Legal Implications of G. E. Moore's Theory on Naturalistic Fallacy

Abstract

We want to examine the opinion that one cannot define the term "good” by referring to any term other than "good” itself, because good as a simple and non-natural quality cannot be replaced with a natural term. At the center of this belief is G. E. Moore who argues that we can only define good as good, if one is to avoid committing naturalistic fallacy. But it seems that the definition of good as good expresses a tendency towards "nihilism” - a position that promotes belief in nothing. The distinction between natural and non-natural qualities is parallel to the distinctions between "is” and "ought”, norms and facts, noumena and phenomena, universals and particulars all of which tend to have brought about controversies in many areas of social discourse including morality and law. Important areas of discourse include justification for indefinability of good and duty; relating intuitionism and naturalism; distinction between law and morality; appraising legal dilemmas; and showing correlation between common sense and equity. This paper argues that although things in the world differ they nevertheless relate, thus expressing the basic principle of unity in diversity in the world. The paper serves as instructional material for the legal profession and therefore argues that understanding naturalistic fallacy will enhance legal practice and the teaching of law.