 years. This result is in contrast with those of Zimbabwe (16.4%) and Somalia; Ethiopia; Ghana and elsewhere (9.5%) of the entrepreneurs were within this age distribution. The results revealed that the majority of South African entrepreneurs were within 36-46 years of age group with those from Zimbabwe (28.8%) and Somalia, Ethiopia, Ghana and elsewhere (28.6%) following thereafter. Twenty percent of South Africans are aged between 47 and 57 years while at this category, Zimbabweans (16.4%) and those from Somalia, Ethiopia, Ghana and elsewhere (19.0%) were distributed. The results revealed that entrepreneurs from Somalia, Ethiopia, Ghana and elsewhere have the largest majority of entrepreneurs within the 36 to 46 age group. The results also revealed that South African entrepreneurs dominated the older age group of 58 years and above (10%) followed by those from Somalia, Ethiopia, Ghana and elsewhere (4.8%).

4.1.8. Educational Level Attained by Respondents
Educational distribution revealed that the majority of South African entrepreneurs had attained primary education (50%), Zimbabweans (46.6%) while those from Somalia, Ethiopia, Ghana and elsewhere (38.1%) also had attained this level. Thirty

Percent of South African entrepreneurs had attained Secondary level education compared to 49.3% of Zimbabwean entrepreneurs and 52.3% of Somali, Ethiopians, Ghanaians and elsewhere entrepreneurs. A few entrepreneurs from Zimbabwe (4.1%) and Somalia, Ethiopia and Ghana (9.6%) have attained tertiary education. This is a sharp contrast with the South African scenario which revealed that instead a larger portion of these entrepreneurs (20%) had never attended any formal school education.

4.1.9. Marital Status of the Respondents
The marital statuses of the respondents revealed that the majority of South Africans (70%), Zimbabweans (79.5%) and Somali, Ethiopians and Ghanaians (76.2%) were married accordingly with the remainder of the population's marital statuses varying from never married for Zimbabweans (2.7%) and 19.0% for the Somali, Ethiopians and Ghanaians respectively. The results also revealed that 20% and 13.7% of the South African and Zimbabwean entrepreneurs were widowed. This trend showed contrasting results for the Somali, Ethiopian and Ghanaian entrepreneurs. On the one hand, South African entrepreneurs had the highest number of divorcees (10%) followed by Zimbabweans (4.1%), and absence of such trend with the rest of the survey.

4.1.10. Period in South Africa
The majority of the Zimbabweans (57.5%) had been in the country for less than five years against those who have been in the country for over five years (42.5%). In contrast to this is that the majority of the Somali, Ethiopians and Ghanaians (66.7%) had been in the country for over five years against 33.3% of those who had been in the country for less than five years. The majority of the Zimbabweans had been in the local area for less than five years (67.1%) against 22.9% who had been in the local areas for longer than five years. The majority of the Somali, Ethiopian and Ghanaian nationals have been in the local areas for less than five years (90.5%) against those in the areas for longer than five years (9.5%).

4.1.11. Business Operations
Entrepreneurs from elsewhere other than Zimbabwe rented buildings from locals from which to conduct their businesses. Those who rented shops from locals were selling grocery, hair products and salons, hard ware and clothes. The majority of foreign nationals did not have any South Africans employed in their businesses; Zimbabweans (94.5%) and others (61.9%). Only 5.5% of Zimbabweans and 38.1% of the other foreign nationals had employed South Africans. However, the businesses were not registered with the Department of Trade and Industry or Ministry of Small Enterprises. For those who have hired locals in their businesses, the workers were also not registered with the required authorities. The majority of the foreign nationals sold on cash while others sold on credit – especially to those customers the foreign nationals personally knew particularly those on old age pension. The foreign nationals opined that it was simpler to work with older South African customers than the younger group because the older customers paid their credits well, and they were more reliable than the younger group. Further probing revealed that the majority of foreign national informal entrepreneurs operated from old shops owned by the locals which the locals could not sustain, back rooms in the local homes and buildings specifically owned by locals for rental purposes. The foreign nationals paid rent from as little as R500 to R3500 a month depending on the size of the business property. However, the rental agreements were in the majority not legal contracts through legal processes by based on gentlemen's agreement. As a result, some foreign nationals skipped their monthly rentals therefore igniting resentments by locals and sometimes expulsions. On the one hand, some locals increased the rentals willy-nilly if the business seemed doing well.

4.1.12. Remittances Back to Homeland
The large majority of Zimbabwean nationals send remittances back home to family (84.9%) while other foreign nationals all send remittances back home to their families (100%). However, 15.1% of Zimbabwean nationals never send remittances back home. The reasons are that all their immediate family members; children and spouses in particular also stay in South Africa. The income is generated from formal employment and small-scale informal trading activities – especially from small shops they keep in South Africa.

4.1.13. Experiences of Xenophobic Tendencies amongst Foreign Nationals
The results of this study revealed both Zimbabwean nationals (15.1%) and other nationals from elsewhere (9.5%) have experienced Xenophobic tendencies while larger majorities (84.9%) and 90.5% for the other nationals have never experienced any personal Xenophobiac tendencies while in South Africa. Those foreign nationals who have experience with Xenophobia in the villages did so through the use of derogatory words used against them. For example, words such as "*makwerekwere*" have been used to discriminate against them by locals. In fact the results of this paper revealed that 80.8% of the Zimbabwean nationals and 14.3% of the other foreign nationals have had the word offendingly used against them at some point in the villages. Despite this behaviour, 76.2% of other foreign nationals did not understand or know what "*makwerekwere*" insinuation by the locals was about. These results are in consistence with the findings of Achume (2014) who reported that foreign nationals were in most cases regular targets of verbal and physical abuse in most multi-ethnic developing regions. The results of this paper further revealed that the majority of the respondents (69.9% and 71.4%) of Zimbabwean nationals and the other foreign nationals felt Xenophobically targeted through religious discrimination on the one hand. Religiosity had always posed a challenge with regard social factors in society – especially in the persuasion of integration and cohesion most commonly where society is multi-ethnic in nature (Dhlandhlara, 2014).

However, the positives of these results could be explained by the fact that social relations amongst Zimbabwean nationals and South Africans were very well (84.9%), fair (11.0%), bad (2.7%) or other (1.4%) while that between the other nationals from elsewhere were perceived to be very well (85.7%), fair (9.5%) or bad (4.8%). The seemingly good relations between the locals

and the foreign nationals could also be explained by the active participation of these foreign nationals in some community activities. For example, 35.6% of the Zimbabwean nationals participated in community activities such as sports (4.1%), funerals (71.2%) and church services (24.7%) while on the one hand a mere 9.5% of foreign nationals took part in community activities. Taking part in community activities might provide a better platform to integrate the foreign nationals into society and in addition to promote cohesion. This might assist in the elimination of stereotypes such as "other people" or "stranger" referring to foreign nationals which subsequently promoted "exclusion" of these "other people" from society (Geschiere, 2005).

Since the majority of Zimbabweans were Christians, it was easier for them to participate in Church and funeral activities which are mostly highly religious, much to the caution of the other foreign nationals who were mostly Muslims or other religious groupings. In addition, most Zimbabweans could relate easier with the dominant Venda culture because of some closeness and similarities of Zimbabwe's Shona and Venda cultures. Interestingly though is the fact that even if the majority of the other foreign nationals had some significant individuals opposed to Christianity in terms of affiliation and the local cultures, still a significant number of them (9.5%) had made time to attend Church. This might suggest that some foreign nationals were socially matured enough to adjust to religious and cultural circumstances which might not necessarily be of their liking or choice. It explains tolerance of diversity. This could be harnessed as social capital to build trust (Dhlandhlara, 2014) amongst locals and foreign nationals.

As a result, the majority of the foreign nationals integrate with the local communities by participating in community activities. Those who drink for example, also freely visit bar lounges and taverns were they freely interact with locals. Contrary to Chinese immigrants who elsewhere in Africa were mostly aloof preferring to stay in secluded compounds away from the locals (Park, 2009), foreign nationals on the one hand in the study area freely intermingled with the locals. Thispoints to a different scenario than the one of a South African public that is obsessed with hatred of foreign nationals – and contrary to the findings of Hendrickse (2009) who argued that South Africans were exceedingly Xenophobic.

It must be stated however that the social attitude displayed by Chinese immigrants strengthen existing myths explaining the business successes of the Chinese, and such myths increased anti-Chinese sentiments by locals (Park, 2009). Myths are critical factors triggering suspicions and fear amongst locals for foreign nationals. That is where issues of "*ubuthakhathi*" emanate from (Hickel, 2014). As has been asserted to by Park (2009), it is clear that the behaviour of Chinese immigrants of not wanting interaction and integration with locals could further explain the assertion that it is not only South Africans who display resentments of differentiation by race or place of origin. Interestingly, Park (2009) avoids calling such tendencies by Chinese immigrants Xenophobic.

4.1.14. Fears Harbored by Foreign Nationals in the Study Area

The results of this paper revealed that the majority of Zimbabwean nationals (78.1%) and the other foreign nationals (76.2%) feared crime in South Africa more than anything-else. However, 6.8% and 9.5% of Zimbabwean nationals and the other foreign nationals feared Xenophobic tendencies amongst South Africans more than the rest of the factors. A significant number of Zimbabweans (15.1%) and the other foreign nationals (14.3%) had also expressed fear with regard factors such as labour exploitations amongst others more than crime and xenophobia combined.

4.2 Qualitative Results from the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)

Focus Group Discussions and Key Informant Interviews revealed that there were many foreign nationals in South Africa who arrived in the country where they were going, and what they were going to do – let alone to know how they were going to survive economically. Some of these nationals arrived carrying plenty of money. Most of these get involved in small-scale informal businesses to earn a living. Some rent buildings from locals for rent to do business. There are those foreign nationals who begin by working for fellow foreign nationals in business with a simple reason of awaiting an opportunity to start their own businesses. What emerged from the discussions is that the majority of these foreign nationals obtained loans and credit from their fellow foreign nationals to start their own businesses which they repaid accordingly.

Contrary to the descriptive results of this paper, there were indeed some foreign nationals who confessed to have committed crimes while in South Africa. On further probing, it was discovered that most of the crimes were house breakings in order to steal on the main food and clothes. This is because life is difficult and hard for these foreign nationals on arrival in South Africa with no food, clothes or money to survive the harsh conditions. This assertion is corroborated by Schwikkard (2013) who found that house breakings and drug trafficking in places such as Umbilo in KwaZulu-Natal dominated crimes by foreign nationals. Schwikkard (2013) further argued that foreign nationals who stayed in abandoned or partially demolished housing and buildings were the most involved in petty criminality to survive the harsh conditions they face in South Africa.

According to the South African Police Service respondent, most of the house breakings in the study area were conducted by Zimbabwean nationals. Ethiopians, Somali and the others, illegally carried large sums of money into the country – and their worst crimes were bribing the police and customs officials when they arrived in the country. However some indicated that their first priority was to obtain South African documents either by bribing officials at Home Affairs or marrying locals. The challenge with the police is that as most of these foreign nationals do not have identity documents, it becomes difficult to effect arrest on crime. When the police fail to arrest criminal foreign nationals, it spills over to Xenophobic attacks and violence against foreign nationals in general by the locals accusing the police for colluding with them or accepting bribes to evade arrest. Theft of clothes and electronics such as Tvs and Cell Phones amongst others and robbery dominate criminality amongst foreign nationals because some of them would want to send something back home – especially during festive seasons.

It also emerged from the study that some locals harbored Xenophobic tendencies against foreign nationals because of false rumours and ignorance of the cultures of the foreign nationals. For example, some locals indicated that foreign nationals would

spread violent religious practices such as those of Boko Harams in Nigeria where members of the communities are abducted and killed. Some opined that foreign nationals from Ethiopia and Somalia were working in the informal markets in their villages to support war and criminal groups where they came from. Locals indicated that they have in fact started to call some of these foreign nationals "Boko Haram" or "Al Shabbab" in addition to "makwerekwere" depending on where such foreign nationals came from. It became clear that there was some level of increased anxiety amongst the locals with regard the continuous presence of these foreign nationals in the neighbourhood. In general, even though it is for now a hidden anxiety amongst the locals, the deductions are that Xenophobic tendencies indeed existed amongst the locals. South Africa's close connectedness with Xenophobia removes the country from multi-ethnicity space which the world has become from globalisation while deeply entrenching the country into a highly tribalistic separatist region as opined by Friedman (2007) in the work "the World is flat..." where the author asks "What is the motto of the tribalist?" and answers "Me and my brother against my cousin; Me, my brother, and my cousin against the outsider"

However, on the one hand the over-stating of such tendencies – especially amongst most emerging social science literature of Xenophobic sentiments about South Africa could be emanating from what Misago (2009) referred to as "speculative explanations based on perceptions and attitudes rather than empirical evidence" This assertion could be justified from the obviously over-stated posit by Crush & Ramachandran (2014) who argued that Xenophobia was a "pervasive phenomenon throughout South African society based on systematic representative sampling of the South African population as a whole" Obviously, Crush & Ramachandran (2014) had generalized their conclusion based on very limited data in terms of South Africa's geographical space – and societal groupings.

The results of this paper compared to Hendrickse (2009) might suggest that the issues of Xenophobia in South Africa might differ from region to region. In fact, this assertion is corroborated by Misago (2009) who opined that Xenophobic tendencies might differ in terms of ferocity, rapidness and intensity more that on where such tendencies occurred because Xenophobic tendencies might be found anywhere in the world. Despite South Africa's long history of racial hatred perpetuated by Whites against the Blacks, South Africans remain a peace loving nation promoting non-racialism, Africanism, "ubuntu" and social cohesion based on the country's rhetoric of a "rainbow nation"

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

- While the local informal business community elsewhere in South Africa has genuine concerns over unregulated number of foreigner business community entering the informal market in South Africa, and in addition out-compete the locals for business, this paper concludes that the manner in which the South African society sought to resolve the concerns were ultra Xenophobic and not in the best interest of public order, human rights and South Africa's role in regional political and economic promotion.
- Some tendencies of Xenophobia were visible in the villages but such tendencies were of low scale. In addition, such tendencies had never manifested in violent attacks against any foreign nationals despite the fact that some foreign nationals were involved in activities such as crime which triggered Xenophobic attacks and violence in some regions in the country.
- There were indeed some South Africans who employed in the small-scale informal businesses owned by foreign nationals. This paper opines however that the economic contribution of foreign nationals in economic welfare of some South Africans is over-stated and exegerated. In fact, the majority of these workers employed by foreign nationals are informal because they are not registered with relevant labour regulatory bodies in the country. As a result of this, basic labour conditions are not applied to these workers resulting in the majority of them being exploited through underpayments and other labour violations. Considering the history of labour exploitation by the Whites on Blacks during apartheid, it could be that the practices of these foreign nationals who employ South africans would be construed as highly provocative for labour unrests and protests – South Africa is prone to such tendencies.
- Like all the regions of the world, South Africans also suffer Xenophobic tendencies. However, in terms of the results of this paper, conclusions that South Africans displayed the worst Xenophobic tendencies in the world could be flawed, baseless, unjust and lacking in empirical proof. For example, there has never been any crimes and violence against foreigners – instead peace and tranquility with such foreigners in this study area.
- With poor confidence of the public on agents of state to enforce law and order, known foreign criminal individuals continue to terrorize communities with impunity. The public takes the law into their own hands to defend themselves against these criminals. These foreign nationals are not hurt because they were foreigners but because they were high class criminals who would not be arrested because some of them are illegal immigrants who have no identity documents – and therefore difficult to trace by law enforcement agencies. Every local South African criminally attacked – in the streets and mostly in the comfort of their homes at night through housebreakings and other high class criminality by foreign nationals would most definitely feel aggrieved against criminal foreign nationals. If one is physically threatened of violence, one would be forced to act in protection – and such reactions by the public might turn out to be unnecessarily violent, criminal and barbaric – and when directed to foreigners construed ad Xenophobic.
- The South African informal traders will have to compete in the market for the customer base without employing Xenophobic, draconian and intimidation tactics against foreign nationals.

Clearly though based on the findings of this study is that alarmists of Xenophobia in South Africa have managed to export issues of Xenophobia from some urban areas where Xenophobic events had taken place – especially based on the events of May 2008 into a South African national nemesis against the background of a totally different circumstance in the rest of the country –

especially in the rural areas. South Africa is geographically and physically more rural than urban – and events taking place in the urban areas might not explain the over-all circumstance of the country. This assertion has been confirmed by the results of this study which posited that foreign nationals and locals continued to live side by side in peace despite some negative factors such as crimes commited by foreign nationals and a few other incidences of negative views of foreign nationals by the locals. Both were able to interact together without any major incidences of hatred and Xenophobia.   It is therefore unwaranted of some commentators of Xenophobia in South Africa to paint the whole country Xenophobic without having first to measure such probabilities nation-wide – including the rural areas. This aper opines that caution needs to be part of the assertions on South African scenario of Xenophobia where seeing of Xenophobia in every aspect of criminality, violence and public disorder against foreign nationals has to reign supreme.

On the one hand, over-zealousness of researchers, commentators and policy makers on isuues of Xenophobia in the country will not assist the cause of developing effective public order enforcement strategies and policies. At the back of the minds of authorities in South Africa should be that increased desire to create a police service devoid of corruption, unethical tendencies, trigger-happy police personnel against unarmed civilians whether foreigner or South African with utmost professionalism to protect whosoever is in the country. Space exists in terms of South African criminal and public order laws to mitigate, against criminality and brutality of the police against society – irrespective of nationality.

Finally, the paper recommends that intensive public education campaigns be held starting from schools to the public in general for various societal groups to conscientise the citizens on the effects of population movements around the world – especially on regional and local socio-economic dynamics. Better understanding of these issues might remove or minimize Xenophobi tendencies in South Africa. In other words, the South African public should be educated on the issues of the development of a global socio-economic space where human rights rule the course of nature – not mob justice – especially in a constitutional democracy such as South Africa. Nobody benefits from Xenophobia in a free market world, and South Africans who have developed a "culture of Xenophobia" might detest from this horrendous behaviour – perhaps adopting the advice of Friedman (2007) who argued "*culture is rested in contexts, not genes*".

6. References

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