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Effective Application of Dialogue and Social Marketing Campaign for Strategic Management of Boko Haram Crisis in North Eastern Nigeria

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Abstract:

The study investigated effective application of dialogue and social marketing campaign for strategic management Boko Haram crisis in North Eastern Nigeria. Several attempts had failed to result to an everlasting end to the crisis due to misapplication of relevant public relations strategies. The specific objectives were to assess the extent of the relationship between dialogue and resolution of Boko Haram crisis and to investigate the extent of the influence of social marketing campaign on resolution of Boko Haram crisis. The population of the study is 9446 which was drawn from the postgraduate students of University of Nigeria Nsukka. The sample size is 400 using Taro Yamani sample size determination method. For the validity of the instrument, the questionnaire was vetted by research professionals based on face validity in terms of relevance to the subject matter, objective of the study, coverage of the content areas, appropriateness of language usage and clarity of purpose. The value of the test of reliability is 0.881 which was conducted using Cronbach's Alpha. Primary data was adopted for the study. Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient and simple linear regression data analyzing techniques was applied. The findings revealed that there is a significant relationship between dialogue and resolution of Boko Haram crisis ($r = 0.945$, $p < 0.05$). And secondly, it was also revealed that the influence of social marketing campaign on resolution of Boko Haram crisis is significant ($r = 0.840$; $t = 22.866$; $F = 522.843$; $p < 0.05$). The study recommends that the federal government should secure through a concerted effort a lasting dialogue with the key leaders of the Boko Haram terrorist group. It is more economical than the use of combat that wastes a lot of human, material, and financial resources. And also, that the media through the strategy of social marketing should hammer and bombard the air with messages that will instill good character on the members of the Boko Haram and make them to dump their anti-westernization believe and Jihad.

Keywords: Dialogue, Social Marketing, BokoHaram, Crisis Management, North Eastern Nigeria, etc.

1. Introduction

1.1. Background to the Study

Nigeria has been ravaged and bedeviled by a brutally fiendish sect called 'Boko Haram' (Peterside, 2014; Ajike, 2015). Boko Haram means; anti-civilization. With Boko; meaning book and Haram, meaning; civilization "Insurgency has become a threat to global peace and security in the 21st century due to the fact that it constitutes the highest contributor to humanitarian crises (Okoli and Lortyer, 2014) in the form of rise in human casualties, internally displaced persons, refugee debacles, food insecurity and the spread of various diseases" (Imasuen, 2015). It is no gainsaying that in the past couple of years, the security situation in Nigeria has moved from bad to worse owing to the fact, that activities of the Islamist extremist group commonly known as Boko Haram which translates; western education is sin has escalated in the North Eastern part of Nigeria. According to Abdi and Shittu (2013), this wave of violence has

created tension between the Christians dominated Southern part of Nigeria and the Moslem dominated part of the Northern Nigeria as a result of the chasm between them in relation to religion. That is not to say that Nigeria hasn't faced series of security threatening challenges in the past. "The country, survived a brutal civil war in the late 1960s, in which more than 1 million people died. The country has witnessed repeated rounds of violence since then, often between Muslims and Christians, often fueled by politics (Akinfala, et al.2014).As a matter of fact, armed groups such as Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) in the Niger Delta region of South South Nigeria, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in the South Eastern part of Nigeria, Oduwa People's Congress (OPC) in the South Western part of Nigeria, as well as other armed pressure and political groups have unleashed terror and violence on the country at different times in the past causing unnecessary commotion and restiveness.

The threat posed by Boko Haram to the security and unity of the nation is quite different from the aforementioned, with devastating consequences ranging from displacement of locals from their homes and villages, mass killing of innocent civilians, executions, robberies, rape, abductions to kidnappings. Most time, their victims are brutally hewed on the neck. Also, the terrorists group has time and again restated their resolve to take over some part of Nigeria's territories in a bid to establish an Islamic Caliphate, a move described by security experts as an attempt to breach the territorial integrity of the country. In a nutshell, Anyadike (2013), submits that the intent of the Islamic revolution in Nigeria is to radically Islamize the country. Ajayi (2012) tagged it politicization of religion. They target churches, media organizations, security agencies, markets, schools, even mosques etc. (Eme and Jide, 2012).

Perhaps Nigeria and the international community didn't seem to understand the magnitude of destruction; carnage and calamity the dreaded Islamist sect were trying to inflict on the nation until their abduction of over two hundred school girls from their hostel rooms in a government owned secondary school in Chibok, a village in Borno, a North Eastern state in Nigeria. That singular act by the terrorist organization; which many considered as an act of barbarism and cowardice sometime last year, 2014, elicited reactions from individuals, civil and human rights organizations from within and around the world. Besides, the wave of security challenge posed by Boko Haram is really a serious threat to national development (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013).

Against this backdrop, renewed interest in the operations of Boko Haram has been generated a mammoth concern by the Nigerian military. Questions as to how the group has metamorphosed from a rag-tag Islamist extremist fighters to a very sophisticated militia group considered to be among the top ten deadliest terror groups in the world, mode of the group's operations, why it took the government of Nigeria so long to do something reasonable about the group's operations; and the big question, what can be done and how this reign of terror can be brought to an end, have been raised by all stakeholders.

Without questioning the rationale behind the questions raised about the activities of Boko Haram in North Eastern Nigeria over the past years, the broad aim of this study is to present and articulate some Public Relations strategies which if well applied could bring an end to Boko Haram's insurgency that is ravaging the North Eastern part of Nigeria. This security trajectory is hinged on the facts that; first, dialogue as well as confrontation is by far the most effective means of resolving conflict in the modern world, and secondly, the consideration of the truism that Public Relations strategies can be applied to full effect in the management of crisis of any magnitude.

1.2. Problem Statement

Terrorism is a major threat in the twenty first century world. This is perhaps one reason why some countries have devised a means and strategies to nip this ugly trend in the bud before it shoots out its ripple effects on the society. "From the 1980 Maitatsine uprising to the 2009 Boko Haram uprising, Nigeria was bedevilled by ethno-religious conflicts with devastating human and material losses" (Adesoji, 2010). Boko Haram insurgency in some North Eastern states of the country is really a quick reminder of the fact that terrorism is not a virtue, but a cankerworm that is eating deep into the fabric of our nation, and has consequently led to a lot of suffering which had ultimately made the nation to bow to poverty (Akinfala, et al 2014) and if this cankerworm is not properly tackled, it could metamorphose into a nightmare for our dear motherland. Unfortunately, it is the innocent civilians that suffer most when insurgency carries out this scene of mayhem and carnage on the nation.

The Boko Haram insurgency in the country had caused a serious blow on the political, social, economic and religious lives of the Nigerian nation. Human rights are seriously abused, local communities have been displaced, women are raped mercilessly, people are kidnapped and abducted, properties are looted, and suicide bombings, executions and mass killings have become recurring events in the North Eastern part of the country. All these condemnable acts have been perpetrated by the Boko Haram insurgents in the past years and had become unconscionable within and outside Nigeria.

Unfortunately, the Federal government of Nigeria does not seem to find the right approach and antidote to bringing this societal menace to an end so as to curtail the attendant wanton loss of lives and properties, and to restore peace and tranquility to the affected communities in the North Eastern part of the country. This has become a serious cause of worry of all well meaning individuals and groups; both locally and internationally. Therefore, this study is focused on addressing the above anomalies in the Nigerian society.

1.3. Objectives of the Study

The objectives this study aims to achieve are as follows:

1. To investigate the extent of the relationship between dialogue and resolution of Boko Haram crisis in North Eastern Nigeria.
2. To determine the extent of the influence of social marketing strategy on the resolution of Boko Haram crisis in North Eastern Nigeria.

1.4. Hypotheses of the Study

The following hypotheses were formulated for this study against which findings shall be tested and conclusions drawn:

1. There is no significant relationship between dialogue and resolution of Boko Haram crisis in North Eastern Nigeria.
2. The influence of social marketing strategy on resolution of Boko Haram crisis in North Eastern Nigeria is insignificant.

2. Review of Related Literature

2.1. A Conceptual Overview of Crisis

Omar (2008) defines crisis as “chaotic situation that might be experienced by people, states, government, organizations, etc”. According to Nwosu (1996) crisis can be defined as “any event, issue, occurrence, or situation that could be described as a turning point, for better or worse”. It is an unstable situation of extreme danger or difficulty. Every sphere of human existence can experience crisis situation. Crises are no longer rare, random or peripheral, but have become an inevitable and natural feature of our everyday lives and an integral feature of the new information/systems age. Hardly a day goes by without the occurrence of a new crisis or the unfolding of old ones. The world has recently witnessed a severe increase in crises of all kinds. Major crises can happen anywhere, anytime and to anyone (Mitroff and Anagnos 2001). Crises are threats that actually do or have the potential to severely damage the image and reputation of an organization or country.

- ❖ “Conflicts and crises are found at every stage of life. Individuals, groups, associations, clubs, societies, local, national and even world community continue to experience conflicts and crises in one way or the other. Conflicts and crises are features of life and they have been since the beginning of creation—conflicts between darkness and light and even between and among the first set of human beings created on earth. So, conflicts and crises are permanent features of life which we have come to live and cope with and resolve from time to time. Their existence cannot be terminated in life unless we want to terminate life itself. However, a poorly handled conflict or crisis could become violent or destructive which could hinder national peace and security. Thus, effective strategies that can help to nip conflict in the bud and to prevent it from escalating if it erupts, as well as to sustain peace to avert the future occurrence of crises and their attendant large scale effects should be developed and sustained by any nation that seeks peace, growth and development” (Alabi, 2010).

Lattimore et al. (2009) list act of God, mechanical problems, management decision/indecision and human errors as four basic causes of business crisis. Similarly, Salu (1993) categorizes crises into unforeseen and expectable situations. Sequel to Lattimore et al. (2009), the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria can be perceived to be fallout of both management decision/indecision and human errors. A country faces a variety of challenges during and after the crisis situation. One of such challenges is to rebuild such a country's infrastructures as well as reputation. The forces of globalization and the internet are pushing us from a so called ‘old world’ or industrial economy, dependent on the value of physical assets such as property and equipment, to a “new world” or knowledge economy characterized by the intangible assets of reputation, knowledge, competencies, innovation, leadership, culture and loyalty.

Good images and reputations are increasingly recognized as having strategic value for countries because they offer competitive advantage in the international marketplace. A country perceived to have good image and reputation stands to attract huge foreign direct investment which could contribute meaningfully to its economic growth and development.

Crises threaten to damage reputations because a crisis gives people reasons to think badly of the affected country or organization. Threats to reputation, whether real or perceived, can destroy, literally in hours or days, a reputation developed over decades. These threats need to be anticipated, understood and planned for.

In the recent past, a rapidly growing body of crisis management research has emerged that focuses on what crisis victims (be it countries or organizations) should do in crisis situations with the use of crisis response strategies. Various stakeholders groups have multiple perceptions of an organization or country and this forms an organization or country's image and reputation. In a similar way, a crisis affects multiple groups of stakeholders of an entity; be it organizations or countries.

An audience could have different opinions of who is responsible and/or accountable for a particular crisis bedeviling a country or an organization. It must be stated here that at the moment, apportioning blames will not be the best way forward for the country as far as the Boko Haram crisis is concerned, therefore, what is important and required now is to explore all avenues and options that will bring succor to the primary victims of the insurgency while also rebuilding the seemingly damaged image and reputation of the country because of the insurgency. This is the main concern of this study.

From the above description and explanation of crisis, it can be said that the Boko Haram insurgency; as experienced in some North Eastern states of the country, qualifies to be referred to as crisis.

2.2. Dialogue

Dialogue is the only efficacious approach to establishing peace with the members of the Boko Haram insurgency (Salisu, et al. 2015). Transitional Institute (2015) notes that without dialogue, the military confrontation in Myanmar against rebel groups will be meritricious. Uchehara (2015) referred to former president Abdusalami Abubakar and noted his quest for the federal government of Nigeria to negotiate. In his study, Uchehara in part of his abstract stated thus:

- ❖ “Even though it appears difficult to see a meaningful dialogue between the government and the Boko Haram, it is argued here that several previous attempts have been made to resolve the issue through dialogue, and that such moves could have been made more productive; yet, unfortunately, they came to a breakdown either because the initiators were afraid that they would benefit from the crisis no more if the peace talks succeeded, or because some attempted to derail these processes for various reasons. Given the danger the group poses to the country, a more focused, pragmatic, and dynamic approach to resolving the

challenge is required on the part of the government and the group. That is, a more comprehensive initiative alongside other civic actions should be employed.”

In defining dialogue, Magda (2010), thus listed eight key characteristics of dialogue:

1. ““dialogue” is a process which goes on for some time, not continuously, but in separate episodes;
2. “dialogue” is a group activity, prototypically involving two groups, and it is reciprocal; consists in talking about a particular range of topics – presumably, topics of mutual interest;
3. “dialogue” [involves participants who] are aware of their differences: there can be no “dialogue” between people with the same, or very similar, views. At the same time, it shows that they are aware that the subject matter is important to both sides and that it is emotionally charged: both sides feel something when they think about things of this kind;
4. “dialogue” is not merely an “exchange of ideas”; it is not just a matter of knowing what the other group thinks, but of understanding how they think, and being similarly understood oneself;
5. “dialogue” [refers to participants who] do not aim at resolving all differences between the parties and achieving a common way of thinking, at least not in the sense that each group will shift its thinking and as a result get closer to the other group. Rather, it is hoped that the two groups will discover some common ground – possibly, through the clarification of their respective positions. It is also hoped, however, that both groups are open to the possibility of change in their thinking;
6. “dialogue” [requires an] attitude of respect and goodwill; Public relations as dialogic expertise?
7. “dialogue” [participants in “dialogue”] refrain from saying [certain things]: one doesn’t attack or even criticize one’s partners (unless one wants to kill the dialogue);
8. “dialogue” is seen by participants as valuable and productive in itself. In due course the two groups are expected to discover that about some things at least they can think the same and, as a result, their thinking on some points may change.”

Dialogue simply means an exchange of perspective, feelings, ideas, and opinions over an issue through conversation or a means of communication. It could be a political, religious, economic, technological, or even an academic issue where two or more people are experiencing a kind of disagreement and therefore needs clarification and resolution. Ahokegh (2013) states categorically that the only means of resolving the protracted Boko Haram crisis is through dialogue since military confrontation had failed to yield any meaningful results. Akinbi (2015) has a contrary opinion to the issue raised by Ahokegh and asserts that resorting to dialogue will not provide any form of succor as the members of the Boko Haram sect are not identifiable. In furtherance of this, he noted thus:

- ❖ “The government especially during the Jonathan’s administration has explored the option of dialogue with leaders of the sect and promising them amnesty if the sect lay down their arms. However the option had not yielded any positive result due mainly to the fact that members of the sect are somehow anonymous, with no clear cut address of locating them. Even if dialogue, even occurs between the government team and leaders of Boko Haram, the religious fanaticism of the sect will lead to irreconcilable positions that will make rapprochement elusive.”

The above statement was criticized and repudiated by Alao and Atere (2012), stating that it was as a result of insincerity, insensitivity and absence of political will on the part of government that nothing has come to fruition concerning establishing a win-win situation between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram members. Ironically, the federal government of Nigeria acted with reservation earlier when some activists suggested the need to negotiate and offer amnesty to the leaders of the Boko Haram sect, but later accepted to do so in 2014 (Barna, 2014). The federal government has after failed attempt to dialogue with the Boko Haram sect through former president Obasanjo and Alhaji Datti led team decided to inaugurate a “Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of the Security Challenges in the north,” under the chairmanship of Kabiru Turaki (Odo, 2015). “Interestingly, while the stick and carrot approach by the Jonathan administration towards Boko Haram have failed to make a lasting impact, one needs to appreciate the administration’s openness to different approaches, including dialogue and peaceful resolution of the crisis as embodied by the Turaki-led Committee.”(Nwankpa, 2014).

The major challenge is that the sect have declined any attempt to dialogue with the federal government and have become more audacious as the spate of violence has escalated in recent time (International Crisis Group, 2014). According to International Crisis Group (2014), members of the sect who nurtured the idea of dialogue were executed on Shakau’s orders. And even when in January 2013, Mohammed Marwan wanted to secure a cease fire agreement with the government, Shakau denied having delegated Marwan to speak on his behalf by asserting that Marwan was an impostor.

One of the points made by European Commission (2012) at their meeting over Boko Haram crisis is:

- seek consultative dialogue with the leadership in the North, including groups such as the Islamic Council of Nigeria, Jama’atu Nasril Islam, the emir of Kano, and ethnic leaders; support interfaith dialogue between the Christian Association of Nigeria and Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs.

2.3. Social Marketing

Social marketing is strategic marketing weapon for transforming, changing and translating individual and group attitude, perception and preferences from latitude of acceptance to latitude of rejection of a negatively perceived behavior. This kind of behavior is capable of inflicting injury on the individual, group, as well a ripple effect on the entire society. Kotler and Armstrong (2001) describe social marketing by deduce its meaning from the marketing of social ideas such as conducting a marketing campaign to reduce or totally renounce alcoholism, terrorism, rape, overeating, drug abuse, etc. According to Kotler and Armstrong (2001), social marketing “includes the creation and implementation of programmes seeking to increase the acceptability of a social idea, cause, or practice within targeted groups”.

- ❖ “Social marketing is a global phenomenon that goes back for years. In the 1950s, India started a family planning campaign. In the 1970, Sweden started a social marketing campaign to turn the country into a nation of nonsmokers. In the 1970s the Australian government ran “Wear Your Seat Belt Campaign”. In the late 1970s, the Canadian government launched campaign to “Say No to Drugs,” “Stop Smoking,” and “Exercise for Health.” In the 1980s, the World Bank, World Health Organisation, and Center for Disease Control and Prevention started to use the term and promote interest...” (Kotler and Keller, 2008).

The media plays a very vital role in propagating the tenets of social marketing. The social marketing approach through aggressive media campaign will definitely restore the already brain-washed members of Boko Haram terrorist organization and integrate and transform them into useful members of the Nigeria society. Both the conventional media; television, radio, magazine, newspaper, billboard, as well as the social media; Facebook, YouTube, Skype, Twitter, etc, including the traditional media which Nwodu (2007), states that these “are communication systems that reflect and embody the totality of people’s way of life, which are their cultures, will bombard the terrorists towards reformation of their mentality. According to Nwodu (2007), the traditional media include;

1. Oramedia or folk media such as festivals, stories, carnivals, parades, debates, shows, dance, song etc.
2. Extramundane media of communication such as various ways of worship and relationship between the living and both the dead and the spirits.
3. Traditional media centres like the village square, village market square, village streams and spring water sources, masquerade arenas, shrines, churches and mosques.
4. Institutional media, which include traditional institutions like the Igwes, Obas, Obongs, Emirs etc.

Some of the above mentioned channel of communication will definitely instill good and ethical behaviour among the youth and equally help in changing the attitude of those who already made up their minds to embark on insurgency to retract from such heinous and nefarious acts. Preaching the negative effect of this act of terrorism on the physical, mental and spiritual life of the terrorists will change their attitude to stray from such intolerable acts.

2.4. The Historical Perspective of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

The Boko Haram insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria cannot be attributed to a particular single cause, it was rather a product of the instrumentality of internal political, social, economic and to some extent, religious factors.

The security challenges as witnessed in the country today; including the Boko Haram insurgency, can be traced to the political happenings of post military handover in 1999. To start with, the perceived abysmal governance of former Heads of State between 1985 and 1988 increased the yearnings of Nigerians for a democratic government. For the records, the duo of Gen. Ibrahim Babangida and Gen. Sani Abacha were Nigeria’s military heads of state between 1985 to 1998 spanning a thirteen year period. Some of the low points of the Gen. Babangida’s military regime started with the “subversion of popular will” by obtaining IMF loan and the introduction of its attendant harsh conditions by the then Military head of state despite wide rejection and condemnation by Nigerians (Nwachuku and Uzoigwe, 2004) to the “flagrant abuse of the electoral laws” by the annulment of MKO Abiola’s presidential victory on June 12, 1993 even when the elections was adjudged by national, regional and international observers as the freest and fairest in the country’s political history (Mahmud, 1993).

On his part, Gen. Abacha also committed several atrocities beginning with the overthrow of the Ernest Shonekan’s Interim National Government to the imprisonment of MKO Abiola; actions that dashed the hopes of the masses and worsened the already precarious Nigerian society.

Egwemi (2010) observes that the period of Gen. Sani Abacha’s rule to his death in 1998, was marked by political weakness in the country as political parties operated weakly, with visibly no serious intention because of his confused political agenda.

Subsequently, the government of Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo who came to power after winning the 1999 presidential election under the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) didn’t do much to alleviate the sufferings of the masses. Rather, the zoning formula of the PDP only helped to increase the ruling party’s tribalistic outlook and the ascension of a Southerner in the person of Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan to the presidency after defeating his major opponent, Gen. Muhammadu Buhari who is from the North, in the 2011 presidential elections cemented the earlier fears that should the PDP fail to adhere strictly to their concocted zoning formula, the country could be heading towards chaos.

To worsen the situation, the Northern part of the country consistently ranked higher on all known poverty ratings compared to other parts of the country with succeeding governments doing very little or nothing to correct the imbalance. So, it is not out of fashion to suggest that poverty in Northern Nigeria arising from injustice, lack of fairness in the polity and imbalance in resource allocation is responsible for the insurgency. Unfortunately, this situation of poverty plays in the hands of a region that historically had a culture derived from well organized Islamic wars (Ahokegh 2013).

The North Eastern part of Nigeria, with over 1000 year history as a Muslim state and the radical tradition which came out of the Jihad of Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio, could not resist the opportunity to express their grievances as a result of perceived ill treatment by successive governments and regimes. They did this by devising a religious cover that led to the formation of a group with the name Boko Haram; which literally translates to ‘western education is sin’ or anti-westernization that has terrorized the North Eastern part of Nigeria over the past years.

3. Research Methodology

Survey method was adopted by the research by administering structured questionnaire to gather primary data from postgraduate students of University of Nigeria, Nsukka. The scope covered the effective management of Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. The population of the study was 9446 which represent the population of postgraduate students of the university. A sample size of 400 was determined using Taro Yamane's sample size determination method. Content validity was used to determine the validity of the instrument by giving to research experts who modified and made the necessary correction so that the instrument can measure adequately. The value of the test of reliability is 0.881 which was conducted using Cronbach's Alpha which indicated that there is internal consistency of the instrument. Out of the 400 questionnaires, 220 were correctly filled and returned. Pearson's Product Moment correlation coefficient and simple linear regression data analyzing techniques was applied with the aid of Statistical Package for Social Sciences.

4. Results and Discussion

The data obtained from the field were presented and analyzed with descriptive statistics to provide answers for the research questions while the corresponding hypotheses were tested with Pearson's correlation and linear regression at 0.05 alpha levels.

/no	Questionnaire items	S. Agree /Agree	Disagree /S. Disagree	Undecided	
		Freq	Freq	Freq	Total (Freq)
1	Dialogue will provide peace between Boko Haram and Nigerian govt.	195	22	03	220
2	Nigerian govt and Boko Haram will embrace peace through dialogue.	200	15	05	220
	TOTAL	395	37	08	440

Table 1: Coded Responses on the extent of the relationship between dialogue and resolution of Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria.
Source: fieldwork 2015

According to table (1) based on aggregate response 395 indicated agreements, 37 indicated disagreements while 08 indicated undecided. This implies that there is significant relationship between dialogue and resolution of Boko Haram crisis in North Eastern Nigeria.

4.1. Hypothesis One

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Dialogue	1.6273	1.06723	220
Resolution of Boko Haram Crisis	1.5000	0.91910	220

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

		Dialogue	Resolution of Boko Haram Crisis
Dialogue	Pearson Correlation	1	.945**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	220	220
Resolution of Boko Haram Crisis	Pearson Correlation	.945**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	220	220
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).			

Table 3: Correlations

The above table (2) shows descriptive statistic of the extent to which dialogue is related with resolution of Boko Haram crisis. The mean value of dialogue is 1.6273, while the standard deviation is 1.06723. Also, the mean value of resolution of Boko Haram crisis is 1.5000, while the standard deviation is 0.91910. By careful observation of standard deviation value, it can be said that there is about the same variability of data points amongst dependent and independent variables. This implies that dialogue has a relationship with resolution of Boko Haram crisis. The table above shows Pearson correlation coefficient for dialogue and resolution of Boko Haram crisis. The correlation in table (3) above shows a 0.945 value. This value indicates that correlation coefficient is significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed) and implies that there is a relationship between dialogue and resolution of Boko Haram crisis ($r = 0.971$). The computed correlation coefficient is greater than the table value of $r = 0.195$ with 218 degree of freedom (df n-2) at alpha level for a two tailed test ($r = 0.945$, $p < 0.05$). We therefore reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternate.

/no	Questionnaire items	S. Agree /Agree	Disagree /S. Disagree	Undecided	
		Freq	Freq	Freq	Total (Freq)
1	Application of social marketing campaign through the media will change Boko Haram terrorists' attitude	210	05	05	220
2	Boko Haram terrorists' attitude could be changed through social marketing campaign.	190	20	10	220
	TOTAL	400	25	15	440

Table 4: Coded Responses on influence of social marketing campaign on resolution of Boko Haram crisis in North Eastern Nigeria.

Source: fieldwork 2015

According to table (4) based on aggregate response 400 indicated agreement, 25 indicated disagreement while 15 indicated undecided. This implies that social marketing campaign significantly influences resolution of Boko Haram crisis.

4.2. Hypothesis Two

- Ho: There is no significant influence of social marketing campaign on resolution of Boko Haram crisis.

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	F	Sum of Squares	t	Durbin-Watson
1	0.840 ^a	0.706	0.704	0.37964	522.843	75.357	22.866	0.171
						31.420		
a. Predictors: (Constant), resolution of Boko Haram crisis								

Table 5: Model Summary^b

- R = 0.840
- R² = 0.706
- F = 522.843
- T = 22.866
- DW = .171

4.3. Interpretation

In table (5) above, the regression sum of squares (75.357) is greater than the residual sum of squares (31.420), which indicates that more of the variation in the dependent variable is not explained by the model. The significance value of the F statistics (0.000) is less than 0.05, which means that the variation explained by the model is due to chance.

R, the correlation coefficient which has a value of 0.840, indicates that there is significant influence of social marketing campaign on resolution of Boko Haram crisis. R square, the coefficient of determination, shows that 70.60% of the variation in social marketing campaign is explained by the model.

With the linear regression model, the error of estimate is low, with a value of about 0.37964. The Durbin Watson statistics of 0.171, which is less than 2, indicates there is no autocorrelation.

Resolution of Boko Haram crisis coefficient of 0.935 indicates there is significant influence of resolution of Boko Haram crisis on social marketing campaign which is statistically significant (with t = 22.866). Therefore, the null hypothesis should be rejected and the alternative hypothesis accordingly accepted.

5. Summary of Findings

Hypothesis one revealed that there is a significant relationship between dialogue and resolution of Boko Haram crisis ($r = 0.945$, $p < 0.05$). This is supported by Transitional Institute (2015) as it asserts that without dialogue, no military confrontation can breed and nurture peace anywhere in the world. Secondly, it was revealed that social marketing campaign has a significant influence on resolution of Boko Haram crisis ($r = 0.840$; $t = 22.866$; $F = 522.843$; $p < 0.05$).

6. Conclusion

The researcher believes that through political dialogue, leaders of the Boko Harm insurgency could dialogue with the Nigerian government to sign a peace pact that will enshrine tranquility and stability in the country. Similarly, social marketing campaign will ensure that through the media, attitudinal change messages could get across to members of the Boko Haram insurgency and this will go a long way to transforming their fiendish behavior into a more adorable behavior and character

7. Recommendations

It is recommended that the federal government should secure through a concerted effort a lasting political dialogue with the key leaders of the Boko Haram terrorist group. It is more economical than the use of combat that wastes a lot of human, material, and financial resources.

Also, the media through the strategy of social marketing should hammer and bombard the air with messages that will instill good character on the members of the Boko Haram and make them to dump their anti-westernization believe and Jihad.

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