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Military Role in Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Joint Military Task Force Headquarters, Yenegoa, Bayelsa State

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Abstract:

Since the return of civil rule in 1999, Nigerian has been battling with series of violent agitation from the various geo-political zones in the country. Recent acts of violence in the country, was carried out by Militant in Niger Delta region and the Boko haram sect in the northern region. This study examines the essence of deploying the Nigerian military in domestic terrorism. Outlining not only the specific role the military can play, but also the implications that can arise from their involvement in domestic terrorism campaigns. The Nigerian Military faces challenges, such as, lack of standard equipments, lack of adequate welfare package, disunity among military personnel's etc. An analysis of the results revealed that military involvement in domestic terrorism has not been as effective as that of civilian law enforcements. And the potential benefits of military involvement do not surpass or over weigh its associated cost. Thus, the use of violence to fight against violence threatens to be counterproductive if their roles cannot be made more effective. Government should therefore, look into those problems military face in order to promote effectiveness in the roles of the military in domestic terrorism; while the following should serve as guidelines to regulate military involvement in counter domestic terrorism (a) military involvement should always be on a short- termed basis, and only when the civilian law enforcements cannot handle the domestic threat. (b) military involvement must form part of an overall domestic terrorism campaign, which also incorporates other non-military means of countering domestic terrorism in Nigeria.

1.1. Background of Study

Domestic terrorism is a common occurrence in Third world countries like Nigeria. It may not be the top of federal counter terrorism priority, but it features prominently among the concerns of the law enforcement, armed forces, civil societies, non- governmental organizations and even the wider society. It can be seen as one of those many problems which pervade society and impedes on socio-economic, political and even cultural development of any society; Nigerian societies has not been an exception.

Terrorism historically has been practiced by a broad array of political organizations and social groups to further their objectives. Also by both left- winged and right- winged political parties, revolutionaries and even ruling government. An abiding characteristic in any terrorist act is the indiscriminate use of violence against non combatants for the purpose of gaining attention of targeted groups. Therefore, in terrorism there must be an act that is "dangerous" to human life, either individuals or groups, indicating some form of physical harm to others as a result of the action.

Terrorist are driven typically, by a particular ideology. In this respect domestic terrorist are a divergent lot, drawing from a broad array of philosophies and world views. They can be motivated into violent acts in the name of ideologies and beliefs like animal rights, white supremacy, anti- westernization, religious beliefs, and freedom and emancipation movements and so on. This makes developing anti- terrorist tactics very difficult and quite tasking, requiring a high level of tactical intelligence.

In 2001, the US state department had officially designated 22 terrorist organizational groups known in different parts of the world, including Nigeria. By 2003, the list had grown to 36 organizational groups. Either terrorism is a tremendous growth industry or its definition has become increasingly liberal in its designation. In Nigeria, the year 1980 recorded the first series of domestic terrorism. And so, from the quasi- Muslim fringe group that sparked series of religious riots in kano, kaduna and maiduguri to the latest activities of the Boko haram radical Islamist fundamental group; there has been more than more 20 cases of ethno- religious clashes resulting in more than 10,000 deaths and destruction of property as well infrastructure worth billions of naira. The first flash out shocked Nigerians to their marrow. In that crisis alone 4,177 lives were recorded lost. This shows that domestic terrorism in Nigeria is not a mysterious phenomenon. It is a form of violence which has real, devastating and fatal consequences. It is a display of tactics not just a movement. Examining the military role in combating domestic acts of terrorism by known terrorist groups in Nigeria is the background of this study.

Due to the fact that, the array of violent attacks by homegrown terrorist pervading the country has become a source of pervasive fear and loathing across states and geo-political zones of the country Nigeria; destroying lives and properties, following the break-down of

law and order which resulted to declaring state of emergency; the nation has been turned into a critical war zone. As Nigerians awaken to the reality of domestic terrorism, a lot is at stake - our nationality, our freedom, our belief, our unity.

If Nigerian has declared war on domestic terrorism, its military must be ready combat. The first rule of war is to know the enemy. Terrorist are not a simple enemy to know. They have a myriad of complex motivations as individuals, groups and organization. Also while to some it is a despicable crime, to others a terrorist is ones freedom fighter. Therefore examining the military and the role they play in combating domestic terrorist activities is of essence to our contemporary as it will determine capabilities of the Nigerian military as regards their involvement in domestic terrorism

1.2. Statement of Problem

Nigerian military role in combating domestic terrorism cannot be overemphasized. Rather it should be examined in order to effectively solve the mayhem of domestic violence on our institutions and infrastructure, culture groups and people; thereby restoring the peace and integration founded on our National unity.

More recent acts of terrorisms has turned some parts of the nation into a critical war zone; talking about the northern and some part of the middle belt region, where security of lives and property can no longer be guaranteed. This has upset national development and progress politically, culturally and economically. Ignoring this epidemic problem would lead to a whole lot of damnable consequences and possible division of the country. Resources that should be used or channeled into more productive areas are wasted on security and combating terrorism.

A major problem here is to examine if the military role in the performance of its duty is not been compromised with respect to ethnic and religious ties. The fact that military personnel's have their individual and various belief and value system; it can go a long way in compromising their role to Nationality. It is of relevance to examine the religious and ethnic ties of military personnel's and how it affects their role in combating domestic terrorism. If not, how are we to ensure that the military perform their roles to national security, which they swore to uphold.

Military involvement in domestic terrorism creates a frantic situation. It involves using violence to fight against violence. How effective has it been? Are the supposed benefits worth the associated cost?

1.3. Objective of Study

- i. This study is to determine the role of the military in domestic context. The challenges they face in combating domestic terrorism in order to proffer solutions to such challenges.
- ii. Also to provide a range of policies and guidelines for the government to regulate the involvement of the military in domestic terrorism in liberal democracies like Nigeria.
- iii. To determine the level of professionalism of the Nigerian military and how effective their role has been over the years. In order enhance their capacity to handle the civilian nature of homegrown terrorism
- iv. To determine the effectiveness of military involvement in domestic terrorism against their civilian counterpart.
- v. To determine also, the potential benefits of military involvement in domestic terrorism if it is worth the associated cost/implications.

1.4. Research Hypotheses

The research hypotheses to guide this study includes the following

- i. The military are more effective than their civilian counterparts in counter domestic terrorism
- ii. The potential benefit of military involvement in domestic terrorism surpasses the associated cost
- iii. The religious and ethnic affiliation of the military affects their role efficiency in combating domestic terrorism

2.1. The Military Role in Counter Terrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies

The employment of the military in counter domestic terrorism has been examined before, but this subject requires a more up-to-date analysis. In order to begin to comprehend this issue, scholars need to understand the historical background as well as the challenges posed by contemporary counter terrorism. Any analysis of this subject is complicated by the fact that domestic terrorism often co-exist with other forms of internal conflict, so it is often difficult to distinguish between counter terrorism or counter insurgency.

The key point here is that political and strategic calculations provide the context, in which military means are employed in any form of conflict, and counter terrorism can either be incorporated as a part of the armed forces or stabilization doctrines in a domestic context, within what the British armed forces refer to as Military Aid to Civilian Authority (MACA). This manuscript will discuss their counterterrorist framework, before critically examining the military contribution/role to counter domestic terrorism as far as democracies are concerned.

In this respect, a state's armed forces can be employed on an ad hoc basis (in situations where it has specific capabilities that the civilian authorities require in the short-term), or as part of a prolonged engagement.

Furthermore, democratically elected governments are obliged to consider the potentially negative consequences of employing military forces prior to deciding to hand specific counter terrorist missions over to their generals and admirals. Democratic governments therefore, face the dilemma of how they can fight the threat of domestic terrorism without undermining the constitutional, legal and normative characteristics upon which government is founded.

A specific viewpoint on the characteristic and causes of terrorism shapes perceptions about whether a state can employ its armed forces as part of its efforts to contain and ultimately defeat terrorism in their homeland, or whether the use of military means would be

counter-productive. With few exceptions, states maintain their own armed forces which are configured, trained and organized to a state-based adversary, although they can be employed in peace-keeping/ peace-supporting missions.

Using Fareed Zakaria's definition of a liberal democracy as a "political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers and protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property". Alex Schmid identifies four intrinsic factors which affect a liberal democracy's response to internal terrorism: freedom of movement, freedom of association, abundance of targets and the constraints of the legal system. Democratic norms also stress openness, tolerance, legality and the high value of each individual life. All of this can affect a states counter terrorism policy in a number of a number of ways, as shown in the British case both by Labour's effort to introduce identity cards (which the conservative- liberal democrat coalition opted to abolish soon after it assumed office in may, 2010), and also the legal effort to block the extradition of radical Islamist clerics to their home countries, where they might be arrested and tortured. The persistent articulation of these norms is a sign of a health democracy, but it also shows how intrinsically controversial it is for a state to become involved in the fight against terrorist in the domestic sphere. If a terrorist group has the numbers, resources and the sufficient popular support to threaten the government's authority, then a states counter terrorist policy has to be incorporated within a wider counter insurgency strategy. Counter insurgency involves the coordinated response of a state government to integrate political, socio-economical, legal, police, military measures to frustrate and ultimately defeat an insurgency.

Within this framework counter domestic terrorism includes defensive measures to minimize the ability of a terrorist group to inflict more violence against non combatants. Examples here includes; emergency legislation to ban membership in organization and its political wing, increased police and military patriots in public areas, and information campaigns to inspire public vigilante against potential attacks.

An enlightened counter domestic terrorist policy will also attempt to strike a balance between public safety and civilian liberties and will acknowledge the need for policies that alleviate the causes of domestic terrorism. This will involve measures to alleviate popular grievances that terrorist groups exploit, and also promote dialogue with community leaders and political figures who may be sympathetic to the terrorist cause, if not their methods. Counter terrorism does, however, incorporate more offensive measures to undermine terrorist groups and neutralize members. These includes recruitment of terrorists to inform on their comrades (to work as agents) and also the turning of captured members of a group (preferably through persuasion, if not coercion) so that they provide intelligence on their former comrades.

Democratic norms dictate that neutralization should ideally involve arrest, followed by the established procedures of trial by due process, conviction and incarceration. Yet neutralization can also involve the killing of terrorists by members of the security forces. This can either be because the former are armed and resist arrest or because are in the process of committing a violent act, in which case soldiers and police act under rules of engagement (ROE) permitting self-defense. Example, the British Army in the Northern Ireland was theoretically bound by the Yellow card each soldier carried; it authorized the use of deadly forces solely in circumstances in which soldiers felt that their lives were at risk- a situation when a suspect appeared likely to use firearm or explosive devices against them. However, in Northern Ireland, as in other cases, critics allege that lethal violence is used because there is a specific, if undeclared, policy to kill suspected terrorist rather than capture them. As noted, some states e.g Israel have conducted targeted killings, also an Algerian example shows that in a permissive environment even a democratic states military can employ unpalatable measures such as torture and extrajudicial executions against suspected terrorists.

According, to CONTEST, the UK's approach to counterterrorism involves:

- The prevention of terrorism by tackling its root causes
- The pursuit of terrorist and their sponsors
- The protection of the public and key services
- The preparation to respond to and mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack

CONTEST emphasizes the primacy of political and non military means of fighting domestic terrorism. This includes the need to isolate the terrorist from the wider physically and psychologically from the wider population and to use notably the diplomatic and economic levers to resolve the grievances that cause terrorism in the homeland. Nonetheless, CONTEST also has an explicit military dimension. The UKs armed forces are explicitly committed to prevent and pursue, while specialist elements are committed to protection like the Royal Air Forces Quick Reaction Alert.

2.2. *Is Domestic Terrorism a Military Problem?*

This presents another strategy for regulating military involvement in homegrown terrorism. It is the criminality or warfare approach. Scholars of terrorism identify two distinct models a state can employ in response to domestic threat.

The Criminal justice approach treats domestic terrorism as a law-and-order issue, and although the government may introduce emergency legislation to bolster a state's legal framework, it is the judiciary and the police that play the lead role in implementing domestic counter terrorist measures, not the military.

The War model, in contrast, treats domestic terrorism as a mortal enemy to the state which can only be resolved or addressed by military force.

If one accepts Clausewitz's statement that "war is an act of violence to compel our enemy to do our will", it is clear that acts of domestic terrorism are not purely criminal in nature: hence the use of military means is justified. Terrorist groups, after all, seek to use force to coerce their targets into their demands.

British General Frank Kitson stated that "there is no such thing as a purely military solution in counter domestic terrorism or insurgency, because insurgency is not primarily a military activity", there is also "no such thing as a wholly political solution.....short

of surrendering, because the very fact that a state of insurgency exist implies that violence is involved which will have to be countered at least by the use of lethal force”

In accepting that there may be conditions in which military power can be employed against domestic terrorism, it is therefore easier to examine the specific tasks that a state’s armed forces can perform in a counter domestic terrorism campaign.

2.3. Military Role in Domestic Terrorism

The tasks discussed here are specific duties carried out by the military as their role if they are to be involved in domestic terrorism.

- i. Military Aid to the Civilian Authority (MACA): In British law, MACA is defined as the employment of the UK’s armed forces by the government in circumstances beyond traditional disturbances to restore peace. MACA can be subdivided into Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP), which involves the use of armed forces to assist civil authorities in restoration of law and order. Military Aid to Civil Authority, usually involves disaster relief and also specific responses to a mass casualty terrorist attack
- ii. Deterrence: The military can also be deployed in a preventative role if the authorities receive intelligence indicating that a terrorist attack is imminent.
- iii. Training Allied Forces: Since September 2001, Western armed forces have become increasingly involved in providing counter-terrorism training to the military and security forces of governments in regions where Islamist extremists are active.

Hostage Rescue: Hostage rescue is an intensely dangerous activity, since there is a clear risk that gunmen may attempt to massacre their prisoners once they come under attack. It therefore, requires well-trained personnel able to defend swiftly assault a defended location to neutralize terrorists within it and to liberate their captives. Their location- a public building, an aircraft, or oil-rig- can be rigged with explosives, primed for detonation if the authorities send in troops. The military possesses specific characteristics that make it ideally suited to fill such roles. So they may be required to conduct a successful rescue.

- i. Targeted Killing: From a purely legal perspective, assassinations are illegal, since they involve extra-judicial killing. But in a conventional warfare, it is permissible to kill key figures within an enemy’s command structure. As Cronin states, “individuals and ordering assassination is different from killing an enemy while he is engaged in a attack”. Since the military only, are justified to do warfare they alone also, are justified to do targeted killing within an enemy’s command.
- ii. Retaliation: A state’s armed forces can be used to launch retaliatory raids or strikes against terrorist groups in the homeland. These operations are coercive in nature since they are intended to persuade an adversary to “choose between making concessions or suffering consequences of continuing in its present course of action”. Retaliation raids are intended to desist from perpetuating further attacks and to force their sponsors to cease assisting them.

2.4. Problems Arising from Military Involvement in Counter Terrorism: The Domestic Context

It is important to stress that democracy rests on the idea that governance is based on the consent of the majority and that any political dispute is to be resolved nonviolently. If changes to the political or socio-economic order are required to address popular discontent, then this needs to be affected incrementally and by consensus of the process of reformation and not by either the application of violence from below (in form of insurgency) or above (in form of authoritarian coup). The ability to reason, to debate and ultimately to persuade is the key feature of liberal democratic politics, as is a clear and understandable distate for those who use intimidation and the application of force to achieve their objectives. The norms of democracy also stress the importance of the rule of law, that governments are bound by an implicit

The social contract with the governed, and that the worst crime a state’s ruler can commit is to abuse the authority vested in them by the electoral process, and to turn government by consent and responsibility into rule by fear.

All of this means that the use of military means to fight domestic terrorism is fraught with political, practical and ethical problems. No democratic politician would feel completely comfortable with the idea that the task of fighting terrorism in the homeland should be entrusted to an organized body of men and women who are conditioned to the idea of using violence albeit in a controlled and discriminate manner to achieve set objectives, who adhere to principles of hierarchy and chain-of-command, and who are accustomed to the idea of identifying an enemy, planning and conducting a sequence of actions aimed at its destruction. The contradiction between democratic politics and the military ethos should be recognized. While it is dangerous to assume that the latter is superior to the former and also naïve to assume that democracy can survive against internal threats without any means of defense, the contradiction between the norms of the liberal democratic state and military realities is a key theme in this section.

2.4.1. Resources

A key question that governments need to ask is whether their armed forces actually have the assets and manpower needed to make a valid contribution to a counter domestic terrorism campaign.

2.4.2. Boots on the Streets

It is a rare and disturbing sight to see armed soldiers in full battle order, complete with webbing and ammunition, in public in a liberal democratic state. The sight of troops on the streets is instinctively unsettling. The average civilian can be forgiven for assuming that he or she may be shot dead for performing an innocuous action that may be interpreted by soldiers as a threat, while the more politically aware may wonder if the sudden presence of troops precedes a more sinister action, such as a coup d’état. No government can inform the media and the populace with true certainty that a decision to put soldiers on the street definitely thwarted a terrorist attack, given the often precise nature of the intelligence involved.

2.4.3. The Intelligence Aspect

One of the principal causes of interdepartmental animosity involves the means needed to gather information about a terrorist, its collation, and its dissemination across various agencies. Success depends on the security forces ability to accurately identify terrorist, obtain timely information about their operations, their objectives and their overall strategy. Generating this information represents a considerable challenge, as Kitson noted "the problem of defeating the enemy consists very largely of finding him".

However, if a state's armed forces and other security services are unable to cooperate, any intelligence gathered is of limited value. Inadequate cooperation was also evident in British Colonial defeats such as Aden, where the inability of the regular Army on ZZSAS to coordinate their intelligence gathered activities led to at least one instances when undercover patrols mistook each other for terrorists and shot at each other.

2.4.4. Massacring the Innocents

The key rationale for involving the armed forces in counter domestic terrorism is to save lives. This motive is however undermined, in instances where military intervention actually causes substantial casualties.

2.4.5. Minimum Force/ Hearts and Mind

This illustrates a serious problem in which the deployment of troops can antagonize the civilian population, particularly if they are perceived by a section of the populace as been brutal and repressive, as was the case in northern Ireland. The fact is, as a former British Army Officer, Colonel Micheal Deware noted, "no army, however well it conducts itself, is suited for police work". Neither the problem of applying minimum force (minimum by whose standards?) nor the issue posed by applying lethal force in self-defense (when is it justified? What happens if a soldier misjudges a situation and shoots an innocent civilian?).

2.4.6. Accountability

In certain cases, military intelligence and Special Forces units involved in counter domestic terrorism has faced accusations that have become involved in so-called "black preparation". These includes assassinations and flag attacks (atrocities committed by military personnel, which are then blamed on terrorist), and they reflect fear that the soldiers concerned are beyond oversight or control and civilian authorities.

2.4.7. Creeping Authoritarianism

Historical experience has shown that a counter domestic terrorism campaign has provided the pretext for military commanders, or an unscrupulous civilian leadership, to subvert the democratic order and establish dictatorial rule. A prime example, is that of the Uruguay during the early 1970's, the army's intervention decisively defeated the Tupamaros, but it also led to the military- sponsored dictatorship declared by President Juan Maria Bordaberry in June, 1973. While Alberto Fujimori was president of Peru from 1990-2000, he over saw the military and police campaign that curtailed Sendero Luminoso's threat to the state, but he also established a corrupt authoritarian regime with the autoglope of April 5, 1992.

2.5. Conceptualizing Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria

The definition of terrorism and the proscription of terrorist acts by the Nigerian anti- terrorist Act of 2011, provided the framework for the identification of terrorist acts or behavior in the country. This Act defines terrorism as: "An act which is deliberately done with malice, a forethought which may seriously harm or damage a country or an international organization; and is intended or can reasonably be regarded as having been intended to;

- unduly compel a government or organization to perform or abstain from any act,
- seriously intimidate a population
- seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economical or social structures of a country or international organization,
- otherwise influence such government or international organization by intimidation or coercion.
- The Act further lists terrorist acts as:
- an attack upon a person's life which may cause serious bodily harm or death,
- kidnapping of a person,
- distribution to a government or public facility, transport system or an infrastructural facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss
- the seizure of an aircraft, ship, or other means of transport and diversion, or the use of such means of transportation to influence government or organization by intimidation or coercion,
- the manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply, or use of weapons, explosives or nuclear weapons, as well as research into and development of biological and chemical weapons without lawful authority,
- the release of dangerous substances or causing of fire explosions or floods the, effect of which is to endanger human life,
- interference with or disruption of the supply of water, power, or any other fundamental natural resources, the effect which is to endanger life,

- an act or omission in Nigerian which constitutes an offence within the scope of a counter terrorism protocols and conventions duly ratified by Nigeria, and
- an act which disrupts a service but is committed in pursuance of a protest.

From the standpoint of the drafted UN convention on terrorism and the Nigerian anti Terrorism Act of 2011, the ongoing violent behavior and attacks of the Boko Haram Islamic sect on national institutions, such as the 2011 attacks on the United Nations building, of homes and schools and the destruction of telecommunication infrastructure and the analysts suggest that the objectives of the Islamic sect are unclear. Barlotta, 2011, has indicated that the group has a "political goal which seeks to create an Islamic state in the 12 northern states of Nigeria".

This suggest, therefore, that the violent attacks by the group are intended to force the actualization of this objective, which captures a critical criterion of domestic terrorism note by the UN convention on terrorism and the Nigerian Anti-terrorism law as noted earlier.

Similarly, pre-amnesty attacks on the oil infrastructure and kidnapping of oil workers by ex Militia groups in the Niger Delta adequately come across as terrorist acts. Groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) used violence a tactics to achieve the goals of self determination, protection, resource control and ownership and environmental pollution and protection. Between 2006 and 2008 alone, a total of 317 persons were kidnapped and taken as hostages (Ibaba, 2011 p.251). Oil infrastructures were badly damaged and oil production disrupted, leading to a drastic decline in oil production output and by extension, oil revenues (Obi, 2009). This has been linked to amnesty offer by the Nigerian government which helped to restore oil production to over 2million barrels a day against under 1million barrels before the amnesty was introduced (Joab- Peeterside, 2010, Courson 2011).

In like manner, non oil related kidnappings across the country, seen by some as evidence of a falling Nigerian state (Adibe, 2012), fall within the description of domestic terrorism. From using kidnapping as a tactic of achieving the goals of self-determination among others in the Niger Delta, it has spread to other parts of the country and has become a commercial enterprise or tool of political intimidation (Adibe, 2012). People are kidnapped and released after payment of ransom and or making commitments to redraw from political contest. Terrorism in Nigeria is politically motivated by clandestine groups or individuals' against civilians or non combatant personnel's.

It should also be emphasized here that terrorism could be domestic or international in nature. For example, if an Israeli- insurgent group, kidnaps and kills an American Ambassador, it is an act of international terrorism. At the same time, if the attack is targeted on Israeli government officials, institutions or civilians it is domestic terrorism. Therefore, the kidnapping of government and other Nigerians, bombing of oil companies, pipeline vandalization by the militants in the Niger Delta region and the recent bombings in the northern part of Nigeria is a perfect situation of domestic terrorism. With the return to civil rule in 1999, Nigeria has been confronted with series of security challenge which cut across its six geopolitical zones. The acts of terrorism in the country was and is mainly carried out by the militant in the Niger Delta and the Boko Haramist in northern, Nigeria.

- The Militant Insurgent Groups of the Niger Delta Region.

The phase of the Niger Delta agitation which began in 1998 to date was marked with the emergence of terror; strategies which included outright confrontation, violence, pipeline vandalization, armed resistance against agents of the Nigerian state, the security and the transnational companies operating in the region, kidnapping and hostage taking (Ogbogbo, 2004). This acts of terrorism in the region was necessitated by the emergence of various youth militia who resorted to violence in a bid to express their views on the marginalization and constant negligence on the part of the government. Among the prominent militias in the region are the Ijaw Youth Council(IYC), Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force led by Allhaji Asari Dokubo, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta(MEND) led by Henry Okah, Niger Delta Vigilante(NDV) led by Ateke Tom. These militia groups poised a very heavy threat to national security, and they were driven by a common ideology- emancipation of the Niger Delta. Since the region produced 70% of the nation's revenue, their goal was to ensure that more development should be brought to the region. Also the region should be given top priority in the allocation of revenue, because of the many devastating side effect of the oil exploration and drilling activities on land, sea, even the air. Government refusal to comply with their demands and constant negligence to their complaints is what resulted to the use of violence and the subsequent destruction of oil companies, vandalization, kidnapping of oil workers and the total seizure of the oil wells in the region. They simply want to be in control of their resources. Therefore, the intervention of the Amnesty programme by the late President Alhaji Musa Yar' Adua in 2010 put an end to domestic terrorism and youth insurgency in the region.

- Boko Haram Sect in the Northern Region

The Islamic sect known as the Boko Haram has been a security challenge to Nigeria at least since 2009. Boko Haram which literally means "western education is forbidden" suggest that the group is adamantly opposed to what it sees as a Western-based incursion that threatens traditional values, beliefs and customs among the Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria.

Members of the Boko Haram are drawn primarily from the Kanuri tribe (roughly 4% of the Nigerian population) who are concentrated in the north-eastern states of Nigeria like Borno and Bauchi, the Fulani and Hausa (29% of the Nigerian population) spread more generally throughout most of the northern states in Nigeria. Since 2009 various attacks has been launched on police stations and patrols, religious leaders-especially Christians and schools and individuals who they seem to be engaged in un-Islamic activities like drinking beer. They have carried out several mass casualty attacks and threaten to sever the country into two parts. The case of this terrorist group is a clear picture of a domestic insurgency as they threaten with all sorts of violence means with a view of taking over the government of the whole country or division of the country, by separating the 12 northern states from the geographical and political region of Nigeria. In the early, 2012, Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in four state-Yobe, Borno, Plateau, Niger- in concerted effort with the deployment of the armed forces, the temporary closing of the international borders in Northern Nigeria. Should the country's latest effort to confront and defeat the Boko Haram fail, the terrorist violence would worsen.

- Government Response to Domestic Terrorism

Nigeria is one of the first countries in Africa to comply with the United Nations (UN) conventions and protocol on combating terrorism and a complaint of almost all existing conventions, protocols and resolutions is combating the financing of terrorism. Nigeria has also gone further to passing the bills proscribing these offences. It established a Presidential Advisory Committee on terrorism and further empowered the National security Adviser to deal decisively with outlaws of any act of domestic terrorism and insurgencies. It went further to grant amnesty to Niger Delta militants and empowering the youths of the region through rehabilitation programmes to douse the youth restiveness rampant in the Niger Delta. Aside from the passage of those bills, Nigerian Government has also established a special agency on terrorism and bombing. A special adviser on terrorism was also appointed by Goodluck Jonathan; promising also to carry out training of special security agents to assist local police and the military force intervention on intelligence gathering and networking.

Also to strengthen their resolve in domestic terrorism, it has severally made overtures to the Boko Haram sect in the North with the view of reaching a dialogue and truce by sending ex president General Olusegun Obasanjo to the group. But it failed. It is yet to be seen if the establishment of Almajiri schools in the north, with the view of using it to educate the teeming illiterate youths and reduce the recruitment of Boko Haram foot soldiers, will be of reasonable effect.

2.6. Military Dilemma in Combating Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria

The problems affecting the role the military in combating domestic terrorism in Nigeria are enormous. In spite of the various actions put in place, the menace seems to be overpowering both the military and the government, and they are as it were, running out of options. For example, while government actions in the Niger delta were merely settling the militants and their leaders, the general lack of infrastructural development in the region has remained unsolved. The following problems have been cited as they hinder the effective strategy towards combating homegrown terrorism in Nigeria:

- Lack of skilled manpower and training –It was reported that security experts were imported from Israel to help in tracking the whereabouts of the kidnappers and their hideouts, this occurred at the peak of the kidnapping crisis in the south-east following the kidnapping of four journalist in Abia state. This explains that the military lack the skilled manpower and expertise to deal with domestic terrorism.
- Government Insincerity in Tackling the Root causes of Domestic Terrorism- This explains the view that the government has also contributed to the challenges the military have in combating domestic terrorism and hence the continuous lingering of the problem. Bloom (2007), enumerated the following as root causes of domestic terrorism among others:
 - Lack of rule of law
 - Failed and weak states that provide a haven for terrorists
 - Corrupt government
 - Depression
 - Discrimination
 - Social Injustice

All of these in the presence of absolute poverty, unemployment, marginalization, relative deprivation and government gross insincerity and insensitivity. Government is insincere in fulfilling its election campaign promises to the people instead they flamboyantly and with great impetus exhibit executive lawlessness in corruption and abuse of office in the face of hungry, poverty-ridden, unemployed and absolutely deprived Nigerian youths. The implication of this is the government inaction precipitate violent acts.

- Lack of Data base by the security agents- The fight against terrorism and other related emerging crime in the country demand a data base which must be consistently updated in line with operational exigencies that may be required. It would be of great value if the root causes of the Boko haram is known and leaders identified, targets identified, modus operandi identified, ideologies noted, sponsors and beneficiaries identified etc. You cannot win a war fighting an unknown enemy.
- Enforcement of Anti-terrorist laws- There has been several constant accusations that the federal government is not actually prosecuting members of the Islamic sect arrested across the country for their ruthless and persistent mayhem. It simply means that the Nigerian Government lacks the will to enforce and implement its laws passed on acts of domestic terrorism or financing domestic terrorism.
- Religion and Culture- Radicalist and fundamentalist like the Boko Haram in Nigeria use religion and belief as a pretext to cause violent acts, this pose serious challenge to the military and a great danger to the internal security and peace of Nigeria. The military face the challenge of how to condemn their own religious beliefs and culture and combat terrorism without appearing to be bias to both roles. Nigeria as a whole faces the challenge of how to condemn and combat terrorist activities, or extremism and violence of specific radical groups without appearing to be anti-islamlic or anti-religious.

3.1. Design of Study

This study is descriptive in nature. It is mainly concerned with describing the purpose of the study: Military Role in Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria: Case study of Joint Military Task Force, Headquarters, Yenegoa, Bayelsa state.

3.2 Population of Study

The population of study is on the military personnel of Nigeria, which comprises of members of the army, navy, and the air force. Because of the size of the entire Nigeria military we are required to choose a case study which will be a good representative of the Nigerian military. The case study is the headquarters of the Joint Military Task Force, Operation Pulo shield, Yengoa, Bayelsa state, Nigeria.

3.3. Sample Size and Sampling Technique

The sample size of a study depends on the type of research involved. And for a descriptive research like this a minimum of 10 percent of the population as recommended by Gay (1981) is required. The case study which is the Joint task force, Operation pulo shield yengoa, Bayelsa state is estimated to be 250 military personnel, comprising the army, navy and air force. A total of 20percent of the sample population which is 50 will be used as the sample size.

The sample technique refers to the kind of sample method/ selection to be used. Random sampling which is a selection method in which members of the population has an equal chance of being selected. A piece of paper with red or green marker indicated on each paper will determine who will be selected or not. All those that picked green were selected to make up the sample size. Those that picked papers with red markers were not selected. This is a simple method of Random sampling technique, and it is also called the ballot method.

3.4. Research Instrument

The research instrument to be used in the collection of relevant data from sample population includes:

Secondary data: Secondary data which will be relevant to the study will be gathered from all ready existing journals, newspapers, related research works from reputable authority etc.

Primary data: Primary data will be gathered using questionnaires and personal interviews. The questionnaires, most of which will be closed-ended, will be structured into two sections. Section A will include questionnaire items used to collect personal data of the respondents. Section B will comprise of questionnaire items for collecting relevant data which will be used to answers research questions and research hypotheses, to ensure desirable findings and facts.

3.5. Method of Data Analysis

Data from this study will be analyzed using the chi-square technique to test research hypotheses in order to accept or reject, alternative or null hypotheses which will be derived.

4.1. Data Presentation and Analysis

➤ Introduction

Having discussed the method of data collection in the previous section, it is therefore considered imperative to present and analyze the data so far collected. Thus, this section contains basically the presentation of relevant data, and analysis to answer research questions and research hypotheses earlier stated in the previous section.

4.2. Research Hypotheses Testing

The research hypotheses to be tested are those postulated earlier . The hypotheses will either be rejected or accepted based on the data analyzed in this section of the work.

4.3. Hypothesis- 1

The military are more effective than their civilian counterparts in counter domestic terrorism

Category	Response		Total
	Yes	No	
Christian	12	24	36
Muslim	8	6	14
Total	20	30	50

Table 1: Response Military role in counter domestic terrorism is more effective than their civilian counterparts

From the table above, 24 members of the Christian respondents say no, while 12 members say yes, making a total 36 respondents from the Christian category. Also 6 members of the Muslim respondents also say no while, 8 members say yes, making a total of 14 respondents from the Muslim category.

To test this hypothesis, we derive a null and an alternative hypothesis of the situation

H0- that military are more effective than their civilian counterparts in counter domestic terrorism.

H1- that military are not more effective than their civilian counterparts in counter domestic terrorism.

The chi-square test of independence would be used to test the hypothesis above, because the expected frequency is not given, it has to be calculated.

Chi –square has the following assumptions:

$$X^2 = \sum \frac{(o-e)^2}{e}$$

$$\text{Expected frequency (ef)} = \frac{CT + RT}{GT}$$

Where,

O = observed frequency

E= expected frequency

CT= column total

RT= role total

GT = ground total

Level of frequency = 0.05

Degree of freedoms= Nr-1 x Nc-1, where,

Nr = number of roles

Nc = number of columns

Category	Response		Total
	Yes	No	
Christian	12/e=14.6	24/e=21.6	36
Muslim	8/e= 5.6	6/e=8.4	14
Total	20	30	50

Table 2: chi square table, showing observed and expected frequency

X₂ = Calculated value = 2.3820

Table value = 3.841, at 1d.f

➤ Interpretation

Since the chi-square calculated value (2.3820) is lower than the critical table value (3.481), we reject the alternative and accept the null hypothesis; which states that military are not more effective than their civilian counterparts in counter domestic terrorism.

4.4 Hypothesis- 2

The potential benefits of military involvement in domestic terrorism surpasses the associated cost

Category	Response		Total
	Yes	No	
Christian	29	7	36
Muslim	8	6	14
Total	37	13	50

Table 3: Response the potential benefits of military involvement in domestic surpasses the associated cost

Table above is the distribution of respondents to questionnaire item 16. 29 members of the Christian category say yes, while 7 members say no. Also, in the Muslim category 8 members say yes while 6 members say no, making a total of 14 respondents of the Muslim category.

To test the hypothesis, we derive a null and an alternative hypothesis of the situation.

H₀ – that the potential benefits of military involvement in domestic terrorism surpasses the associated cost

H₁- that the potential benefits of military involvement in domestic terrorism does not surpass the associated cost.

The chi-square test of independence would be used to test the hypothesis above, because the expected frequency is not given, it has to be calculated.

Chi –square has the following assumptions:

$$X^2 = \sum \frac{(o-e)^2}{e}$$

$$\text{expected frequency (ef)} = \frac{CT + RT}{GT}$$

Where,

O = observed frequency

E= expected frequency

CT= column total

RT= role total

GT = ground total

Level of frequency = 0.05

Degree of freedoms= Nr-1 x Nc-1, where,

Nr = number of roles
 Nc = number of columns

Category	Response		Total
	Yes	No	
Christian	29/e=26.64	7/e=9.36	36
Muslim	8/e=10.36	6/e=3.64	14
Total	37	13	50

Table 4: chi square table, showing observed and expected frequency

X²= calculated value= 2.8718

Table value= 3.841, at 1d.f

➤ Interpretation

Since the chi-square calculated value (2.8718) is lower than the critical table value (3.841) we reject the alternative and accept null hypothesis which states that the potential benefits of military involvement in domestic terrorism does not surpass its associated cost.

4.5. Hypothesis- 3

There is a significant relationship between ethnicity and religious affiliation of the Nigerian military and their role efficiency in combating domestic terrorism.

Category	Response		Total
	Yes	No	
Christian	7	29	36
Muslim	5	9	14
Total	12	38	50

Table 5: Response Relationship between religious and ethnic affiliation of the military and their role efficiency in combating domestic terrorism

From table above, 29 members of the Christian respondents say no, while 7 members say yes, making a total 36 respondents of the christain category. While 9 members of the mulsim category say no, 5 say yes, making a total 14 respondents of muslim category.

To test this hypothesis we derive a null hypothesis of the situation.

H1- there is no significant relationship between ethnic and religious affiliation of the Nigerian military and their role efficiency in combating domestic terrorism.

The chi-square test of independence would be used to test the hypothesis above, because the expected frequency is not given, it has to be calculated.

Chi -square has the following assumptions:

$$X^2 = \sum \frac{(o-e)^2}{e}$$

expected frequency (ef)= $\frac{CT + RT}{GT}$

Where,

O = observed frequency

E= expected frequency

CT= column total

RT= role total

GT = ground total

Level of frequency = 0.05

Degree of freedoms= Nr-1 x Nc-1, where,

Nr = number of roles

Nc = number of columns

Category	Response		Total
	Yes	No	
Christian	7/ e= 8. 64	29/ e= 27.36	36
Muslim	5/ e= 3.36	9/e=10. 64	14
Total	12	38	50

Table 6: chi square table, showing observed and expected frequency

X² = calculated value= 1.462

Table value= 3.841, at 1d.f

➤ Interpretation

Since, the chi-square calculated value (1.462) is lower than the critical table value (3.841), we reject the alternative and accept the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between ethnicity and religious affiliation of the Nigerian military and their role efficiency in combating domestic terrorism.

5.1. Conclusion

The Nigerian military face a lot of challenges in countering domestic terrorism. An interview with some military personnel's at the Joint task force military barracks, suggest that the military faces challenges such as inadequate equipments such as arms and ammunitions, inadequate funding/welfare packages, disunity among military personnel's. These three challenges feature prominently among challenges the Nigerian military face.

In order for the military role in a domestic terrorism to be more effective, these challenges have to be looked into, this would enhance their capabilities to handle the civilian nature of homegrown terrorism. Despite the specific roles the military can play in domestic terrorism, these challenges should be resolved first if they are to get involved; it will make their role effective and not counterproductive. Since their involvement is not more effective than that of civilian forces, neither do the potential benefits of their involvement surpass the associated cost and implications for liberal democracies.

The underlying conclusion of this work is that while the employment of military means in combating domestic terrorism in Nigeria can have clear drawbacks, implications, it does not necessarily mean that the Nigerian state should eschew the use of the armed forces as part of an overall counter domestic terrorism policy. The requirement to involve the military depends on a variety of factors- whether the civilian police can cope with the threat, the kind of specific tasks that the military can perform, and the kind of threat posed by the terrorist group. These should serve as policies and guidelines to regulate military involvement in domestic terrorism.

In certain cases, military and police operations can be integrated as part of an overall policy of containing and, if necessary, neutralizing hardcore terrorist, while repressing those amendable to compromise that negotiations offer a more viable means of achieving objective than the continual use of violence.

It is necessary to urge here that, there is a role for a state armed forces in domestic terrorism, but the use of military means should be on a short-termed basis, to enable them perform specific tasks that are beyond the civilian authorities and that the use of military means must form part of an overall strategy which also incorporates and prioritize non-military means. Nonetheless, government needs to ensure that the resort to armed forces in specific circumstances which are beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities does not undermine the constitutional and legal framework upon which the "democratic" republic of Nigeria rests.

5.2. Recommendations

The researcher however makes the following recommendations which if implemented would be of benefits to the Nigerian military and help improve their roles in combating domestic terrorism. It would also throw more some light to help the government check the cause of terrorism in the homeland.

- i. Provision of standard equipments: Equipments here refers to necessary tools; a collectivity of designated articles used for and expenditure. Military equipments includes arms and ammunitions etc. these equipments should be of measurable standard with those of other armed forces in other countries.
- ii. Sensitization for National unity: this is recommended in order to reduce the level of misunderstanding among the military, which arises from their religious differences and ethnic bias. Sensitization awareness among members of the military will put away differences. It will also make the military more professional in their roles in combating terrorism in the homeland.
- iii. Enforcement of terrorist Laws and Acts: the government should be able to use its legislative power to enforce terrorist laws and acts as stated in the constitutions within its jurisdiction. Some of the challenges the military face is governments' inability to enforcement terrorist laws. Terrorist that has been arrested arte released, sometimes discharged and acquitted without them facing the penalties set for participating in terrorism. This alone causes lack of motivation among the Nigerian military.
- iv. Community policing: a joint assistance of every citizen of Nigeria- civilian, local authority and military is required. Intelligence gathering should not be left for police alone. The military shouldn't just be trained to do warfare but also to work with local authorities and civilians with respect to intelligence gathering. A police led intelligencing should incorporate both military and community aid, because these terrorists have a place from which they stay to strategize, they do not live in space, they live in houses in one community or the other. It would be surprising to discover the amount of intelligence they can gather from civilians and communities where terrorist operates.
- v. Even distribution of development: this goes to the government. The military believe in even distribution of wealth, resources and development. If this is done, every region will be content. One method to encourage even wealth distribution is the method of regional government. Where each region in the six geo-political zones of Nigeria controls its resources and develops the region. With confederalism there will be no central government to wield so much power, and therefore, no basis for the display of religious and ethnic bias in the distribution of wealth and allocation of resources.
- vi. Commitment on the part of the government: the government has the overall part to play in domestic terrorism in Nigeria. As the government of the people- civilians and military and everybody. Over the year the Nigerian government from the federal to the local government has shown insensitivity and inaction to fulfill their promises. It is this gross insensitivity and lack of commitment by the ruling class in the presence of poverty and corruption that has led to violence. The youths are marginalized,

their homes desecrated, their resources taken right of their hands. Government showing commitment to the needs of the people, especially the youth is the first step in the right direction to the problem of domestic terrorism.

On a final note, government can equally curtail the menace of the militants generally by engaging non-serving security expert's especially military and paramilitary officers in the area of security and intelligence. These ex-officers who have various security expertise and experience arising from their previous trainings and exposure while in service and are in better positions to educate and re-orient members of their community on the negative impact of terrorism on our collective existence and national development.

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