

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES & SOCIAL STUDIES

The Critical Analysis of the Viability of Cosmopolitan Democracy in the 21st Century: Cosmopolitanism, the Present and the Future

Funom Theophilus Makama

Human Rights and Global Ethics Researcher,
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester, UK

Abstract:

This review aims to critically analyse the concept of cosmopolitanism as applicable to global democracy. It firstly questions the viability of cosmopolitan democracy from the practicality of this concept on a pragmatic, rather than an idealistic lens, to its 'world state' concept where a decentralised system of governance is sustained by various decision-making sources whilst honouring states with some level of national autonomy. Issues raised, such as distributive justice, coercion and partiality, the cosmopolitan conceptual legitimacy at a global level, citizenship, reciprocity and sovereignty, oppose the legitimacy and practicality of this concept, giving statist, sovereigntists, nationalists and other sceptics of the cosmopolitan Agenda reasons to question this ideology. The second part of this review aims to answer these questions, explaining how this concept practically fits into today's global society as an effective form of global governance. The Moderate-Moral Cosmopolitan ideology will be used to critically address the issues of military interventions: the legality of human rights, the preference for transnational laws over international laws in the propagation of cosmopolitan rights and the role of expert bodies in ensuring that the enforcement of these rights whilst spreading cosmopolitan democracy is effective.

Keywords: *Cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan democracy, globalism, global governance, distributive justice, sovereignty*

1. Introduction

Cosmopolitanism is defined by three components: individualism, universalism and generality (Barry, 1999). Thus, Cosmopolitan Democracy aims to promote and protect universal civic and political rights (Song, 2010, 138). The individualistic nature of this perspective puts the individual, rather than the families, tribes, communities or states, as the unit of morality. The implication of this is the universal status of persons being applied as the same in every part of the world and not particular to certain groups or geography. This negates, for instance, Thomas Hobbes's Westphalian sovereignty ideology as the human being is naturally an asocial and chaotic being until placed into order by a higher authority such as 'the state,' hence fundamentally incapable of being the 'source of morality.' In this case, according to Hobbes, states that are relevant to human rights and humanity should also have their autonomy and independence from external influence (Hobbes, 1994).

However, the state and the human are not alike. The human possesses an 'intrinsic' moral value for good association, but the state does not. The state can also be autonomous in the framework of individual rights. Hence, interference in a state is implicative of going against the will of the citizens of the state (Beitz, 1999). Therefore, state autonomy, though not the same as individual autonomy, is an extension of it.

But are states free associations? Is the assumption of the voluntary bond and consent of individuals of states accurate? Most citizens are born into the political system to be coercively controlled by it even without giving their consent, and rejection of such membership comes with dire consequences, leaving the 'members' with no choice. However, choosing to stay or immigrate into a particular political society or acts such as voting cannot be adequately described as constituting consent, which qualifies an individual's membership (Simmons, 1981). So, criticising interventions, for instance, based on coercion of individual members of a state, as persistently done by scholars of opposing views, means all governments are equally guilty of this since no state qualifies as 'free association' without coercing its citizens, one way or another (Beitz, 1999). The aim of this article is to critically assess the possibility of how practical the Cosmopolitan Democracy concept is in our contemporary global society whilst addressing the 'serious concerns' raised by Sovereigntists, Nationalists, statist, liberal democrats and proponents of any other opposing view.

1.1. Practicality of This Concept

The individual has been refocused and given huge importance by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, setting the stage for the possible practice of Cosmopolitan Democracy in a world of post-sovereign states (Booth, 1999, 65-66). Cosmopolitan democracy over sovereign equality and non-intervention gives room for public accountability on a

global scale where members are no longer restricted to states but are seen as 'global citizens' in an 'international society' (Bianchi, 1999). Therefore, scholars argue that sovereignty and non-intervention are in direct opposite to democracy and accountability, and hence the need to evolve democracy to transcend borders into a global level (Archibugi, 2000; Bianchi, 1992; Camilleri & Falk, 1992; Robertson, 1999). David Beetham argues that just as democracy has evolved from township practice to a national practice in the eighteenth century, it should also evolve from national to humankind as a whole or to global practice in the twentieth century, so cosmopolitan democracy is feasible and achievable.

In a state consisting of a divided set of residents in the 'citizens vs non-citizens' dichotomy, when decisions are taken by citizens without the input of 'non-citizens' like in the instances of border villages in the African States being affected by decisions made by the intra-state governments, central power structures and hierarchies, it is no longer a democracy (Held 1998). Such inequalities have been further illustrated by Daniele Archibugi as, for instance, Germany's interest rate decisions may hamper Greece's and Portugal's employment rates. Likewise, the European Union's immigration policies negatively affect the economic growth of Mediterranean Africa. I will add the building of the water dam by Ethiopia, which will affect Egypt, hence causing the Ethiopia-Egypt water conflict (Lawson, 2017; Woldemariam, 2020). All these happened without the affected citizens giving their own input in these decisions. (Archibugi 1998, 204).

If everyone must be heard and given the chance to participate in decision-making, frameworks creating political constituencies that may be larger or smaller than states should be created. These constituencies should give individuals the opportunity to be adequately represented in global affairs independently and autonomously of their political representation in domestic affairs (Archibugi, 1998, 212). Sovereign states may still play a role in this cosmopolitan democratic framework. However, they will not be responsible for taking the final say as 'independent and autonomous' institutions will be present to do so whilst preserving the rights of their global citizens (Shaw, 1994, 134-135).

1.1.1. Concept of Distributive Justice

Matthias Risse would say, 'Earth belongs to humanity in common'- an assumption that is at the core of some versions of liberal cosmopolitanism (Cited in Chatterjee 2000, 66). So, particularity in culture is not an excuse for exclusion, and this can also be extended to immigration policies mischievously or intentionally aimed at excluding others with different cultures or worldviews, even in so-called liberal states. This is why Michael Walzer, David Miller and John Rawls claim that egalitarian distributive justice is typical only to political communities with borders (Miller, 1995; Rawls, 1999; Walzer, 1983). In this regard, social justice may only be well understood and effective from the perspective of a 'bounded world' but factored by its culture, history and membership. Since distributive justice is local, some cultures seeing themselves as dominant or the 'majority' are liable to appropriate resources to themselves much more than they proportionately deserve, to the detriment of others, and this further cements this view as an extreme opposing view to cosmopolitanism.

The reality on the ground is that larger communities are defined as a collection of mini-communities. This spreads across rich and poor nations, western and non-western states. Practically, contingent matters define community membership, cultural uniqueness and a collective consensus. Having the interest or extending some loyalty to another community by members of a different community is usually not the case because of the 'insiders vs outsiders' divide, which makes normative justice very difficult, if not impossible. However, it can still be achieved. Since the desire from people to connect to others outside their small units is significantly low, they can create a new identity they can familiarise themselves with and expand rather than demand their loyalties to correspond with the global society through political and economic globalisation by gradually evolving their consensus, cultural uniqueness, collective practices and contingent issues. Therefore, moral justice on a global scale can be achieved, and it is on this ideology that the cosmopolitan democratic framework is established (Arneson, 2004; Oldenquist, 2008).

So, Cosmopolitan Democrats are faced with fighting the issue of boundaries that separate people physically, politically, culturally and morally, a fight against giving precedence to exclusion over inclusion. Therefore, provided boundaries exist, achieving moral justice, especially on a global scale, is practically difficult (Chatterjee, 2009, 67)

1.1.2. Coercion and Partiality

In the liberal democratic setting, legitimacy to exhibit partiality towards one's fellow citizens is established on the grounds of responsibilities demanded by the political community. These demands are created from coercion and the imposition of rules to prove one's loyalty and for self-development. These demands are then displayed in different degrees as more would be expected from 'citizens,' leading to more coercion, while less expectation is shown of 'foreigners.' Equal respect for all humans is, therefore, not the same as equal concern for all (Miller, 2004; 2005). This is more illustrated in a scenario of the rich countries' obligations in eradicating poverty in the world. Should they prioritise these obligations to poorer countries or prioritise the poor in their own domains? Blake will argue that it is a reasonable standpoint if they insist on prioritising their own poor people even if they are better off than poor foreigners (Blake, 2002). This, therefore, creates a dichotomy of 'the poor' because of boundaries or borders, and though the foreigners may need the benefit of this obligation more, they are of less concern since they are not coerced to be responsible to the rich countries confined in borders.

Therefore, coercion is characteristic of self-governance in democratic settings through legal bindings of citizens to their governments, unlike on a global scale where binding agreements are non-existent between 'outsiders' and, hence, no coercion. No coercion means less or no demands of duties, which in turn means less partiality.

1.2. Concerns against Cosmopolitan Democracy

1.2.1. Just a Radical Agenda

A big issue with the Cosmopolitan democracy concept is the obsessive resistance from its scholars against democracy and politics to the point where too much focus is centred on legitimising moral and ethical policies rather than reducing the limits of sovereign governments, thereby giving less concern to establishing a new framework for democracy on the global scale (Chandler, 2003, 340).

The hostility towards sovereignty does not strengthen the mechanisms of democratic accountability, and no feasible action has been taken to do the latter. Human rights protection, global peace, and sustainable development are progressive ends. The means to these ends will require some 'frameworks' to arrive there. Cosmopolitan Scholars seem to shy away from such frameworks. Andrew Linklater calls for a 'bolder moral standpoint' (Linklater, 1998), adding that the preference for normative rather than a substantive democracy to propagate ethical and legal norms in the global society and Ken Booth's wish for global ethics as the centre of international relations in the twenty-first century (Booth, 1995) means that the conceptual framework of Cosmopolitan Democracy is based on a radical Agenda of criticism which is by default, conservative, uncritical and Machiavellian.

1.2.2. Cosmopolitan Legitimacy Favours the West

The Cosmopolitan concept is by far different from the liberal democratic approach. While the former claims rights for others, the latter, on the background of the self-governing capacity of individuals, derives rights from them. The framework of this liberal-democratic concept lies on the assumption of independent, rational, responsible and accountable individuals on which laws and their enforcements, legal contracts, punishment of defaulting or committing crime, governments, state institutes and their systems are developed (Chandler, 2003, 343-344) In essence, the individual subjects fully participate voluntarily and willingly without being coerced into accepting any bounding agreement or higher purpose or policy. This cuts across all laws, for instance, civil law- a legal contract between two individuals, binding them based on their own words; criminal law- the breaking of a social contract between an individual and their community where their action affects another member of that same space they are; hence the equality of every individual altered in the balance due to the crime committed.

The court of law, in this case, is responsible for passing judgements after the accused has been scrutinised and allowed to defend themselves; yet again, equality and free will are respected. So, principles such as equality, justice, etc, must come from the people themselves and not from an external source. As Hannah Arendt states: 'Equality, in contrast to all that is involved in mere existence, is not given us, but is the result of human organisation... We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights (cited in Chandler, 2003, 342; Arendt, 1979, 301).

This is not the case with the Cosmopolitan framework, as 'human rights' are still abstract and not practical until legal and political frameworks are established (Lewis, 1998, 85). Cosmopolitans see human rights as moral as opposed to being legal and political, thereby creating difficulties in the implementation and protection of these rights and their accountability thereof. In international relations, for example, while the UN Charter legitimately treats both Western and non-Western states equally despite the disparities, Cosmopolitans still consider some states illegitimate. The Cosmopolitans stand on an 'Audit framework' where states are assessed by external agents, and the states which fail these 'assessments' lose their rights of legitimacy and extension, equality with others and since decision-making affecting individuals that are bonded to states must involve the making and enactment of laws, this perspective indirectly supports partiality and grossly gives an advantage to western views (Held 1995, 232).

Since the West has these resources and the necessary culture to promote it, they need to assume this 'new duty' to take on this needed 'global leadership.' (Shaw 1994, 180-181) The liberal democracy concept is based on the collective decision of the people, but what if these people have no global interest but self-interests? So, Cosmopolitans believe a decision made even democratically can be as wrong as a 'final say' from the government. The people also cannot be fully trusted, as their governments, leaving the international community to establish institutions that can carefully select micro-societies with Cosmopolitan interest, as Kaldor will call them 'Islands of Civility', which can be trusted to make decisions for all, even if a minority (Kaldor, 1999, 120).

Nothing beats imposition and injustice like this. This new moral concept of 'legitimacy' further widens the gap between legitimacy and legality, creating 'grey zones of ambiguity' in international relations. This gives rise to flexibility in the approach to international laws, making these laws more dangerous and accessible to be used by Western States to foster their Agendas. For example, the issue of Military intervention cannot be settled only based on protecting human rights in the intervened state. If several states are to give their input, a consensus will not be reached because of their different criteria for human rights abuses. This leaves it open for 'legitimate states,' usually Western, to act when the need arises, which also sets it up as a prerogative of the powerful against the weak (Chandler, 2003, 346).

Cosmopolitan democracy also gives a forum to globalise the economy and define the rights and responsibilities of actors in the 'free market,' these so-called 'free markets' will still be controlled by more powerful participants than their less powerful counterparts, thereby generating a legitimate fear by non-western states of the neo-Marxist systematic expansion or spread of empires (Hardt & Negri, 2001; Tully, 2008). Also, the UN Security Council is creating global 'emergency conditions' using this as a tool to deformalise laws and promote extrajudicial political measures around the world. The right to protect, especially which the UN promotes as necessary to avoid threats to international peace and security from domestic human rights violations, is a plausible cause. However, the selective imposition of debilitating

sanctions, military invasions and the authoritarian occupation of administrations by some states, either acting on their own or unilaterally through coalitions, tagged as 'enforcements', are causes of concern. More so, these states cannot be opposed by other member states of the UN due to their veto power. Therefore, the threat of converting cosmopolitan intents into hegemonic nightmares is real (Cohen, 2008; Scheppele, 2006).

Finally, the function of the International Criminal Court to prosecute crimes against humanity is seen by some scholars as a neo-colonial deceptive tool to dominate the world of the West (Mamdani, 2008, 18; Mamdani, 2009).

The Cosmopolitan Democracy framework, therefore, proves to be not only flexible but multi-layered whilst dismissing accountability in decision-making, putting non-western states vulnerable. This framework also fuels the incapacitation of strict hierarchies of international law, giving room for the West to dictate international relations, which invariably means a gradual and increasing inequality in universal international law, hence 'might equal right' (Chandler, 2000, 55-56).

1.2.3. Citizenship

The concepts of 'global citizen' and 'state citizen' and how they correlate or how an individual may assume these statuses are complex problems. Should these two statuses have the same kind of rights? Are they equally demanding or responsible? Is the global citizen also responsible to the state and vice versa? Can a citizen have different privileges as a legal resident of the world rather than a secular state (Archibugi, 1998, 216; Kaldor, 1999, 148)? These issues even further complicate the roles of national political parties as Cosmopolitan theorists cancel them for their inability to propagate Cosmopolitan citizenship because they function around national issues rather than global ones (Archibugi, 2000, 146). In this regard, national political parties are replaced with transnational civil society groups to represent individuals on a global level (Beetham, 1999, 142). But can these groups influence policy-making at national government levels? How easily can these groups devise a framework of political accountability? (Charnovitz, 1997; Forsythe, 2000, 169) Civil society groups usually include: Community groups, pressure groups on particular issues, grassroots campaign organisations, NGOs, the media, research groups, etc, and they usually operate independently of the political terrain, which has, in turn, institutionalised democratic equality and accountability.

Therefore, even if they are a part of the policy-making process, their formal representation is most often lacking to be worthy enough to be counted as propagating 'world citizenship' (Edwards, 1999, 180; Heater, 1999, 144). A good example is the non-governmental organisations fighting for human rights, such as Human Rights Watch or the International Commission of Jurists, which have only very few members that are affluent, intentionally so to have the needed networks or necessary access to governments and international officials (Charnovitz, 1997, 270; de Waal, 1997, 3-4; Forsythe, 2000, 167-168). In this case, representation, especially on a global scale to denote 'world citizenship' status, is defeated. There is also the issue of their 'non-elected' system of operations that makes them not fully answerable to the people they represent. This is the direct opposite of democracy (Bosco, 2000). Thus, it is difficult to hold these civil societies to account, which, in other words, means a defeat to democratic accountability (Chandler, 2003, 336).

Even if civil society groups take part in the decision-making process of a nation, they do not have the power to hold states democratically accountable, as the process of receiving licenses or being appointed by international officials gives more power to states (Charnovitz, 1997, 283). These make the civil society groups essentially advisory, not executive (Archibugi, 1998, 219)

The global citizen has no fixed territorial identity and, hence, has no legal or political standing to hold policy actors accountable. The rights of the Cosmopolitan citizen are, hence, attached to international agencies or groups, which then means that the authenticity of the global citizen is shown only through 'representation' on particular issues raised by a 'representing' agency. This makes it difficult to understand the claims of 'representation of the people' by civil societies since there is no institutionalisation of the mechanisms of accountability (Edwards 1999, 180). For instance, most NGOs raise awareness rather than express 'representation' (Clark, 1995; Cheyns, 2014; Dombrowski, 2010), thereby triggering the moral conscience and not appealing to a political majority in a more-or-less display of democracy by articulation rather than by representation (Galtung, 2000, 155)

The state citizen has a defined set of rights and duties enforced by the police and the courts. However, the global citizen has 'new rights' which are not exercised by them but by international institutions, which have 'new duties' matching these 'new rights', making its practicality very complex, and there is no provision of a mechanism of accountability to give content to these rights. So, in the case of an impending genocide, global civil societies can exercise control to prevent it by demanding the intervention of the governments of all states (Archibugi, 1998, 219). Enforcing this demand becomes a serious problem if the states in question are reluctant to dedicate resources for such an intervention, as in the case of the Rwandan genocide (Beetham, 1999, 140). The irony here is allocating duties of using force to actors incapable of coercive powers while demanding from the champions of military might, the states, to be 'silent' (Chandler, 2003, 338).

1.2.4. State Coercion and Reciprocity in Distributive Justice

External interference means some level or degree of coercion because not every member of the state will agree to it, so the Cosmopolitan democracy is equally guilty. Coercion, be it from the government or elsewhere, is no different in principle. What matters is the result, which is liberal justice (Song 2010, 140). External interference also means imposition, which can also be detrimental to the will of the people. Forcing my son to go to the football Academy is different from another Man doing the same to him. My son may most likely accept my authority, but not the other man. In coercive imposition, what matters is 'who' is imposing and not 'what' is being imposed (Song, 2010, 143). Irrespective of

methodology or the fantastic framework created, an external agent acting as an 'authority' over sovereignties is liable to be resisted.

However, when it comes to distributive justice, Cosmopolitan scholars have accused statist and sovereigntists of state coercion, and this is not the case. The reason for distributive justice is not state coercion but reciprocity. The more the state is responsible for an individual, the higher its moral right to demand loyalty. In another way, the more loyal a citizen is to a state, the more responsible the state is or should be. It is a case of reciprocity and not coercion (Sangiovanni, 2007). This, then, is a relational view of distributive justice. The Cosmopolitan perspective is non-relational and functions on the 'demand' of moral personhood, independent of institutional and cooperative affiliations (Sangiovanni, 2007, 71). Reciprocity functions on an existing political governance model; for this reason, it will have to be egalitarian in nature when dispensing justice among fellow citizens. This will be different from the globalist cosmopolitan perspective, which is abstract.

When citizens and residents sustain the state system via a financial and sociological network of contributions paid through trust, compliance, resources and participation, they, by right, should enjoy more considerations and benefits from their states (Sangiovanni, 2007, 20-21). Interestingly, without these states and the 'coins' paid by their citizens, the global order cannot be sustained even if established. Thus, 'contributions,' 'reciprocity,' and 'participation' are important factors in justice.

A statist view of maintaining statism is more realistic and just than a globalist view. In this regard, inequality between fellow citizens is more of a serious problem because they share the same political system, economic structures and legal institutions within a state compared to inequality between residents of different states. Therefore, prioritising the poor within a state despite being better than the poor elsewhere is moral and justified (Sangiovanni, 2007, 72).

If reciprocity-based institutional arrangements presuppose the need for state boundaries whilst being established as a yardstick for justice, then the notion of equity is completely defeated. Equity aims to create a 'near-balanced' world, be it in a mini-society or in our global society, irrespective of the disparities in the status and contributions of the members of these societies. As much as it is insane for smaller communities to make demands to be at par with their richer counterparts, the richer ones can 'assist' or 'contribute' more to the smaller one in an external 'space' or even directly to allow significant representation of both parties in an international forum. This 'space' can be regulated by a body or community outside the two participatory communities, which will also provide an intermediate sort of international governance and co-operation that may even generate duties of reciprocity at the global level.

Nevertheless, the two communities still remain major actors or stakeholders in this arrangement so as not to 'extort' one to please another or bully one whilst deceptively 'helping.' In this regard, the promoters of statism have a strong argument, even at the level of global democracy, because reciprocity at whichever degree cannot be ruled out, or else a divide of 'charity states' vs. 'begging states' will be established. The beggars will only have themselves to blame if they eventually lose respect or relevance on the global stage. This is the current plight of Africa as a continent, which is the most beneficiary of international aid and yet little development has come out of it, whilst the continent continues to suffer 'global marginalisation' in world politics and representation (Abbas & Niyiragira, 2009; Cai et al., 2018; Lancaster, 1999). This reciprocity comes with 'political accountability,' a major problem the Cosmopolitans are finding hard to address.

1.2.5. Sovereignty

Sovereigntism can be best seen from two perspectives: nationalist and democratic. Sovereigntism is defined around the concept of sovereigntist territorialism, whereby laws legitimise the self-determination of a homogenous group of people clearly separated from others in discrete makeup, societal functions and ideologies whose laws promote and bind its collective will alone. This group of people is known as the 'ethnos', and this idea is propagated by the nationalists. The democratic view holds the self-determining people responsible as the author and, at the same time, the subject of its laws and hence not a must that these laws should express the will of its people or an 'ethnos' but should focus on the mechanism of creating these laws and the extent of the authority of these laws (Benhabib, 2009, 693).

The nationalist view is quite rigid and strict and is hardly considered when debating about the Cosmopolitan globalist idea because the ideology behind it is emphatically clear and opposing to Cosmopolitan democracy. The democratic sovereigntist can be brought into the equation because of the more liberal and flexible nature of its ideology. Interestingly, adherents of this view still consider a harmonised global society from a legal and political angle as normatively dangerous and undesirable (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Koh, 1996) since neither the economy nor the legal system on a global scale is created on the background of human associations whose members are willing to relate with each other under a framework of differential rules for the distribution of benefits and liabilities (Nagel, 2005, 120).

Let us also consider Communitarianism. Communitarianism is a social philosophy that concentrates on communities and their moral framework formed from individual moral contributions to it. Communitarianism functions on societal units such as the family, voluntary associations and schools that historically transmit values and morals within themselves to give the community an identity (Etzioni, 2015). Some Communitarian theorists strongly opined that a shared identity is because of shared responsibility. The sense of mutuality and solidarity among persons is what leads to a joint commitment to social justice, and as Sandel would state, individuals only see themselves as members of society if they are responsible to each other (Sandel, 1984).

Walzer made clear that, unlike nations which are historic communities, embodying a common history, language, culture and way of life, and hence having a viable moral community, the global society exhibits none of these shared common ideals and, unlike the nation, cannot be a moral community (Walzer, 1980). On this school of thought, Michal Sandel concludes that a more difficult task of achieving commonality on a framework established to achieve a global

society consisting of political associations that are more expansive than nations and with fewer cultural traditions and historical memories is the case with this globalist view of democracy (Sandel, 1996). Therefore, the existence of sovereign states is exactly what makes justice function and enforcing a relationship between citizens of a state and the rest of humanity, which they do not have, must come from a framework on which building enduring projects of mutual benefits and co-operation are established. This is lacking in the global society; hence, this globalist idea is relegated to the promotion of seemingly 'anonymous governance' to achieve a techno-elitist or Cosmopolitan democracy, which in turn is already proving problematic rather than progressive.

Attempts to achieve democracy and human rights on a global scale and beyond territorial limitation to establish global governance will create a gap between the custodians of these new Cosmopolitan rights and those with social duties, hence creating dependency rather than empowerment, which puts the UN's Charter framework of the preservation of self-governance and the rights already in existence at risk of being bastardised (Chandler, 2003, 332). The Cosmopolitan democracy framework can only come into practicality if a high level of homogenisation on a global scale is achieved. Such a level of homogenisation can only happen through war and repression (Held 1995, 230; Kaldor 1999, 148; The Commission on Global Governance, 1995, xvi). War and repression mean human rights violations and negate the only reason the concept of cosmopolitan Democracy was established in the first place. So, having a Cosmopolitan framework on a global scale that operates on social, economic, and cultural regulation that enables individual citizens to enjoy political equality is impossible.

2. Introduction: Moderate-moral Cosmopolitanism Is the School of Thought

The concept of 'Cosmopolitanism' has developed over time into a wide range of thoughts, and this is not unique to it as every school of thought is liable to metamorphose into such ranges. First, there is 'institutional Cosmopolitanism,' which promotes a world state through the support of political institutions. Then, there is moral cosmopolitanism, which hammers more on morality- all persons must be treated equally and fairly. The moral variant does not promote a world state but emphasises a just and evidently fair outcome of any political institution on its subjects. A significant number of Cosmopolitan scholars are in this school of thought, which shockingly shows that the creation of a 'world state' is not really the desired outcome of Cosmopolitan democracy, and in extension, counteracting the 'Agenda-shots' fired at it (Tan, 2012, 189).

The theorists of moral cosmopolitan democracy are calling for institutions of governance and not governmental institutions (Tan, 2012, 189-90). Moral cosmopolitanism is not set to disrupt cultural identities but, at the same time, resist the restriction of an individual's identity based on boundaries. Justice, which is the aim, cuts across boundaries and is a fight against discrimination, as, for example, it should not be championed only in some cultures or 'bounded' communities. So, nationality or citizenship is not justified in imposing 'principled restrictions' to dispense justice (Tan, 2012, 190). Then, of course, there are the extreme and moderate cosmopolitan views, the former emphasising this concept as central to which every other moral commitment is referenced and must be justified. For example, denying the independence and moral worth of patriotism. Outrightly, the scholars of extreme cosmopolitanism see patriotism as bad and dangerous. The latter is quite the opposite of the former as some obligations are respected and viewed as independent whilst not insisting on the Cosmopolitan values as absolutes that must be referenced and on which other moral values are measured.

Meanwhile, the moderate view accepts the morality of certain kinds of obligations that may not be explained or fully understood in cosmopolitan terms. Commitments that matter to people are very important; hence, any obligation promoting such commitments with outcomes of a better and stable society while 'expressing Justice' is still in order. 'Justice' is not well defined by the people and their appreciation of it when expressed. Therefore, a 'world citizen' can still be patriotic and identify with a particular state while showing solidarity with other 'world citizens' who identify with other states. The cosmopolitan democratic agenda is to make these relations intrinsic and legal in whichever political framework best suits it.

An individual, therefore, can be politically or culturally Arab but still show solidarity and promote Justice with the Americans or Europeans. This 'complete' and 'evolved' view of cosmopolitanism exalts individual responsibility above personal identification, the scope of Justice over world government, and 'value pluralism' over supremacy of a particular value. In this respect, there is no tension between the cosmopolitan concept as an account of Justice and an account of patriotism, which is also an account of identity. It will not be contradictory to have a cosmopolitan patriot (Tan, 2012, 193).

So, moderate-moral cosmopolitan democracy will be the focus of this review to further explain why it is the best concept for global governance and quash any fears while addressing any concern associated with the concept of cosmopolitan democracy. We can look at this concept as synonymous and practically the same as the 'democratic humanism' concept, which encourages citizens to imbibe justice into their political culture not just for their compatriots but for all humans, irrespective of the difference in citizenship. If this spreads and cuts across nations, different citizens will relate alike in dealing fairly and justly with each other. A good democratic patriot will not only consider their fellow citizens to have similar rights but also consider 'non-nationals' transcending their limited national interests to include 'others and hence a 'Cosmopolitan patriot' as well (Gutmann, 1996; Kymlicka, 2001).

Jurgen Habermas constitutionalised this concept for citizens to understand and relate beyond borders or nationality through cultural, ethnic or linguistic terms, creating a joint commitment to a liberal political structure. This goes beyond a national cultural or linguistic identity termed 'constitutional patriotism' in a 'constitutional democracy' (Habermas, 1996).

3. Discussion

3.1. *The World as a Global Village Is Gradually Cosmopolitan*

The world is naturally evolving and becoming a global society on its own. Recent events and the sharing of cultures are proving this. For instance, Islam is the fastest-growing religion not only in the world but in Europe (Hohol, 2021), and Africa, a so-called dark continent which may seem to lag in global politics, is influencing the world elsewhere. Just as Pop culture has spread across the globe (Van Elteren, 1996; Darling-Wolf, 2014), Africa now has a stake in influencing the world through its popular culture (Kings & Simmert, 2020) and particularly the West African Afrobeat, both in Music and in Poetry, not only to the west but to Asian, Arab and non-Anglo Saxon Nations as well (Cobo-Pinero, 2020; Wonodi & Okoro, 2022).

Islam in the globe is generally becoming more liberal with new practices such as Islamic pop culture, which is a result of the hybridisation of reconciling the mixture of Western culture, global Islamic influences and local traditions in Malaysia and especially in Indonesia (Nef-Saluz, 2007; Weintraub, 2011). Saudi Arabia, the custodian of the religion of Islam is also evolving as it has recently relaxed some of its guardianship laws to enable Saudi Arabian women travel out of the country, independently of any man's supervision or permission, just after allowing its women to drive independently as well (Stickings, 2019). Still, in Saudi Arabia, the global football star Cristiano Ronaldo joined the Al Nassr football club in the Kingdom and was allowed to stay with his unmarried partner despite the strict marriage rules in the country (Mbu, 2023).

The Green Card visa Lottery to the USA (Wilson & Rael, 2014), the highly skilled and low-skilled immigration to Europe (Naumann et al., 2018) and to some Asian countries such as Singapore, Japan and South Korea (Kwon, 2019) are great contributory factors to culture spread and mixture. These skilled professionals move to these countries with their families, cultures, identities, and worldviews. When this happens over time, these countries accepting the skilled professionals become 'global societies' and hence are also influenced by immigration. It also shows that one can learn a skill in one part of the world and use that skill in another part of the world. The United States, for instance, have citizens who still maintain their identities while being responsible citizens as an integral part of the population. Identities such as African-Americans, Chinese-Americans, Hispanics, Arab-Americans, etc, are the case. The celebration of multinational festivals and holidays, popular in various parts of America, also proves the viability of a global society. Holidays such as the Greek Saint Basil's Day, Sikh and Hindu influenced Lohri/Bhogi, Makar Sankranti, Pongal, Ram Navami and Diwali holidays; Japan's Hanamatsuni; Welsh's Calan Gaeaf among many others; are common holidays in America. Halloween is now a global festival and is particularly popular in Asia because of its similarity with the Ghost Festival, which is the celebration of the dead (Monticello, 2009).

The central focus of cosmopolitanism is 'human rights.' It is already a flawed mentality to think human rights are Western-centric. Human rights are applicable to anywhere there is a human being. For instance, 'Gender Equality' is one of the agenda of the 21st century globalists.

When women are treated with equality in rights and equity in responsibilities, society is set to thrive in developments, be they Western or not (Johnsson-Latham, 2007). Considering the countries that have had a female president or prime minister in their history, as shown in table 1 below (Wills et al., 2019), it is interesting to note that a massive representation of African nations can be observed in that list, so is the representation of some majority-Islamic nations like Indonesia. In fact, Pakistan not only had a female leader in the form of Benazir Bhutto, but she was also the leader on two occasions, 1988 to 1990 and 1993 to 1996, campaigning and leading a Muslim-Male dominated country with her liberal and secularist views. Having a female leader in a country may not fully justify the 'Gender equality' status of that country. Nevertheless, it still counts because the highest regard a society may give to an individual is to give that person the mantle of leadership to lead them. Moreover, a society where a woman can lead is a society with a good chance for the female gender to thrive.

Year or Duration	Country	Name of Female President or Prime Minister
1960	Sri Lanka	Sirimavo Bandaranaike
1966	India	Indira Gandhi
1975	Central African Republic	Elisabeth Domitien
1986	Philippines	Corazon Aquino
1988	India	Benazir Bhutto
1993	India	Benazir Bhutto
1993	Burundi	Sylvie Kinigi
1993	Rwanda	Agathe Uwilingiyimana
1993	Turkey	Tansu Ciller
2001	Indonesia	Megawati Sukarnoputri
2001	Senegal	Mame Madior Boye
2002	Sao Tome and Principe	Maria das Neves
2004	Mozambique	Luisa Diogo
2006	Liberia	Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
2010	Kyrgyzstan	Roza Otunbayeva
2011	Mali	Cisse Mariam Kaidama Sidibe
2011	Thailand	Yingluck Shinawatra

Year or Duration	Country	Name of Female President or Prime Minister
2012	Malawi	Joyce Banda
2015	Mauritius	Ameenah Firdaus Gurib-Fakim
2015	Namibia	Saara Kuugongelwa-Amadhila
2022	Samia Suluhu Hassan	Samia Suluhu Hassan

Table 1: List of Female Presidents or Prime Ministers in the World from 1960 to 2023

Various political alliances across the globe also set it on a path to a global society. The European Union and, by extension, the Schengen common visa policy is always mentioned. This is a union of different autonomous countries with very similar histories, cultures, and languages but independent whilst operationally and functionally borderless. However, the EU is not the only good example of this concept. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is another good example, with a similar operational framework to that of the EU and already proposing a single currency for the union (Agyei & Clotey, 2007; Mati et al., 2019). Such unions exist in other parts of the world, such as: Union of South American Nations (USAN), South Africa Development Community (SADC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), etc. There are some national passports or visas that their owners, by virtue of having them, have access to hundreds of countries around the world, indicating the possibility of having borderless alliances even if the countries involved are thousands of miles apart; hence, transnational interaction. Therefore, the world is already, on its own, gradually 'homogenising' in culture and history, counteracting the thought that only war and repression can achieve this. As cultures and politics gradually mix, everyone influences everyone and, in turn, is influenced by everyone in a 'back-and-forth' mutating interaction. We are already Cosmopolitan to some degree without even knowing it. Therefore, relegating cosmopolitanism or cosmopolitan democracy to being 'Western-centric' is inaccurate.

3.2. Military Interventions

External interference will not be the case if states can satisfy liberal justice. It is as simple as that (Caney, 2005). Interventions only violate sovereignty if their attempt to establish justice in the intervened country fails. Basic structures in place in the affected state or its domestic policies which have international relevance are keys to establishing this justice in the state, subject to 'rehabilitative intrusions' (Caney, 2005; Moellendorf, 2002).

Though Military interventions are seen as too aggressive to most likely cause further international crisis, they are, however, outcomes of a process that was carefully followed since not all human rights violations require such interference (Tan, 2000). Armed interventions are expensive both financially and socially as soldiers also are at risk of dying. A procedure of non-violent actions, which is the first step of the approach involving debates, resolutions, economic incentives/sanctions or penalties, is first applied before military interventions are invoked (Benhabib, 2009, 142). If, after all these measures are taken, violations such as 'ethnic cleansing,' 'genocides,' etc., continue or even worsen, these acts are violent or aggressive enough on their own account to trigger an aggressive response to be curbed. Therefore, interventions are empirically and methodologically enforced, not rushed or implemented in political manipulation and are therefore necessary for the preservation of human rights. The essence of military interventions in the grand scheme of things is to protect human lives, and if the international society is not held accountable to uphold this right, it will always find convenient excuses to avoid intervening even in the face of genocide, just as it was in Rwanda (Makama, 2023).

3.3. The Possibility of Human Rights Legality

Basic human rights are not only moral but can be legal, and their justifications can be produced, popularised and enforced. However, the substantive minimalisation of the legality of human rights also comes into question. For instance, stopping crimes against humanity via ethnic cleansing, genocides, enslavements, and mass deportations has been obligated to all nations by the Genocide Convention, but enforcing this on states becomes a problem. Finding this balance between morality and Justice further legitimises the law and does not cause problems as insinuated by opposing scholars (Dworkin 2018, 184ff).

In law, vocabulary is key and distinguishing between 'concepts' and 'conceptions' is important to further understand this process. Fairness, for instance, is a concept, but the concept of fairness is better relatable when other moral and political principles factor into the original concept as critically assessed (Dworkin 2018, 134ff). Rawls defines Justice as fairness, while Karl Marx defines it as 'from each, according to his abilities, to each, according to his needs.' (cited in Benhabib 2009, 697). To be able to understand from any of these angles, factorial claims such as human needs, wants and scarcity must be put into the definition to adequately understand justice.

So, in responding to the issue of distributive justice, in a situation of abject scarcity and stark tragic conflict, social justice becomes irrelevant, as in the case of a very scarce vaccine commodity in a country where there is a flu epidemic, as illustrated by David Miller (Miller, 2008). In such a case, it would be irrational, immoral, and impartial to give 'outsiders' equal consideration to 'compatriots' when all other factors have been considered. The extreme Cosmopolitan or Institutional Cosmopolitan may think otherwise, as both the 'citizens' and 'strangers' are global citizens. Another good example is in the case of Emergency Unit services in a hospital setting where there are not enough staff to attend to the many patients trooping in (Scarcity again). The concept of triaging comes into play where the patient with the most need of emergency care is prioritised and attended to, even if they are the last to be brought to the unit.

However, when other factorial needs are the same and not really in play, 'strangers' should be treated fairly, just as 'citizens' too. In some Cosmopolitan societies, the 'strangers' may even seem to be treated better, and this in no way

counters 'reciprocity.' Walzer states that what should be distributed first in a group is 'membership' before anything else (Walzer, 1983), but cosmopolitanism does not negate this school of thought. In fact, it evolves and solidifies it. What if these 'shared responsibilities' are taken to the 'strangers' first? Would it not make them have a sense of belonging for them to subsequently partake in the 'patriotic duties' also? If a group is so good to 'outsiders' or 'newcomers,' these set of 'strangers' will not only want to be a part of that group but will also want it to function (even better) for them to continue to benefit from it.

A good example is the Sanctuary Scholarships being offered to Asylum Seekers and refugees or/and their dependants to study in the UK, from undergraduate to research post-graduate level, despite having a lot of British citizens taking student loans to study, which would be paid in later years while they work (Hudson et al., 2018; Mitchell et al., 2017). This is in addition to the fact that their children are entitled to free hours in years two and three of nursery education and entitled to go to school from year four of reception. This may seem unfair to the citizenry, but it is not. A person who flees from a tumorous environment to a stable one where they are accepted, settled and given free education will not only integrate into that society but will most likely do everything possible to 'reciprocate' and be a 'responsible contributor' to such a society.

In addressing human rights issues and issues of justice and partiality, these other factors of need must be put into consideration to dispense justice instead of displaying rigidity and extremism, which is liable to backfire and cause more chaos to the world we are trying to shape in fairness and justice. Thus, while the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) gives general normative principles of human rights, the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the 1951 Convention on Refugees, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Res, 1966) or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Assembly, 1966) can create specific formulations of these general principles which can then be enacted in various legal documents.

Rules and their interpretations go hand in hand. None can exist without the other. However, rules cannot control the broad spectrum of interpretations they are associated with, especially in every context in which they can be applied. In this regard, the interpretation of rules and extension, laws should be able to transcend their fixity of meaning and, hence, have the possibility of carving out an extra-legal normative universe for public claim-making. This can be achieved through the development of new vocabularies to promote new perspectives and subjectivity for the public's engagements.

Therefore, Laws can anticipate forms of justice in the future and not tools for domination and coercion (Benhabib, 2009, 696). This fact has empowered the international community to also empower citizens of local democracies and civil societies for new claim-making by producing new vocabularies. The various empowered civil groups can then become powerful transborder networks of rights propagators/activism and actors of resistance to hegemonies (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). However, it is not enough to provide vocabulary and then paper-empowerment of the citizens and the civil societies. The endorsement of human rights norms must be institutionally channelled to shape and influence the political structure and legislation of signatory states. Moreover, this leads us to the next segment of this review- transnational laws.

3.4. *Transnational Law versus International Law*

As Seyla Benhabib (2009, 697) will argue, 'rights to life and liberty will translate to specifics on freedom from slavery, serfdom, forced occupation, sexual violence and sexual slavery.' In democracies where the 'majority carries the vote', what will become of the freedom of religious expression? Should all, including the minority religions, have this freedom, or some form of restriction should be applied to the minority to foster unity and calmness and avoid chaos? Cohen explains human rights as 'entitlements' that justify membership because being human is not enough on the basis that no society wants just any human to be its member. The accountability of an individual's 'goodness' as assessed by the political society's institutions is necessary to establish these rights for that person (Cohen, 2006, 237-38). Therefore, in a society where two religions with conflicting doctrines are dominant, 'restriction' as a political tool of suppression is not always the case. It is for political order and stability. The suspension of sovereignty is, in fact, what will bring about this suppression, as the more dominant religion is liable not to recognise and disobey external authority when called to order.

So, what becomes of the free processes of democratic opinions towards the human rights of the people who are both the subject and the authors of the law? If Cosmopolitan human rights must come into play, should they override democratic legislation? To answer this question, we need to understand the difference between 'transnational law' and 'international law.'

Transnational law is a legal process between nations on how private and public stakeholders interact within large forums of domestic and international spaces in a back-and-forth dynamic-mutating manner whilst constituting and reconstituting national interests (Kohs, 1997, 2626-27). International law, on the other hand, centres on public legal conventions on a global scale, painting a one-large-world-community where every human being is a global citizen (1948 UN Convention). International law is legitimised by lawmakers, as seen in Article IV on the Status of Treaties of the United States Constitution. Sovereignty comes into play here because a state chooses to adopt or not to adopt these laws to become a part of its domestic laws. However, the lack of clauses to explicitly recommend enforcement has reduced the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights as only mere principles (Koskeniemi, 2001) or seemingly different kinds of laws (Resnik 2001, 2006, 2008a), or mere treaties to be alternatives to domestic laws (Benhabib, 2009, 699).

However, the laws with specifics, such as the UN Charter and the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) or the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming, have been adopted by State legislatures, State Judges, City Councils and Mayors (Degener et al., 1995; Koderer, 1996; Resnik, 2006, 1564, 70; Resnik, et.al., 2008b). This process has fostered immense transnational co-operation between neighbouring nations.

3.5. *The Role of Expert Bodies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*

With the legality of human rights in place, the establishment of 'expert bodies' who will be involved in the mobilisation, participatory discussions and the regulated compliance of citizens and governments of related nations in a transnational relationship will further enforce cosmopolitan rights legally through litigation in local courts (Neuman 2002, 1863-901). These expert bodies, when established in the form of social movements and civil society actors, will sustain the compliance of multilateral covenants, achieving both the sustenance of stable societies and the regard for human rights.

In the 1980s, nine women from Muslim societies: Mauritius, Tanzania, Iran, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Morocco, Sudan and Algeria came together to form the 'Women Living Under Muslim Laws' (WLUML) in response to Muslim family laws that discriminate against Muslim women. These women constitute the practising Muslim and the antireligious. Their efforts transcend nations to trigger 'transnational participation' of other movements, such as Malaysia's Sisters in Islam, which constituted devoted Muslim women members as they all rose to debate some of these laws that are repressive towards women in their societies (Benhabib, 2009, 700).

A good example of the influence of the WLUML group is when the Canadian Muslim Women sought their help to overturn the Muslim arbitration courts in 2003. These women who are Canadians were also immigrants in a multi-layered minority status. Yet, they were able to build local and global constituencies, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This period also marked the increase in national and transnational relevance of other faith-based organisations such as the Salvation Army, B'nai Brith, the Sunni Masjid' El Noor, the Christian Legal Fellowship and the Ismaili Muslims (Moghadam, 2009). Alternative dispute resolution was also becoming popular in many countries for the enforcement of private conflict settlements and resolutions but under the supervision of the state (Resnik, 2005).

Though, in Quebec, family law arbitrations are not binding but advisory, the province of Ontario, for instance, empowers women as right holders to seek compensation for household labours that created the platforms for their husbands to build their careers when the marriage is dissolved. In this case, 'domestic contracts' are more or less legally binding as well, meaning that outcomes from them are enforceable in court (Macklin 2009, 276, 304). Audrey Macklin (2009, 276) has further elaborated how women have successfully used transnational and transcultural mechanisms to claim their Canadian citizenship to participate in political and socio-economic activities of the Canadian Societies while still maintaining their cultural Citizenship. This also negates the claim that minorities are not able to express themselves to maintain order and calmness in society.

After studying the impact of these Muslim women across borders and how they diplomatically interacted through state-centred and transnational mechanisms, Valentine Moghadam (2009, 271), the Iranian sociologist, concluded that feminism is not 'Western' but global. This is applicable to a significant number of cosmopolitan human rights and, hence, counteracting the concern that the cosmopolitan democracy framework favours the West.

Societies with the increasing empowerment of networking actors across borders, societies that sustain 'political order' through the 'restriction' of the human rights of minorities, which cuts across gender, religious and political views or tribal or linguistic affiliations, will have these 'expert bodies' to contend with. The framework will be built on the strategic development of claim-making in expanding the cosmopolitan human rights agenda through the mobilisation of the participation of various represented groups such as mosques, churches, synagogues, cultural institutions, the media, etc., which in turn promotes 'liberal tolerance' and 'liberal interventionism.' So, when analysing the cosmopolitan perspective, limiting this view to Military intervention alone is not appropriate, and this is evidently shown from the recent 'liberal interventions' to end genocide in Dafur, improving the health status of HIV/AIDS victims, the prohibition of female genital mutilation in the entire African continents, and the protection of undocumented migrants' rights in Western States- also proving that those at the receiving end of cosmopolitan democracy are not always non-western states (Benhabib, 2009, 701).

So, unlike what statist, nationalists or sovereigntists portray, the current global system of interdependence is much stronger than expressed and sufficiently influential enough to initiate transnational co-operation to enforce justice across borders.

3.6. *Cosmopolitanism as Practically Global, Not Western*

From the concerns raised, it is observed that the concept of Cosmopolitan Democracy may most likely favour the West. The Open Market, for instance, would be used by Western powerhouses to dominate the global market, just as it will open doors for unfair trans-national and trans-continental trade and transactions between 'rich countries' and their 'poor' counterparts. But is this really the case in the 21st century global open market? Let's begin with the Clinton era, during whose administration the 'Democratic enlargement' foreign policy as a post-cold war strategy to stabilise order and foster peace around the globe was initiated. The blueprint of this policy targets four objectives which were:

- To strengthen the community of market democracies,
- To foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies where possible;
- To counter the aggression and support the liberalisation of states that are hostile to democracy and
- To help democracy and market economies take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern (Brinkley, 1997, 116).

Though this policy had noble intentions, these targets were not viable as, for instance, the Asians see constituted democracy as a concept to maintain social order rather than individual rights. Thus, the USA needed to respect the Asians, which they did. By trying to network together with the Asians, the Americans were concerned about access to a free market, leaving the other components of these strategies to sort themselves out. However, decades of trade, integration and cultural mix later, human rights are now more popular and even adopted in-laws, values and practices in various parts

of Asia (Baik, 2012; Ciorciari, 2012; Yasuaki, 2000). Laws, frameworks or policies were not needed to make this happen. This is practical proof that whilst the free market is not a global tool for manipulation or imperialism by the West, it is an excellent platform for a healthy relationship between actors in the global society, which, in extension, propagates cosmopolitanism.

The organisation of the petroleum exporting countries, otherwise known as OPEC, is another excellent example of a global free market that is not run or influenced by the West. The 13-member-state organisation includes countries from the Gulf, Middle East and Africa, and they control the global supply and the prices of oil, a group of nations where there is no Western state as a member (Griffin & Teece, 2016; Onifade et al., 2021; Cattlin, 2022). Saudi Arabia is the leader of this organisation, and though the USA-Saudi Arabia relationship is a very important one in the world, Saudi Arabia has ignited an oil conflict as it accuses the United States of manipulating the market, removing some supply from the world oil market (Egan, 2022; Bland, 2022), a conflict that has angered the USA. Interestingly, this is not the first time Saudi Arabia has tormented the United States on account of a similar conflict. Between October 1973 and March 1974, Saudi Arabia placed an embargo on the United States in retaliation to the US military aid to Israel during the Yom Kippur War (Peck, 2020). During this time, Americans suffered terrible fuel scarcity. They experienced long queues in filling stations, the rationing of fuel availability on certain days and the binary categorisation of license plate numbers: whether even or odd. For not just a Western nation but the superpowers of the world to experience this means that the market is beyond its reach to be influenced.

This particular issue will not be satisfactorily tackled if Africa is not mentioned. Africa has been the worst victim when it comes to the global market, but it is largely responsible. There are numerous instances, one being France's illegal suppressive mining of uranium in the Niger Republic in an unfortunate protracted colonial relationship (Martin, 1989; Goumandakoye, 2016; Pederson, 2000). Another is the same France and its neo-colonisation of 14 African countries till this day (Taylor, 2019). Moreover, the very unfair International Cocoa market, which is worth \$107 Billion, subjects Ghana, the second largest producer of Cocoa in the world, to earn a meagre \$2 Billion (Ndukwe, 2021).

Starting with Ghana, the nation has recently woken up to stop the export of Cocoa products, especially to Switzerland (Ghanaweb, 2021). Ivory Coast, the largest producer of the product in the world, has joined in this fight for fairness in the global market (Maytaal & Ange, 2020), and just recently, the two nations boycotted a Cocoa meeting in Brussels to show their displeasure (Mensah, 2022). Why have a 'cocoa meeting' in Brussels in the first place? Now, Africa is taking charge, as it was expected for a long time now. Cosmopolitan Democrats champion full participation in the open market, and when this is done, there will be equal opportunities, mutual respect and fairness. If there is no active participation and contribution, the inactive or less contributing member may be vulnerable or subjected to unfair transactions. Ghana and Ivory Coast have just matched that participation. Cosmopolitanism advocates for this participation and, in extension, fairness. Ghana and Ivory Coast standing up will be supported by proponents of cosmopolitanism- this is what it should be.

As for the other issues surrounding African nations, Africa will need to step up as well in order to be helped or assisted by the cosmopolitan world. Africa has influential International Organizations, and a few are: the African Union, African National Congress, Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, etc (Georgetown University Library 2022). So why is none of them interested in acting as a 'transnational' organisation to be at the forefront in fighting for Africa and bringing Africa to be a respected contemporary on the global stage? Why must it be non-African bodies' responsibility to shoulder the burdens of a continent of 'independent Nations'? The Independent states can start, and then 'transnational bodies' around the world will pick up from there and only then will some of these atrocities meted out by the member states stop. However, if somehow, the leadership of the individual states are part of what is making the continent remain 'malnourished' and intra-continental bodies, which, by the way, are made up of the same selfish and corrupt leaders, there is nothing any other 'transnational body' or international group/community can do. The change starts from Africa, with Africa, all for Africa to develop. Therefore, from the suppressive mining in Niger to the neo-colonialism of 14 African countries by France and many others, Africa and Africa alone is the only player to save itself. Others will only join to enforce this fairness. This is already happening as different coups have happened in several 'francophone-African' nations to get loose from France's neocolonial dominance (Adekoya, 2021; BBC, 2022; Mensah, 2023). The intent of these toppling military rulers was to be free from neocolonialism so that their nations could develop. Niger Republic has reverted the price of Uranium from \$0.80/Kg, set by France, the major buyer of the natural resource, to \$200/Kg, the actual price in the global market (Spectacle, 2023; The African Web, 2023). Africa now takes its own destiny into its own hands; the continent can, therefore, match any global player to be an equal participant in the open market whilst commanding respect from their international partners. The Asians commanded it, even when their political value system differed from the West and Africans as well.

Therefore, the free global market is not meant to benefit the West but to be a fair playing ground for individual states and groups to trade and transact. Any player subjected to unfair networking is either not participating well or has allowed itself to be taken advantage of, for most likely, a morsel of bread, and has nothing to do with the side effect of cosmopolitanism. In this regard, Cosmopolitan democracy is the solution to such inequality in the global market and not a cause or consequence of it.

4. Conclusion

The individuality of Cosmopolitan Democracy means that every human is treated the same in every part of the world, irrespective of environmental, socio-political and economic factors. Globalists believe that it is practically possible as it also uniquely propagates democracy. Since Democracy has evolved over the last century from smaller geographic units to national levels, it should be able to continue in this manner on a global scale in this century. However, the cosmopolitan theorists have invested more in the criticism of sovereignty and the politics of states than in creating a framework where democracy will be feasible at a global level, relegating the concept of cosmopolitan democracy to merely an Agenda.

The heavy emphasis on morality, rather than the legality or political relevance of human rights, makes human rights abstract. Moreover, until a legal and political framework is created on which citizens can practically explore and enjoy the 'cosmopolitan drive,' this concept will only continue to exist in an 'Audit' mode for powerful nations to take advantage of. Since the West, with its enormous wealth, exists in cultures that are favoured by it, the Western States will automatically be given undue advantage if it is adopted as a global system of governance, and this is already evident as seen in the West's dominance of the 'free market' and global politics, especially of interventions.

Enforcement of human rights that the cosmopolitan concept is attempting to address is arguably the biggest challenge ever since there is no framework to propagate it. Unfortunately, the state, which has the coercive might and political powers to convert these human principles into laws that will be enacted and implemented, is being opposed by cosmopolitanism. The use of 'external bodies' as a system of the implementation of Cosmopolitan Democracy is also hardly ever practical. These bodies are hardly a 'representation' but more of the 'articulation' of specific issues without any empowerment to enforce or, sometimes, even lobby the implementation of these principles. From the ambiguous and conflicting definitions of a global citizen from a state citizen to its flexible and multi-layered structure, which gives rise to extrajudicial political measures, Cosmopolitan democracy is problematic rather than progressive and hence impossible to adopt in global governance.

In response to this criticism, cosmopolitan democracy should first be seen as a decentralised system of democracy at the global level which centres on individuality, human rights and social justice. This concept is developed from a range of thoughts, from the institutionalised to the moral and to the extreme and the moderate views of this concept. However, I chose both the moderate and the moral schools of thought in a harmonised concept of 'moderate-moral cosmopolitan Democracy' to show the viability of this concept as applied to global governance. Based on this theoretical concept, everyone is a global citizen who should have a say and get justice. Boundaries are divisive physically, politically, culturally and, by extension, morally, which enhance exclusion rather than inclusion. For this reason, there is seemingly a slight tension between cosmopolitanism and sovereignty and proponents of statism and nationalism.

The scholars of these opposing theoretical concepts show concerns about a radical agenda coming out of cosmopolitan Democracy as more resistance against Sovereignty is felt than efforts put in place for a cosmopolitan framework to work for the global citizens practically and effectively. There is also the issue of its lack of political and legal framework and, hence, its inability to implement its principles and convert them into laws. The multi-layer nature of this ideology and its flexibility means that powerful nations such as the West can take advantage of it to dominate the world. The use of 'external bodies' to enforce human rights principles and spread ideology across the globe is another issue that seems more mythical than practical. These 'external bodies' are not empowered politically to enact and implement these principles into laws.

I responded to these issues by suggesting how the world has naturally become a global village on its own over the last few decades, setting the path to a cosmopolitan democratic era. The exchange of cultures, alliances formed, and the universality and not western-centric nature of cosmopolitan rights are all indicative of the 'shrinking world' of mixed people and cultures. Also, military interventions are not rushed. A methodological approach is always adopted to reduce the chances of invasions. In this case, they are still needed to preserve human rights in sovereign states violating them. As for the global open market, the West does not dictate it; the West or anyone only takes advantage if the other party does not participate appropriately. When all parties participate appropriately, the global market will be a platform of equals doing business.

Human rights are applicable anywhere in the world, provided a human being exists there, and hence can be legal through producing new vocabulary, empowering civil groups to become powerful transnational agents and the institutional endorsement of human rights into the political structure and legislation of states. Hence, cosmopolitanism is not against states but encourages states to practice fairness and justice and obey the rule of law in relation to preserving human rights. Transnational laws can then be created to promote a back-and-forth, mutating relationship among nations. When these expert bodies initiate, regulate and spread such relationships among nations in a world that is already becoming a 'global village,' cosmopolitanism is already well executed and, hence, clearly viable to practise in a modern global society.

5. References

- i. Abbas Hakima and Niyiragira Yves (eds.). *Aid to Africa: So much to do, so little done*. University of Chicago Press. 2009
- ii. Adekoya Remi. *Why are Coups Making a Comeback in Africa?* CNN. (2021)
<https://edition.cnn.com/2021/09/12/africa/africa-coups-resurgence-intl-cmd/index.html>
Accessed: 24 September, 2023.

- iii. Agyei, John, and Ezekiel Clotey. "Operationalising ECOWAS protocol on free movement of people among the member states: Issues of convergence, divergence and prospects for sub-regional integration." *International Migration Institute, University of Oxford*. <http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/publications/operationalizing-ecowas-protocol> (2007).
- iv. Archibugi, Daniele, David Held, and Martin Köhler. *Re-imagining political community: studies in cosmopolitan democracy*. Stanford University Press, 1998.
- v. Archibugi, Daniele. "Cosmopolitan Democracy," *New Life Review*, 4, July/August, 137–50. (2000).
- vi. Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Harvest. 1999.
- vii. Arneson, Richard J. "Moral limits on the demands of beneficence?" *The ethics of assistance* (2004): 33–58.
- viii. Assembly, UN General. "International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights." *United Nations, Treaty Series* 993, no. 3 (1966): 2009–2057.
- ix. Baik, Tae-Ung. *Emerging regional human rights systems in Asia*. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- x. Barry, Brian. "Statism and nationalism: a cosmopolitan critique." *NOMOS: Am. Soc'y Pol. Legal Phil.* 41 (1999): 12.
- xi. BBC. "Coups in Africa: Why they don't spell the end of Democracy." BBC. 2022. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-60289571> Accessed: 24 September, 2023.
- xii. Beetham, David. *Democracy and human rights*. Vol. 249. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.
- xiii. Beitz, Charles R. *Political theory and international relations*. Princeton University Press, 1999.
- xiv. Benhabib, Seyla. "Claiming rights across borders: International human rights and democratic sovereignty." *American Political Science Review* 103, no. 4 (2009): 691–704.
- xv. Benhabib, Seyla, and Judith Resnik, eds. *Migrations and mobilities: citizenship, borders, and gender*. NYU Press, 2009.
- xvi. Bianchi, Andrea. "Immunity versus human rights: the Pinochet case." *European Journal of International Law* 10, no. 2 (1999): 237–277.
- xvii. Blake, Michael. "Distributive justice, state coercion, and autonomy." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 30, no. 3 (2001): 257–296.
- xviii. Booth, Ken. "Human wrongs and international relations." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944)* 71, no. 1 (1995): 103–126.
- xix. Bosco, David. "Dictators in the Dock," *American Prospect*, 14, August, 2000.
- xx. Cai, Jinyang, Zuting Zheng, Ruifa Hu, Carl E. Pray, and Qianqian Shao. "Has international aid promoted economic growth in Africa?" *African Development Review* 30, no. 3 (2018): 239–251.
- xxi. Chandler, David. "International Justice." *New Life Review*, 6, November/December, (2000): 55–66.
- xxii. Charnovitz, Steve. "NGOs and International Governance." *Michigan Journal of International Law*, no. 18 (1997): 183–286.
- xxiii. Chatterjee, Deen. "The conflicting loyalties of statism and globalism: Can global democracy resolve the liberal conundrum?" *Metaphilosophy* 40, no. 1 (2009): 65–76.
- xxiv. Cheyns, E., (2014). "Making 'minority voices' heard in transnational roundtables: The role of local NGOs in reintroducing justice and attachments." *Agriculture and Human Values*, 31, pp.439–453.
- xxv. Ciorciari, John D. "Institutionalizing human rights in Southeast Asia." *Hum. Rts. Q.* 34 (2012): 695.
- xxvi. Clark, Ann Marie. "Non-governmental organisations and their influence on international society." *Journal of International Affairs* (1995): 507–525.
- xxvii. Cobo-Piñero, Rocio. "Afrobeat Journeys: Tracing the Musical Archive in Sefi Atta's A Bit of Difference." *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 41, no. 4 (2020): 442–456.
- xxviii. Cohen, Gerald Allan. *The egalitarian conscience: essays in honour of GA Cohen*. Oxford University Press, USA, 2006.
- xxix. Cohen, Jean L. "A global state of emergency or the further constitutionalisation of international law: A pluralist approach." *Constellations* 15, no. 4 (2008): 456–484.
- xxx. Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighbourhood*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1995.
- xxxi. Convention relating to the status of Refugees, GA 1954. res. 429 (v) (entered into force, April 22, 1954).
- xxxii. Darling-Wolf, Fabienne. *Imagining the global: Transnational media and popular culture beyond East and West*. University of Michigan Press, 2014.
- xxxiii. De Waal, Alex. "Becoming shameless: The failure of human rights organisations in Rwanda." *Times Literary Supplement* 21 (1997): 3–4.
- xxxiv. Degener, Theresia, and Yolán Koster-Dreese. "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979 Entry into force: 3 September 1981, in accordance with Article 27 (1)." In *Human Rights and Disabled Persons*, pp. 242–258. Brill Nijhoff, 1995.
- xxxv. Dombrowski, Kathrin. "Filling the gap? An analysis of non-governmental organisations responses to participation and representation deficits in global climate governance." *International environmental agreements: politics, law and economics* 10 (2010): 397–416.
- xxxvi. Dworkin, Ronald. *Taking rights seriously*. A&C Black, 2013.
- xxxvii. Edwards, Michael. *Future positive: International co-operation in the 21st century*. Routledge, 2013.
- xxxviii. Egan, Matt. "America and Saudi Arabia are locked in a bitter battle over oil. The stakes are massive," CNN, 2022.

- xxxix. Eliason, Antonia. "Blockchain, trade, and the global south: Entrenching supply chain roles." *Stan. J. Blockchain L. & Pol'y* 5 (2022): 206.
- xl. Etzioni, Amitai. *Communitarianism. The Encyclopedia of Political Thought*. First Edition. Gibbons, M.T. (ed.). John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 2015.
- xli. Forsythe, David P. *Human rights in international relations*. Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- xlii. Holden, Barry, ed. *Global democracy: Key debates*. Taylor & Francis US, 2000.
- xliii. Georgetown University Library. *African Studies & African History-Organizations in Africa*. Georgetown University Library. 2022. <https://www.guides.library.georgetown.edu/Africa>. Accessed: 22. February. 2023
- xliv. Ghanaweb. *Why Ghana will no longer sell Cocoa to Switzerland*. 2021. <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/why-ghana-will-no-longer-sell-cocoa-to-switzerland-1206019> Accessed: 22 February, 2023.
- xlv. Goumandakoye, Halima. "Oil in Niger: A foundation for a promise or a new resource curse?" *The Extractive Industries and Society* 3, no. 2 (2016): 361–366.
- xlvi. Griffin, James M., and David J. Teece. *OPEC behaviour and world oil prices*. Routledge, 2016.
- xlvii. Habermas, Jürgen. *Citizenship and national identity*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990.
- xlviii. Hardt Michael and Negri Antonio. *Empire*. Harvard University Press. 2001.
- xlix. Heater, Derek. "What is citizenship? Cambridge." (1999).
- l. Held, David. "Democracy and the global order." *World Bank. GDP (Current) Sub-Saharan Africa 2018* (1780).
- li. Archibugi, Daniele. "Cosmopolitan Democracy." In *Cosmopolitanism in Hard Times*, pp. 167–180. Brill, 2020.
- lii. Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan, I*. 13, xii. Indianapolis: pp. 78. Hackett Publishing Company. 1994.
- liii. Hohol, Kateryna Vyacheslavivna. "Islam as a civilisational factor of Europe's future." Ph.D. diss., National Aviation University, 2021.
- liv. Hudson, Ben, and Rebecca Murray. "Guiding Principles on Sanctuary Scholars in UK Higher Education." (2018).
- lv. Johnsson-Latham, Gerd. "A study on gender equality as a prerequisite for sustainable development." *A REPORT TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL ADVISORY COUNCIL 2007: 2* (2007).
- lvi. Kaldor, Mary. Transnational Civil Society, in Dunne, T. and Wheeler, M. J. (eds.). *Human Rights in Global Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1999):195–213.
- lvii. Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics*. Cornell University Press, 1998.
- lviii. Koh, Harold Hongju. "Why do nations obey international law?" *Yale Ij* 106 (1996): 2599.
- lix. Krings, M. and Simmert, T., 2020. African Popular Culture Enters the Global Mainstream. *Current History, 119*(817), pp.182–187.
- lx. Kodera, S., (1996). Implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women within Japan. *Japanese Ann. Int'l L.*, 39, p.149.
- lxi. Koh, Harold Hongju. "Why do nations obey international law?" *Yale Ij* 106 (1996): 2599.
- lxii. Koskeniemi, Martti. *The gentle civiliser of nations: the rise and fall of international law 1870–1960*. Vol. 14. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- lxiii. Kwon, Oh-Jung. "The diverging paths of skilled immigration in Singapore, Japan and Korea: policy priorities and external labor market for skilled foreign workers." *Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources* 57, no. 4 (2019): 418–444.
- lxiv. Lawson, F.H., (2017). Egypt versus Ethiopia: The conflict over the Nile Metastasizes. *The International Spectator, 52*(4), pp. 129–144.
- lxv. Lewis, Norman. "Human rights, law and democracy in an unfree world." *Human rights fifty years on: A reappraisal* (1998): 77–104.
- lxvi. Linklater, Andrew. "The Transformation of Political Community (Cambridge: Polity)." (1998).
- lxvii. Makama, FUNOM Theophilus. "INTERNATIONAL NEGLECT IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE; LESSONS MISSED IN SOMALIA THAT WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE MOGADISHU SYNDROME." *African Journal of Social Issues* 6 (2023): 1.
- lxviii. Mamdani, Mahmood. "The new humanitarian order." *Review of African Political Economy* 36, no. 122 (2009): 621–629.
- lxix. Mamdani, Mahmood. "Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, politics, and the war on terror." *New York* (2009).
- lxx. Martin, Guy. "Uranium: A case study in Franco-African relations." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 43, no. 3 (1989): 89–101.
- lxxi. Mati, Sagiru, Irfan Civcir, and Hüseyin Ozdeser. "ECOWAS common currency: How prepared are its members?" *Investigación económica* 78, no. 308 (2019): 89–119.
- lxxii. Mbu, Joshua. *Cristiano Ronaldo will be allowed to live with Georgina Rodriguez despite Saudi Arabia's strict rules on Marriage*. 2023. The Sun. <https://www.thesun.co.uk/sport/20953846/> Accessed: 12 February 2023.
- lxxiii. Mensah, K. (2022). *Ghana and Ivory Coast Boycott Cocoa Meeting in Brussels*. Voice of Africa News. <https://www.voanews.com/ghana-and-ivory-coast-boycott-cocoa-meeting-in-brussels/> Accessed: 22 February 2023
- lxxiv. Mensah, Kent. Africa's coup epidemic: Has democracy failed the continent? Aljazeera. 2023. <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/9/22/africas-coup-epidemic-has-democracy-failed-the-continent> Accessed: 24 September 2023.

- lxxv. Miller, David. *On nationality*. Clarendon Press, 1995.
- lxxvi. Miller, David. National responsibility and International Justice. In *The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy*, Chatterjee, D. K (ed.). (2004): 123–46. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- lxxvii. Miller, David. Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern. In *The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism*, Brook, G. and Brighouse, H. (eds.). (2005): 127–47. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- lxxviii. Miller, David. "National responsibility and global justice." In *Nationalism and Global Justice*, pp. 14–30. Routledge, 2013.
- lxxix. Mitchell, W. L., and Melanie Haith-Cooper. "From sanctuary in health to university of sanctuary." 2017.
- lxxx. Naumann, Elias, L. U. K. A. S. F. STOETZER, and Giuseppe Pietrantuono. "Attitudes towards highly skilled and low-skilled immigration in Europe: A survey experiment in 15 European countries." *European Journal of Political Research* 57, no. 4 (2018): 1009–1030.
- lxxxi. Ndukwe, Ijeoma. *Ghana's farmers eye sweet success from chocolate*. BBC. 2021. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-56687427> Accessed 13 December 2023.
- lxxxii. Nef-Saluz, Claudia. "Islamic Pop Culture in Indonesia: An anthropological field study on veiling practices among students of Gadjah Mada University of Yogyakarta." (*No Title*) (2007).
- lxxxiii. Neuman, Gerald L. "Human rights and constitutional rights: Harmony and dissonance." *Stan. L. Rev.* 55 (2002): 1863.
- lxxxiv. Nussbaum, Martha Craven, and Joshua Cohen. "For love of country: Debating the limits of patriotism." (*No Title*) (1996).
- lxxxv. Oldenquist, Andrew. Varieties of Nationalism. In *Democracy in a Global World*, Chatterjee, D.K., 147-60. Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield. 2008.
- lxxxvi. Onifade, Stephen Taiwo, Andrew Adewale Alola, Savaş Erdoğan, and Hakan Acet. "Environmental aspect of energy transition and urbanisation in the OPEC member states." *Environmental Science and Pollution Research* 28 (2021): 17158–17169.
- lxxxvii. Peck, Michael. *Oil Wars: Why the United States Almost Invaded Saudi Arabia*. The National Interest, 2020. <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/oil-wars-why-united-states-almost-invaded-saudi-arabia-154916> Accessed: 22. February. 2023.
- lxxxviii. Pederson, Nicholas, R. The French desire for uranium and its effects on French foreign policy in Africa. *ACDIS Occasional Paper*. 2000.
- lxxxix. Res, G. A. "2200A (XXI), UN Doc." A/6316 999. (1966)
- xc. Resnik, Judith. "Categorical federalism: Jurisdiction, gender, and the globe." *Yale Ij* 111 (2001): 619.
- xc. Resnick, Judith. "Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry' (2006)." *Yale Law Journal* 115: 1564.
- xcii. Resnik, Judith. "Law as affiliation: "Foreign" law, democratic federalism, and the sovereigntism of the nation-state." *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 6, no. 1 (2008): 33–66.
- xciii. Resnik, Judith, Joshua Civin, and Joseph Frueh. "Ratifying Kyoto at the local level: Sovereigntism, federalism, and trans-local organisations of government actors (TOGAs)." *Arlz. l. rev.* 50 (2008): 709.
- xciv. Robertson, Geoffrey. *Crimes against humanity: The struggle for global justice*. Penguin UK, 2006.
- xcv. Sandel, Michael, J. "The procedural republic and the unencumbered self." *Political theory* 12, no. 1 (1984): 81-96.
- xcvi. Sandel, Michael, J. *Democracy's Discontent*. Cambridge, M.A, Harvard University Press, 1996, p.339.
- xcvii. Sangiovanni, Andrea. "Global justice, reciprocity, and the state." *Philosophy and public affairs* (2007): 3–39.
- xcviii. Shaw, Martin. *Global society and international relations: Sociological concepts and political perspectives*. Polity Press, 1994.
- xcix. Simmons, John, A. *Moral Principles and Political Obligations*. Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, pp. 57-100. 1981.
- c. Song, Edward. "Subjectivist cosmopolitanism and the morality of intervention." *Journal of social-philosophy* 41, no. 2 (2010).
- ci. Spectacle. Niger Increases Price of Uranium From €0.8/Kg to €200/Kg. Spectacle Nigeria. 2023. <https://spectacle.com.ng/2023/09/03/niger-increases-price-of-uranium-from-e0-8-kg-to-e200-kg/> Accessed: 24 September, 2023.
- cii. Sternlight, Jean R., and Judith Resnik. "Competing and complementary rule systems: Civil procedure and ADR." *Notre Dame L. Rev.* 80 (2004): 481.
- ciiii. Stickings, Tim. *Saudi Women will be able to leave the country without a man's permission later this year under planned reforms to guardianship laws*. Daily Mail, 2019. <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article/7239927/>
- civ. Tan, Kok-Chor Tolerant. "Diversity and Global Justice." *University Park, PA: Penn State* (2000).
- cv. Taylor, Ian. "France à fric: the CFA zone in Africa and neocolonialism." *Third World Quarterly* 40, no. 6 (2019): 1064–1088.
- cvi. The African Web. *Niger Increases the Price of Uranium from \$0.80/Kg to \$200/Kg*. YouTube. 2023. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YKcQWyktqK0> Accessed: 24 September 2023.
- cvii. Tully, James. On Global Citizenship and Imperialism Today: Two Ways of Thinking about Global Citizenship. Presented at the *Political Theory Workshop*, Yale University, New Haven, CT. 2008.
- cviii. UN GAOR supp. (No.16) at 81, UN Doc. A/6716. (1967).

- cix. Van Elteren, Mel. "Conceptualising the impact of US popular culture globally." *Journal of Popular Culture* 30, no. 1 (1996): 47.
- cx. Walzer, Michael. "The moral standing of states: a response to four critics." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* (1980): 209–229.
- cxii. Walzer, Michael. *Spheres of justice: A defence of pluralism and equality*. Basic books, 2008.
- cxiii. Wilson, J. Stephen, and Marybeth Rael. *Win the Green Card Lottery! 2014 Edition: The COMPLETE Do-It-Yourself Guide to the USA Diversity Visa Lottery*. Creative Networks, 2014.
- cxiiii. Woldemaryam, E. "Making the Nile River a point of co-operation between Ethiopia and Egypt: Building confidence through water diplomacy." *Budapest International Research and Critics Institute-Journal (BIRCI-Journal)* 3, no. 3 (2020): 2494–2500.
- cxv. Yasuaki. "In Quest of Intercivilizational Human Rights:" Universal" vs "Relative" Human Rights Viewed from an Asian Perspective." *Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law* 1, no. 1 (2000): 53–88.