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Victims of Terrorism in Nigeria: A Study of Boko Haram and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Thomas Imoudu Gomment

Senior Lecturer, Department of Sociology, Kogi State University, Anyigba, Nigeria

Abstract:

Despite government condemnation of terrorism and international concern for safety of lives and property, terrorism keeps raising its ugly face up across the globe. This paper examines the relationship between Boko Haram and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria. It is no longer news to insinuate that the activities of this deadly sect have forced millions of people to flee their homes for safety. Adopting the Frustration/Aggression theory as the theoretical framework, the paper basically utilized secondary data generated by scholars on the nexus between the terrorist activities of the sect and the plight of displaced individuals in Nigeria. The paper found religion, ethnicity, violation of human rights, corruption, poverty, unemployment, bad governance, unconstitutional and undemocratic practices as major causes of Boko Haram in Nigeria while the effects of their nefarious act include: loss of lives and property, radicalization of the younger generations, violation of human rights and above all, displacement of people. The paper recommended poverty alleviation programme, job creation, ethno-religious tolerance, adherence to the rule of law, respect for human rights to be collectively pursued by all stakeholders so as to prevent insurgency and the rate at which people flee their homes.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Internally Displaced Persons, Radicalization, Terrorism, Victims of Crime.

1. Introduction

Terrorism is one of the human issues that is frowned at and provokes hostile, unpalatable, and unpleasant reactions from the bulk of members of the society. At the level of religion, it is a sin; at the level of law, it is a crime; at the level of norms, it is deviance; at the level of society, it is a social problem; and at the level of interaction, it is anti-social. Apart from the terrorists themselves-a sub-cultural group, who take pleasure in violating the conduct norms of the society, no right thinking man will encourage terrorism. Terrorism is expressed in favour of proscriptive norms and against the prescriptive norms of the larger society.

Terrorism is one of the violent crimes that have assumed international status. According to Imhonopi and Urim (2012:143), "terrorism is extreme violence or threat of violence that could harm innocent people involving such acts as kidnapping, bombing (suicide bombing inclusive), assassination and plane hijack, carried out for political or other purposes/reasons". The American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had defined terrorism as an unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives (see Ugwuoke 2015:193). Similarly, the American National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice defines terrorism as "a tactic or technique by means of which a violent act or the threat thereof is used for the prime purpose of creating overwhelming fear for coercive purposes" (Siegel, in Igbo, 1999:115). Terrorist attacks in Nigeria and other parts of the world have claimed lives and property worth billions of dollars.

The origin of Boko Haram, otherwise known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lid da'awati Wal- Jihad (congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad), is not certain. Two likely assertions traced the sect back to 1995, when it was called sahaba which was led by one Abubakar Lawan, who later proceeded to University of Medina for studies, paving way for Yusuf's take over. The second source traced the sect to Maitatsine of the 1980s (Ahizih, 2014). There is a growing suspicion among Nigerians about the real identity and motive of Boko Haram sect. Most Muslims see it as an extension of *Maitatsine* sect which was established in 1945 to transport turmoil to Islam as it was confirmed that *Maitatsine* was not a Muslim until his death, while a reasonable number of Christians see it as an attempt to Islamize Nigerians (Shehu in Shuaibu, Salleh and Shehu 2015:254-255). In 2009, the activities of Boko Haram had transformed from a local peace militia into a violent group, after the government attacked the sect in some major cities of northern Nigeria, which led to five days violent clashes between the group members and the Nigerian forces which resulted in the killing of the sect leader, Muhammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, and more than 700 other people (Blanchard, cited by Shuaibu, Salleh and Shehu 2015:255). It is not any sense of flippancy to call Boko Haram a terrorist organization as amplified by different international non-state actors. For instance, Boko Haram has been listed as one of the most dreaded insurgents that commit human rights violation alongside *Al-Qaeda*, *Al-Shabab*, *Taliban* and *Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)* by Amnesty International (see Usman and Isiaka 2017:76). In another submission, Boko Haram and Ansaru were designated as Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) by the United State Security Department in November 2013. Subsequently, the

United Nations Committee on Al Qaeda sanction blacklisted the group on 22nd May, 2014 as one of the world terrorist organizations. The United Nation listing entry describes Boko Haram as an affiliate of Al-Qaeda and also one of the organizations of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Reuters in Shuaibu, Salleh and Shehu 2015:255). One of the major consequences of Boko Haram activities is the displacement of people who are wallowing in chronic hardships in Internally Displaced Persons' camps across the country. These set of people who are victims of Boko Haram terrorism, are bedeviled by several forms of problems as we shall see later in this piece.

2. Theoretical Framework

This paper is anchored on Frustration Aggression theory. The theory propounded by John Dollard, and reviewed by Berkowitz and Aubrey, seems to have a very sound explanatory relevance to the menace of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. According to the theory, when an individual or a group is deprived or blocked from attaining a particular goal, there is every tendency of becoming frustrated which could lead to aggression. Consequently, the aggression can be expressed in a criminal way in form of transfer of aggression (violence). Remarking from the frustration-aggression point of view, Akor and Audu (2016) explain that frustration causes aggression but when the source of the frustration cannot be challenged, the aggression gets displaced onto an innocent target. According to Ugwuoke (2015), the activities of the restive members of the Islamist sect can be explained as the outpouring of accumulated frustration and grievances motivated by unemployment, poverty and illiteracy. As we are going to see in subsequent sections, the causes of Boko Haram which can be considered as the source of frustration that can lead to aggression include: unemployment, poverty, inequity, economic disparity, bad governance, ethno-religious sentiments, lack of respect for human rights, due process and rule of law, among others. Apart from government, Boko Haram have attacked civilians, churches, mosques, hotels, schools, and even IDPs camps as a way of ventilating their aggression occasioned by various frustrations encountered in the social environment.

3. Methodology

The paper, as a theoretical study, made use of secondary source of data collection. Relevant data were extracted from reports, textbooks, academic journals, magazines, and from other secondary sources such as the internet and library. The data collected were content analysed.

4. Costs of Boko Haram

This section is an attempt at explaining the pains of Boko Haram activities to Nigeria and Nigerians. There are so many consequences of the insurgent conduct of the sect, but for the purpose of this piece, we shall concentrate on the few out of many that quickly come to mind. These include: destruction or loss of lives and property, radicalization of younger generation, violation of human rights, and specifically, displacement of people. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, 2019), although the Nigerian military has regained control in parts of the country's north-east, civilians in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger continue to be affected by grave violations of human rights, gender-based violence, forced recruitment and suicide bombing. The Boko Haram insurgency has displaced nearly 2.4 million people in the Lake Chad Basin. A detailed discussion of the costs of Boko Haram terrorist act is presented below.

5. Loss of Lives and Property

To say that since inception of Boko Haram in Nigeria, a lot of lives and property have been lost is not an exaggeration. The sect has claimed responsibility for numerous deadly attacks on police formations, communities, churches, banks, markets, military, media, United Nation Building in Abuja, and beer palours. Car Bombs have been a relatively recent addition in their operational strategy. Two Nyanya motor park bombs in Abuja and Kano motor park bomb late 2013 are still fresh in our memories (Ahizih, 2014). There are cases of abduction of Chibok and Dapchi girls from schools. Some of the girls are still missing in the hands of Boko Haram insurgents. The postponement of the 2015 general elections from February 14 and 28 to March 28 and April 11 on the ground of insecurity in the North Eastern Nigeria shows the gravity of the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The shift in the general elections has attracted heated controversies from members of the opposition political parties, Civil Society Organisations and International Organisations and community. Recently, Ukwu (2019) reported that the Borno State governor, Babagana Zulum, said the insurgents were now using drones to monitor military operations. This, according to him, shows that the sect possesses higher technological warfare and expertise than the joint military taskforce.

Abuh (2015) found that the rising insecurity in Northern Nigeria creates threat to economic and political stability. The spate of violence in the region which has, recently, come under attack by the members of Boko Haram Islamists group, has worsened inspite of the opportunities offered by the return to democracy.

6. Radicalisation of Younger Generations

It is no longer news to say that Boko Haram makes use of youths and children to carry out their nefarious and ungodly activities. The set of people they draw their major recruits from are *Almajirai*-child beggars that roam the streets of major cities in the northern part of Nigeria. These *Almajirai*, are one of the most vulnerable set of people in Nigeria; they suffer from parental neglect, poverty, abuse, hostility, lack of shelter and can be indoctrinated by the wicked sets of people in Nigeria, to say the least. Within the assumption of this background, they are susceptible to social vices and trafficking. The relationship between the *Almajirai* and Boko Haram is not farfetched as demonstrated by Nigerians. The belief of most

Nigerians is that Boko Haram is an Islamic terrorist group who proclaimed that Western education is a sin. This background is justified by the fact that the *Almajirai* do not attend formal school.

Accordingly, Shehu (2012) observed there is basically nothing new in saying Boko is Haram. The perception that Boko is Haram has been with us since Boko (western education) came to the north through Christian missionaries. Northern Muslims then and some even now, feared the Christianization of their children if they enrolled them in Boko schools, hence the predominance of *Almajiri* schools. The products of these schools have often preached that Boko is Haram and, in spite of this, decade after decade; the northern elites have allowed this system to flourish.

Onochie (2011) found that *Almajirai* and Boko Haram are now like primary pupils graduating into secondary school. The two are inseparable and Boko Haram cannot exist without *Almajirai*. If there is any difference between *Almajirai* and Boko Haram, it should be a matter of semantics. Thurston (2013) found that the violent northern Nigerian sect, Boko Haram, draws some of its recruits from *Almajirai*. Other scholars note that the *Almajiri* system in the northern part of Nigeria made the intensive membership mobilization of Boko Haram easy (Christian, Ibrahim, Chima & Sussan, 2014).

Linking *Almajirai* to Boko Haram should worry every well-meaning Nigerians because this Islamic sect has been adjudged the latest and deadliest of its kind as observed by Odoma (2014), who equally acknowledged that the activities of the sect have greatly affected the economy of northern Nigeria.

Onwumere (2013) found that those who are not from the north are worried that while the *Almajirai* wander the streets in search of support from people, they pose a threat to national security as they could be vulnerable to the indoctrinations of the Boko Haram terrorist group. This shows a strong nexus between *Almajirai* and Boko Haram.

Asuelimu (2015) observed that the problem with the current Boko Haram menace is unarguably traceable to the uncared for *Almajirai* beggars who lost parental and governmental welfare and have become the recruitment grounds for rebels in northern Nigeria and now spreading to Nigeria's northern neighbours in Niger republic, Cameroun and Chad, which initially felt unconcerned about Boko Haram menace until their territories were invaded and used as launching pads to attack Nigerian territories.

To establish the above assertions, the Northern Traditional Rulers' Council (NTRC) recommended that the only solution to the festering wounds inflicted on the North and its people by the activities of the dreaded Boko Haram sect is to ban the current *Almajiri* system. The council also recommended that begging should be made an offence, as part of measures aimed at securing the northern region from what it termed "sustainable socio-economic developments" just as it called on the federal government to apprehend, prosecute and punish those behind what it described heinous crime (Folaranmi, 2011).

7. Violation of Human Rights

Human rights, going by the views of social contract philosophers-Hobbes, Locke and Rosseau, are inalienable rights that every man should enjoy unhindered because he is a human being. The fundamental human rights are one of the principles of the rule of law. In Nigeria, these rights are enshrined and protected in the constitution, in chapter 4, sections 33-44 of the 1999 constitution. According to the Human Right Watch (2015 in Usman and Isiaka: 76), terrorism in Nigeria has led to the violation of human rights by Boko Haram. These, according to Amnesty International (cited by Usman and Isiaka 2017:76), include: killings, abduction, displacement, attacking schools, markets, banks and homes. These atrocities constitute gross violation of fundamental human rights. No country can claim to be adhering to the rule of law when there is violation of human rights.

8. Displacement of People

It is not untrue to say that many persons have fled their homes in order to avoid the deadly experience of Boko Haram attack. To corroborate this assertion, there are many camps set up to provide temporary shelter for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) across the country. According to Akor and Audu (2016), part of the fallout of Boko Haram crisis is the rising incidence of millions of people especially women, children and the elderly, majority of who have turned into refugees and forced to take up shelter in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps in different parts of the country.

9. Causes of Boko Haram

There is no monocausation for Boko Haram. A combination of factors has been adduced as major causes of Boko Haram. A brief literature review will capture the causes of Boko Haram in Nigeria. While some are causes, some are facilitating or fuelling factors which together have solidified the consistency, severity, intensity, composition and the size of the sect. Before we present scholarly review on causes of Boko Haram, it is ideal we confess that while some scholars have divergent views on the cause of the menace, there is congruence of ideas on certain causative issues on the terrorist act of the insurgents. For instance, Olofinbiyi and Steyn (2018) have observed that there have been widespread assumptions across the globe that the root cause of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria is religious rather than socio-economic. The root cause of Boko Haram emanates from non-fulfillment of socio-economic goals that are prompted by the violation of fundamental human rights, corruption, poverty, unconstitutional and undemocratic practices in the northern part of Nigeria.

Similarly, Fetter (2018) has attributed the activities of Boko Haram to a response to longstanding religious tensions, political corruption and widening economic disparity, as well as the amalgamation treaty of 1914 which merged various territories and peoples that had little in common other than geographic proximity.

In tandem with the above assertion, Adelaja, Labo and Pener (2018) identified a combination of poverty, unemployment and ethnic tensions as factors responsible for Boko Haram insurgency. In the same vein, Uzodike and Maiangwa (2012) posit that Boko Haram terrorism is triggered by cocktail of bad governance in Nigeria, including the widespread failures of state policies, inefficient and wasteful parastatals and endemic corruption, poverty, unemployment in the northern part of Nigeria.

10. Victims of Crime

The United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985) defines victims as Persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm including mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws operative within member states, including those laws proscribing criminal abuse (Dambazzau, 2007:211).

The above definition shows that crime victims suffer so much as a result of crime. The perpetrator or offenders may not be identified or apprehended for prosecution, but victims must have suffered a lot which could be personal injury, death, damage or loss of property. As Dambazzau (2007) observed, in order to qualify as a victim of crime (in which victim of terrorism is one), an individual must have suffered a loss or injury in emotional, economic and social terms. On his part, Igbo (2007) argued that crime victims wear the shoe and they know where it pinches. They suffer physically, materially and emotionally.

11. Types of Victims of Crime in Nigeria

This is an attempt at explaining different categories of crime victims, why and how criminal victimization takes place. While many victimization cases are victim-induced, many more are caused by circumstances beyond their immediate control. Many a times, we hear of criminals taking advantage of victims' vulnerabilities or helplessness. Old people are victimized, house helps or maids are sexually abused, women are deprived of their rights, and children are sexually abused. These are few examples of unproven common allegations leveled against perpetrators in Nigeria.

Ugwuoke (2015: 182-185) identified seven types of victims of crime. These include unrelated victims, provocative victims, precipitative victims, biologically-weak victims, socio-economically weak victims, self-victimised victims and political victims. These typologies of crime victims are predicated on whether or not the victims are responsible for their victimization. It is true that some victims of crime are innocent or not responsible for their victimization, but that does not mean that victims cannot equally serve as the architect of their victimization.

11.1. Unrelated Victims

These groups of victims of crime are not responsible for their victimisation. They exhibit all forms of precautionary behaviour, but still they suffer victimization. Individuals who refused to go to the North East because of the fear of attack by Boko Haram could still be attacked by Niger Delta militants or consumed by ethno-religious crisis in other parts of the country.

11.2. Provocative Victims

These categories of victims are by every means responsible for their victimization. Indecent dressing can provoke action of rape or rape attempt. Loose talk, carelessness and being credulous, playing the role of good Samaritans and conspicuous consumption, are identified as factors through which victims of armed robbery in post-civil war Nigeria precipitated their victimization (Nkpa, cited by Igbo 2007:133).

11.3. Precipitative Victims

These are victims who have generally contributed to their victimization by either tempting or instigating the action of the offender (Ugwuoke, 2010). Display of wealth, bodily movement, polite insults, verbal confrontation and the use of force can lead to victimization. All of these have triggered criminal events in Nigeria.

11.4. Biologically-Weak Victims

These are victims whose offenders took advantage of their weak biological state or condition. Examples of these victims in Nigeria include children, disabled, the aged, and the mentality sick. They are in no way responsible for their victimization. Some dubious individuals have engaged in child abuse, human trafficking, wife battery, and other forms of family-related crimes targeted at the vulnerable in our society.

This is well captured by Dambazau (2007:212-213):

The elderly are physically weak and fragile by their age; they mostly suffer from amnesia and lack the ability to defend themselves; the traditional victims of rape are women mainly because they are the weaker sex; less violent than men; and lastly emotional in their relationship with the opposite sex. Children are frequently abused and molested by adults and like the elderly; they are disadvantaged in terms of age and the ability to defend themselves.

11.5. Socio-Economically Weak Victims

These are victims who are socially disadvantaged in the society. These include: the poor, the unemployed, the marginalized, and war refugees among others. They are victims of bad governance and corruption in Nigeria which is a serious crime in Nigeria. An alleged case of job racketeering in the Ministry of Interior where there have been allegations

of job sales against paramilitary services supervised by the ministry, where some young graduates paid certain amount of money in return for jobs was uncovered. The affected agencies are Nigerian Immigration Services, Nigerian Prisons Service, Federal Fire Service and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, 2013). There are feelers and allegations of diversion of food meant for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and female IDPs offering sex to camp officials for food in Nigeria recently, which is buttressed by Isaac (2016) that women and girls in IDPs' camps are being raped on a daily basis as a result of insecurity in the camp. These are glaring instances of victimization of the socio-economically weak persons in Nigeria.

11.6. *Self-Victimized Victims*

This is nothing different from the victimless crime we discussed earlier on. There is no difference between the perpetrator and the victim. Ugwuoke (2015) argued that these categories of victims are their own criminal since they victimize themselves. Instances of these types of crime in Nigeria include; prostitution, sorting, gambling, and drug abuse.

11.7. *Political Victims*

This category of victims suffers victimization from their political opponents. Human rights activists suffer victimization from the government. In Nigeria today, President Muhammad Buhari Federal Government-led administration has been accused of selective justice against the opposition party members.

12. **Understanding the Plight of Internally-Displaced Persons in Nigeria**

Displacement has become a global social problem as it cuts across continents in the world. For instance, at the end of 2014, it was estimated there were 38.2 million IDPs worldwide, the highest level since 1989, the first year for which global statistics on IDPs are available. The countries with the largest IDP population were Syria(7.6m), Colombia (6m), Iraq (3.6m), the Democratic Republic of Congo (2.8m), Sudan (2.2m) South Sudan (1.6m), Pakistan (1.4m), Nigeria (1.2m) and Somalia (1.1m) (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2019). In Africa, there are approximately 9 to 10 million people who have fled or been forcibly displaced from their homes for same reasons as refugees: armed conflict, ethnic strife, human rights violations, but who remain in their countries (Cohen, 1999). In Nigeria, the Boko Haram insurgency has caused over 2 million people to be internally displaced, making Nigeria the home of Africa's largest IDPs (Chegwe, 2016). These people have lost everything and are now dependent on faith-based organizations, foundations and well-meaning individuals for their daily bread.

The report of the Internal Displaced Monitoring Centre, IDMC, and the Norwegian Refugee Council, NRC, stated that the number of Internally Displaced Persons, IDPs, in Nigeria is approximately a third of the IDPs in Africa and 10 percent of IDPs in the world (Nigerian Pilot, 2016). In Nigeria, particularly, Abuja, Plateau, Gombe, Nassarawa, Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Borno, Kaduna, Kano, Taraba, Yobe and Zamfara, IDP camps have been set up in over 207 LGAs (Chegwe, 2016). Igenebu (2016) re-echoing the report of the Institute for Peace, identified the causes of internal displacement of people in Nigeria to include ethnic intolerance, religious intolerance, ecological problem, and the activity of Militants. Others include famine and herders/famers clashes. Igenebu (2016) went further to highlight lack of help from government, financial problem, intolerance, lack of medical supplies, and violence towards IDPs, among others as the problems of IDPs in Nigeria. This is not at variance with the findings of the field survey conducted on IDPs in Area 1 IDPs Camp in Abuja by Akor and Audu (2016), where it was found that IDPs are bedeviled with lack of access to basic needs such as food, clean water, shelter, and health care facilities, among others. In a similar development, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, UNOCHA, disclosed that no fewer than 300,000 people in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States-70 percent of them women and children have fled their homes since early 2013. In different parts of the country, communal clashes and related violence have also resulted in many people fleeing their homes and properties (Nigerian Pilot, 2016). This chapter is worthwhile due to the alarming number of IDPs in Nigeria as shown in the aforementioned statistics.

Approximately, over 2 million people are internally displaced in Nigeria. This corroborates the figure estimated by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, IDMC. According to this report, there are almost 2,152,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Nigeria as at 31 December, 2015. The figure is based on assessment conducted from November to December 2015 by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) team in 207 Local Government Areas (LGA) covering 13 states (IDMC, 2015). The states include Abuja (13, 481IDPs); Adamawa (136,010); Bauchi (70,078); Benue (85, 393); Borno (1,434,149); Gombe (25,332); Kaduna (36, 976); Kano (9,331); Nassarawa (37,553); Plateau (77,317); Taraba (50,227); Yobe (131,203) and Zamfara (44,929).

The living condition of IDPs in Nigeria is so deplorable and mindboggling that you don't even wish your enemy to experience it. This is best explained by Aluko (2017) where it was found that over 108,000 IDPs in Ngala community, Borno State, are grappling with a litany of infections and hunger. They are exposed to cough, malaria, diarrhea and acute respiratory disorders as a result of unhygienic living conditions and harsh weather. The IDPs in Nigeria who were displaced by circumstances outside their immediate control are living like refugees in their own land. Statistics have shown that the bulk of people living in IDP camps are displaced by violence-related issues such as insurgency. For instance, the assessment of IOM and DTM as re-echoed by the International Displacement Monitoring Centre, IDMC, (2015) shows that while 12.6 percent of the total figure of IDPs were displaced due to communal clashes and 2.4 per cent were displaced by natural disasters, it is scandalous, disheartening and demoralizing to know that 85 percent of the IDPs were displaced as a result of insurgency attacks by Islamist, an indication that terrorism is the bane of peace in Nigeria.

In 2018, 541,000 new displacements were recorded, 200,000 of which took place in the Middle Belt region and the rest as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East. About 2.2 million people remained displaced due to these conflicts as of the end of the year (IDMC 2018). In another submission, Edward and Yenda (2016) found that the insurgency carried by the Boko Haram sect in North-East account for over 90 percent of the IDPs.

It is equally important to note here that some IDPs camps have become avenues for exhibition and promotion of moral decadence and laxity. This situation is typical of allegations of sexual escapades in camps in Benue State where condoms, used and unused, stain pants were seen littering in camps and famous individuals come to camps at night to take girls out (*Daily Post Online, 2017*).

Efforts are made by individuals, NGOs, religious organisations and other care-givers to improve or alleviate the ordeals of the IDPs in camps across the country. This is in tandem with Chegwe (2016)'s position where it was found that churches, NGOs and individuals contribute to their daily survival by providing food, clothes and medical supplies to these camps. In the same token, in fulfilling its corporate social responsibility, the Nigeria Mortgage Refinance Company (NMRC) in conjunction with Industrial training Fund (ITF) has commenced a vocational skills acquisition programme in the New Kunchingoro IDP, Kawa District, Abuja (NMRC, 2017).

13. Conclusion

Having examined the causes and costs of Boko Haram terrorism, and having found that there is a growing incidence in the number of IDPs in camps across the country as a result of the activities of the sect, it is hereby concluded that the menace of Boko Haram insurgency and the plight of IDPs are arguably the products of unemployment, poverty, ethno-religious differences, bad governance, economic disparity, lack of respect for fundamental human rights and rule of law. However, it constitutes serious social problems for the individuals, investors, governments, and the entire Nigerian society, and thereby requires urgent solutions.

14. Recommendation

Based on the findings of this work, the following measures are hereby recommended: Poverty alleviation and job generating programmes should be put in place by the government at all levels and other stakeholders. This include skill acquisition programmes, apprenticeship schemes, vocational training, ease of doing business and other forms of youth empowerment programme such as free education, agric loans and other credit schemes.

Adherence to the tenets of democracy, due process, rule of law and respect for human rights can usher in good governance in the country. This can reduce the rate at which youths can be lured into militancy.

Ethno-religious sentiments can be curtailed by ensuring that the government should be fair to every Nigerians irrespective of their ethno-religious and political leanings. If the quota system, federal character, and citizenship are applied without personal or preferential treatments, human tensions are likely to be exhibited with moderation.

Perpetrators of terrorism directly or indirectly inform of sponsors or facilitators in Nigeria should henceforth be duly prosecuted so as to serve as deterrence to other would-be perpetrators.

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