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## **The Effects of Pay Policy Systems on Motivation of Employees in Institutions of Higher Learning in Rwanda (A Case Study of Selected Private Institutions of Higher Learning in Rwanda)**

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### ***Abstract:***

*The main objective of this study was to investigate the effects of pay policy Systems on motivation of employees in selected Private Higher Learning Institutions in Rwanda. Private Higher Learning Institutions face challenges of employees' motivation as a result of inadequate pay policy. The researcher used a descriptive design based on qualitative and quantitative approach in order to get better analysis of the study. The researcher also used both primary and secondary data collection tools with their relevant tools like questionnaire and documentary analysis in order to come up with required data. The study population of this research project was 180 lecturers from 7 selected private Institutions of High Learning in Rwanda where a sample size of 112 respondents was calculated by using Slovin's formulas. The data collected were analyzed using SPSS version 22 and the results from analysis, interpretation and presentation were displayed in tables. In the findings it was established that pay policy systems such as fixed pay, skilled fixed pay, performance pay and tangible pay has a significant effect on motivation of lecturers in institutions of High learning and this increase productivity, ensure stability of lecturers in the Institutions, improve timely service delivery and lastly it makes lecturers comply with rules and regulations. The Pearson correlation has indicated that there is a significant relationship between Pay Policy Systems and Motivation of employees in Higher Institutes of learning whereby the respondents N was 112 and the significant level is 0.01 and the sig is .000 and when sig is less than significant level, it means that variables are correlated and pay policy system has a positive strong relationship to motivation equal to .983\*\* and there is a significant relationship between Pay Policy System and Motivation of Employees in selected Private Higher Learning Institutions in Rwanda. Consequently, Pay Policy System has effects on Motivation of Employees in selected Private Institutions of Higher Learning in Rwanda.*

**Keywords:** Pay policy, higher learning institutions, motivation

### **1. Background of Study**

Pay policy factors is the total amount of the monetary and non-monetary pay provided by employer to an employee in return for work performed as required. Cascio (1982) had stated that pay policy system which include indirect cash payment and direct payments in the form of employee benefits and incentives that are provided by employer in order to motivate employees to perform well for higher levels of productivity is an important component of the employment relationship between employer and employee. According to Milkovich, Newman & Gerhart (2011), pay policy factors refers to all forms of financial returns and tangible services and benefits that are given by employer to employee as part of an employment relationship. For monetary pay, it is the return for employee that work or contribution to organization, while for non-monetary pay is provided by employer to an employee in order to motivate employee to perform in their work.

Rwanda, like many other countries in Africa, embarked on public sector pay reforms with the objective of improving effectiveness and efficiency through, among others, enhancing pay to attract, motivate and retain the requisite skills in the public service.

In the case of Rwanda, current civil service reforms have sought to address issues likely to hinder Government high performance. Key pay policy reforms started in 2004 when the Government of Rwanda developed the Guidelines for salary which were implemented in 2006. Experience and practices have since called for the necessity to develop a new integrated, comprehensive and systematic pay and retention policy to help the Government achieve its objectives under Vision 2020, the EDPRS and MDGs which all require a capable,

competent and well-motivated public service. The new Pay and Retention Policy in Rwanda Public Service was approved by the Cabinet in 2012.

Under the current pay and retention policy, pay is determined based both on job position and career development. Therefore, pay is not fixed but is subject to increase every three years by 15% subject to good performance as provided for by Prime Minister's Order No 121/03 of 08/09/2010 establishing the procedure of performance appraisal and promotion of public servants.

For Institutions of Higher Learning, Research, Medical and Clinical personnel, in addition to horizontal step promotion which results in salary increases every three years of high performance, vertical professional promotion is also possible and results in pay enhancements.

In addition to the above, the new pay policy has clear directions about reducing disparities within the public service as a whole. For example, by 2016, only index-value of 400 and 500 will remain in the public service, resulting in narrowing down by far pay disparities across the entire public service. Also meriting mentioning is the fact that the Government of Rwanda has put in place special benefits enhancement mechanisms for the Education sector by way of special loan access facilities from 'UMWARIMU SACCO'.

The Performance Based Financing (PBF) scheme is also used by the Government of Rwanda as a top up in order to enhance salaries in the health sector. The Government of Rwanda remains committed to pursuing the principles of compensation including equity, transparency, competitiveness, employee performance and affordability, as enshrined in the new pay and retention policy. Looking at disparities in salaries and benefits, in the new Rwanda pay policy proposal as reported by the East African news paper, Article 2 of the order sums it up: "Determination of the salary: Salaries for the public servants of the Central Government shall be determined basing on job classification in accordance with the general principles on salary fixation for public servants of the Central Government."

## **2. Statement of Problem**

Motivation of employees is an important key to an organization that can lead to overall effectiveness of organization. Basically, employees will do or perform well in their work if their employer provides equitable pay policy factors to them. According to Thomas (2009) the main challenge of motivation in workplaces is identifying what motivates each individual employee taking into account his or her individual differences. In other words, individual differences have been specified by Thomas (2009) as the major obstruction for management in engaging in employee motivation in an effective manner. Many employers recognize that the success of their business is highly influenced by the professional capacity and motivation of their workforce. Companies must face the challenges of increasing the level of commitment, motivation and job satisfaction among their employees. In this regard, it is important to take into consideration the impact of employees' needs, motives and ambitions and to negotiate more flexible schemes for financial participation, career development opportunities and performance recognition as part of the quality of work agenda. The problem to be investigated in this study, therefore, is whether pay policy systems have a bearing on employees' motivation in Institutions of Higher Learning in Rwanda.

## **3. Objectives of the Study**

The focus of this research is to investigate the effects of pay policy Systems on motivation of employees in Institutions of Higher Learning in Rwanda.

### *3.1. Specific Objectives of the Study*

1. To analyze pay policy systems in Institutions of Higher Learning in Rwanda.
2. To examine the relationship between pay policy systems and employees motivation in Institutions of Higher Learning in Rwanda in terms of Productivity, Stability and Compliance
3. To establish the challenges facing employees' motivation in Institutions of Higher Learning in Rwanda.

### *3.2. Research Questions*

1. What are the pay policy systems in Institutions of Higher Learning in Rwanda?
2. What is the relationship between pay policy systems and employees motivation in Institutions of Higher Learning in Rwanda
3. What are the challenges facing employees' motivation in Institutions of Higher Learning in Rwanda?

## **4. Research methodology**

### *4.1. Research Design*

The study used a descriptive design basing on both qualitative and quantitative approach. This is because quantitative research excels at summarizing large amounts of data and reaching generalizations based on statistical projections. Qualitative research on the other hand, excels at story telling form the participants' viewpoint, providing the rich descriptive detail that sets qualitative results into their human context. For this study, the quantitative method was investigated the pay policy systems in Higher Learning Institutions. The qualitative data collection method, on the other hand investigated the extent to which the pay policy systems impact on the motivation of employees in Institutions of Higher Learning in Rwanda.

#### 4.2. Target Population

Target population included a total of 180 lecturers from 7 selected private higher Institution of learning which constituted the population of the study so as to understand their motivation in relation to pay policy systems in their Institutions.

#### 4.3. Sampling Size and Procedure

For the qualitative methodology, a sample of 7 Institutions was selected. Lecturers are selected from each of the selected institutions which are the University of Kigali (UOK); Adventist University of Central Africa (AUCA); Institut Laique Adventiste de Kigali (INILAK); Kigali Independent University (ULK); Kigali institute of Management (KIM); Mount Kenya University Kigali Campus (MKU Kigali) and Rwanda Tourism University College (RTUC).

Higher Institutions of Learning	Population size	Sample size	Technique used
University of Kigali (UOK)	24	16	Random Sampling
Adventist University of Central Africa (AUCA)	30	18	Random Sampling
Kigali Independent University (ULK)	32	19	Random Sampling
Kigali Institute of Management (KIM)	15	11	Random Sampling
Mount Kenya University Kigali Campus (MKU Kigali)	32	17	Random Sampling
Rwanda Tourism University College (RTUC)	20	15	Random Sampling
Institute Laique Adventiste de Kigali (INILAK)	27	16	Random Sampling
<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>112</b>	

Table 1: Sample Frame

- Sample size determination: Researcher selected sample for research using Slovin's formula. The sample size calculated was 112 respondents.

### 5. Data Collection Instruments

Data was collected using different instruments.

#### 5.1. Questionnaires Distribution/ Collection

This is an important method of data collection. Judd (1991) said that a questionnaire is justifiable in data collection mainly because; it enables the researcher to collect large amount of data within a short time period, it also provides opportunity for respondents to give frank, anonymous answers. One set of questionnaire was designed for the lecturers; it included both open and closed ended set of questions that to be answered. The questionnaire was written in a simple and clear language for the respondent to feel free while answering. In addition to that the use of questionnaire was considered vital to the research since it provides accurate information regarding the study.

#### 5.2. Documentary Review

The researcher reviewed literature obtained from the case study organization. This literature included higher institution of learning workers motivations policy in different institutions. This method was chosen because; it is vital in providing background information and on pay policy in institution of higher learning before primary data could be collected. Indeed, before field data is collected, a wide collection of data had been collected and this was used to cross check with the primary data that is to be obtained by the field.

#### 5.3. Data Management and Analysis

The data collected was processed and analyzed using SPSS software. This involved data coding, editing and tabulation especially quantitative data. The purpose of all these is to make the information clear and understandable for other people. Qualitative and quantitative approach was used for analysis. Mean and standard deviation was used to give a clear understanding of the research interpretations for clear and easy understanding of the phenomenon studied. Relationship between the variables was established by use of Pearson correlations.

## 6. Results and Interpretation

### 6.1. Pay Policy System in Institution of High Learning in Rwanda

#### 6.1.1. Pay Systems in Institution of High Learning in Rwanda

The table 2 shows the payment system in Institution of High Learning in Rwanda.

Payment Systems	Mean	Std. Deviation	Comments
My Institute has a fixed pay	4.7857	.66344	Very strong heterogeneity
My Institute has a performance pay	4.3571	.82590	Strong heterogeneity
My Institute has a skilled fixed pay	4.0357	.58400	Strong heterogeneity
My Institute has a tangible pay	4.0179	.92981	Strong heterogeneity
<b>Overall</b>	<b>4.2991</b>		<b>Strong</b>

Table 2: Payment Systems in Institution of High Learning in Rwanda

Source: Primary data, 2015

Table 2 shows the pay policy system in Higher Institution of Learning and the following findings were generated;

Fixed pay system: Respondents agreement signified by a mean of 4.7857 (very strong) and a standard deviation of .66344 (heterogeneity) meaning that some institution have pay fixed pay while other do not have. This implies to a large extent the private higher of high learning has fixed pay as a way of motivating their staffs though few institutions may not be having the policy in place.

Performance pay system: This was shown by the mean of 4.3571 (strong) and the standard deviation of .82590 (heterogeneity) as observed above. This means that their institution of high learning has a performance pay as a way of encouraging good performance and motivating other employees to work under minimum supervision. Respondents further stated that some of them are motivated once at the end of the year by gifts inform of performance pay. They further stated that some institution pay overtime as a sign of motivation.

Skilled fixed pay system: This was indicated by a mean of 4.0357 (strong) and a standard deviation of .58400 (heterogeneity) meaning that their institution motivates them by paying skilled fixed pay even if they are different in opinion. This implies that the institution of high learning in Rwanda has got a skilled fixed pay as a way of motivating employees to the institution especially for the PhD holders and Professors.

Tangible pay system: The finding was indicated a mean of 4.0179 (strong) and a standard deviation of .92981 (heterogeneity) meaning that there is tangible pay in the higher institute of learning even if they are different in opinion. This implies that some of the selected higher institution of learning in Rwanda has a tangible pay as a way of motivating their employees especially during the end of years gifts to best employees and Christmas gifts to all staffs whereby they are given coupons for shopping.

Generally, the overall mean of all the statements of Payment Systems in Institution of High Learning in Rwanda is 4.2991(strong) meaning that payment system plays a significant role in motivating the employees.

### 6.2. Effects of Pay Policy System on Motivation

#### 6.2.1. Performance Measures

The table 3 shows the performance measures in Higher Institute of Learning in Rwanda .

Effects of Pay Policy System	Mean	Std. Deviation	Comments
Pay policy system has increased productivity in my Institution	4.8750	.52204	Very strong heterogeneity
Pay policy system has increased stability of employees in my Institution	4.8214	.64674	Very strong heterogeneity
Pay policy system has improved timely service delivery in my Institution	4.8571	.48131	Very strong homogeneity
Pay policy system has made my Institution met its goals and objectives	4.9286	.41837	Very strong homogeneity
Pay policy system has made employees in my Institution comply with rules and regulations	4.7054	.69280	Very strong heterogeneity
<b>Overall</b>	<b>4.8375</b>		<b>Very strong</b>

Table 3: Performance Measures

Source: Primary data, 2015

Table 3 shows the effects of Pay Policy System on Motivation in Institution of High Learning and the following findings were generated:

Pay policy system has increased productivity in the Institution: The respondents agreed signified by a mean of 4.8750 (very strong) and a standard deviation of .52204 (heterogeneity) meaning that Pay policy system has increased productivity. This implies that in

institution of high learning, pay policy system is a motivating factor of increasing productivity of their lecturers inform of students performance. The productivity of lecturers are seen by student performance in the job market and university ranking.

Pay policy system has increased stability of employees in the Institution: respondents agreed with a mean of 4.8214 (very strong) and a standard deviation of .64674 (heterogeneity). This implies that to a large extent the current pay policy system has promoted staff stability. But some institution still has problems in motivation that is why some lecturers move up and down as part time lecturer.

Pay Policy system has improved timely service delivery in the Institution: respondents agreed with a mean of 4.8571 (very strong) and a standard deviation of .48131 (homogeneity). This implies that to some extent pay policy system improves timely service delivery of the institution of high learning hence a way of motivating their employees but not to all institutions. Motivation makes lecturers report to work early, perform in time and produce results in time which is a requirement for the university effective and efficient performance.

Pay policy system has made the Institutions of High learning meet their goals and objectives: Research findings indicate a mean of 4.9286 (very strong) and a standard deviation of .41837 (homogeneity). This implies that Pay Policy system helped institutions of high learning to meet their goals and objectives hence it's a motivating factor in performance, for example timely marking and results release.

Lastly Pay policy system has made lecturers in the Institutions of High learning comply with rules and regulations: This was indicated by a mean of 4.7054 (very strong) and a standard deviation of .69280 (heterogeneity) where respondents agreed that Pay policy system has made employees in the Institutions comply with rules and regulations. This implies that in some Institutions of high learning pay policy system made employees to comply with rules and regulations though not in all institutions.

Generally, the overall mean of all the statements of Effects of Pay Policy System on Motivation of employees working in institutions of high learning in Rwanda is 4.8375 (very strong) meaning that payment system has a significant effect on motivation of employees in institutions of high learning in Rwanda as the findings have suggested above.

### 6.3. Motivation Challenges

#### 6.3.1. Ascertaining Whether There Are Challenges Faced as a Result of Motivation in the Institutions?

The table 4 shows the motivation challenges facing the higher Institutions of learning.

Are There Challenges Faced	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	76	67.9	67.9	67.9
No	36	32.1	32.1	100.0
Total	112	100.0	100.0	

Table 4: Are there challenges faced as a result of motivation system in the institutions

Source: Primary data, 2015

Table 4 shows that 67.9% have agreed that there are challenges lecturers are facing as a result of motivation, 32.1% have disagreed. This implies that institutions of High Learning are facing motivational challenges as a result of the policy.

### 6.4. Factors affecting Motivation in Institution of high learning.

The table 5 shows the motivation challenges the Higher Institute of Learning in Rwanda.

Motivation Challenges	Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Agree		Strongly Agree		Total	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Late payment which changes attitudes	20	17.85	25	22.34	7	6.25	15	13.39	45	40.17	112	100
The pay policy is static as the cost of living is increasing	20	18.85	12	10.71	10	9.22	52	46.42	18	14.8	112	100
Lack of overtime allowances	7	6.25	13	11.66	10	8.92	37	33	45	40.17	112	100
Lack of facilitation allowances	20	18.85	12	10.71	10	9.22	52	46.42	18	14.8	112	100

Table 5: Motivation Challenges

Source: Primary data, 2015.

Table 5 shows motivation challenges in the Higher Institution of learning and the following findings were generated:

Late payment which changes attitudes: 53.56% of the respondents agreed that late payment affects their motivation as it changes their attitude towards work, 40.19% disagreed and 6.25% were not sure. This implies that some institutions pay late salary to their staff, which affects their motivation and changes their attitude towards work. They further stated that some institutions don't pay for extra activities like examination invigilation's, marking of scripts beyond the agreed number, workshops and seminars, research publications and many others that worsens their attitudes towards work hence lowering quality performance of the lecturers.

Pay policy is static as the cost of living is increasing: 61.22% agreed that pay policy is static as the cost of living is increasing, 29.56 % disagreed and 9.22 % of the respondents were not sure. This implies that pay policy is static as the cost of living is increasing which affects motivation of lecturers as they don't review their pay policy regularly.

Lack of overtime allowances: 73.17% agreed that Lack of overtime allowances, 17.91 % disagreed and 8.92% of the respondents were not sure. This implies that Lack of overtime allowances affects motivation of the lecturers. They stated that some institutions don't pay for extra activities and they expect you to stay the whole day in the institutions without reward for example from 8 am to 9 pm.

Table 5 shows that 61.22% of the respondents agreed that lack of facilitation allowances in the form of research paper writing affects performance of the lecturers, 29.56% disagreed that and 9.22% were not sure. This implies that some selected higher institutions of learning do not have such motivation as a policy and this affects performance of the lecturers.

#### 6.5. Relationship between Pay Policy System and Motivation

The table 6 indicates the Relationship between Pay Policy System and Motivation of the employees in institutions of High learning.

		Increase in Productivity	Increase in stability of Employees	Timely service delivery	Meeting goals and objectives of institutions	compliance with rules and regulations
Fixed Pay	Pearson Correlation	.988**	.962**	.955**	.966**	.982**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	112	112	112	112	112
Performance Pay	Pearson Correlation	.975**	.963**	.971**	.942**	.974**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	112	112	112	112	112
Skilled fixed Pay	Pearson Correlation	.993**	.984**	.982**	.965**	.985**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	112	112	112	112	112
Tangible Pay	Pearson Correlation	.976**	.986**	.988**	.962**	.956**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	112	112	112	112	112
<b>**.</b> Correlation is significant at the 1% (2-tailed).						

Table 6: Relationship between Pay Policy System and Motivation

The table 6 gives the statistical evidences concerning the relationship between fixed pay and increase in productivity. According to the results, sample size N is 112 and the significant level is 0.01, the results indicate that fixed pay has positive strong correlation on productivity equal to .988\*\* and the sig is .000 which is less than 0.01. When sig. is less than significant level, researchers conclude that variables are correlated. It is therefore concluded by the researcher that there is a statistically significant correlation between fixed pay and productivity increase, implying that when you considered the fixed pay your employees will be committed to the work which promotes organizational productivity in the long run.

The evidences also indicated that fixed pay has a strong positive correlation to Increase in stability of Employees equal to .962\*\*. Again the results give a relationship between fixed pay and timely service delivery equal to .955\*\* which is positive high correlation and it is significant that fixed pay and stability of employees have a relationship.

The results gave the positive strong correlation between fixed pay and goals and objectives of institutions equal to .966\*\* which means that fixed pay has a significant effect in meeting the goals and objectives of the institutions. The relationship between fixed pay and employees compliance with rules and regulations is equal to .982\*\* and this means that it is positive strong correlation and the way employees are paid will determine the manner they comply with the rules and regulations.

There is a significant relationship between performance pay and increase in productivity is equal to .975\*\* and this shows that variables are correlated which means that performance pay play is a vital role in increasing productivity. Pearson correlation indicated that there is a relationship between performance pay and stability of employees equivalent to .963\*\* and this means that performance pay influences stability of employees.

Table 6 also expresses the relationship between performance pay and timely service delivery as .971\*\* which is positive strong correlation and this means that performance pay influencing timely service delivery in the institutions. The relationship between performance pay and goals and objectives of the institutions is .942\*\* and this means that performance pay has a role on meeting goals and objectives of the institutions. From the findings of Pearson correlation, the relationship between performance pay and employees compliance with rules and regulations corresponding to .974\*\* this means that when employees motivation makes them respectful and become committed to the institutions rules and regulations.

The statistical evidences state that there is a significant relationship between skilled fixed pay and increase in productivity at .993\*\* which is positive strong correlation and subsequently researcher concludes that variables are correlated and when skilled

employees are motivated their productivity improves accordingly. Additionally, the results showed that there is a relationship between skilled fixed pay and stability of employees equal to .984<sup>\*\*</sup> which is positive strong correlation and this means that when skilled employees are paid with a regular basis their stability in institutions will be automatic. The table 6 also gives the relationship between skilled fixed pay and timely service delivery is equivalent to .982<sup>\*\*</sup> which is positive strong correlation and this means that if skilled employees have fixed pay the more the timely service delivery.

The table 6 also expresses the relationship between skilled fixed pay and goals and objectives equivalent to .965<sup>\*\*</sup> which is strong positive correlation and this means that the skilled employees should have a fixed pay in order to meet the goals and objectives. Additionally, skilled fixed pay and comply with rules and regulations have a strong positive correlation of .985<sup>\*\*</sup> which means that when the skilled employees have a fixed pay is a factor for the complying with rules and regulations.

The results also proved the relationship between tangible pay and increase in productivity equivalent to .976<sup>\*\*</sup> which is strong positive correlation and this means that the tangible pay is a motivating factor as it increases productivity lecturers. There is a relationship between tangible pay and stability of employees is noted by a value of .986<sup>\*\*</sup> which is strong positive correlation and this means that tangible pay has a significant effect on stability of employees in the institution.

The results also indicated that tangible pay has a strong positive correlation on timely service delivery with .985<sup>\*\*</sup> and it implies that the more employees are provided with tangible assets, the more their service improves. Additionally, the table 4.9 showed that tangible pay has a positive strong correlation on goals and objectives with equivalent of .962<sup>\*\*</sup> and this implies that tangible pay can help in meeting goals and objectives of the institution and lastly, the research indicated that tangible pay has a positive strong correlation to compliancy with rules and regulations equal to .956<sup>\*\*</sup> which means that once employees are rewarded they with comply with rules and regulations of the institutions.

### 6.6. Correlation Summary

As conclusion, the Pearson correlation test indicated the relationship between Pay Policy System and Motivation of employees in institutions of High learning whereby the respondents N is 112 and the significant level is 0.01, the results indicate that Pay Policy system has positive strong relationship to motivation equal to .983<sup>\*\*</sup> and the p-value is .000 which is less than 0.01 and when p-value is less than significant level, therefore researcher conclude that variables are correlated. This means that there is a significant relationship between Pay Policy System and Motivation of employees in selected private institutions of high learning in Rwanda which means that Pay Policy System has positive effects on Motivation of Employees in selected Private Institutions of High Learning in Rwanda.

## 7. Conclusion and Recommendations

### 7.1. Conclusion

The research has indicated that pay policy system such as fixed pay, skilled fixed pay, performance pay and tangible pay has a significant effect on motivation of lecturers in higher institutes of learning and this will increase productivity, ensure stability of lecturer in the institutions, improved timely service delivery and lastly comply with rules and regulations as fear the risk of losing their well paid job. The Pearson correlation has indicated that there is a significant relationship between Pay Policy System and Motivation of employees in institutions of High learning whereby the respondents N is 112 and the significant level is 0.01 and the sig is .000 and when sig is less than significant level, it means that variables are correlated and pay policy system has a positive strong relationship to motivation equal to .983<sup>\*\*</sup>. And there is a significant relationship between Pay Policy System and Motivation of Employees in selected private institutions of high learning in Rwanda. Consequently, Pay Policy System has effects on Motivation of Employees in selected Private Institutions of High Learning in Rwanda.

### 7.2. Recommendations

The following are recommendations identified by the researcher:

Higher institutions of learning should have a comprehensive pay policy which should be updated from time to time in order to cope up with environmental changes in the labor market and inflation accordingly. For case of inflation the institution should pay lecturers in common denominations which are stable internationally for example dollars and pounds.

Extra activities like invigilation's, marking of scripts above the required numbers, workshops and seminars, publications should be paid for separately because they are quality issues in learning institutions and they should be treated with care. This will help motivate lecturers to improve on quality as major objectives in the academic world.

All private higher institutes of learning in Rwanda should adopt performance pay in order to encourage and motivate good performers which will eventually improve educational quality. This should be conducted basing evidence based appraisal system in order to avoid biasness.

Consequently, the Government of Rwanda should establish affordable policies to the private higher institutes of learning for encouraging and motivating their employees in order to promote a good service delivery and good performance.

Overtime allowances should be provided for in the pay policy in order to improve on the performances of the lecturers. Research facilitation should also be provided for in the policy because research is a core activity in the University across the world and it should be highly motivated.

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