Open Justification and Correct Reasoning

Abstract

How it is possible for one moral subject to claim one norm to be justified whereas another subject does not agree with that norm? This issue addresses not only moral principles, but rather the contents of belief systems which lead to various conclusions. According to Gaus, each subject holds her own system of reasons and beliefs, in which she can be openly or closely justified, depending on her willingness to include new information in the existing system of reasons and beliefs. However, all the members of a community need not necessarily abide by the same norms, but they must be able to understand which norms the community accepts as reasonable so they can either express their agreement or disagreement about it. In such a way, disagreement does not result in misunderstanding neither disagreement is followed by consensus.

By making references to the studies of Rips, Lehman and Nisbett, Gauss succeeded to show that people share common inference rules to a sufficient extent that it cannot be said that one is not openly justified because of her excessive differentiation with respect to these rules. Nevertheless, it is possible to figure that a subject is openly justified to have certain belief while another is not.