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The Influence of Distribution of County Revenue Allocation from Central Government to Sub Counties, on Inter-Clan Conflict in Mandera County, Kenya

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Abstract:

Mandera County has been a hotbed of the recurrent inter-clan conflict between Garre, Degodia and Muralle communities that erupts from time to time. Ethnic conflicts in the region have been associated with the disposal of scarce resources and the people's nomadic tendencies. Mandera is characterized by long spell of droughts which make the residents encroach rival clans' community land, in search of water points and pastures for their starving herds, inadvertently sparking ethnic conflicts. That has hampered the County's economic progress as investors and professionals have shied away from investing and working in the area due to the rampant insecurity and hostility. The objective of the study was to examine the distribution of County revenue allocation from central government to Sub-counties and its contribution to the inter-clan conflict in Mandera County, Kenya. The study was guided by Hommer Dixion theory on conflict and the Marxist Theory that purports that most conflicts in the world are either triggered by quest for control over limited resources or as a result of oppression of the vulnerable group by a powerful minority. This study found out that enormous County revenue allocation from central government is a contributing factor to the recurrence of inter-clan conflict as rival clan competes for political representation so as to control the County resources. This was in line with the research question which sought to establish whether enormous resources flowing to the County from the central government contribute to recurrence of inter-clan conflict in the wake of devolution. In order to achieve its objective; a mixed methodology approach that incorporated exploratory and descriptive research design was adopted; as it not only provided the researcher with a greater breadth of perspectives around county revenue allocation but also enhanced reliability of the research instruments and procedures. The data was collected using questionnaires and FGDs. The data was analyzed quantitatively using SPSS. The result established that disparities in distribution of county revenue allocation in Mandera County is a contributing factor to the inter-clan conflict as clans strive for political dominance and relevancy. Over time this feeling of insecurity has bred mistrust among rival clans escalating conflicts to modern times. To alleviate interclan conflict brought about by disparities in county revenue allocation this study recommends that Mandera County leadership should ensure that there is transparency, equity and accountability in the manner in which resources are distributed among all regions in the County. It should depart from clan based politics to agenda based politics grounded on inclusivity of all clans.

Keywords: Examine, allocation, county revenue, central government, Mandera County, Kenya

1. Introduction

Internal conflict is not a new phenomenon in the world as it has been there since time in memorial. According to Brown et. Al., (2016) world is awash of conflict triggered by ethnic or religious identities that have characterized contemporary politics there by weakening and polarizing the stability of most countries. Most recently is Ukrainian ethnic conflict that resulted to violent antagonism between ethnic and pro-Russian Ukrainians fighting for power and regional integration. The ethnic Ukrainians were against Russian involvement in their political and economic affairs while Pro-Russian Ukrainians support their agenda.

In the year 2004 Yanukovich expressed his desires to cut trade ties with Europe in favor of closer economic ties with Russia triggering mass revolts that ousted him. And since then there has been upsurge in violence, as negotiation and mediation efforts have been thwarted by ethnic retribution (Sorenson, 2007). Empirical evidence suggests that these ethnic conflicts are much prevalent in developing countries with weak judicial systems and have rampant cases of corruption, nepotism, racism and propaganda based politics that oppresses minority ethnic group while alleviating the latter one; that is in power.

As, it was evident in Sri Lanka, where Tamil of Eleam engaged the Sinhalese political class that had denied them of their nationality status, despite the fact that they had lived in Sri Lanka since time in memorial (Yass, 2014). They were infuriated by the fact that they were regarded as mere second class citizens who had no nationality and were ostracized in all forms of development. In frustrations, they began to revolt and formed a rebel group in 1976 that violently engaged the Sri Lankan government until it was defeated in 2009 (Devotta, 2009; Mushtaq, 2012). It is crystal clear that the Tamils were fighting for their fundamental right that had been infringed by the ruling Sinhalese regime that took power after the British colonial forces exited their country upon attainment of independence in 1948. The research deduces that these conflicts could have been prevented if only there was democracy in the country. The government of Sri Lanka could have sat down with representatives of Tamil and charted the way forward. However, in lieu of that it used its powers to oppress them (Mushtaq, 2012). According to Yass (2014) this is one of the reason why ethnic conflicts are more prevalent in developing economies as opposed to developed and welfare states; as they have advanced democratic systems of government; that are deeply entrenched in their national values (Yass, 2014).

Ethnic conflicts in the world have increasingly grown in complexity due to cultural and religious transformation that has given rise to groups that purports to be better than latter based on societal norms. In Syria there has been an ethnic strife among the Sunni and Shia Muslim adherents. Their rivalry has been on religious line where the Sunnis believe that Islam leadership should be bestowed upon that person who have leadership attributes contrary to Shias who believe that leadership should stay within the family of Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him.

This religious schism has led to brutal violence among most countries in the Middle East with the two religious groups. The most profound conflict in history is the Syrian and Iraq ethnic conflict that has periodically erupted to full blown civil war that has ravaged these nations to the core. Contemporary Shia-Sunni conflict has worsened diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia inhabited by majority Sunni and Iran which is dominated by Shia. This has been witnessed when Iran has constantly supported the Shia rebels in Yemen who have been fighting Saudi Arabia forces that had embarked on a mission to weed-out Houthi fighters.

Sunni-Shia sectarianism in the Middle-east has evolved over time and has now gone beyond ancient religious tensions as it is fuelled by individualism and greed for power. After toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 by United States led invasion, it saw countries like Iran Shias try to exploit the historical schism by supporting Shia militias in Iraq advancing their interests and abhorring all Sunni political ideologies being instilled by Saudi Arabia. This manifests a paradigm shift in the determinant of Shia-Sunni ethnic conflict, as it had now become political contests as opposed to a religious contest. Shia sectarianism in Syria for instance, has seen a civil strife against an authoritarian government turn into a Sunni-Shia conflict.

The Syrian government allied to Shia states like Iran has led in an armed strife against Sunni radicals armed and financed by Sunni states of the Middle East. Iran have always condemned the Syrian war and term it as a genocide against Shia and called for foreign Shia fighters from Iraq and Lebanon to join in the battle to alleviate the plights of their fellow Shias under extreme violence from Sunni radicals (Cockburn, 2015). This sectarianism is deeply entrenched in all levels of the society escalating social tensions and mistrusts. Similar ongoing ethnic conflicts involve Kurds and Turks (Aslan, 2014).

Majority of Kurds at 48% of Kurds population, live in Turkey that is dominated by the Turks. Turks are ethnic Turkik group that originally migrated from Altay Mountains in Mongolia and arrived in the Middle East in the 7th century as servants. On the other hand, Kurds are Iranic ethnic group that headed East towards the Middle East. However, over the years the Kurdish culture has been eroded due to governments ban on the use of Kurdish language in schools and lack of goodwill to support the Kurdish culture. As results the Kurds have increased their civil strive to liberate their people against oppressive Arabs and Persians regimes (Heshmati, Dilani, & Baban, 2014).

The most prominent Kudish contest begun in 1978 and is still ongoing because their fundamental human rights have not been addressed fully (Balci, 2012). They seek to secede from Turkey and form Kurdistan state that shall be deeply entrenched into the Kurds culture and traditions or simply have autonomy to practice their culture in Turkey without intimidation by the Turks government (Bilgin & Sarihan, 2013). The Kurds aggression has negatively affected the state of security in the nation affecting key sectors of the economy like tourism and ballooning military expenditure budget in the tune of 300 million US dollars (Servet, 2008). These conflicts have been ongoing due to lack of goodwill among governments who resort to the use of force to flash warring elements instead of manifesting their commitment in ending these civil strives through round-table dialogues.

The most recent flare-ups of ethnic cleansing involved Rohingya Muslims, an ethnic minority group in 2017 where they underwent persecutions by the dominant Buddhist ethnic community in the Republic of Myanmar. According to United Nation (2017) an estimated 625, 000 refugees crossed over to Bangladesh from Rakhine, since 25th August, 2017 to 2nd November, 2017. The Rohingya people are described by United Nations (2017) as the most persecuted people in the modern history.

Apart from being persecuted they have constantly been denied citizenship under the 1982 Myanmar nationality as they are termed as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh; as such they have faced brutal military crackdowns and massacre (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2018). Rohingya conflict is grounded on religious intolerance by ruling Buddhist nationals who treat them like second-class citizens and subject them to executions, brutality, torture and illegal detentions (Reuters in Yangon, 2018)

The Myanmar military aggression in the province of Rakhine led to a mass exodus of Rohingya ethnic group to Bangladesh for fear of being brutally executed. Rohigya Muslim alleges that they were descendants of Arab merchants. However, their allegations are refuted by the ruling Buddhist nationals who term them as illegal immigrants who

encroached on their land (McPherson, 2017). The government of Burma over the years has enforced discriminatory policies aimed at compelling the Rohingya Muslims to flee their homes. This is coupled with renewed ethnic cleansing by Buddhist nationals who often attack them; mostly because they are a minority Muslim community (Albert, 2018). Another religious fuelled ethnic conflict broke in 1971 after a section of Muslim community in Philippine island of Mindanao who sought autonomy over Island of Mindanao and Sulu. The secession strife has been perpetrated by Moro National Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the more radical sect of Abu Sayyat. The extremist group alleges that they are indigenous people of these island and it was encroached by foreign immigrants. In response to that, they formed liberation movements to liberate themselves against the Philippine rule. The various peace talks to give autonomy to the Moro people has hit rock bottom as the government fears giving autonomy to a radical secessionist ethnic group that has sequence of in-fights among themselves due to conflicting interests. Moro people secession strife is still underway as contentious issues have not been solved.

Similar to Moro people session strife is the Xinjiang ethnic conflict in Northwest China that has long history of discord between indigenous people of Uighur and China administrative authorities (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2014). Xinjiang autonomous region borders eight countries that include Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Pakistan and India. The inhabitants of Xingjian region are Uighurs Sunni Muslims who have made several secession attempts due to nepotism, cultural and religious repressions perpetuated by China regime that favors Han Chinese over Xinjiang indigenous Uighur people. The Uighurs who constitutes more than 46% of Xinjiang population has a long history of marginalization by China. They allege that China has constantly ostracized them economically and culturally. In July, 2014 Xinjiang government banned Muslim civil servants from fasting during the Holy month of Ramadhan.

Similar China oppression was evident in 2009 when wide-spread ethnic intolerance commenced in Urumqi region where a total of 200 people died. The ethnic unrest was waged by Uighurs against Han Chinese who they blamed of unduly getting more socio-economic privileges than them. The ethnic tensions were perpetuated by Uighurs separatists who have constantly claimed that Xinjiang is not part of China and was illegally incorporated in People's Republic of China in 1949. The Uighurs ethnic resentment has simmered in the surface for a long period of time as the underlying causes of the conflict remained unaddressed by relevant stakeholders.

Uighurs social and religious repressions have caused them to revolt China rule as they view them as non-indigenous immigrants encroaching on their ancestral land. In June, 2012 Uighur separatists hijacked a plane a deliberate attempt to express their Uighurs collective discord with China illegal occupation in Xinjiang province; which is culturally and religiously distinct from China which is officially Buddhist. Similarly in April and June 2013 Uighurs secessionists armed with crude weapons such as knives and machetes attacked government officials in Shanshan County. In the light of the above conflict, we can conclude that as long as underlying causes of any conflict are not addressed, conflict occurrence is imminent. The use of force against ethnic groups; whose fundamental rights have been trampled on by the ruling elite, is like rubbing pepper in an infected wound expecting to get relief, as they become hardened and revolt more aggressively.

Another sectarian violence spate was in the Island of Borneo in Indonesia where indigenous Dayak community waged war against immigrants from the Island of Madura. The Dayak-Mudarese ethnic conflict begun in 1960s after the Indonesian government launched a transmigration program that led to influx of more than 100,000 Mudarese to the Island of Borneo. A move that was not taken kindly by indigenous communities of Borneo who felt that their ancestral heritage was under threat of depletion from Mudarese immigrants (Klinken, 2007; Corson, 2016). The Dayak renders a nomadic and conservative lifestyle as opposed to Mudarese who are traders and receptive to change brought about by modernity. The Dayaks alleged that Mudarese immigrants took away their jobs in local mines. Their conflict simmers on the surface like magma due to cultural and religious diversity.

Dayaks are mostly Christians as opposed to Mudarese who like most Indonesians are Muslims (Mailto & Chang, 2018). Dayak militias have been engaged in anti-transmigrants cleansing. Dayak ethnic fascism has escalated over years as there is reduced goodwill among government organs to resolve the ethnic spate for once and for all as it is the case with most recurrent ethnic conflicts in the world. This is a worrying trend that should be revisited as lives and property are being lost yet little is done to alleviate this malady. It is on these grounds that this research is based on, which is to endeavor to understand the underlying causes of ethnic conflict and coming up with sustainable conflict resolution framework.

It is without a doubt, that ethnic conflicts are detrimental to the economic and social development of any community or country, and should thus be prevented, managed and handled long before they break and spread. Devotta (2009) noted that peace is a prerequisite, should there be any meaningful development and thus all stakeholders in peace process should be involved. This and other ethnic conflicts in the world are largely motivated by greed and power. In all these contexts conflicts have resulted to loss of property, lives and trade, displacement of people and poverty.

2. Methodology

2.1. Research Design

The research adopted a mixed methodology approach that incorporated exploratory and descriptive research design. This aimed at providing an in-depth, contextualized qualitative and quantitative result with more predictive power than a single research method. This method was appropriate, as it provided the researcher with greater breadth of understanding while offsetting the weakness inherent in using one type of approach.

2.2. Location of the Study

The research was undertaken Mander County, Kenya. Mander County is located in North-Eastern Kenya and borders Ethiopia to the North, Somalia Republic to the East and Wajir County to the South. It is about 1,100km from Nairobi. Mander county is positioned at Latitude: 3° 25' 0.01" N and Longitude: 40° 40' 0.12" E. The county is occupied by four main communities namely, Garre, Degodia, Muralle and Corner tribes.

2.3. Target Population

Target population for the study constituted of 1,025,756 people drawn from communities living in Mander County (KNBS, 2009). The target population consisted of individual households; that include women and youths, County administrators, chiefs and clan leaders drawn from Garre, Degodia, Muralle and Corner tribe communities who are natives of the aforementioned County. The target population was as illustrated in table 1 below.

Sub-Counties	Population
Lafey	109,856
Mander North	169,675
Mander South	247,619
Mander East	178,831
Mander West	161,701
Bannisa	158,074
Total	1,025,756

Table 1: Target Population

Source: (IEBCS, 2017)

2.4. Sampling Technique

The research therefore inclined to the use of a stratified sampling design that involves dividing a population into homogenous strata and selecting a simple random sample from each stratum (Cochran, 1963; Creswell, 2011). In that spirit the researcher divided the entire study population into different strata namely Lafey, Mander North, South, East, West and Bannisa Sub-Counties; then used simple random to select the final subjects proportionally from the different strata.

Item	Value
Confidence Level	95%
Confidence Interval:	5%
Population Proportion:	50%
Population Size:	1,025,756

Table 1: Table for Online Calculation of Sample Population

Source: <https://www.calculator.net/sample-size-calculator.html>

Type=1&Cl=95&Ci=5&Pp=50&P S=1025756&X=118&Y=16 (Accessed 18th March, 2017, 1605hrs)

From the online formula for sample size determination where the population is greater than 500,000, 385 or more samples is required. Furthermore, for a large population, the formula shown below is applicable in determinant sample size:

Where:-

- z the z score
- ϵ is the margin of error
- N is population size
- \hat{p} is the population proportion

$$n = \frac{z^2 \times \hat{p}(1-\hat{p})}{\epsilon^2}$$

$$n = \frac{1.96^2 \times 0.5(1-0.5)}{0.05^2} = 384.16$$

The above formula gives 384 as the sample population. The same sample population is also derived from Krejcie and Morgan (1970) as shown below:

N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S
10	10	100	80	280	162	800	260	2800	338
15	14	110	86	290	165	850	265	3000	341
20	19	120	92	300	169	900	269	3500	346
25	24	130	97	320	175	950	274	4000	351
30	28	140	103	340	181	1000	278	4500	354
35	32	150	108	360	186	1100	285	5000	357
40	36	160	113	380	191	1200	291	6000	361
45	40	170	118	400	196	1300	297	7000	364
50	44	180	123	420	201	1400	302	8000	367
55	48	190	127	440	205	1500	306	9000	368
60	52	200	132	460	210	1600	310	10000	370
65	56	210	136	480	214	1700	313	15000	375
70	59	220	140	500	217	1800	317	20000	377
75	63	230	144	550	226	1900	320	30000	379
80	66	240	148	600	234	2000	322	40000	380
85	70	250	152	650	242	2200	327	50000	381
90	73	260	155	700	248	2400	331	75000	382
95	76	270	159	750	254	2600	335	100000	384

Table 2: Table For Determining Samples from Known Population
Source: (Krejcie And Morgan, 1970)

$$\frac{\text{Stratum Population}}{\text{Total Population}} \times \text{Sample (n)}$$

Mandera Sub-Counties	Population (N ^h)	Stratum Weight (N ^h /N)	Sample (n ^h)
Lafey	109,856	0.107097594	41
Mandera North	169,675	0.165414582	64
Mandera South	247,619	0.241401464	93
Mandera East	178,831	0.174340681	67
Mandera West	161,701	0.157640803	61
Bannisa	158,074	0.154104875	59
Total	1,025,756	1.00000000	384

Table 3: Sample Size
Source: (Modified IEBCS Data, 2017)

Data was collected by the use of questionnaires and focused group discussions. Data was analyzed by the use Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS). Data was presented through graphs, charts and inferential statistics. Pearson correlation and multiple regression were also used to establish the relationships that existed among independent and dependent variables. The two statistical measures were appropriate since they complemented each other in that Pearson correlation described the relationship between independent variables and dependent variable.

2.5. Validity and Reliability Analysis

In order to ensure validity and reliability of research instruments, the researcher began by carrying out a pilot test to ascertain if the questionnaires answered the questions that they sought to answer. The researcher also used Cronbach's Alpha approach to measure internal consistencies of the questionnaires used to collect data. This method according to Creswell (2009) assists the researcher to establish how well the research instruments measure what they are supposed to measure. Cronbach's Alpha sought to establish if multiple questions on Likert scale were reliable. Normally, Cronbach's Alpha coefficient of more than 0.7 is acceptable while that lower than 0.7 is unacceptable. The Cronbach reliability was derived using SPSS, and it was established that the Cronbach Alpha score for all items in the Likert scale were above 0.7. This indicated that the research instruments were adequately reliable for the measurement.

2.6. Data Collection Procedure

The researcher, begun the process of data collection by first seeking permission to carry out research from the Department of Social Sciences, Kisii University. The researcher also sought National Commission of Science and Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) research permit to carry out the research in Mandera County, as well as permission from Mandera County Director of Education. An introduction letter was administered to each respondent to seek his or her consent to participate in the research. This was followed by administration of questionnaires to all research participants, whereas FGDs were carried out in Rhamu Youth Polytechnic hall. The questionnaires were administered within two weeks after which they were collected by the researcher for analysis. The FGDs was carried out in Somalia dialect, as that was the language the participants were comfortable with, the session was audio recorded, translated and stored for further analysis.

2.7. Data Analysis

The collected data was screened for accuracy, consistency, completeness, coded and then tabulated using frequency tables. The researcher later analyzed the extracted data using (SPSS) Statistical Package for Social Science to deduce graphs,

charts and inferential statistics. Pearson correlation and multiple regressions were also used to establish the relationships that existed among independent and dependent variables. The two statistical measures were appropriate since they complemented each other in that Pearson correlation described the relationship between independent variables and dependent variable. It measured the nature of relationship therein to establish if variables were either positively, negatively or not correlated. The Pearson correlation coefficients indicated the extent to which variables correlated with each other. On the other hand, multiple regressions measured the magnitude of relationship between dependent and independent variables.

3. Distribution of County Revenue from Central Government

Most of conflicts in the world are resource based and arises as a result of inequality in resource distribution as those in authority tend to discriminate some group due to political, social and economic ideologies. This sparks rebellion as those whose livelihood has been threatened fight for their fundamental rights. Existing literature is full of conflicts of this nature, the most profound being in South Sudan where different ethnic groups have been fighting for power so as to control resources at their disposal ((Abura & Goldsmith, 2002; Malith, 2016).

The Nuer and Dinka conflict has been termed as the worst ongoing ethnic strife that has resulted to massive loss of lives and property. It is an ethnic conflict that had escalated to a civil strife, destabilizing peace and harmony in Sudan. Greed for power has been an underlying cause of this ethnic conflict as it results to skewed distribution of resources, therefore escalating the inter-ethnic conflict further (Blanchard, 2013; Malith, 2017). Similarly, Ethiopia has experienced inter-ethnic conflicts between Oromo and Tigray ethnic communities; where Oromo alleged that they had been socially and economically marginalized by the ruling elite comprising of Tigray. This resulted to an intense inter-ethnic conflict that led to destruction of Tigray community properties in Oromo stronghold. These intense confrontations forced the former Ethiopian Prime-minister to resign and the subsequent election of an Oromo prime minister, Abiy Ahmed (Alemayehu, 2013; Aljazeera, 2018). Similar resource based conflict was witnessed in Niger Delta, where communities that previously existed harmoniously with each other, rose against each other in agitation of oil resource (Folami, 2017).

The quest for a fair formula of sharing resources at the disposal of communities remains one of the most contested issues. This is mostly the case, due to governance failures. Sarcastically, the formula to share resources is well articulated in the constitution of most states; however, due to reduced goodwill among leaders is not enforced, causing rebellion among those denied fundamental rights. According to Matura (2017) revenue allocation should be aimed at enhancing equitable distribution of resources, addressing national interests, geographical and population attributes. The Commission of Revenue Allocation is the one that is mandated by the constitution to formulate a formula of revenue allocation based on various factors that are reviewed from one financial period to another. All aimed at enhancing regional development of Counties based on their history of marginalization. Empirical evidence suggests that most ethnic conflicts arises due to perceived injustices in distribution of state resources to various regions and such the Commission of Revenue Allocation is established to alleviate resource distribution injustices (Nguru, 2012).

The core function of Commission of Revenue Allocation in Kenya is to make recommendations on equitable sharing of revenues raised by federal government among various Counties and national government. The commission is also mandated to make recommendations with regard to financing and financial management of Counties expenditures as determined by law. The key principles governing the revenue allocation formula is articulated in Article 203 (1): where revenue allocation formula shall be based on national interests with respect to national debt financing needs, needs of national government, needs of County governments, fiscal capability of County governments and Counties developmental needs (Constitution of Kenya, 2010). The County revenue allocation formula shall also be based: on the salient needs for alleviating economic disparities among Counties, needs to provide incentives to Counties to enhance their economic potentials, emergencies needs and desire to enhance stable revenue allocations. The County's share raised shall be transferred to respective Counties with no alterations. Pursuant to Articles 203 (2) further outlines the equitable amount that shall go to Counties from the national coffers, which should not be less than 15% of the total revenue collected. However, there have been attempts to raise this fund to 40%. In addition to its core functions the commission makes recommendations for consideration by Parliament prior to formulation of any Bill relating to Equalization fund is enacted. The Commission submits all its proposals with regard to equitable distribution of revenue between the various counties (Constitution of Kenya, 2010; Kenya Law Reform Commission, 2013). Similar definition was floated by Ngozi et. al (2015) who reckoned that the chief role of Commission of Revenue Allocation is to provide a mechanism for equalizing mismatch between revenue expenditures and revenue sources; aimed at minimizing intergovernmental conflicts.

As discussed earlier devolution primary role was to ensure resources were brought nearer to the people; who through their regional leaders exercises the power bestowed on them in developing their respective regions (Lumumba, 2011). Mandera County according to Commission of Revenue Allocation (2011) was among the top counties after Turkana and Nairobi to be allocated high amount of county revenue aimed at putting it at par with rest of the counties as it had been marginalized by previous regimes. The research hypothesized that, this enormous resources is likely to be a contributing factor to the recurrence in inter-clan conflict as clans contest for control over those resources. In the past, access to water points and pastures were the driving forces to Mandera inter-clan conflict. However, this has changed over time as clan interests have shifted to county resources and each clan contest to out-win each other so as to have autonomy over them.

4. Results

The objective of the study was to examine the extent of distribution of County revenue allocation from central government to Sub-counties contribute to the inter-clan conflict in Mandera County, Kenya.

	Frequency	Percent
Very Satisfied	12	3.1
Satisfied	81	21.1
Okey	44	11.5
Dissatisfied	193	50.3
Very Dissatisfied	54	14.1
Total	384	100.0

Table 4: Level of Satisfaction with the Manner Which Resource Are Distributed
Source: Field Data, 2017




Figure 1: Level of Satisfaction with the Manner Which Resource Are Distributed
Source: Field Data, 2017

64% (constituting of 193 and 54 respondents); as illustrated in figure 1, were dissatisfied with the manner in which Mandera County resources are allocated and managed by their leaders. This inference perhaps suggests that there are governance challenges that ought to be addressed should there be meaningful progress in the region. This was further strengthened by the verbatim 1; where participants expressed their outcry with regard to the current leadership.

"In Mandera County we should have elected selfless and experienced leaders with the interests of all communities at heart. The entrant of young inexperienced County leaders could be blamed for the current County state of affairs. Perhaps, we should have leaders with more than twenty years in public service; who are well versed with state of affairs of their people."

Verbatim Box 1 : Response on level of Satisfaction on Level of Transparency

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Very Satisfied	5	1.3
Satisfied	39	10.2
Okey	26	6.8
Dissatisfied	227	59.1
Very Dissatisfied	87	22.7
Total	384	100.0

Table 5: Satisfaction with Level of Transparency Exhibited by the County Leadership
Source: Field Data, 2017




Figure 2: Satisfaction with Level of Transparency Exhibited by the County Leadership
Source: Field Data, 2017

On transparency level question, 82% (constituting of 227 and 87 respondents); as illustrated in figure 2, were dissatisfied with the level of transparency exhibited by the County leadership. An indicator that County affairs are sloppy and that could be a contributor to inter-clan conflict as the disadvantaged section of the community strive for transparency in the manner in which resources are allocated and distributed among diverse clans living in the region. Without a doubt, this is a worrying trend as it is in contravention with what is articulated in the new constitution promulgated in 2010.

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Very Satisfied	5	1.3
Satisfied	34	8.9
Okey	49	12.8
Dissatisfied	226	58.9
Very Dissatisfied	70	18.2
Total	384	100.0

Table 6: Satisfaction with Level of Accountability Demonstrated by Leaders
Source: Field Data, 2017

Accountability Level was also investigated. The inference drawn from table 7 indicates that over two thirds, constituting of 77% (296 respondents) were equally dissatisfied with Mandera County leadership level of accountability. This inference reinforces what was expressed by participants in verbatim 2; where it is apparent that there were incidences of misappropriations of County funds.

“Am quite dumbfounded by the extravagance tendencies of the County government; as it is exactly five years since devolution was adopted in 2013 but we have nothing to smile about; since lots of cash has gone to the pocket of a few at the expense of the majority. As a tax payer who duly comply with Kenya Revenue Authority laws am flattered by how my money is being put to use. Not once has the Office of the Auditor General questioned the financial sanctity and prudence of the County. We should be seeing major infrastructural development in all corners of the County; however, we are always prompted with heart breaking allegations of massive looting of public funds by our leaders, nepotism and corruption. This implies that resource allocation among the 6 sub-counties is skewed.”

Verbatim Box 2: Response on Level of Satisfaction on Accountability Levels

The above snippet of the verbatim 2 clearly indicates a very heart-breaking account of the realities of devolution in grassroots. This could possibly trigger inter-clan conflict if not checked. As the victims constitute the minority clans who are often side-lined in governance matters.

	Frequency	Percent
Very Satisfied	11	2.9
Satisfied	44	11.5
Okey	101	26.3
Dissatisfied	161	41.9
Very Dissatisfied	67	17.4
Total	384	100.0

Table 7: Satisfaction with the Level of County Policies Implementation
Source: Field Data, 2017




Figure 3: Satisfaction with the Level Of County Policies Implementation

Source: Field Data, 2017

On County policies Implementation, 59% of the respondents (constituting of 161 and 67) were dissatisfied with the level of County policies implementation. This implies that reduced implementation of County policies could negatively impact on public service delivery; thereby, causing dissatisfaction among County residents who may rise against each other. Correspondingly, 27% of the respondents felt that the County government is on track; as there are increasing levels of development in regions that they come from. Some of the development projects cited by the respondents include construction of dispensaries and upgrading some dirt roads to all-weather roads.

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Clan quest for electoral representation	313	81.5
Mode of governance	48	12.5
Inclusivity aspects of County leadership	23	6.0
Total	384	100.0

Table 8: Cause of Recurrence Interclan Conflict

Source: Field Data, 2017




Figure 4: Factors Contributing to Mandera Inter-Clan Conflict

Source: Field Data, 2017

According to the data illustrated in figure 4 it was apparent that clan quest for electoral representation contributes to inter-clan conflict in Mandera County as 82% (313 respondents) were in favour of it. Correspondingly, a considerable level of respondents at 13% (48 respondents) were of the opinion that mode of governance and level of inclusivity of communities living in Mandera could be the one contributing to the recurrence of inter-clan conflict in the wake of devolution. This deduction implies that inter-clan conflict is largely influenced by clan quest for electoral representation; that in most cases encourage nepotism and racism in allocation of County resources triggering clan rivalry. This does not occur in isolation as it is closely tied to Mandera County mode of governance and level of inclusivity of other clans.

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Very Satisfied	10	2.6
Satisfied	30	7.8
Okey	58	15.1
Dissatisfied	240	62.5
Very Dissatisfied	46	12.0
Total	384	100.0

Table 9: Level of Fairness in Distribution of Resources among Various Clans
Source: Field Data, 2017




Figure 5: Level of Fairness In Distribution of Resources among Various Clans
Source: Field Data, 2017

On fairness in resource Distribution According to figure 5; most of the respondents at 75% (286 respondents) expressed their dissatisfaction with the level of fairness in distribution of resources among all clans living in Mandera; as respondents were either dissatisfied or strongly dissatisfied. This skewedness in distribution of resources could be a contributing factor to perennial conflicts as rival clan fight for their perceived justice. This inference confirms this research hypothesis that the immense resources brought about by devolution was a likely contributor to Mandera inter-clan conflict that kept occurring from one period to another.

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Very Satisfied	17	4.4
Satisfied	40	10.4
Okey	84	21.9
Dissatisfied	169	44.0
Very Dissatisfied	74	19.3
Total	384	100.0

Table 10: Level of Satisfaction with County Leadership Development Agenda
Source: Field Data, 2017

On the issue of County leadership development Agenda, a trend is noticeable on the respondent responses with regard to Mandera County development agenda; where 63% of the respondents (243 respondents) expressed their dissatisfaction with the same. The result above is in contradiction with the mandate of the County government as enshrined in the Kenya constitution; which is to promote economic and social development of their communities at the grass-root level.

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Very Satisfied	19	4.9
Satisfied	37	9.6
Okey	127	33.1
Dissatisfied	158	41.1
Very Dissatisfied	43	11.2
Total	384	100.0

Table 11: Level of Satisfaction with County Leaders' Role in Conflict Prevention
Source: Field data, 2017

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Very Satisfied	15	3.9
Satisfied	28	7.3
Okey	117	30.5
Dissatisfied	190	49.5
Very Dissatisfied	34	8.9
Total	384	100.0

Table 12: Satisfaction with the Level of Economic Inclusivity of All Clans

Source: Field Data, 2017

Concerning inclusivity of all communities in Economic development, majority of the respondents at 59% (190 and 34 respondents) expressed their dissatisfaction with the level of economic inclusivity of all Mandera communities; with a considerable number of the respondents at 11% (43 respondents) being satisfied. This is probably an indicator that the County leadership has been gradually involving few communities on matters of economic development though at a lower level. These accounts are further reinforced by verbatim 3 where an FGD participant reckoned that the composition of Mandera leadership is detached from realities on the ground as most of them are busy advancing enriching themselves at the expense of the majority people hailing from the County. This is said to trigger conflict as the disadvantaged minority strive for inclusivity and sound governance.

"Mandera County residents want responsible leaders with the interests of their people at heart. They would like County leaders who are at the forefront of fostering unity in diversity. Unfortunately, we are not lucky to have such leaders, we want County leaders who are selfless and whose main agenda is improving the welfare of County constituents without fear or favour. Until that is achieved we shall be having on-and-off inter-clan conflicts as disadvantaged communities fight for their rights that might have been substantially infringed."

Verbatim Box 3: Response on inclusivity of all Communities in Development

These inferences suggests that Mandera County leadership is still struggling to execute their mandate as articulated in the constitution probably because they are pursuing personal or kinship agendas. The extant evidence indicates that a section of the constituents are not satisfied in the manner in which County affairs are carried-out. The County leadership should roll-up its sleeves to address the underlying issues facing their communities.

5. Discussion of Findings

The rationale of County revenue allocation from the central government is based on the level of poverty as opposed to the level of population or its geographical size. Prior to devolution it had been marginalized by previous ruling regime in terms of economic, social and political development making it to lag behind relative to other regions in the country; such as the rift-valley and central provinces. In an attempt to open up the County the central government increased its annual revenue allocation from one period to another; making it a great beneficiary of County funds after Turkana and Nairobi. The amount has since grown from 391 million in 2012/13 financial year to 10 billion in 2016/17. This enormous resources flowing to the County with a long history of clan chauvinists is likely to trigger inter-clan conflict in an attempt to control these resources

The inference revealed that enormous County revenue allocation from central government is a contributing factor to the recurrence of inter-clan conflict as rival clan competes for political representation so as to control the County resources. This was in line with the research question which sought to establish whether enormous resources flowing to the County from the central government contribute to recurrence of inter-clan conflict in the wake of devolution. This contradicts earlier claims by Abdi (2014) who purported that Mandera inter-clan conflict is largely caused by limited resources at their disposal; such as, pasture and access to water points. This is attributed to the fact that these previously underlying causes were addressed through sinking of boreholes and demarcation of boundaries. But unfortunately the conflict has persisted perhaps due to the dynamic nature of the causes of conflict that keep changing from one period to another.

Most of the respondents felt that the County government should prioritize on key areas; such as building of key infrastructures in schools, hospitals and enhancing security. Nonetheless, the greatest challenge has been on how to distribute these projects equitably in all the regions. As there has been overwhelming dissatisfaction arising from disparities in distribution of County jobs and other opportunities such as tenders. Clan dominance is to be blamed for the current state of affairs as the minority clans feels that their livelihoods are under constant threat. Those in political positions have been accused of favouring their own kinsmen at the expense of other communities living in Mandera County. As a result this has escalated the contest for control of County resources among all clans in an effort to overcome skewed distribution of resources by those in power. Aggrieved clan alleges that the dominant clan uses its number to be in power and allots most County positions to its kinsmen.

It is apparent that conflicts are imminent if minority clans are ostracised on political and economic matters; as they feel politically threatened. Greed for power, lack for transparency and accountability among those in leadership is the one to blame for the recurrence of inter-clan conflict in Mandera County. The empirical evidence presented therein indicates that the enormous resources from the central government to the County is a contributing factor to the inter-clan

conflict as they strive for political dominance and relevancy. Over time this feeling of insecurity has bred mistrust among rival clans escalating conflicts to modern times. These assertions strongly conclude that there is a significant relationship between the enormous county revenue allocation from the central government and Mandera inter-clan conflict.

6. Conclusion

Promulgation of the new constitution in 2010 meant that Mandera County would be the next economic frontier attracting investors far and wide. However, five years on devolution, it is still struggling to get there due to some fundamental issues that ought to be addressed. Those fundamental issues have been accelerated by the enormous resources flowing to a County deeply entrenched on clanship. As a result of that there has been skewed distribution of County resources among different regions. Most of the respondents attributed it to weak governance, nepotism and chronic corruption. These disparities often escalate to inter-clan conflicts as disgruntled clans seek for social, political and economic inclusivity. Based on the foregoing narrative it is possible to mitigate recurrence of inter-clan conflict especially by involving the clan elders in consultative meetings on social and political matters. Through those forums they are enlightened on importance of endorsing leaders with a regional and selfless appeal who shall execute their mandate without favouring anyone.

7. Recommendations

Since Mandera inter-clan conflict is a quest for control for immense resources brought about by devolution there should be sound regional policies on how resources should be distributed among the different sub-counties. The policies should be formulated upon a consensus forum with all stakeholders and after ensuring that there are no contentious issues left out of discussion. Inclusivity policies are likely to make residents to own them up and facilitate their implementation as opposed to policies imposed to them. Religious leaders should be at the fore front in encouraging their adherents to coexist peacefully as they are all one. They should encourage them to resolve their differences in more humane manner while refraining from acts that would trigger violence in their communities. In case their differences on distribution of resources escalate they can mediate and reconcile the warring groups to come to an amicable consensus. Religious leaders should always preach to their adherents the importance of upholding peace in their society. The immense resources flowing to the County would be of no use to the residents if there is no peace because it makes it unattractive to foreign investors from other Counties and countries; who may create opportunities to the locals. Devolutionary resources may result to development of key infrastructures; such as, roads, health and education among others; however, in absence of security is all in vain as no one is willing to harness opportunities therein.

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