Governance and Violent Radicalization Nexus: The Deteriorating State-Citizen Relationship as a Push Factor for Violent Radicalization in the Coast Region of Kenya

Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen
Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Social Sciences, Technical University of Mombasa, Kenya
Dr. Hussein Abdullahi Mahmoud
Associate Professor, Department of Social Sciences, Technical University of Mombasa, Kenya
Dr. Saeed Mwaguni
Associate Professor, Institute of Research, Innovation and Extension (IRIE),
Technical University of Mombasa, Kenya
Dr. Paul Goldsmith
Independent Consultant in Peace and Security, Kenya

Abstract:
Poverty, marginalisation and weak governance severe citizen-state relationships as citizens lose trust in their governmental development policy-making. The weaker the citizen-state relationship due to failed governmental policies the higher the chances for the radicalisation of young people for extremist organizations which fills the gaps of state failure. The main objective of the article is to understand the causes for the deteriorating citizen-state relationship in the coastal region of Kenya which contributes to the radicalization and recruitment of youth into the al-Shabaab terrorist organization. Based on an ethnographic study, the author highlights causes such as poverty, marginalization, ineffective governance and repressive strategies of counter terrorism measures as push factors for radicalization and extremism in the coast region of Kenya. The article reveals how marginalization as a consequence of ineffective or bad governance since colonial periods have resulted in poor human development in the region creating frustrated individuals ripe for Jihadist organizations such as al-Shabaab. Few economic prospects, outlets for meaningful civic participation, little trust in the state to either provide services or respect human rights, or experiences of abuse of power by the state have tipped young people over the edge into extremism. There is a need for a stronger development focus to security challenges such as creating pathways for economic empowerment, accountable and transparency in service delivery, strengthening local institutions and redress mechanisms for justice.

Keywords: *Citizen-state relationship, marginalization, poverty, radicalization, recruitment, al-Shabaab*

1. Introduction

Weak governance and a lack of access to services and injustice have undermined stability in the marginalized regions of the coast in Kenya, thereby increasing the gap between citizens and the state. Citizens in the region consistently express on a deteriorating citizen-state relationship based on concerns such as marginalization, poverty, lack of opportunities. This is often accompanied by an indication of dissatisfaction with the government, mainly with regard to the police and judicial institutions (International Alert, 2016). Violence and terrorism are ongoing in the region, and the citizens feel they are repressed by the government, where the government is more often fighting terrorism with band-aid solutions rather than probing deeper into the problem with contextual solutions. The core in understanding violent radicalization is to understand it as a development problem, necessitating a holistic understanding of the concept, viewing it from a multidimensional perspective of economic, social, cultural and the political in the coastal region of Kenya (UNDP, 2015).

It is within this prevailing context of grievances, radicalization processes and recruitment of youth for al-Shabaab radicalization needs to be explored and assessed. The article centers on the main research question of understanding the causes for the deteriorating citizen-state relationship in the coastal region of Kenya contribution to radicalization and recruitment into the al-Shabaab[1]. The article is based on a wider ethnographic study conducted by the author in the coastal

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[1] Al-Shabaab is terrorist organization originating from Somalia. The organization has a recruitment pool drawing youth from Kenya.

region of Kenya[2]. The study was framed under the social movement theory with emphasis on strains and grievances at the societal and individual levels. The framework also ascertained political opportunities and constraints as trigger factors facilitating youth mobilization towards youth radicalization and recruitment in the coast. The article establishes these factors have the potential to push youth away from the mainstream society thereby increasing their vulnerability to a radical entrepreneur or radical organization or the acceptance of an extreme narrative (Borum, 2011). The study centers on the coast region as the region has been marked as a hotspot for radicalization and recruitment for the al-Shabaab organization (Badurdeen, 2012; Botha, 2013; ICG 2011). The coast region of Kenya is one of the eight provinces of Kenya situated along the Indian Ocean. The region is composed of a population of 3, 325, 307[3] and has six counties: Mombasa, Lamu, Kilifi, Kwale, Tana River, and Taita Taveta. The prevailing marginalization, poverty and ineffective governance have stimulated a context conducive for violence, with young people seeking for alternative avenues to vent out their anger such as joining radical groups available in the region (Badurdeen, 2012).

This article is divided into four sections. Following the introduction, the second section focuses on the contextualization of the concepts and the background context of the problem. The third second section determines local factors which precipitates as a governance crisis in the coastal region: regional marginalization, poverty, ineffective governance and the lack of opportunities. The final section comprise of the conclusion. The article limits itself to the push factors for radicalization and recruitment for the al-Shabaab. However, the author acknowledges on other factors in radicalization and recruitment as discussed elsewhere by the author (Badurdeen, 2012; Badurdeen, 2016).

1.1. Governance and Violent Extremism: A Conceptualization

Governance can be defined in its broadest sense as the process of exercising political power to manage the affairs of a country which entails the process of making decisions and implementing such decisions based on popular participation, observance of human rights, respect for the rule of law, transparency, free access to information, prompt responses to human needs, accommodation of diverse interests, equity, inclusiveness, effective results and accountability (UNICEF 2002). According to Santiso (2009), the core elements of governance comprise of the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and the respect of citizens' fundamental rights. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation defines governance as the provision of the political, social and economic public goods and services that a citizen has the right to expect from his or her state, and that a state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens (IIAG 2013:6).Hence a governance crisis occurs when there is misapplication of mismanaging public resources, the prevailing of a dearth in public services, inability to respond to insecurity and injustice. There by spurring resentment or rejectionist behaviour from its citizens who are expected to be law-abiding.

A governance crisis reveals a deteriorating citizen-state relationship. Citizen-state relationship is the interactions between the government administration and the citizens of a country. This relationship between the government and the citizens exist in a wide range of areas such as policy making, delivering of public services and even consuming public services at different levels (local, regional and national) (OECD, 2001). Embedded in this relationship is the aspect of good governance with its tenets of transparency, accountability, rule of law, equity and participation (Frey, 2008; Onichakwe, 2016). The Citizenship Development Research Centre defines a citizen as 'someone with rights, aspirations and responsibilities to others in the community and to the state. This implies a relationship among citizens, and between the state and all those living within its borders' (Benequista, 2010, p. 4). Therefore, citizenship confers various benefits to a citizen such as 'the right to enjoy a nationality; to vote, hold office and participate in political processes; to access education, health and other goods; to access the labour market beyond the informal sector; to own businesses, land and other forms of property; and to security of residence and freedom of movement' (GSDRC, 2017). DFID defines the state societal relationship as 'interactions between state institutions and societal groups to negotiate how public authority is exercised and how it can be influenced by people. Here the focus is on issues of 'defining the mutual rights and obligations of state and society, negotiating how public resources should be allocated and establishing different modes of representation and accountability' (DFID, 2010, p. 15). The focus goes beyond institutional forms to relational functions of state and societal institutions. Hence, neither the state nor civil society acts in isolation. Rather, the state derives its legitimacy through its interaction with citizens and an organised and active civil society. In these contexts, the nature of the political settlement can impact upon state-society relations. In many marginalized regions, relations are based on discrimination, patronage and lack of accountability. The concentration of power in a few people or group limits the participation of citizens from public life. These contexts of marginalization in regions or groups within a state due the lack or ineffective development policies could push young people into violent radicalization and extremism. Here, radicalization and extremism is a result of the social breakdown or experiences of strain and deprivation at individual or group levels (Useem, 1998).

In some situations, citizens may be excluded from public life through state repression and violence. This results in a legacy of negative and weak citizen-state relations. Usually, governance crisis acts a major push factors accompanied by pull factors such as charismatic recruiters for violent extremism, appealing extremist ideologies and sophisticated social media

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[2] The background for the article is from a PhD study conducted by the author. 249 participants participated in the study. This includes key stakeholder such as religious leaders, CSO members, law enforcement officials, radicalized young people and their family members.
[3] Population Census, 2009 – the population census is conducted every ten years.

strategies aimed to lure disgruntled youth. Efforts to promote an inclusive political settlement can re-shape relations and contribute to political and social transformation.

The contentious nature of the concept violent extremism is reasonable, given the intricate nature of the term terrorism, out of which, the word violent extremism is viewed. There is a tendency for extremist ideologies and groups to become violent when their particular goals are unmet. The concept could manoeuvre itself between terrorism and insurgency, particularly if the concept is drawn from the ideological interpretations of 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'. This justification for the violent acts of both state and non-state actors attempts to view one side's legitimate killing to another side's illegitimate killing, blurring the distinctions between acts of non-state terrorism and state terrorism (English 2009:4; Hough 2008:66).Within this context, this right of legitimate killing is considered a right of state(s), since in international law, state violence is perceived through the prism of legality. However, violence from non-state actors is perceived illegal in its totality (Hough 2008:66). Therefore, violent extremism which results in terror could be perpetrated upon people either by governments (state terrorism) or by groups (groups like Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab).

Thus, in this article, violent extremism is viewed with regard to the al-Shabaab terrorist group. Here, the threat of violence is against non-combatants or property in order to gain a political, ideological, or religious goal through fear and intimidation. Hence the terror acts by the extremists are strategies employed by non-state actors with goals they intend to achieve and constituencies they intend to reach (Post 2007:3; Enders and Sandler 2012:4).

1.2. Deteriorating State-Citizen Relationship

In this article the deteriorating citizen-state relationship is discussed under the following themes: (i). marginalization of the Coast region (ii) poverty (iii). ineffective governance, and (iii) the lack of trust in CT policies that constantly targets Muslim youth. Most often, discriminatory CT policies and practices act as trigger factors resulting in radicalization or re-radicalization of youth in a context where push factors such as poverty and marginalization are evident (Precht, 2007).

1.3. Marginalization of the Coast Region

Marginalization attributed to poor economic growth in the coast region, despite being endowed with relatively rich natural resources is a grave concern among the coast population. Rasul and Sharma (2014:221) reveals that economic marginalization is 'an outcome of a myriad of social, economic and political factors rooted in structural, historical and macro-economic policies'. In the coast region, inequalities and marginalization is a result of the uneven penetration of capitalism with the onslaught of colonialism. For, the colonial administration concentrated on selected regions such as the Centra, Western, Nyanza and Eastern leaving the Coast and the North Eastern Provinces (SID, 2012; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2012). The Coast and the North Eastern regions lagged behind in infrastructure development, education, agricultural development and other social welfare policies (Ochieng', 1995: 89). The coast region has a mixed population, and had been dominated by Arabs and Asian traders for decades. The colonial administration created a racially tiered society in which Europeans and other colonial administrators were at the top of the pyramid. The Asians and Arabs occupied the second tier, while Africans occupied the bottom level. The Arabs played a privilege role in administration. Being dominated by Arabs, the coastal people were especially afraid of being dominated by the upcountry people as well (Ogot, 1995:66). Upcountry people were migrants belonging to the Kamba, Luo, Luhya and Kikuyu, the larger tribal/ethnic groups of inland Kenya (Rakodi, 2006). Many coastal people are Muslims, while migrants were Christians.

Rakodi, Gatabaki-Kamau and Devas (2000:158) highlighted that the 'Coastal Africans are found in all occupations but are disproportionately concentrated in unskilled and casual jobs because of their low educational levels'. Hence the 'economic inequalities associated with tribal and ethnic heterogeneity have, thus, been a longstanding source of resentment on the part of poorer groups, fueled by a political system (both national and local) which plays on tribal loyalties as a basis for support and reward'. This, combined with relatively low financial resources received from central government over consecutive development plan models after independence, has under mined the states' capacity to invest in health, education, and other social and physical infrastructure and resulted in low human development in the coast region. The poor performance of the coast may be attributed to low human capital, weak institutions and poor infrastructure coupled with political instability and social conflicts rooted in tribal politics and class divides. The resulting poverty, illiteracy and unemployment are attributed to these ineffective governance mechanisms which have fueled disgruntled unemployed youth into crimes such as gangs and radicalization (Badurdeen, 2012). In these marginalized deprived societies in the Coast, violent radicalization and extremism are viewed as a result of the social breakdown or experiences of strain and deprivation at group or individual level (Badurdeen, 2016). Despite recent changes due to devolution with in the center-peripheral power structures, conditions favourable for investment, growth and social development have yet be to put in place due to political turmoil, elite control, corruption, transparency, accountability and poor law and order conditions

In Kenya, residents from the coast and the north eastern counties had been marginalized since independence as a consequence of ineffective decentralization of development plans and ineffective governance. Consequences of ineffective governance in the Coast have led into sporadic political violence with the formation of various vigilante groups and the secession movement, the Mombasa Republican Council (Goldsmith, 2011). Among the many grievances in the coast, the unfair

provisions on agricultural settlements for Coasterians[4], where the residents have suffered with the lack of title deeds in their possession had taken precedence in most of the coastal political movements. A context aggravated by the perceived preferential treatment received by new settlers (people from other parts of Kenya)[5] in the Coast region mainly influenced by politicians. For, the Coasterians had remained as squatters in their own lands. The deep structured issue of the lack of title deeds, illiteracy and the resulting under-development in the region had culminated into the formation of political groups such as the MRC. Other grievances which have fueled violence in the region had been the claims raised by the residents, who had experienced bias in civil service recruitment and thus exclusion from employment and government development plans (Badurdeen, 2012). These types of strains lead to negative emotions that can lead to a number of outcomes such as delinquency (Agnew, 2004). The 'strains for the Coasterians include the failure to achieve positively valued goals such as jobs and education and the removal of a positively valued stimulus such as the ownership of resources' (Badurdeen, 2012).

Existing strains in the coast region provides a conducive environment for Al-Shabaab radicalization and recruitment of youth where youth feel the system is unjust and the only way to end their plight of discriminatory treatment is to fight back. For, they view the government as the main perpetrator in the underdevelopment of their regions. The lack of avenues to express their grievances lead them to resort to alternatives such as resort to violence as an alternative, in many instances they join groups which oppose the government (Interview, 27 February 2016). Hence they try to find answers in extremist ideologies and groups which resonates with their plight for a just and equal world – a world they find at peace where 'majority are Muslims' where all are considered equal as promoted in extremist narratives advocating for an Islamic State or a land for only Muslims (Interview, 22 February 2016). Narratives which go in line with Muslims suffering all over the world and blends well with extremist ideologies of the al-Shabaab (Interview, 2 March 2016). Among many other factors, experiences of these strain provides a conducive environment which makes youth vulnerable to being radicalized or recruited.

1.4. Poverty in the Coast Region

Reportedly, the incidence of poverty was higher is the two regions of North Eastern and the Coast in Kenya. In terms of inequality, the three counties of the Coast region ranked among the five counties with the highest poverty gaps, namely: Tana River (46%), Kwale (42%) and Kilifi (31%) (KNBS & SID, 2013). The report further highlighted that poverty was the highest in the North Eastern region but most severe in the coastal region. The coast region was marked with a growing population with a growth rate of 1.93% in 2015 with a bulging youth population of more than 50% of the population under the age of 25 (Oxford Business Report, 2017). Endowed with natural resources as well as economic structures such as the port (Mombasa and the proposed LAPSET project in Lamu) the region boasts of scope in terms of economic and social development. However, the coast region is in dire need for social, economic and political development as a consequence of neglect or discrimination since independence (IPSOS, 2013).

Poverty as a consequence of ineffective governance was highlighted as a main factor that pushed youth into radical networks such as the al-Shabaab or the MRC (Interview, Youth Leader, Mombasa, 22 February 2016). This was further reiterated by a respondent who revealed how poverty affected the entire Kwale region in the coast and drive youth to seek out for financial alternatives, '...poverty affects most youth in this area [Kwale] and they are in the lookout for any opportunity which will sustain their lives' (Interview, Youth Leader, 6 Aril 2016). Due to the need for money, young people often get trapped to recruiters of extremist organizations such as the al-Shabaab (Interview, 22 February 2016). Further, narratives clarified the context of being trapped to al-Shabaab recruiters as a result of poverty as follows: A respondent from Kwale revealed that for around '500 shilling or 1000 shilling, you can get youth to do anything' ['anything' here meant 'illegal activity'] (Interview, 3 March 2016). A respondent explained on the financially viable option which lures young people in the coast, 'al-Shabaab lures young people with money. The amount they offer exceeds the amount a young person can make on a monthly basis. Just imagine, making 50,000 a month when you have no education or any other skills. Their poverty context also forces them into these networks' (Interview, 14 January 2016). Therefore, respondents ascertained that in poverty ridden communities, youth were vulnerable to become radicalized[6] or recruited into radical organizations or networks. The context of youth lured into radical networks as a result of poverty is well reiterated in other studies on radicalization in the coast region (Getachew, 2016; Odhiambo et al, 2015).

One of the causes for poverty in the regions was the lack of opportunities in the coast region. The lack of opportunities in the region was meant for a context on the lack of jobs for youth or the lack of education or training for youth. The problem of the lack of opportunities was usually pegged with marginalization in the region. Often, this factor was manipulated by extremists as they exploited these strains by providing jobs, provisions of training and providing money for their studies. The context of how youth were lured due to the lack of opportunity was were well highlighted in the following narrative: 'the youth just waste time doing nothing, they have ample time but are not engaged in studies or work...recruiters motivate them

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[4] Coasterian is a word used to describe the people who originate from the Coast region of Kenya.
[5] The coast people resented the new settlers known as 'outsiders' or 'westerners – originating from the western part of the country'. The context had culminated into incidents such as the Kaya Bombo raiders from the South Coast who carried out attacks on non Coasterians mainly the outsiders in 1997 (Human Rights Watch, 2002) and the formation of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). MRC is a cessation movement originating from the Coast, which seeks for an independent Coast under the banner 'Pwani Si Kenya'[5] (Goldsmith, 2011).
[6] Radicalization and recruitment is used interchangeably, as well as in not in particular order. There is no consensus of which comes first, whether it is radicalization or recruitment. Some youth are radicalized and recruited, while others are recruited prior to being radicalized (Olesen, 2009).

to join their networks by offering them jobs, scholarships and money' (Interview, 21 January 2016). In most cases, youth need money for their studies. Only few can afford that privilege of studying and 'getting a good job [white collar job]' (Interview, 2 February 2016). The feeling of social exclusion in obtaining a good education was further ascertained as a respondent who revealed that education after form four was not affordable to the poor, attributing to the low grades in the coast region due to the lack of teachers and also the lack of money for university education (Interview, 6 March 2016). There was a direct link between employment and the required education and training that has affected youth in the region. For, most of the jobs need qualifications and training (Interview, 4 February 2016). These contexts of unemployment and the lack of training and skills for jobs amidst proper formal qualifications do have the potential to inculcate feelings of frustration and anger, easily exploited by radicalizers in luring youth with money or other amenities (Interview, 27 February 2016).

1.5. Ineffective Governance and Mismanagement of Resource Allocation
     Ineffective government policies with regard to education, employment, other social welfare policies had resulted in socio-economic marginalization of communities as a consequence of misappropriate revenue distribution and ineffective policy making from the central government to the coastal constituencies (Rakodi, 2006). Ineffective governance as a consequence of mismanagement of resource allocation and failures in development planning was highlighted as a factors wherein development does not trickle down to the locals (FGD, Lamu February 2016). The governance crisis in the region as a result of mismanagement of resources resulted in disparities in socio-economic development of the region. Extremist narratives and networks usually exploited this crisis to lure young into their organizations. Three major themes from the narratives revealed the existence of a governance crisis in the coast region: First, was the capacity of the government to effectively manage and distribute its local resources without facilitating local ownership of development projects in the region. Second, the aspect of transparency, accountability and corruption that hindered the development process of the region. Associated to this fact was the evidence of discrimination among groups prevalent in the region. Third, the loopholes evident in the decentralization process in the region where power was centred among elites. Therefore, the governance crisis emanates from the misapplication of the rightful decision-making processes in the coast region. Resulting in resentment and rejectionist behavior from the citizens often exploited by radicalizers to arouse tensions of coastal Muslims being discriminated by a non-Muslim state (Interview, 8 April 2016).
     Local resources should be managed by local people. Local resources managed by a central government, and the resulting revenue used by a central government had hindered the coastal region for many decades. Santiso (2009) posits that one of the key elements of governance is the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement effective policies. The ineffective management of resources locally and a strong role of the central government in controlling the revenues resources was negatively viewed by the respondents (Interview, 22 February 2016). The prevailing decentralized system of governance was viewed favourably as it would assist in decentralized development particular to specific counties (Interview, 9 April 2016). However, some viewed the decentralized mechanism with caution as it had favoured the growth of power within elite circles (Interview, 3 March 2016). Three development initiatives were highlighted as misappropriate managed. Here the respondents viewed local participation in the projects negatively in terms of local ownership and unfair allocation of resources and revenue. While some of the respondents highlighted how the government was trying to rectify the atrocities causes, nevertheless others complained that it was insufficient: 'How much do we benefit from the Mombasa Port? The Mombasa port revenue is important for the development of the coast. It's important to consider, how many coasterians have management positions in the port and who benefits from the revenue? The revenue and jobs goes to the outsiders [people from the West]...' (Interview, 22 February 2016).
     Similarly, some respondents resented Titanium mining initiative in Kwale district. They viewed the project favoured outsiders and not the local citizens. 'The government promised us development here, it has only favoured the people who work their [in the project]. Most of the people were displaced [5000 indigenous people] without adequate compensations, 'affecting livelihoods and environmental impacts' (Interview, 14 April 2016). The third project highlighted was the LAPPSET Corridor Project. A respondent highlighted on the LAPSETT Corridor Project as ineffectively planned with the lack of local participation: 'why was the LAPSETT project resented initially? Do you think locals would not like a massive development project like that? The problem was that the locals were never involved in the planning, some even did not know about the project until they say their lands were surveyed for the project...in other words, there lands were grabbed for the project...' (Interview, 28 March 2016). However, some explained on how the government intended to rectify gaps by facilitating development trickling down to the local communities like providing jobs from the project for local youth, giving youth the necessary trainings and skills for the jobs and even providing scholarships on higher education so they deem fit for the jobs (Interview, 30 March 2016). Within resource allocation and distribution, respondents highlighted issues of corruption, nepotism, tribalism, the lack of accountability and transparency as issues which hindered development in the region (Interview, 2 February 2016).
     Social services and civic institutions were considered a necessity in the region, mainly in uplifting the poor members of the communities of the coast. One main reason where young people engage in criminal or gang activities is the lack of social services to assist them in their lives. Among these poor communities young people become the most vulnerable for radicalization (Interview, 20 February 2016). Further civic institutions should help the marginalized to voice out their

consents and opinions with regard to their rights, especially when they are discriminated in terms of land issues, resource allocations, distributions in the coastal region (Interview, 3 March 2016).

1.6. The Lack of Trust in CT Strategies and Legislations

Like many other African governments, Kenya embarked on counter terrorism strategies to combat terrorism in the country mainly with regard to the al-Shabaab terrorist wave. Most often, these laws take extreme measures to mitigate terrorism with unintended consequences of heavy handed, military and extra-judicial responses sometimes making terrorism worse. As evident in the West (USA, UK and Europe), most likely CT strategies have unintentional consequences on particular communities such as Muslim communities which often becomes a target in interventions (Nyaundi, 2014). Narratives have highlighted how particular Muslim communities in the coast had been vulnerable to counter terrorism strategies such as discriminatory legislations. Some Muslims viewed the implementation of strategies to counter terrorism such as the Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2012 (PoTA 2012) as discriminatory (Interview, 22 March 2016). The PoTA 2012 was further strengthened with the Security Laws (Amendment) Act 2014 revealing a shift of balance between security and human rights, as the Act emphasizes security concerns over other rights (Maingi, 2014). Within this backdrop, some youth viewed the CT legislations unfavorably as the legislations have expanded the scope of surveillance targeting and harassing Muslims. In specific locations known as high risk areas mostly dominated by Muslims, youth had been always under the 'watchful eyes of the police'. Further, the respondent stated he was targeted because of being a Muslim, '...if they see a Muslim youth who always went to the Mosque, wears the garb...may talk about religion or have conservative views, he is a radical, extremist or terrorist...whatever they may name him...' (Interview, 13 June 2016).

Counter terrorism initiatives by the law enforcement officials were considered positive by members who attributed such initiatives as having the ability to reduce terrorist incidents in the coast (Interview, 22 February 2016). However, this positive stance of attributes among the community on counter terrorism strategies should not negate the underlying assumption of the existing strains and grievances culminated as a result of harassments on Muslim youth which had resulted in communities under risk or risk societies. Muslim youth from the marginalized regions of the coast revealed that being at risk as a community constantly targeted had vast repercussions as they viewed the police unfavourably affecting the building of community trust with the police. Perception and attitude towards the police by the youth revealed the anger and animosity on the way the police dealt with the issue. Grievances were associated to the context of profiling, where various individuals arrested as a result of CT initiatives belonged to a particular religion and age group.

Mosque raids and mosque closures as a consequence of counter terrorism strategies were viewed as discriminatory, as it focused on scared spaces of the Muslims. While some considered it as a necessity to counter or prevent extremist acts, narratives by the extremists expressed this as an attack against the Islamic religion (Interview, 27 February 2016). Some expressed this as an act that could lead to more hatred and anger among Muslim youth towards the police and the state (Field Observation 12 June 2016). Similarly, there was resent among members of the community on extrajudicial killings on clergies or religious leaders whom some youth considered as their mentors (FGD, Youth June 2016). It was revealed that since 2000, there have been a record of twenty one killings and disappearances of religious leaders or preachers due to the prevailing violence in the region (AlJazeera, 2014).

Therefore, marginalization, poverty, ineffective governance, the lack of social services and civic institutions, with the opinion that law enforcement and legal systems are biased or vicious are conditions that radicalizers exploit to create allies or to generate sympathy in the coast region. As Olsen (2009, p.24) posited that 'the opportunity space contracts due to a combination of decreasing access and repression', where 'more individuals will experience repression (either personally or through "observation")' might fuel radicalization. This violence has motivation and resource for mobilizing youth from these marginalized communities (della Porta, 2009).

2. Conclusion

Good and effective governance is vital for national security, among which the context of radicalization and recruitment in the coast region of Kenya needs to be understood. The ineffective governance-violent extremism nexus is vital to understand how state institutes social, political and civil rights as well as design techniques to craft the membership of a political community in regulating policies on social welfare of its citizens. For instance, how do the Coastal Muslims feel to be Kenyans? Are they marginalized in terms of racial or ethnic profiling in security efforts? While being a citizen is a crucial of being part of the country, it entails the real feeling of being a citizen with rights as a citizen of the country. Therefore, if youth are marginalized socially or economically, in regions such as Kwale or Kilifi, how would he or she feel being part of Kenya? Or as a Muslim, being closely scrutinized due to his affiliation to religion - How would a youth feel in such context? (Interview, 21 February 2016). This reveals a breakdown of state-citizen relationship, resulting in frustrations which do facilitate communities to detest the state apparatus and join alternate avenues – among which is the al-Shabaab. This context of grievances and discrimination is often manipulated by radicalizers, who provides an alternative avenue to flush their anger to counter state practices or means of retaliating against the practices of the state.

Economic empowerment models should cater for the dearth of employment opportunities in the region. Young people need to be integrated into these models. Education, skills and training needs to match the scope and potential of employment

opportunities in the region. Overall, development should trickle to the local communities rather than concentrate into the hands of a few elites in the respective counties in the coast.

Most often, marginalized communities such as Muslims communities in the Coast have been victims of counter terrorism strategies where extreme law enforcement measures to mitigate terrorism with heavy handed, military and extra-judicial responses making them resent and lose trust on the government. For, unlawful responses to terrorism destroys the trust in the government, undermines 'the social contract, and radicalizes young people' (Brookings, 2017). There is a need for holistic measures based on the rule of law and an understanding of what causes young people to join extremist movements from the coast, hence address mitigation measures accordingly. Vicious and populist band aid solutions to terrorism run the risk of reinforcing the existing status of the problem 'ineffective governance based on discriminatory polices' contributing further in re-radicalizing youth to alternative extremist groups creating a vicious cycle of radicalization and recruitment into terrorist organizations. There is a need on forums to discuss issues facing youth in the region. The lack of avenues for expression gives room for radical entrepreneurs to exploit their grievances and facilitate the channeling of grievances through extreme actions (Badurdeen, 2018.

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