The Best Laid Plans: Japanese Doctrinal Failure at the Battle of Midway

Abstract

Contemporary historical scholarship on the Battle of midway is largely in agreement regarding how the engagement itself played out. In general terms, the Japanese navy's defeat is primarily attributed to tactical failures made by the Japanese battlefield commanders. The overall aim of this paper is to broaden historical understanding of the Battle of Midway by offering an in-depth analysis of the Japanese strategic perspective both prior to and during the battle. This paper contextualizes the Battle of Midway from a doctrinal standpoint by presenting these tactical errors as deriving from the strategic context in which they were made. Specifically, this paper argues that the Japanese military intelligence apparatus grievously underestimated American response capabilities, thereby compromising the overall Japanese plan of attack. Furthermore, the governing Japanese naval doctrine of the time, Kantai Kessen, prized battleships over all other fleet vessels and deemphasized aerial and ship-based protection of aircraft carriers, leaving the strike group relatively undefended against a possible American counterattack. The battle plan also needlessly dispersed Japanese forces, leaving a large portion of the fleet unable to contribute to the attack or assist in fleet defense in the event of an American counterattack.